Ben, list, You gave Peircean examples whereas the rule (or law) is *already known* either before or after the surprising fact. This seems all well and good to me for certain types of abductions, say, those involved in sleuthing, Sherlock Holmes style.
But what of those inquiries in which the rule (law) is *not* known, *but is exactly the hypothesis* of the inquirer? This is to say that scientists sometimes come to uncover laws hitherto unkown or unrecognized (such as those hypothesized by Newton, Darwin, Einstein, Planck, etc.) I have sometimes thought that in *that* context--that is, of someone hypothesizing a law *not* previously known--that, modifying the 1878 bean example you gave: Suppose I enter a room and there find a number of bags, containing different kinds of beans. On the table there is a handful of white beans; and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans only. I at once infer as a probability, or a fair guess, that this handful was taken out of that bag. This sort of inference is called _*making an hypothesis*_. It is the inference of a _*case*_ from a _*rule*_ and _ *result*_. (CSP) the situation might look something like this (although I'm not sure that any bean example will quite do for this purpose. Suppose I enter a room and find a large number of bags which I know to contain different kinds of beans. Near one bag I find a handful of white beans (the surprising fact) and I make the supposition (the hypothesis) that *that* particular bag of beans is all white. I examine the bag of beans (make my experiment) and find that the bag in question does indeed contain only white beans (the rule). (GR) Well, it may turn out that I know beans about abduction, but it does seem to me that the scientifically most fruitful and significant hypotheses are those where the law (rule) is *not* know in advance and is only supposed by the scientist, again, exactly *as the hypothesis*. Peirce gives an example of that kind of hypothesis, one which is, shall we say, *fresh *at the time (the rule or law not being previously known): Fossils are found; say, remains like those of fishes, but far in the interior of the country. To explain the phenomenon we suppose the sea once washed over the land (CP 2.625). Now suppose that a historian of the region in which those fish fossils were found, himself finding documents showing that a large caravan of traders had brought large quantities of dried fish into that region, pooh-poohs my *sea washing over the land *hypothesis, which I have already imagined (for some good reasons) to have happened in other parts of the world as well. Thus, as other investigators find many other places, including deserts, etc., containing many fish fossils where there was no possibility of any fish trade occurring, my hypothesis takes hold and is in time accepted quite generally by the scientific community. (Another, not unrelated example, would be that of continental drift.) It seems to me that Peirce intended to cover both kinds of hypotheses even in his bean illustrations as he offers examples of both (the fossil example is preceded by what I referred to above as a sleuthing type of example). Any help which you or others can offer towards clarifying this matter--of someone hypothesizing a rule or law not previously known--would be appreciated. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 11:49 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi, Gary, > > Here the known rule is "All the beans from this bag are white." The > hypothesis is "These beans are from this bag." From there one may deduce > implications of these beans' being from this bag, tests of which would > usefully corroborate the rule if the rule were in doubt, but would not, of > itself, fully confirm it. To confirm it well, one would want to find some > way to check the beans currently in the bag, perhaps even track down (by > evidence other than their whiteness) beans taken from the bag in the past > and observing whether they're white, or at least whether fair samples are > consistently white. But is there any reason in Peirce's example to suppose > that it's in question whether all the beans in the bag are white? > > In the 1878 beans example, Peirce says, > > Suppose I enter a room and there find a number of bags, containing > different kinds of beans. On the table there is a handful of white beans; > and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans > only. I at once infer as a probability, or a fair guess, that this handful > was taken out of that bag. This sort of inference is called _*making an > hypothesis*_. It is the inference of a _*case*_ from a _*rule*_ and _ > *result*_. > [ https://books.google.com/books?id=u8sWAQAAIAAJ&jtp=472 ] > > In that example, the reasoner finds the bag of white beans _*after*_ the > observation of white beans on the table. Still, the rule that all that > bag's beans are white is not a conjecture, but an observation (if the > reasoner has observed all the beans in that bag). As a perceptual judgment, > it is essentially abductive, but it is not in doubt, and it really doesn't > make a difference to the idea of hypothesis whether the rule came to be > known before or after the surprising observation. The hypothesis in > question is, instead, that the beans on the table are from the bag of white > beans. > > In 1903, Peirce discusses the case where a rule (or law) already known _ > *before*_ the surprising observation > > [....] The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new > discovery, into order; that is, to form a general conception embracing > them. In some cases, it does this by an act of _*generalization *_. In > other cases, no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts > that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is > recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis, so that the > phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite > likely, or even would be a necessary result. This synthesis suggesting a > new conception or hypothesis, is the Abduction. [....] > (From "Syllabus", 1903, EP 2:287 > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-syllabus-syllabus-course-lectures-lowell-institute-beginning-1903-nov-23-some > ) > > Best, Ben > > On 4/25/2016 4:20 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Ben, you wrote: > > Many of Peirce's examples of abductive inference involve merely the > extension of a known rule to cover a surprising case. The beans example is > classic, from 1878 in "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis". > > All the beans from this bag are white. > These beans are white. > ∴ these beans are from this bag.' > > Again, I don't think that it's a matter of "merely the extension of a > known rule," but rather of the *supposition* that there *is* a rule > (i.e., my hypothesis should it be shown to be true through experimental > testing, say). That rule was *not* earlier known, but now--if my > hypothesis is valid--it is known. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > > > > *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 > <718%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:43 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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