Thanks for your comments - see mine below.
1) EDWINA: I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at least to me)
the idea of active interaction, while the 'stands as/for/to' implies (at least
to me) the idea of static, mechanical cut-and-paste
[End quote]
Then substitute 'represents' for 'stands'. Stylistic question merely.
EDWINA: No- 'represents' is, to me, conceptually similar. To me, semiosis is
a transformative process; it doesn't just replace 'x' with 'y'. It actually
takes data from X (let's say, a food source for a cell) and transforms it
within the Sign (the cell) , to a new 'bit' of information (a component of that
cell).
2) You wrote,
EDWINA:That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three
trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'.
BEN: Peirce says that the classes of signs are defined by relations, not that
they are themselves the relations defined. A dicisign _is_ a sign of a certain
class, defined by said sign's relation to interpretant. If something is related
to something, it does not consist merely in that relation, any more than
something's having a quality makes it consist merely in that quality. Something
is blue, that doesn't make the thing be blueness. The being of each correlate
is not confined to the abstracted semiotic relation but instead has roots into
the world which give semiosis something to do, to learn, to explore. Otherwise
semiosis is sealed in a bubble.
EDWINA: I agree; the ten classes of signs are defined by their relations. I
didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'. A dicisign is a triad and I
understand that it is defined by the whole Sign's relation to BOTH the object
and the interpretant - which is why it is understood as 'conveying information'
(2.309--). I don't think that the term 'relation' can be reduced to a 'state'
(which is what 'quality' is); the term 'relation', to me, means an interaction.
I don't think that 'blue' is in itself a relation.
That's exactly my point with semiosis - that it is not 'sealed in a bubble'
but is a CAS, a complex adaptive system, a network of transformative
interactions.
3) You wrote:
BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations",
on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes
have trouble following what you say.
EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
No, and you've never provided an example of his so expressing himself.
EDWINA: I've given numerous examples of Peirce using the terms of 'relation'
to refer to the interactions/connections within the semiosic triad; eg, to
repeat yet again, 8.335, "in respect to their relations to their dynamic
objects'....
4) You wrote,
EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist within the
Relation of Being The Father of Jackson . But Jack exists only within some
other Relation - even if it is just air and water.
Even better. In a sense - in a sense- the relates always come into being with
the relation. But, as I said, semiosis doesn't occur in a bubble, things from
outside a particular semiosis can enter into a particular semiosis, and be
called into being as 'Jackson-as-index' etc.
The clarity problem remains that, for instance, a dicent indexical sinsign is
a sinsign that also _i_ an index that also _is_ a dicisign. One sign _is_ all
three at once. Yet the dicent relation _is not_ the indexical relation, and
each of them _is not_ the sinsign relation. This sort of thing makes my head
hurt. You're creating unneeded problems with 'A is A'.
EDWINA: A dicent indexical sinsign (each relation in a mode of Secondness).
One Sign (capital S) is 'all three at once'. Yes - exactly, the dicent relation
is not the indexical relation - I fully agree - which is why I refer to it
separately (as one of the three).
5) You wrote, "And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign'
(see 2.243)!"
CP 2.243 shows him doing just the opposite.
[CP2.243.] Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as
the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general
law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in
the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to
that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its
Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a
sign of reason.
[End quote, reddish colorations added]
If you were correct about the quote, then Peirce would be mean, replacing
'sign' with 'triad,' by which is to be understood
'representamen-object-interpretant triad
EDWINA: I'm sure you know that he often refers to the whole triad in lower
case; 'the readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or
not...' 2.310.
"Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an
object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant
becoming in turn a sign" 2.303. And see 8.334--
6) BEN:Triads are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the
triad in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law;
secondly according as the relation of the triad to its object consists in the
triad's having some character in itself or in some existential relation to that
object, or in the triad's relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as
the triad's interpretant represents the triad as a triad of possibility or as a
triad of fact or as a triad of reason.
EDWINA: See my examples above; I don't think your rewriting the above is 'the
answer'! He also will sometimes capitalize other terms (Symbol, Icon, Index,
Representamen) and at other times, use lower case.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 3:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Thanks for your comments, Ben. I'll add a few.
1) BEN: How something stands as a sign (for an object to an interpretant) :
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) a sign stands for an object (to an interpretant) :
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) a sign (for an object) stands to an interpretant :
rheme, dicisign, index.
EDWINA: I'd define the first set as Mediation - a term Peirce uses
frequently. And the second set as the "relations to their dynamic objects"
8.335. And the third set as "its relation to its signified interpretant"
8.337.
That is, I'm using Peirce's terms of 'relation', not 'stands as/stands
for/stands to'. I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at least to
me) the idea of active interaction, while the 'stands as/for/to' implies (at
least to me) the idea of static, mechanical cut-and-paste.
2) You wrote:
BEN: E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant represents it as
(or as if it were) a character attributed or imputed to an object.
EDWINA: What bothers me about the above is that it implies (to me) the need
for an agent who does the 'attribution' or 'imputation'. I prefer Peirce's
description of the rheme as "a Sign of qualitative Possibility.....any
Rheme...will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so"
2.250. That is, your description includes some 'attribution' of information,
but I don't think a rheme does that.
3) You wrote:
BEN:On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the
relations that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just
discussed, are considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation for
the sake of focus.
EDWINA: As Peirce said, "signs are divisible by three trichotomies' 2.243 -
and he outlines them, within the three categories, and, within the relations to
the object and the interpretant: 'the relation of the sign to its object...;
according as its Interpretant represents it...
That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three
trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'. They are indeed,
analytic abstractions from the full triadic Sign. As I've said numerous times
- these 'relations' can't exist per se on their own. But they certainly do
'exist' in analysis - otherwise - we wouldn't be able to analyze the ten
classes of Signs!
4) You wrote:
BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations",
on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes
have trouble following what you say.
EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
5) You wrote:
BEN: Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the relations. Is
Jack the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still exist
EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist within the
Relation of Being The Father of Jackson . But Jack exists only within some
other Relation - even if it is just air and water.
6) The reason I prefer to use the capital 'S' when referring to the triad,
is to differentiate it from the many times when Peirce refers to the
Representamen as the 'sign' (lower case). And often, he'll refer to the whole
triad as lower case 'sign' (see 2.243)!
Many thanks for your triadic three cents worth. Much appreciated.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Udell
Cc: [email protected] ; 'Peirce-L'
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 2:31 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
Edwina, lists,
I haven't read the whole thread, but...
I think that it's true that many of us have discussed the sign relations
quasi- or pseudo-dyadically for convenience, for example, in the _trikonic _
(2004) PowerPoint presentation, slide 42, discussing the
9-adic Sign Relations:
as to the sign itself:
qualisign (tone)
▷ legisign (type)
sinsign (token)
as to the interpretant:
rheme ([e.g.,] propositional function)
▷ ▷ argument
dicisign ([e.g.,] proposition)
as to the object:
icon
▷ symbol
index
In each case one is really discussing a triad with something as a sign
for something as an object to something as an interpretant, but there are three
places in there where we trichotomize, playing down some aspects of the triadic
relation in order to focus on others:
How something stands as a sign (for an object to an interpretant) :
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) a sign stands for an object (to an interpretant) :
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) a sign (for an object) stands to an interpretant :
rheme, dicisign, index.
This playing down has its limits. In particular, the third trichotomy
(rheme, dicisign, argument) depends on how the sign is represented, in its
signified interpretant, as, or as if, character, indexical, or sign of
intepretant) of the object. E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified
interpretant represents it as (or as if it were) a character attributed or
imputed to an object.
So, one could as well say that, among the trichotomies:
The first trichotomy (qualisign, sinsign, legisign)
depends on how a sign stands (or how something stands as a sign).
The second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol)
depends on how a sign stands for an object .
The third trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument)
depends on how a sign stands for an object to an interpretant .
But we wouldn't actually think that the first trichotomy involves a trio
of monadic characters, the second involves a trio of two-correlate relations,
and the third a trio of three-correlate relations.
On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the relations
that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just discussed, are
considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation for the sake of
focus.
Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations", on
the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes have
trouble following what you say.
You object that to speak of the correlates as correlated things rather
than as relations implies that they would exist without the relations. Yet in
particular cases they often do exist without the relations. Is Jack the father
of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still exist. Then Jackson may
not be an index of Jack at all, yet still exist. Jackson will surely be an
index of other people and things, of course. Generally of course it is hard to
conceive of things in general without conceiving of representational relation
in general.
The distinction between correlates and relations helps us focus flexibly
on various aspects of the phenomenon, including when the correlates are real
but not individually existent, and even when a correlate is a figment. Now,
flexibility of focus thanks to potential precision justifies speaking of the
'relations' and the 'relation', which you like to be able to do. It also
justifies and, I'd say, requires, distinguishing relative (or correlate) from
relation, even if the relative were called into being entirely by the relation.
As regards speaking of the semiotic triad as the capital-S 'Sign', I seem
to disagree with an increasing number of people about this. Not only do I see
nowhere Peirce doing this, it seems like a bad move terminologically - it is at
odds with everyday-English word 'sign'; I think that such an everyday-English
word should not be pressed into service as term of art for a technical
conception that has no everyday-English word approximating to it.
I would suggest that the semiotic triad, a.k.a. genuine triad, be called
a 'eutriad.'
The eutriad would 'consist' or however one wants to put it, of the three
correlates, their triadic relation, and the relations abstracted from the
triadic relation. The genuine triadic relation itself could be called a
'trilation', and the 'members' or relatives having the trilation could be
called the 'trilates' or 'trilatives'. On the other hand, I'm not sure how this
would gibe with finer-grained classifications in which a sign could be
classified by relations to dynamic object, immediate object, etc.
And that's my three cents worth.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 8:20 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
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