Edwina, lists,
1) >>> EDWINA: I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at
least to me) the idea of active interaction, while the 'stands
as/for/to' implies (at least to me) the idea of static, mechanical
cut-and-paste
[End quote]
>> BEN: Then substitute 'represents' for 'stands'. Stylistic
question merely.
> EDWINA: No- 'represents' is, to me, conceptually similar. To me,
semiosis is a transformative process; it doesn't just replace 'x'
with 'y'. It actually takes data from X (let's say, a food source
for a cell) and transforms it within the Sign (the cell) , to a new
'bit' of information (a component of that cell).
BEN: So semiosis samples the object data and represents it with a sign.
The semiosis arranges for itself to be determined by, and thereby
represent, the object. But the _/sign/_ doesn't sample the object,
instead it is a representative sample or representative product of the
sample from the object.
> 2a) EDWINA: I agree; the ten classes of signs are defined by
their relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'.
A dicisign is a triad and I understand that it is defined by the
whole Sign's relation to BOTH the object and the interpretant -
which is why it is understood as 'conveying information' (2.309--).
BEN: Yet you continually call the representamen a relation. Back on
8/26/2014 you called the difference between correlation and correlative
"nitpicking".
[8/26/2014]
>>>> BEN: Again, Peirce calls sign, object, and interpretant the
semiotic correlates, not the semiotic correlations. He typically
distinguishes between representation as the relation or operation of
representing, on one hand, and sign, or representamen, as that which
represents, on the other hand. He never refers to a sign or
representamen as a representation except when he is using the word
'representation' in one of its popular senses, to mean _/something
that represents/_, as when we say that a painting is a
representation of something, or that somebody made a representation
in court.
>>> EDWINA: Agreed - but I think that 'correlates' and
'correlations' is nit-picking. I am aware when he uses the terms
'representamen' and 'representation' and again, I don't think that
changes my outline.
[End quote]
BEN: If a dicisign is a triad (consisting of
representamen-object-interpretant) then what class of representamen is
in its triad? Another dicisign?
A dicent representamen?
2b) >EDWINA: I don't think that the term 'relation' can be reduced
to a 'state' (which is what 'quality' is); the term 'relation', to
me, means an interaction. I don't think that 'blue' is in itself a
relation.
BEN: The point is not confusing the abstraction (quality or relation)
with the concrete source. A quality is static if only color, odor, etc.
are considered. But there are also rhythm, melody, harmony, qualities of
motion and form, etc. Peirce considered 'tuone', a cross between 'tune'
and 'tone', as a term for qualisign.
3) >>>> BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates
themselves "relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me
to read you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say.
>>> EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
>> BEN: No, and you've never provided an example of his so
expressing himself.
> EDWINA: I've given numerous examples of Peirce using the terms of
'relation' to refer to the interactions/connections within the
semiosic triad; eg, to repeat yet again, 8.335, "in respect to their
relations to their dynamic objects'....
BEN: That's not what I denied. I said "your generally calling relatives
or correlates themselves 'relations', on the other hand, makes it
difficult for me to read you...."
And you just said back in (2a): "the ten classes of signs are defined by
their relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'."
Now here's the quote that you cite:
CP 8.335. In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I
divide signs into Icons, Indices, and Symbols (a division I gave in
1867). I define an Icon as a sign which is determined by its dynamic
object by virtue of its own internal nature. Such is any qualisign,
like a vision, — or the sentiment excited by a piece of music
considered as representing what the composer intended. Such may be a
sinsign, like an individual diagram; say a curve of the distribution
of errors. I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic
object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper
Name (a legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease.
(The symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite
character. The occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign.) I
define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object
only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends
either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its
interpretant or of the field of its interpretant (that of which the
interpretant is a determination). Every symbol is necessarily a
legisign; for it is inaccurate to call a replica of a legisign a
symbol.
[End quote]
As you say in (2a), he classifies them in respect of their relations and
not as said relations themselves.`
6) > EDWINA: See my examples above; I don't think your rewriting the
above is 'the answer'! He also will sometimes capitalize other terms
(Symbol, Icon, Index, Representamen) and at other times, use lower
case.
It was 'the answer' for the quote that you chose to cite. You're the one
who said "*And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case
'sign' (see 2.243)*!". You have provided no example where he uses either
uncapitalized 'sign' or capitalized 'Sign' to mean the whole triad, much
less a quote where he stipulates that he is doing so. Replacing
instances of 'sign' with 'triad' shows that your interpretation of CP
2.243 doesn't work.
5) > EDWINA: I'm sure you know that he often refers to the whole
triad in lower case; 'the readiest characteristic test showing
whether a sign is a Dicisign or not...' 2.310.
"Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to
refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same
way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign" 2.303. And see 8.334--
I don't see it there in any of those quotes. Let's try the substitution
test with the text that you cite from CP 2.303. It is Peirce's
definition of 'sign' in the Baldwin Dictionary,
§4. Sign
303. Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to
refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same
way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum.
[End quote, redness added]
Substituting with 'triad' in the sense of
'representamen-object-interpretant' triad':
§4. Triad
303. Anything which determines something else (the triad's
interpretant) to refer to an object to which the triad itself refers
(the triad's object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in
turn a triad, and so on ad infinitum.
The representamen-object-interpretant triad determines something
_/else/_, which is the triad's interpretant?
And again I wonder what are the classes of representamina inside those
triads. Are they of the same classes as the triads? If so, then what is
gained by calling the whole triad the 'Sign' and classifying it the same
way as the representamen?
Let's try it with another text that you cite:
CP 8.334. As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an
appearance, when I call it a _/qualisign/_; or secondly, it is an
individual object or event, when I call it a _/sinsign/_ (the
syllable _/sin/_ being the first syllable of _/sem/_el, _/sim/_ul,
_/sin/_gular, etc.); or thirdly, it is of the nature of a general
type, when I call it a _/legisign/_. [....]
[End quote, redness added]
Replacing 'sign' with 'triad' in the sense of
'representamen-object-interpretant triad':
As it is in itself, a triad is either of the nature of an
appearance, when I call the triad a _/qualisign/_; or secondly, the
triad is an individual object or event, when I call the triad a
_/sinsign/_ (the syllable _/sin/_ being the first syllable of
_/sem/_el, _/sim/_ul, _/sin/_gular, etc.); or thirdly, the triad is
of the nature of a general type, when I call the triad a
_/legisign/_. [....]
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 4:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Thanks for your comments - see mine below.
1) EDWINA: I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at
least to me) the idea of active interaction, while the 'stands
as/for/to' implies (at least to me) the idea of static, mechanical
cut-and-paste
[End quote]
Then substitute 'represents' for 'stands'. Stylistic question merely.
EDWINA: No- 'represents' is, to me, conceptually similar. To me,
semiosis is a transformative process; it doesn't just replace 'x'
with 'y'. It actually takes data from X (let's say, a food source
for a cell) and transforms it within the Sign (the cell) , to a
new 'bit' of information (a component of that cell).
2) You wrote,
EDWINA:That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same
three trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'.
BEN: Peirce says that the classes of signs are defined by
relations, not that they are themselves the relations defined. A
dicisign _/is/_ a sign of a certain class, defined by said sign's
relation to interpretant. If something is related to something, it
does not consist merely in that relation, any more than
something's having a quality makes it consist merely in that
quality. Something is blue, that doesn't make the thing be
blueness. The being of each correlate is not confined to the
abstracted semiotic relation but instead has roots into the world
which give semiosis something to do, to learn, to explore.
Otherwise semiosis is sealed in a bubble.
EDWINA: I agree; the ten classes of signs are defined by their
relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'. A
dicisign is a triad and I understand that it is defined by the
whole Sign's relation to BOTH the object and the interpretant -
which is why it is understood as 'conveying information'
(2.309--). I don't think that the term 'relation' can be reduced
to a 'state' (which is what 'quality' is); the term 'relation', to
me, means an interaction. I don't think that 'blue' is in itself a
relation.
That's exactly my point with semiosis - that it is not 'sealed in
a bubble' but is a CAS, a complex adaptive system, a network of
transformative interactions.
3) You wrote:
BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves
"relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to
read you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say.
EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
No, and you've never provided an example of his so expressing himself.
EDWINA: I've given numerous examples of Peirce using the terms of
'relation' to refer to the interactions/connections within the
semiosic triad; eg, to repeat yet again, 8.335, "in respect to
their relations to their dynamic objects'....
4) You wrote,
EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist
_within the Relation of Being The Father of Jackson_ . But
Jack exists only within some other Relation - even if it is
just air and water.
Even better. In a sense - in a sense- the relates always come into
being with the relation. But, as I said, semiosis doesn't occur in
a bubble, things from outside a particular semiosis can enter into
a particular semiosis, and be called into being as
'Jackson-as-index' etc.
The clarity problem remains that, for instance, a dicent indexical
sinsign is a sinsign that also _/i/_ an index that also _/is/_ a
dicisign. One sign _/is/_ all three at once. Yet the dicent
relation _/is not/_ the indexical relation, and each of them _/is
not/_ the sinsign relation. This sort of thing makes my head hurt.
You're creating unneeded problems with 'A is A'.
EDWINA: A dicent indexical sinsign (each relation in a mode of
Secondness). One Sign (capital S) is 'all three at once'. Yes -
exactly, the dicent relation is not the indexical relation - I
fully agree - which is why I refer to it separately (as one of the
three).
5) You wrote, "And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower
case 'sign' (see 2.243)!"
CP 2.243 shows him doing just the opposite.
[CP2.243.] Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first,
according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an
actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as
the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's
having some character in itself, or in some existential
relation to that object, or in its relation to an
interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant
represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or
a sign of reason.
[End quote, reddish colorations added]
If you were correct about the quote, then Peirce would be mean,
replacing 'sign' with 'triad,' by which is to be understood
'representamen-object-interpretant triad
EDWINA: I'm sure you know that he often refers to the whole triad
in lower case; 'the readiest characteristic test showing whether a
sign is a Dicisign or not...' 2.310.
"Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to
refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same
way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign" 2.303. And see 8.334--
6) BEN:Triads are divisible by three trichotomies; first,
according as the triad in itself is a mere quality, is an actual
existent, or is a general law; secondly according as the relation
of the triad to its object consists in the triad's having some
character in itself or in some existential relation to that
object, or in the triad's relation to an interpretant; thirdly,
according as the triad's interpretant represents the triad as a
triad of possibility or as a triad of fact or as a triad of reason.
EDWINA: See my examples above; I don't think your rewriting the
above is 'the answer'! He also will sometimes capitalize other
terms (Symbol, Icon, Index, Representamen) and at other times, use
lower case.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 3:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Thanks for your comments, Ben. I'll add a few.
1) BEN: How *something stands as a sign* (for an object to an
interpretant) :
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) *a sign stands for an object* (to an
interpretant) :
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) *a sign* (for an object) *stands to an
interpretant* :
rheme, dicisign, index.
EDWINA: I'd define the first set as Mediation - a term Peirce
uses frequently. And the second set as the "relations to their
dynamic objects" 8.335. And the third set as "its relation to
its signified interpretant" 8.337.
That is, I'm using Peirce's terms of 'relation', not 'stands
as/stands for/stands to'. I prefer the term 'relation' because
it implies (at least to me) the idea of active interaction, while
the 'stands as/for/to' implies (at least to me) the idea of
static, mechanical cut-and-paste.
2) You wrote:
BEN: E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant
represents it as (or as if it were) a character attributed or
imputed to an object.
EDWINA: What bothers me about the above is that it implies (to
me) the need for an agent who does the 'attribution' or
'imputation'. I prefer Peirce's description of the rheme as "a
Sign of qualitative Possibility.....any Rheme...will afford some
information; but it is not interpreted as doing so" 2.250. That
is, your description includes some 'attribution' of information,
but I don't think a rheme does that.
3) You wrote:
BEN:On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if
the relations that you discuss, and the variant formulations that
I've just discussed, are considered merely as abstractions from
the triadic relation for the sake of focus.
EDWINA: As Peirce said, "signs are divisible by three
trichotomies' 2.243 - and he outlines them, within the three
categories, and, within the relations to the object and the
interpretant: 'the relation of the sign to its object...;
according as its Interpretant represents it...
That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three
trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'. They
are indeed, analytic abstractions from the full triadic Sign. As
I've said numerous times - these 'relations' can't exist per se
on their own. But they certainly do 'exist' in analysis -
otherwise - we wouldn't be able to analyze the ten classes of Signs!
4) You wrote:
BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves
"relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read
you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say.
EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
5) You wrote:
BEN: Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the
relations. Is Jack the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a
father at all, yet still exist
EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist
_within the Relation of Being The Father of Jackson_ . But Jack
exists only within some other Relation - even if it is just air
and water.
6) The reason I prefer to use the capital 'S' when referring to
the triad, is to differentiate it from the many times when Peirce
refers to the Representamen as the 'sign' (lower case). And
often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign' (see
2.243)!
Many thanks for your triadic three cents worth. Much appreciated.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Udell <mailto:[email protected]>
*Cc:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> ; 'Peirce-L'
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Wednesday, December 17, 2014 2:31 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
Edwina, lists,
I haven't read the whole thread, but...
I think that it's true that many of us have discussed the
sign relations quasi- or pseudo-dyadically for convenience,
for example, in the _trikonic _ (2004) PowerPoint
presentation, slide 42, discussing the
9-adic Sign Relations:
*as to the sign itself:*
qualisign (tone)
▷ legisign (type)
sinsign (token)
*as to the interpretant:*
rheme ([e.g.,] propositional function)
*▷* ▷ argument
dicisign ([e.g.,] proposition)
* as to the object: *
icon
▷ symbol
index
In each case one is really discussing a triad with something
as a sign for something as an object to something as an
interpretant, but there are three places in there where we
trichotomize, playing down some aspects of the triadic
relation in order to focus on others:
How *something stands as a sign* (for an object to an
interpretant) :
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) *a sign stands for an object* (to an
interpretant) :
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) *a sign* (for an object) *stands to an
interpretant* :
rheme, dicisign, index.
This playing down has its limits. In particular, the third
trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument) depends on how the
sign is represented, in its signified interpretant, as, or as
if, character, indexical, or sign of intepretant) of the
object. E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant
represents it as (or as if it were) a character attributed or
imputed to an object.
So, one could as well say that, among the trichotomies:
The first trichotomy (qualisign, sinsign, legisign)
depends on how *a sign stands* (or how something stands as a
sign).
The second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol)
depends on how *a sign stands for an object* .
The third trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument)
depends on how *a sign stands for an object to an
interpretant* .
But we wouldn't actually think that the first trichotomy
involves a trio of monadic characters, the second involves a
trio of two-correlate relations, and the third a trio of
three-correlate relations.
On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if
the relations that you discuss, and the variant formulations
that I've just discussed, are considered merely as
abstractions from the triadic relation for the sake of focus.
Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves
"relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to
read you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you
say.
You object that to speak of the correlates as correlated
things rather than as relations implies that they would exist
without the relations. Yet in particular cases they often do
exist without the relations. Is Jack the father of Jackson?
Jack may not be a father at all, yet still exist. Then
Jackson may not be an index of Jack at all, yet still exist.
Jackson will surely be an index of other people and things,
of course. Generally of course it is hard to conceive of
things in general without conceiving of representational
relation in general.
The distinction between correlates and relations helps us
focus flexibly on various aspects of the phenomenon,
including when the correlates are real but not individually
existent, and even when a correlate is a figment. Now,
flexibility of focus thanks to potential precision justifies
speaking of the 'relations' and the 'relation', which you
like to be able to do. It also justifies and, I'd say,
requires, distinguishing relative (or correlate) from
relation, even if the relative were called into being
entirely by the relation.
As regards speaking of the semiotic triad as the capital-S
'Sign', I seem to disagree with an increasing number of
people about this. Not only do I see nowhere Peirce doing
this, it seems like a bad move terminologically - it is at
odds with everyday-English word 'sign'; I think that such an
everyday-English word should not be pressed into service as
term of art for a technical conception that has no
everyday-English word approximating to it.
I would suggest that the semiotic triad, a.k.a. genuine
triad, be called a 'eutriad.'
The eutriad would 'consist' or however one wants to put it,
of the three correlates, their triadic relation, and the
relations abstracted from the triadic relation. The genuine
triadic relation itself could be called a 'trilation', and
the 'members' or relatives having the trilation could be
called the 'trilates' or 'trilatives'. On the other hand, I'm
not sure how this would gibe with finer-grained
classifications in which a sign could be classified by
relations to dynamic object, immediate object, etc.
And that's my three cents worth.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 8:20 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
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