Can you give me an idea of the types of "fact" you have in mind? Do you mean statements of the kind "This jam is made from strawberries." or "If A = B AND B = C, A = C" or "This statement is false." or "There is a God."
There are well known problems with language that do "supervene" upon our usage. In inventing ideas, in speaking, about the world (scientific or not) there is no necessary correlation there is error and ambiguity and simply ways of speaking. A simple way to state my view is to say that there is nothing contradictory in the physical world. It is what it is, it is discoverable, we may develop knowledge of it and refine that knowledge by falliblism (classic Ontology in the Epistemology of Science). This knowledge evolves toward the way things are. The science of Benjamin Peirce is a/the science of necessity, "Mathematics is the science that draws necessary conclusions" he says. And as I noted before, he believed that Logic could build the bridge between Pure Mathematics and the Physical Sciences. He did not argue Logicism (that logic is the foundation of mathematics). This view suggests "a conceivable certainty." That Scientific knowledge can be developed, still be fallible, but is ultimately sustainable for all time. The Peirce family, Rudolf Carnap and I all argue for and by necessity. There is, indeed, a fundamental state of the world toward which we, and all other scientists, work. If there were no necessity then the world would simply not exist. Since the world manifestly does exist it has the following properties 1. it has always existed (by implication you do not get something from nothing) 2. it has unidirectional necessity (cause and effect, by observation). If the world did not exist, at any point, then it cannot, by any means, exist today. This is an argument that I call "Logical Existentialism." Benjamin Peirce, in particular, argued for pure mathematics: the human mind is necessarily capable of ideas that correspond to the physical world. "In every form of material manifestation, there is a corresponding form of human thought, so that the human mind is as wide in its range of thought as the physical universe in which it thinks." (in his Linear Associative Algebra) We lost faith in this view because of the perceived failure of the Hilbert program at the start of the twentieth century. I argue that this is a failure not of mathematics in general but a failure of a particular method (FOL). So, generally, if anything "supervenes" upon the physical it is what we call either "error" or "narrative." Narrative is the story that we tell ourselves about the world and it includes a range of things that are important to our behaviors. Religion is such a narrative. How I fit into the world. What people think of me. How much I am worth. How smart I am. What my politics are. Etc... Could these ideas be said to "supervene?" If you limit your Physicalist view and accept Materialism you have to, by necessity, say that they do. But if you accept the broader Liberal Physicalism articulated by early Carnap, the Peirce's and myself, in which a knowledge of sense and response is included, you do not. Regards, Steven On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 2:09 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <[email protected]> wrote: > Thank you. I have one more question about physical. We talk after all > about processes in time and the question would be on how it happens > according to your view. To this end, let me quote from Tim Maudlin's "The > Metaphysics Within Physics" > > “I believe there is a fundamental physical state of the world.” > > “In addition to the physical state of the universe, I believe in > fundamental physical laws.” > > “Once the total physical state of the universe and the laws of physics are > fixed, every other fact, such as may be, supervenes.” > > Would you agree with such a description of physical processes? Or do you > consider a physical process differently? > > Evgenii > > > Am 28.03.2015 um 21:00 schrieb Danko Nikolic: > >> I subscribe to this. >> >> (I am also aware that this is not an absolute truth, but a convenient >> way of describing the world in scientific terms.) >> >> Danko On 28 Mar 2015 14:46, "Evgenii Rudnyi" <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Dear Danko, >>> >>> Before discussing Peirce, I would like to know your understanding >>> of physical. >>> >>> Let me quote the definition of physicalism from Stanford >>> Encyclopedia of Philosophy >>> >>> "The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the >>> universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, >>> the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don't deny >>> that the world might contain many items that at first glance don't >>> seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, >>> or social nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of >>> the day such items are either physical or supervene on the >>> physical." >>> >>> Do you subscribe to this, or your vision of physical is different? >>> >>> Evgenii >>> >>> Am 27.03.2015 um 20:50 schrieb Danko Nikolic: >>> >>> Dear Evgenii, >>>> >>>> This is the first time I hear of that definition of matter. It >>>> is interesting. I don't know the implications as I am new to >>>> Peirce. >>>> >>>> Yes, of course, I would agree that being biological implies that >>>> the mind is a physical phenomenon. >>>> >>>> Danko >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 27/03/15 19:34, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >>>> >>>> This implies that "The mind is a physical phenomenon." Along >>>>> this line I would appreciate if you make your statement on what >>>>> is for you physical and how it is related to inevitable >>>>> physical laws. >>>>> >>>>> Peirce's quote in this respect: >>>>> >>>>> “Matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit to >>>>> the point where the breaking up of this habits is very >>>>> difficult.” >>>>> >>>>> Evgenii >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L >>> posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a >>> message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line >>> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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