Edwina, lists,
You wrote,
I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at least to me) the
idea of active interaction, while the 'stands as/for/to' implies (at
least to me) the idea of static, mechanical cut-and-paste
[End quote]
Then substitute 'represents' for 'stands'. Stylistic question merely.
You wrote,
That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three
trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'.
Peirce says that the classes of signs are defined by relations, not that
they are themselves the relations defined. A dicisign _/is/_ a sign of a
certain class, defined by said sign's relation to interpretant. If
something is related to something, it does not consist merely in that
relation, any more than something's having a quality makes it consist
merely in that quality. Something is blue, that doesn't make the thing
be blueness. The being of each correlate is not confined to the
abstracted semiotic relation but instead has roots into the world which
give semiosis something to do, to learn, to explore. Otherwise semiosis
is sealed in a bubble.
You wrote:
BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves
"relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read
you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say.
EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
No, and you've never provided an example of his so expressing himself.
You wrote,
EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist
_within the Relation of Being The Father of Jackson_ . But Jack
exists only within some other Relation - even if it is just air and
water.
Even better. In a sense - in a sense- the relates always come into being
with the relation. But, as I said, semiosis doesn't occur in a bubble,
things from outside a particular semiosis can enter into a particular
semiosis, and be called into being as 'Jackson-as-index' etc.
The clarity problem remains that, for instance, a dicent indexical
sinsign is a sinsign that also _/i/_ an index that also _/is/_ a
dicisign. One sign _/is/_ all three at once. Yet the dicent relation
_/is not/_ the indexical relation, and each of them _/is not/_ the
sinsign relation. This sort of thing makes my head hurt. You're creating
unneeded problems with 'A is A'.
You wrote, "And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case
'sign' (see 2.243)!"
CP 2.243 shows him doing just the opposite.
[CP2.243.] Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first,
according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual
existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation
of the sign to its object consists in the sign's having some
character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object,
or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its
Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of
fact or a sign of reason.
[End quote, reddish colorations added]
If you were correct about the quote, then Peirce would be mean,
replacing 'sign' with 'triad,' by which is to be understood
'representamen-object-interpretant triad
Triads are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the
triad in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a
general law; secondly according as the relation of the triad to its
object consists in the triad's having some character in itself or in
some existential relation to that object, or in the triad's relation
to an interpretant; thirdly, according as the triad's interpretant
represents the triad as a triad of possibility or as a triad of fact
or as a triad of reason.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 3:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Thanks for your comments, Ben. I'll add a few.
1) BEN: How *something stands as a sign* (for an object to an
interpretant) :
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) *a sign stands for an object* (to an interpretant) :
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) *a sign* (for an object) *stands to an interpretant* :
rheme, dicisign, index.
EDWINA: I'd define the first set as Mediation - a term Peirce uses
frequently. And the second set as the "relations to their dynamic
objects" 8.335. And the third set as "its relation to its signified
interpretant" 8.337.
That is, I'm using Peirce's terms of 'relation', not 'stands as/stands
for/stands to'. I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at
least to me) the idea of active interaction, while the 'stands
as/for/to' implies (at least to me) the idea of static, mechanical
cut-and-paste.
2) You wrote:
BEN: E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant represents
it as (or as if it were) a character attributed or imputed to an object.
EDWINA: What bothers me about the above is that it implies (to me) the
need for an agent who does the 'attribution' or 'imputation'. I prefer
Peirce's description of the rheme as "a Sign of qualitative
Possibility.....any Rheme...will afford some information; but it is
not interpreted as doing so" 2.250. That is, your description
includes some 'attribution' of information, but I don't think a rheme
does that.
3) You wrote:
BEN:On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the
relations that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've
just discussed, are considered merely as abstractions from the triadic
relation for the sake of focus.
EDWINA: As Peirce said, "signs are divisible by three trichotomies'
2.243 - and he outlines them, within the three categories, and, within
the relations to the object and the interpretant: 'the relation of the
sign to its object...; according as its Interpretant represents it...
That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three
trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'. They are
indeed, analytic abstractions from the full triadic Sign. As I've
said numerous times - these 'relations' can't exist per se on their
own. But they certainly do 'exist' in analysis - otherwise - we
wouldn't be able to analyze the ten classes of Signs!
4) You wrote:
BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves
"relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you;
I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say.
EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
5) You wrote:
BEN: Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the
relations. Is Jack the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at
all, yet still exist
EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist _within
the Relation of Being The Father of Jackson_ . But Jack exists only
within some other Relation - even if it is just air and water.
6) The reason I prefer to use the capital 'S' when referring to the
triad, is to differentiate it from the many times when Peirce refers
to the Representamen as the 'sign' (lower case). And often, he'll
refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign' (see 2.243)!
Many thanks for your triadic three cents worth. Much appreciated.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Udell <mailto:[email protected]>
*Cc:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ;
'Peirce-L' <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Wednesday, December 17, 2014 2:31 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
Edwina, lists,
I haven't read the whole thread, but...
I think that it's true that many of us have discussed the sign
relations quasi- or pseudo-dyadically for convenience, for
example, in the _trikonic _ (2004) PowerPoint presentation, slide
42, discussing the
9-adic Sign Relations:
*as to the sign itself:*
qualisign (tone)
▷ legisign (type)
sinsign (token)
*as to the interpretant:*
rheme ([e.g.,] propositional function)
*▷* ▷ argument
dicisign ([e.g.,] proposition)
* as to the object: *
icon
▷ symbol
index
In each case one is really discussing a triad with something as a
sign for something as an object to something as an interpretant,
but there are three places in there where we trichotomize, playing
down some aspects of the triadic relation in order to focus on others:
How *something stands as a sign* (for an object to an interpretant) :
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) *a sign stands for an object* (to an
interpretant) :
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) *a sign* (for an object) *stands to an
interpretant* :
rheme, dicisign, index.
This playing down has its limits. In particular, the third
trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument) depends on how the sign is
represented, in its signified interpretant, as, or as if,
character, indexical, or sign of intepretant) of the object. E.g.,
a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant represents it as
(or as if it were) a character attributed or imputed to an object.
So, one could as well say that, among the trichotomies:
The first trichotomy (qualisign, sinsign, legisign)
depends on how *a sign stands* (or how something stands as a sign).
The second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol)
depends on how *a sign stands for an object* .
The third trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument)
depends on how *a sign stands for an object to an interpretant* .
But we wouldn't actually think that the first trichotomy involves
a trio of monadic characters, the second involves a trio of
two-correlate relations, and the third a trio of three-correlate
relations.
On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the
relations that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've
just discussed, are considered merely as abstractions from the
triadic relation for the sake of focus.
Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves
"relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read
you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say.
You object that to speak of the correlates as correlated things
rather than as relations implies that they would exist without the
relations. Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the
relations. Is Jack the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father
at all, yet still exist. Then Jackson may not be an index of Jack
at all, yet still exist. Jackson will surely be an index of other
people and things, of course. Generally of course it is hard to
conceive of things in general without conceiving of
representational relation in general.
The distinction between correlates and relations helps us focus
flexibly on various aspects of the phenomenon, including when the
correlates are real but not individually existent, and even when a
correlate is a figment. Now, flexibility of focus thanks to
potential precision justifies speaking of the 'relations' and the
'relation', which you like to be able to do. It also justifies
and, I'd say, requires, distinguishing relative (or correlate)
from relation, even if the relative were called into being
entirely by the relation.
As regards speaking of the semiotic triad as the capital-S 'Sign',
I seem to disagree with an increasing number of people about this.
Not only do I see nowhere Peirce doing this, it seems like a bad
move terminologically - it is at odds with everyday-English word
'sign'; I think that such an everyday-English word should not be
pressed into service as term of art for a technical conception
that has no everyday-English word approximating to it.
I would suggest that the semiotic triad, a.k.a. genuine triad, be
called a 'eutriad.'
The eutriad would 'consist' or however one wants to put it, of the
three correlates, their triadic relation, and the relations
abstracted from the triadic relation. The genuine triadic relation
itself could be called a 'trilation', and the 'members' or
relatives having the trilation could be called the 'trilates' or
'trilatives'. On the other hand, I'm not sure how this would gibe
with finer-grained classifications in which a sign could be
classified by relations to dynamic object, immediate object, etc.
And that's my three cents worth.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 8:20 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
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