Hmm. My understanding of the scholastic 'universal' (the Aristotelian, to which 
I am assuming Peirce refers) is quite different from the specific actualities 
of genes and natural selection. These two are actualities and very specific 
despite their having observable commonalities with, eg, a species. They exist 
'per se' while my understanding of the universal is its nature as an abstract 
potential which is articulated, but never completely, as embedded within an 
actual instantiation. 

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Frederik Stjernfelt 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce Discussion Forum 
(PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu) 
  Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2015 1:40 PM
  Subject: [biosemiotics:7958] Re: Natural Propositions:


  Dear Edwina, lists -  


  The neo-Darwinist conception of evolution works nicely as an example, exactly 
because it is so stripped-down. 
  Even a concept as naked as that refers to real universals - as Edwina writes, 
to "genes", and "natural selection". 


  F




  Den 18/01/2015 kl. 19.30 skrev Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
  :


    Stan and Frederik: I think that you both are talking about different 
issues. It's not whether or not evolution is a 'real process', or even about 
the notion of 'realism' vs 'nominalism' (whether one uses the scholastic or 
non-scholastic definition of those two terms). I think Stan was referring to 
the very definition of 'what is evolution'. The neoDarwinians have a very 
simple (simplistic?) definition which rejects any notion of there being 
'potentialities',  'probabilities' or 'possibilities' . There's the status quo 
genes; there's natural selection; and that's it.

    Edwina

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