Edwina, lists,

You wrote,

   What I'm talking about is a biochemical process, where, let's say, a
   cell (which is a cognitive system) ingests some external data
   (water, nutrients) (Object) and, semiosically transforms that input
   data, via its mediative habits-of-organization (the
   Representamen)...into ..parts of that cell (Interpretant).

I'd retain the possibility of distinguishing the object from the capturing or acquisition or ingestion of (some of) the object (object data). Likewise I'd retain the possibility of distinguishing the processing of that data from a resulting representamen. A weathercock is a versatile index that may point in various directions, its particular turnings, particular interactions with the wind, are indices too. More importantly, in your picture above, it is hard to see how the interpretant is another representamen analogously as a decoding is another encoding. The end state of it as parts of the cell seems not like a decoding but like a destination, like what Peirce called an ultimate logical interpretant, a reinforced or modified disposition, which is not a sign, except perhaps in some other respect, some other semiosis. I know little of cells, but I'm supposing that the cell breaks down or "cooks" the ingested data, metes it out in various proportions to parts of the cell, and those allotments are the representamen or representamina. Then an interpretive transformation takes place, the process of incorporating the processed data into parts of the cell. Those incorporatings, or the data in its being incorporated, are the interpretant(s). Well, maybe the overall process is not so neatly segmented, maybe one could cut it at various points (ideally, at any point) into relatively representaminal and relatively interpretantial stages. Anyway, the end state - including how the cell eventually fares - is a test of the semiosis itself, its representation of the object, etc., and in a sense of the object too. Well, I have trouble seeing that end state _/only/_ as a general habit or disposition. It will produce, or be, some collateral 'experience' of the object - answering for example whether it was in the end really good to have eaten it. But it's still not unlike an ultimate logical interpretant which is not a sign in the semiosis that led to it.

You wrote,

   Yes, it [the representamen] is a Relation-in-Itself. There are three
   Relations: the one between the Representamen-and-the-Object; the one
   between the Representamen-and-the-Interpretant; and the
   Representamen-in-Itself.

The result of this sort of thing is that when you discuss semiotic relations in a general way, I am left scratching my head as to whether you are discussing the correlates, or their relationships. The mental blur that this causes in me makes it hard for me to understand what you're saying in such cases. A relation, a process, etc., can be a representamen, but in the context of a triad, that relation or process is a correlate in the triad.

You wrote:

        >> BEN: If a dicisign is a triad (consisting of
       representamen-object-interpretant) then what class of
       representamen is in its triad? Another dicisign? A dicent
       representamen?

    > EDWINA: The representamen in the three dicisigns is not in a
   class but in a mode; in the Dicent Sinsign, the representamen is in
   a mode of Secondness, and in the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the
   Dicent Symbolic Legisign, the representamen is in a mode of Thirdness.

        >> BEN: And I have the same problem with some of your comments
       below, regarding the Representamen- where you talk about it as
       if it were a 'class', while I see it as within a 'mode'.

   [....]

        >> BEN: And again I wonder what are the classes of
       representamina inside those triads. Are they of the same classes
       as the triads? If so, then what is gained by calling the whole
       triad the 'Sign' and classifying it the same way as the
       representamen?

    > EDWINA: I have no idea what you mean by 'class of
   representamina'. Representamens exist  within the categorical modes.
   Not classes. And I certainly don't classify the whole triad (the
   Sign) in the same way as the Representamen. After all, consier a
   Rhematic Indexical Legisign; it has THREE categorical modes within
   it, in order, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.

BEN: Your 'categorical modes' of the 'Relations' encode the same information as the classes of sign. If I understand you correctly at this point, you define the sign not as the triad of representamen-object-interpretant, as my tests by terminological substitution assumed, but instead as the triad of 'Relations' among those correlates in the representamen-object-interpretant triad. To top it off, your representamen is both a a member your triad of 'Relations', and a member of the representamen-object-interpretant triad. The passage from the usual way of understanding Peirce's semiotic terms to your way seems to me more complicated than you seem to think.

The unusual usages of the words 'sign' and 'triad' seem the source of much of people's confusion about what you're saying. Now that I think I understand it, I'm still left wondering what is the advantage of using the words 'sign' and 'triad' in these ways. In particular, it goes against common English usage of the word 'sign'. In addition, it seems contrary to Peirce's usages and definitions. I've looked at your cites of Peirce. I've pored through Marty's 76 Peirce definitions of 'sign' too.

Best, Ben

On 12/19/2014 11:02 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

On 12/18/2014 2:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Thanks for your comments, Ben. See mine below, but I think the post is getting messy and incomprehensible with the various post/responses all mixed up. You are probably the only one who will read it and I hope you can figure it out. I'll try colour-coding my current responses.

    1) EDWINA: No- 'represents' is, to me, conceptually similar. To
    me, semiosis is a transformative process; it doesn't just replace
    'x' with 'y'. It actually takes data from X (let's say, a food
    source for a cell) and transforms it within the Sign (the cell) ,
    to a new 'bit' of information (a component of that cell).

    BEN: So semiosis samples the object data and represents it with a
    sign. The semiosis arranges for itself to be determined by, and
    thereby represent, the object. But the _/sign/ _ doesn't sample
    the object, instead it is a representative sample or
    representative product of the sample from the object.

    EDWINA : No, no, I don't see this 'represents the object data
    with a sign'. That's a linguistic perspective, where a cognitive
    system, which happens to be linguistic, re-presents what the
    agent observes (eg, Object: a cat sitting out there) and
    re-presents that image with the linguistic sign of 'cat'. That,
    to me, is superficial and hardly acknowledges the strength of
    Peircean semiosis.

    What I'm talking about is a biochemical process, where, let's
    say, a cell (which is a cognitive system) ingests some external
    data (water, nutrients) (Object) and, semiosically transforms
    that input data, via its mediative habits-of-organization (the
    Representamen)...into ..parts of that cell (Interpretant).


     2) EDWINA: I agree; the ten classes of signs are defined by
    their relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations
    defined'. A dicisign is a triad and I understand that it is
    defined by the whole Sign's relation to BOTH the object and the
    interpretant - which is why it is understood as 'conveying
    information' (2.309--).

    BEN: Yet you continually call the representamen a relation. Back
    on 8/26/2014 you called the difference between correlation and
    correlative "nitpicking".

    EDWINA: Yes, it is a Relation-in-Itself. There are three
    Relations: the one between the Representamen-and-the-Object; the
    one between the Representamen-and-the-Interpretant; and the
    Representamen-in-Itself. The Representamen, is 'in itself',
    because is has a vital function; it mediates between the Object
    and the Interpretant Relations. And, the Representamen is often
    (in six) in the mode of Thirdness, which is a mode of
    generalization, against which particular input data is referenced
    and 'interpreted'.

    ------------------------------ From now on, the
    post/replies/comments...are getting messy.

        [8/26/2014]
        >>>> BEN: Again, Peirce calls sign, object, and interpretant
        the semiotic correlates, not the semiotic correlations. He
        typically distinguishes between representation as the
        relation or operation of representing, on one hand, and sign,
        or representamen, as that which represents, on the other
        hand. He never refers to a sign or representamen as a
        representation except when he is using the word
        'representation' in one of its popular senses, to mean
        _/something that represents/ _, as when we say that a
        painting is a representation of something, or that somebody
        made a representation in court.

        >>> EDWINA: Agreed - but I think that 'correlates' and
        'correlations' is nit-picking. I am aware when he uses the
        terms 'representamen' and 'representation' and again, I don't
        think that changes my outline.
        [End quote]

    3) BEN: If a dicisign is a triad (consisting of
    representamen-object-interpretant) then what class of
    representamen is in its triad? Another dicisign?
    A dicent representamen?

    EDWINA: The representamen in the three dicisigns is not in a
    class but in a mode; in the Dicent Sinsign, the representamen is
    in a mode of Secondness, and in the Dicent Indexical Legisign and
    the Dicent Symbolic Legisign, the representamen is in a mode of
    Thirdness.

    And I have the same problem with some of your comments below,
    regarding the Representamen- where you talk about it as if it
    were a 'class', while I see it as within a 'mode'.

    ---------------------------------------------

    4)  >EDWINA: I don't think that the term 'relation' can be
    reduced to a 'state' (which is what 'quality' is); the term
    'relation', to me, means an interaction. I don't think that
    'blue' is in itself a relation.

    BEN: The point is not confusing the abstraction (quality or
    relation) with the concrete source. A quality is static if only
    color, odor, etc. are considered. But there are also rhythm,
    melody, harmony, qualities of motion and form, etc. Peirce
    considered 'tuone', a cross between 'tune' and 'tone', as a term
    for qualisign.

        3) >>>> BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates
        themselves "relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult
        for me to read you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following
        what you say.

        >>> EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.

        >> BEN: No, and you've never provided an example of his so
        expressing himself.

        > EDWINA: I've given numerous examples of Peirce using the
        terms of 'relation' to refer to the interactions/connections
        within the semiosic triad; eg, to repeat yet again, 8.335,
        "in respect to their relations to their dynamic objects'....

    BEN: That's not what I denied. I said "your generally calling
    relatives or correlates themselves 'relations', on the other
    hand, makes it difficult for me to read you...."

    And you just said back in (2a): " the ten classes of signs are
    defined by their relations. I didn't say that they 'are the
    relations defined'."

    Now here's the quote that you cite:

        CP 8.335.  In respect to their relations to their dynamic
        objects, I divide signs into Icons, Indices, and Symbols (a
        division I gave in 1867). I define an Icon as a sign which is
        determined by its dynamic object by virtue of its own
        internal nature. Such is any qualisign, like a vision, — or
        the sentiment excited by a piece of music considered as
        representing what the composer intended. Such may be a
        sinsign, like an individual diagram; say a curve of the
        distribution of errors. I define an Index as a sign
        determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real
        relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is
        the occurrence of a symptom of a disease. (The symptom itself
        is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The
        occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign.) I define a
        Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object
        only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus
        depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural
        disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its
        interpretant (that of which the interpretant is a
        determination). Every symbol is necessarily a legisign; for
        it is inaccurate to call a replica of a legisign a symbol.
        [End quote]

    As you say in (2a), he classifies them in respect of their
    relations and not as said relations themselves.`

        6) > EDWINA: See my examples above; I don't think your
        rewriting the above is 'the answer'! He also will sometimes
        capitalize other terms (Symbol, Icon, Index, Representamen)
        and at other times, use lower case.

    It was 'the answer' for the quote that you chose to cite. You're
    the one who said "*And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as
    lower case 'sign' (see 2.243)* !". You have provided no example
    where he uses either uncapitalized 'sign' or capitalized 'Sign'
    to mean the whole triad, much less a quote where he stipulates
    that he is doing so. Replacing instances of 'sign' with 'triad'
    shows that your interpretation of CP 2.243 doesn't work.

        5) > EDWINA: I'm sure you know that he often refers to the
        whole triad in lower case; 'the readiest characteristic test
        showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not...' 2.310.

        "Anything which determines something else (its interpretant)
        to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in
        the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign"
        2.303. And see 8.334--

    I don't see it there in any of those quotes. Let's try the
    substitution test with the text that you cite from CP 2.303. It
    is Peirce's definition of 'sign' in the Baldwin Dictionary,

        §4. Sign

        303. Anything which determines something else (its
        interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers
        (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in
        turn a sign , and so on ad infinitum.
        [End quote, redness added]

    Substituting with 'triad' in the sense of
    'representamen-object-interpretant' triad':

        §4. Triad

        303. Anything which determines something else (the triad's
        interpretant) to refer to an object to which the triad itself
        refers (the triad's object) in the same way, the interpretant
        becoming in turn a triad , and so on ad infinitum.

    The representamen-object-interpretant triad determines something
    _/else/ _, which is the triad's interpretant?

    EDWINA: Yes - As you know, a triad (Sign) does connect to
    something else...
    another Sign and so on ad infinitum...

    -------------

    And again I wonder what are the classes of representamina inside
    those triads. Are they of the same classes as the triads? If so,
    then what is gained by calling the whole triad the 'Sign' and
    classifying it the same way as the representamen?

    EDWINA: I have no idea what you mean by 'class of
    representamina'. Representamens exist  within the categorical
    modes. Not classes. And I certainly don't classify the whole
    triad (the Sign) in the same way as the Representamen. After all,
    consier a Rhematic Indexical Legisign; it has THREE categorical
    modes within it, in order, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.

    Let's try it with another text that you cite:

        CP 8.334. As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature
        of an appearance, when I call it a _/qualisign/ _; or
        secondly, it is an individual object or event, when I call it
        a _/sinsign/ _ (the syllable _/sin/ _ being the first
        syllable of _/sem/ _el, _/sim/ _ul, _/sin/ _gular, etc.); or
        thirdly, it is of the nature of a general type, when I call
        it a _/legisign/ _. [....]
        [End quote, redness added]

    Replacing 'sign ' with 'triad ' in the sense of
    'representamen-object-interpretant triad ':

        As it is in itself, a triad is either of the nature of an
        appearance, when I call the triad a _/qualisign/ _; or
        secondly, the triad is an individual object or event, when I
        call the triad a _/sinsign/ _ (the syllable _/sin/ _ being
        the first syllable of _/sem/ _el, _/sim/ _ul, _/sin/ _gular,
        etc.); or thirdly, the triad is of the nature of a general
        type, when I call the triad a _/legisign/ _. [....]

    Best, Ben

    On 12/17/2014 4:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:


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