Dear Danko,
You have already received answers from Peirce's experts. I just follow
this list trying to grasp Peirce's cosmology. I should say that this is
not an easy endeavor. In general, I believe that your answer is
inconsistent with physicalism.
> Perhaps we should establish the rules of the mind, use them as
> fundamental and consider physics "supervening" on these rules.
In this respect I would like just to point out works of Bruno Marchal:
B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th
International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference,
SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
Bruno Marchal. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body
problem, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, Volume 113, Issue
1, September 2013, Pages 127–140
and his book The Amoeba's Secret.
Bruno starts with computational theory of mind and he shows that as a
consequence, physics under such a hypothesis do supervenes on mind.
Evgenii
Am 29.03.2015 um 12:54 schrieb Danko Nikolic:
Dear Evgenii,
My replies bellow:
On 29/03/15 11:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Thank you. I have one more question about physical. We talk after
all about processes in time and the question would be on how it
happens according to your view. To this end, let me quote from Tim
Maudlin's "The Metaphysics Within Physics"
“I believe there is a fundamental physical state of the world.”
No.
“In addition to the physical state of the universe, I believe in
fundamental physical laws.”
No.
“Once the total physical state of the universe and the laws of
physics are fixed, every other fact, such as may be, supervenes.”
Not in reality. However, this may be a damn good approximation, maybe
the best that we can come up with. So, for all practical purposes,
perhaps yes. But in reality, not really.
Would you agree with such a description of physical processes? Or
do you consider a physical process differently?
I consider it differently.
I consider physical laws to be a product of our minds. They are not
really fundamental. Our physics is just a practical way of organizing
knowledge. These laws are fundamental only for our way of thinking
about it. If we had different minds i.e., if the evolution took some
other direction to make us intelligent enough to develop technology,
we would have different "physics" too. We would consider some other
descriptive rules as fundamental.
It would be more fair to say that minds came first and that these
minds then invented physical laws (and mathematics and so on).
However, having said that, I also have to make a qualifier. I
disagree that science (i.e., physics-based science) will never
explained qualia or mind.
I believe that with our physics-based model of the universe we will
be able to explain qualia -- despite physics not being fundamental.
(This is what practopoiesis is about, anyway.)
It may not be the simplest or most practical explanation but,
importantly, we can do it.
Once we have done it, we can look back more accurately to reconsider
what we want to adopt as fundamental. What should be the most
elegant model of "everything"? In which way can we make most accurate
descriptions and predictions of as many phenomena with as
parsimonious model possible?
Maybe at that time it will become apparent to the mainstream science
that physics needs to be replaced with something else.
Perhaps we should establish the rules of the mind, use them as
fundamental and consider physics "supervening" on these rules. In
fact, I would argue that this is exactly what we can do already
today, using results from mainstream science of the mind and add to
it even the mainstream physiology and anatomy of the brain. We can
find the rules that "govern our universe" already in the functional
anatomy of the cerebrum and in the ways how we think in general and
make decisions, categorizations, inferences.
Maybe Peirce has already hinted on that mind-based approach. Or has
he already elaborated it to a substantial degree?
I wouldn't know. Please tell me.
Danko
Evgenii
Am 28.03.2015 um 21:00 schrieb Danko Nikolic:
I subscribe to this.
(I am also aware that this is not an absolute truth, but a
convenient way of describing the world in scientific terms.)
Danko On 28 Mar 2015 14:46, "Evgenii Rudnyi" <[email protected]>
wrote:
Dear Danko,
Before discussing Peirce, I would like to know your
understanding of physical.
Let me quote the definition of physicalism from Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e.
the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain
condition, the condition of being physical. Of course,
physicalists don't deny that the world might contain many items
that at first glance don't seem physical — items of a
biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But
they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items
are either physical or supervene on the physical."
Do you subscribe to this, or your vision of physical is
different?
Evgenii
Am 27.03.2015 um 20:50 schrieb Danko Nikolic:
Dear Evgenii,
This is the first time I hear of that definition of matter.
It is interesting. I don't know the implications as I am new
to Peirce.
Yes, of course, I would agree that being biological implies
that the mind is a physical phenomenon.
Danko
On 27/03/15 19:34, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
This implies that "The mind is a physical phenomenon."
Along this line I would appreciate if you make your
statement on what is for you physical and how it is related
to inevitable physical laws.
Peirce's quote in this respect:
“Matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit
to the point where the breaking up of this habits is very
difficult.”
Evgenii
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