Ben, lists, A very insightful and helpful analysis. I'll want to study it and comment further when we get to a discussion of "optimal iconicity" in the Chapter 8 thread.
Meanwhile, having no time left in this day to write anything more, all I'll say for now is, thanks for a most valuable post (which I hope pushes the conversation on this topic forward). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 4:15 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, lists, > > You wrote, > > I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at least to me) the idea > of active interaction, while the 'stands as/for/to' implies (at least to > me) the idea of static, mechanical cut-and-paste > [End quote] > > Then substitute 'represents' for 'stands'. Stylistic question merely. > > You wrote, > > That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three > trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'. > > Peirce says that the classes of signs are defined by relations, not that > they are themselves the relations defined. A dicisign _*is*_ a sign of a > certain class, defined by said sign's relation to interpretant. If > something is related to something, it does not consist merely in that > relation, any more than something's having a quality makes it consist > merely in that quality. Something is blue, that doesn't make the thing be > blueness. The being of each correlate is not confined to the abstracted > semiotic relation but instead has roots into the world which give semiosis > something to do, to learn, to explore. Otherwise semiosis is sealed in a > bubble. > > You wrote: > > BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves > "relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I > mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say. > > EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms. > > No, and you've never provided an example of his so expressing himself. > > You wrote, > > EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist *within > the Relation of Being The Father of Jackson* . But Jack exists only > within some other Relation - even if it is just air and water. > > Even better. In a sense - in a sense- the relates always come into being > with the relation. But, as I said, semiosis doesn't occur in a bubble, > things from outside a particular semiosis can enter into a particular > semiosis, and be called into being as 'Jackson-as-index' etc. > > The clarity problem remains that, for instance, a dicent indexical sinsign > is a sinsign that also _*i*_ an index that also _*is*_ a dicisign. One > sign _*is*_ all three at once. Yet the dicent relation _*is not*_ the > indexical relation, and each of them _*is not*_ the sinsign relation. > This sort of thing makes my head hurt. You're creating unneeded problems > with 'A is A'. > > You wrote, "And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign' > (see 2.243)!" > > CP 2.243 shows him doing just the opposite. > > [CP2.243.] Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as > the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a > general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its > object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some > existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an > interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a > sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason. > [End quote, reddish colorations added] > > If you were correct about the quote, then Peirce would be mean, replacing ' > sign' with 'triad,' by which is to be understood > 'representamen-object-interpretant > triad > > Triads are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the triad > in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; > secondly according as the relation of the triad to its object consists in > the triad's having some character in itself or in some existential > relation to that object, or in the triad's relation to an interpretant; > thirdly, according as the triad's interpretant represents the triad as a > triad of possibility or as a triad of fact or as a triad of reason. > > Best, Ben > > On 12/17/2014 3:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Thanks for your comments, Ben. I'll add a few. > > 1) BEN: How *something stands as a sign* (for an object to an > interpretant) : > qualisign, sinsign, legisign. > How (something as) *a sign stands for an object* (to an interpretant) : > icon, index, symbol. > How (something as) *a sign* (for an object) *stands to an interpretant* : > rheme, dicisign, index. > > EDWINA: I'd define the first set as Mediation - a term Peirce uses > frequently. And the second set as the "relations to their dynamic objects" > 8.335. And the third set as "its relation to its signified interpretant" > 8.337. > > That is, I'm using Peirce's terms of 'relation', not 'stands as/stands > for/stands to'. I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at least > to me) the idea of active interaction, while the 'stands as/for/to' implies > (at least to me) the idea of static, mechanical cut-and-paste. > > 2) You wrote: > BEN: E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant represents it as > (or as if it were) a character attributed or imputed to an object. > > EDWINA: What bothers me about the above is that it implies (to me) the > need for an agent who does the 'attribution' or 'imputation'. I prefer > Peirce's description of the rheme as "a Sign of qualitative > Possibility.....any Rheme...will afford some information; but it is not > interpreted as doing so" 2.250. That is, your description includes some > 'attribution' of information, but I don't think a rheme does that. > > 3) You wrote: > BEN:On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the > relations that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just > discussed, are considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation > for the sake of focus. > > EDWINA: As Peirce said, "signs are divisible by three trichotomies' 2.243 > - and he outlines them, within the three categories, and, within the > relations to the object and the interpretant: 'the relation of the sign to > its object...; according as its Interpretant represents it... > That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three > trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'. They are > indeed, analytic abstractions from the full triadic Sign. As I've said > numerous times - these 'relations' can't exist per se on their own. But > they certainly do 'exist' in analysis - otherwise - we wouldn't be able to > analyze the ten classes of Signs! > > 4) You wrote: > BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves > "relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I > mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say. > > EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms. > > 5) You wrote: > BEN: Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the relations. > Is Jack the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still > exist > > EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist *within > the Relation of Being The Father of Jackson* . But Jack exists only > within some other Relation - even if it is just air and water. > > 6) The reason I prefer to use the capital 'S' when referring to the triad, > is to differentiate it from the many times when Peirce refers to the > Representamen as the 'sign' (lower case). And often, he'll refer to the > whole triad as lower case 'sign' (see 2.243)! > > Many thanks for your triadic three cents worth. Much appreciated. > > Edwina > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected] ; 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 17, 2014 2:31 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations > > Edwina, lists, > > I haven't read the whole thread, but... > > I think that it's true that many of us have discussed the sign relations > quasi- or pseudo-dyadically for convenience, for example, in the _trikonic > _ (2004) PowerPoint presentation, slide 42, discussing the > > 9-adic Sign Relations: > *as to the sign itself:* > qualisign (tone) > ▷ legisign (type) > sinsign (token) > > *as to the interpretant:* > rheme ([e.g.,] propositional function) > *▷* ▷ argument > dicisign ([e.g.,] proposition) > > * as to the object: * > icon > ▷ symbol > index > > In each case one is really discussing a triad with something as a sign for > something as an object to something as an interpretant, but there are three > places in there where we trichotomize, playing down some aspects of the > triadic relation in order to focus on others: > > How *something stands as a sign* (for an object to an interpretant) : > qualisign, sinsign, legisign. > How (something as) *a sign stands for an object* (to an interpretant) : > icon, index, symbol. > How (something as) *a sign* (for an object) *stands to an interpretant* : > rheme, dicisign, index. > > This playing down has its limits. In particular, the third trichotomy > (rheme, dicisign, argument) depends on how the sign is represented, in its > signified interpretant, as, or as if, character, indexical, or sign of > intepretant) of the object. E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified > interpretant represents it as (or as if it were) a character attributed or > imputed to an object. > > So, one could as well say that, among the trichotomies: > The first trichotomy (qualisign, sinsign, legisign) > depends on how *a sign stands* (or how something stands as a sign). > The second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol) > depends on how *a sign stands for an object* . > The third trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument) > depends on how *a sign stands for an object to an interpretant* . > > But we wouldn't actually think that the first trichotomy involves a trio > of monadic characters, the second involves a trio of two-correlate > relations, and the third a trio of three-correlate relations. > > On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the relations > that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just discussed, > are considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation for the > sake of focus. > > Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations", on > the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes > have trouble following what you say. > > You object that to speak of the correlates as correlated things rather > than as relations implies that they would exist without the relations. Yet > in particular cases they often do exist without the relations. Is Jack the > father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still exist. Then > Jackson may not be an index of Jack at all, yet still exist. Jackson will > surely be an index of other people and things, of course. Generally of > course it is hard to conceive of things in general without conceiving of > representational relation in general. > > The distinction between correlates and relations helps us focus flexibly > on various aspects of the phenomenon, including when the correlates are > real but not individually existent, and even when a correlate is a figment. > Now, flexibility of focus thanks to potential precision justifies speaking > of the 'relations' and the 'relation', which you like to be able to do. It > also justifies and, I'd say, requires, distinguishing relative (or > correlate) from relation, even if the relative were called into being > entirely by the relation. > > As regards speaking of the semiotic triad as the capital-S 'Sign', I seem > to disagree with an increasing number of people about this. Not only do I > see nowhere Peirce doing this, it seems like a bad move terminologically - > it is at odds with everyday-English word 'sign'; I think that such an > everyday-English word should not be pressed into service as term of art for > a technical conception that has no everyday-English word approximating to > it. > > I would suggest that the semiotic triad, a.k.a. genuine triad, be called a > 'eutriad.' > > The eutriad would 'consist' or however one wants to put it, of the three > correlates, their triadic relation, and the relations abstracted from the > triadic relation. The genuine triadic relation itself could be called a > 'trilation', and the 'members' or relatives having the trilation could be > called the 'trilates' or 'trilatives'. On the other hand, I'm not sure how > this would gibe with finer-grained classifications in which a sign could be > classified by relations to dynamic object, immediate object, etc. > > And that's my three cents worth. > > Best, Ben > > On 12/17/2014 8:20 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
