Thanks for your response, Ben. See mine below.
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Udell
To: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 1:09 PM
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7792] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
Edwina, list,
1) You wrote,
What I'm talking about is a biochemical process, where, let's say, a cell
(which is a cognitive system) ingests some external data (water, nutrients)
(Object) and, semiosically transforms that input data, via its mediative
habits-of-organization (the Representamen)...into ..parts of that cell
(Interpretant).
BEN: I'd retain the possibility of distinguishing the object from the
capturing or acquisition or ingestion of (some of) the object (object data).
Likewise I'd retain the possibility of distinguishing the processing of that
data from a resulting representamen.
EDWINA: I fully agree with the above; the semiosic process does not blend
into a 'smoothie'.
BEN: A weathercock is a versatile index that may point in various directions,
its particular turnings, particular interactions with the wind, are indices
too. More importantly, in your picture above, it is hard to see how the
interpretant is another representamen analogously as a decoding is another
encoding. The end state of it as parts of the cell seems not like a decoding
but like a destination, like what Peirce called an ultimate logical
interpretant, a reinforced or modified disposition, which is not a sign, except
perhaps in some other respect, some other semiosis.
EDWINA: The Interpretant, which has become part of the cell, is not a
Representamen, which I understand as the generalized rules of semiosis
processes within that cell. The end state is, indeed, a final
Interpretant....which actually is aligned with the rules in the common
Representamen of that cell's 'species'.
BEN: I know little of cells, but I'm supposing that the cell breaks down or
"cooks" the ingested data, metes it out in various proportions to parts of the
cell, and those allotments are the representamen or representamina.
EDWINA; You and I have a different understanding of the Representamen, which
I understand as the mediative generalized rules of formation of instantiations.
The 'allotments' are Interpretants.
Then an interpretive transformation takes place, the process of incorporating
the processed data into parts of the cell. Those incorporatings, or the data in
its being incorporated, are the interpretant(s). Well, maybe the overall
process is not so neatly segmented, maybe one could cut it at various points
(ideally, at any point) into relatively representaminal and relatively
interpretantial stages. Anyway, the end state - including how the cell
eventually fares - is a test of the semiosis itself, its representation of the
object, etc., and in a sense of the object too. Well, I have trouble seeing
that end state _only_ as a general habit or disposition. It will produce, or
be, some collateral 'experience' of the object - answering for example whether
it was in the end really good to have eaten it. But it's still not unlike an
ultimate logical interpretant which is not a sign in the semiosis that led to
it.
EDWINA: The 'end state' is not a 'general habit or disposition. It's a
specific, individual result within that cell. Now, the entire semiosic process
may have added knowledge to that cell's Representamen (which I understand as
its, so to speak, common knowledge base)..and that common knowledge base is
available to other cells in the area.
2) You wrote,
Yes, it [the representamen] is a Relation-in-Itself. There are three
Relations: the one between the Representamen-and-the-Object; the one between
the Representamen-and-the-Interpretant; and the Representamen-in-Itself.
The result of this sort of thing is that when you discuss semiotic relations
in a general way, I am left scratching my head as to whether you are discussing
the correlates, or their relationships. The mental blur that this causes in me
makes it hard for me to understand what you're saying in such cases. A
relation, a process, etc., can be a representamen, but in the context of a
triad, that relation or process is a correlate in the triad.
EDWINA: I can only refer to a site I suggested earlier today, because it
shows the 'three spokes of the semiosic wheel'.
http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/hoffmann/p-sighof.htm
3) You wrote:
>> BEN: If a dicisign is a triad (consisting of
representamen-object-interpretant) then what class of representamen is in its
triad? Another dicisign? A dicent representamen?
> EDWINA: The representamen in the three dicisigns is not in a class but in
a mode; in the Dicent Sinsign, the representamen is in a mode of Secondness,
and in the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Symbolic Legisign, the
representamen is in a mode of Thirdness.
>> BEN: And I have the same problem with some of your comments below,
regarding the Representamen- where you talk about it as if it were a 'class',
while I see it as within a 'mode'.
[....]
>> BEN: And again I wonder what are the classes of representamina inside
those triads. Are they of the same classes as the triads? If so, then what is
gained by calling the whole triad the 'Sign' and classifying it the same way as
the representamen?
> EDWINA: I have no idea what you mean by 'class of representamina'.
Representamens exist within the categorical modes. Not classes. And I
certainly don't classify the whole triad (the Sign) in the same way as the
Representamen. After all, consier a Rhematic Indexical Legisign; it has THREE
categorical modes within it, in order, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
BEN: Your 'categorical modes' of the 'Relations' encode the same information
as the classes of sign. If I understand you correctly at this point, you
define the sign not as the triad of representamen-object-interpretant, as my
tests by terminological substitution assumed, but instead as the triad of
'Relations' among those correlates in the representamen-object-interpretant
triad. To top it off, your representamen is both a a member your triad of
'Relations', and a member of the representamen-object-interpretant triad. The
passage from the usual way of understanding Peirce's semiotic terms to your way
seems to me more complicated than you seem to think.
EDWINA: Now, I'm confused. The Sign is a triad of three relations (see the
three spokes in the site I suggested above); see also the image in Peirce
1.347. Informational processing, which is what semiosis is all about, begins
with the stimuli the 'system' receives within the Representamen-Object
Relation. [The 'system' holds its own Representamen internally]. This input
data is mediated within the Representamen general rules in the system. Then, it
is finalized into an Interpretant, the result.
I don't understand what you mean by a triad of
-representamen-object-interpretant. The semiosic Sign is made up of; it
functions within three Relations; that between the Representamen-Object; the
Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen-Interpretant.
That's the triad I'm talking about. The only triad I'm talking about. Those
'three spokes' as seen in 1.347. [And check out the site above; I think it's a
good outline].
The unusual usages of the words 'sign' and 'triad' seem the source of much of
people's confusion about what you're saying. Now that I think I understand it,
I'm still left wondering what is the advantage of using the words 'sign' and
'triad' in these ways. In particular, it goes against common English usage of
the word 'sign'. In addition, it seems contrary to Peirce's usages and
definitions. I've looked at your cites of Peirce. I've pored through Marty's 76
Peirce definitions of 'sign' too.
Best, Ben
On 12/19/2014 11:02 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
On 12/18/2014 2:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Thanks for your comments, Ben. See mine below, but I think the post is
getting messy and incomprehensible with the various post/responses all mixed
up. You are probably the only one who will read it and I hope you can figure it
out. I'll try colour-coding my current responses.
1) EDWINA: No- 'represents' is, to me, conceptually similar. To me,
semiosis is a transformative process; it doesn't just replace 'x' with 'y'. It
actually takes data from X (let's say, a food source for a cell) and transforms
it within the Sign (the cell) , to a new 'bit' of information (a component of
that cell).
BEN: So semiosis samples the object data and represents it with a sign.
The semiosis arranges for itself to be determined by, and thereby represent,
the object. But the _sign_ doesn't sample the object, instead it is a
representative sample or representative product of the sample from the object.
EDWINA: No, no, I don't see this 'represents the object data with a
sign'. That's a linguistic perspective, where a cognitive system, which happens
to be linguistic, re-presents what the agent observes (eg, Object: a cat
sitting out there) and re-presents that image with the linguistic sign of
'cat'. That, to me, is superficial and hardly acknowledges the strength of
Peircean semiosis.
What I'm talking about is a biochemical process, where, let's say, a
cell (which is a cognitive system) ingests some external data (water,
nutrients) (Object) and, semiosically transforms that input data, via its
mediative habits-of-organization (the Representamen)...into ..parts of that
cell (Interpretant).
2) EDWINA: I agree; the ten classes of signs are defined by their
relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'. A dicisign is a
triad and I understand that it is defined by the whole Sign's relation to BOTH
the object and the interpretant - which is why it is understood as 'conveying
information' (2.309--).
BEN: Yet you continually call the representamen a relation. Back on
8/26/2014 you called the difference between correlation and correlative
"nitpicking".
EDWINA: Yes, it is a Relation-in-Itself. There are three Relations: the
one between the Representamen-and-the-Object; the one between the
Representamen-and-the-Interpretant; and the Representamen-in-Itself. The
Representamen, is 'in itself', because is has a vital function; it mediates
between the Object and the Interpretant Relations. And, the Representamen is
often (in six) in the mode of Thirdness, which is a mode of generalization,
against which particular input data is referenced and 'interpreted'.
------------------------------ From now on, the
post/replies/comments...are getting messy.
[8/26/2014]
>>>> BEN: Again, Peirce calls sign, object, and interpretant the
semiotic correlates, not the semiotic correlations. He typically distinguishes
between representation as the relation or operation of representing, on one
hand, and sign, or representamen, as that which represents, on the other hand.
He never refers to a sign or representamen as a representation except when he
is using the word 'representation' in one of its popular senses, to mean
_something that represents_, as when we say that a painting is a representation
of something, or that somebody made a representation in court.
>>> EDWINA: Agreed - but I think that 'correlates' and 'correlations'
is nit-picking. I am aware when he uses the terms 'representamen' and
'representation' and again, I don't think that changes my outline.
[End quote]
3) BEN: If a dicisign is a triad (consisting of
representamen-object-interpretant) then what class of representamen is in its
triad? Another dicisign?
A dicent representamen?
EDWINA: The representamen in the three dicisigns is not in a class but
in a mode; in the Dicent Sinsign, the representamen is in a mode of Secondness,
and in the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Symbolic Legisign, the
representamen is in a mode of Thirdness.
And I have the same problem with some of your comments below, regarding
the Representamen- where you talk about it as if it were a 'class', while I see
it as within a 'mode'.
---------------------------------------------
4) >EDWINA: I don't think that the term 'relation' can be reduced to a
'state' (which is what 'quality' is); the term 'relation', to me, means an
interaction. I don't think that 'blue' is in itself a relation.
BEN: The point is not confusing the abstraction (quality or relation)
with the concrete source. A quality is static if only color, odor, etc. are
considered. But there are also rhythm, melody, harmony, qualities of motion and
form, etc. Peirce considered 'tuone', a cross between 'tune' and 'tone', as a
term for qualisign.
3) >>>> BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates
themselves "relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read
you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say.
>>> EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
>> BEN: No, and you've never provided an example of his so expressing
himself.
> EDWINA: I've given numerous examples of Peirce using the terms of
'relation' to refer to the interactions/connections within the semiosic triad;
eg, to repeat yet again, 8.335, "in respect to their relations to their dynamic
objects'....
BEN: That's not what I denied. I said "your generally calling relatives
or correlates themselves 'relations', on the other hand, makes it difficult for
me to read you...."
And you just said back in (2a): " the ten classes of signs are defined
by their relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'."
Now here's the quote that you cite:
CP 8.335. In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I
divide signs into Icons, Indices, and Symbols (a division I gave in 1867). I
define an Icon as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object by virtue of
its own internal nature. Such is any qualisign, like a vision, — or the
sentiment excited by a piece of music considered as representing what the
composer intended. Such may be a sinsign, like an individual diagram; say a
curve of the distribution of errors. I define an Index as a sign determined by
its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a
Proper Name (a legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease.
(The symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The
occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign.) I define a Symbol as a sign
which is determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be so
interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural
disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant (that of
which the interpretant is a determination). Every symbol is necessarily a
legisign; for it is inaccurate to call a replica of a legisign a symbol.
[End quote]
As you say in (2a), he classifies them in respect of their relations
and not as said relations themselves.`
6) > EDWINA: See my examples above; I don't think your rewriting the
above is 'the answer'! He also will sometimes capitalize other terms (Symbol,
Icon, Index, Representamen) and at other times, use lower case.
It was 'the answer' for the quote that you chose to cite. You're the
one who said "And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign'
(see 2.243)!". You have provided no example where he uses either uncapitalized
'sign' or capitalized 'Sign' to mean the whole triad, much less a quote where
he stipulates that he is doing so. Replacing instances of 'sign' with 'triad'
shows that your interpretation of CP 2.243 doesn't work.
5) > EDWINA: I'm sure you know that he often refers to the whole
triad in lower case; 'the readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign
is a Dicisign or not...' 2.310.
"Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer
to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the
interpretant becoming in turn a sign" 2.303. And see 8.334--
I don't see it there in any of those quotes. Let's try the substitution
test with the text that you cite from CP 2.303. It is Peirce's definition of
'sign' in the Baldwin Dictionary,
§4. Sign
303. Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to
refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the
interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum.
[End quote, redness added]
Substituting with 'triad' in the sense of
'representamen-object-interpretant' triad':
§4. Triad
303. Anything which determines something else (the triad's
interpretant) to refer to an object to which the triad itself refers (the
triad's object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a triad, and
so on ad infinitum.
The representamen-object-interpretant triad determines something
_else_, which is the triad's interpretant?
EDWINA: Yes - As you know, a triad (Sign) does connect to something
else...
another Sign and so on ad infinitum...
-------------
And again I wonder what are the classes of representamina inside those
triads. Are they of the same classes as the triads? If so, then what is gained
by calling the whole triad the 'Sign' and classifying it the same way as the
representamen?
EDWINA: I have no idea what you mean by 'class of representamina'.
Representamens exist within the categorical modes. Not classes. And I
certainly don't classify the whole triad (the Sign) in the same way as the
Representamen. After all, consier a Rhematic Indexical Legisign; it has THREE
categorical modes within it, in order, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
Let's try it with another text that you cite:
CP 8.334. As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an
appearance, when I call it a _qualisign_; or secondly, it is an individual
object or event, when I call it a _sinsign_ (the syllable _sin_ being the first
syllable of _sem_el, _sim_ul, _sin_gular, etc.); or thirdly, it is of the
nature of a general type, when I call it a _legisign_. [....]
[End quote, redness added]
Replacing 'sign' with 'triad' in the sense of
'representamen-object-interpretant triad':
As it is in itself, a triad is either of the nature of an appearance,
when I call the triad a _qualisign_; or secondly, the triad is an individual
object or event, when I call the triad a _sinsign_ (the syllable _sin_ being
the first syllable of _sem_el, _sim_ul, _sin_gular, etc.); or thirdly, the
triad is of the nature of a general type, when I call the triad a _legisign_.
[....]
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 4:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
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