Thanks Jon, I appreciate your earnest questioning.
If you don't mind, allow me to proceed with this discussion along my terms and not yours and ask: Why is it that Peirce's foremost contribution to philosophy is said to be his logic of discovery, viz., abduction, which is ampliative and not necessary reasoning? How important is triadic reasoning to Peirce? If important, why would he only discuss two and not three terms in the form that abduction *ought* to take? *What are your reasons for why the set (C and A) and not (B and A) in CP 5.189?* ____________ Now, in response to your questions: Just prior to presenting CP 5.189, he states, “It may therefore very likely be objected that doubt must perforce on this account hang over my first cotary proposition that every general element of thought is given in perceptive judgment. This objection, however, involves a logical fallacy. No doubt in regard to the first cotary proposition follows as a necessary consequence of the possibility that what are really abductions have been mistaken for perceptions. For the question is whether that which really is an abductive result can contain elements foreign to its premises. It must be remembered that abduction, although it is very little hampered by logical rules, nevertheless is logical inference, asserting its conclusion only problematically or conjecturally it is true, but nevertheless having a *perfectly definite logical form*.” But the arguments go much beyond what only Peirce said. Spinoza is said to have been a pragmaticist. Why are they classified in the same category if not value given to emotional content and its position in sequence of thinking? For instance, “*Spinoza held that the best way to make our ideas clear is to control our emotions, and thereby to unite our minds with God…”~*Shannon Dea "Why, then, is spirit privileged over appetite as the ally of reason?" ~ Moss ____________ Another reason is that of addressing the *eternal question* of philosophy: “…pragmaticism is a species of prope-positivism. But what distinguishes it from other species is, first, its *retention of a purified philosophy*.” ~Peirce “He (Farabi) concludes the first part with the remark that philosophy as previously described stems from Plato and Aristotle who both “have given us philosophy” together with “*the ways toward it and the way toward its introduction after it has been blurred or destroyed*,” and that, as will become clear from the presentation of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle in the two subsequent parts, the *purpose of Plato and of Aristotle was one and the same*… According to Farabi, Plato started his inquiry with the question regarding the essence of man’s perfection or of his happiness…” ~Strauss “The very intention of interpreting the *Guide* would imply an unbearable degree of presumption on the part of the would-be interpreter; for he would implicitly claim to be endowed with all the qualities of a Platonic philosopher-king.” ~Strauss “So then, the writer, finding his bantling “pragmatism” so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the *precise purpose of expressing the original definition*, he begs to announce the birth of the word “pragmaticism,” which is *ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers*.” ~ Peirce “Virtually the first thing everyone has to learn. It is common to all arts, science, and forms of thought.” “What?” “Oh, that trivial business of being able to identify one, two, and three. In sum, I mean number and *calculation*” (*Republic*, 522c) “One, Two, Three. Already written.” ~Peirce, *A Guess at the Riddle* *“**The perfection of reason is the perfection of man as such: the perfection of his power. In order to perfect his power, man is led, not merely into society, but to an effort to understand, and to actualize, the best society…so few are philosophers…A fundamental accommodation of this sort is the recognition that all men are moved by their calculation of goods (pleasures) and evils (pains), but that few are capable of making such calculations accurately**.”~Strauss and Cropsey, Benedict Spinoza* *As for icon, index and tension* *Icon: CP 5.189* *Index: Syllogism* *Symbol: Meaning for you, Meaning for me, Interpretant for the Commens* *Seth*: “…the *eidos* has a structure to it. There is an internal tension within an *eidos*, which I called the “indeterminate dyad”… *Ronna*: “Would you call it an indeterminate dyad, then, when you have this kind of tripartite structure? There’s a middle part that gets connected in some sense with one extreme, so that together they make up one over against the other extreme, but then it gets linked with that opposite and forms one with it over against the other…So the question is how these various structures are related”… *Seth*: “Yes, I’ve understood it that way.” ~ Encounters and Reflections: Conversations with Seth Benardete *__________* *There’s more but I think this is good for now and I will leave you with: * *What are your reasons for thinking that a deductive syllogism is something that Peirce even cared to elaborate upon when others have already done so sufficiently?* *How is your reading suggestive of future action? * *With best wishes,* *Jerry Rhee* On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 5:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry R., List: > > I just came across a couple of additional data points that seem relevant. > > First, in CP 8.209 (1905): "... abduction is the inference of the truth > of the minor premiss of a syllogism of which the major premiss is selected > as known already to be true while the conclusion is found to be true." As > in EP 2.414 (1908), Peirce is here referring to a valid *deductive* > syllogism as spelled out in CP 2.623 (1878), not the *abductive* form of > inference that we find in CP 5.189 (1903). > > Major premiss, known already to be true (CP 8.209) = circumstances > of surprising fact's occurrence (EP 2.441) = Rule, "all beans from this bag > are white" (CP 2.623) = M is P. > Minor premiss, inferred to be true (CP 8.209) = credible conjecture or > hypothesis (EP 2.441) = Case, "these beans are from this bag" (CP 2.623) = > S is M. > Conclusion, found to be true (CP 8.209) = observed surprising fact (EP > 2.441) = Result, "these beans are white" (CP 2.623) = S is P. > > Second, in a 2008 *Transactions* article by Daniel J. McKaughan, "From > Ugly Duckling to Swan: C. S. Peirce, Abduction, and the Pursuit of > Scientific Theories," Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 454 (emphasis in original): > "Rather than statements about what we are entitled or required to believe, > abductions yield *recommendations about what courses of action to pursue* > given our values and given the information and resources at our disposal > ... The content of the conclusion [in CP 5.189; i.e., the minor premiss > above] is not the hypothesis itself, but rather a suggestion that we look > into it." He cites EP 2.287 and CP 2.662 as support for this. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 1:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Jerry R., List: >> >> I appreciate your efforts to clarify where you would like to take this >> discussion, but I must continue to confess that "I do not understand >> you," although I would certainly not characterize myself as "an angry man" >> in this context. :-) >> >> JR: "That is, the possibility for resolution of the tension between icon >> and index actually contributes to the inquirer conceiving of his hypothesis >> with favor." >> >> What icon? What index? What tension between them? >> >> JR: "My *hypothesis*, which should incite genuine doubt, is >> that [surprise and suspect] ought to be considered as a single term of an >> inverted syllogism and that this was Peirce’s intention." >> >> How do you propose that we should go about testing this hypothesis? I >> have been explaining all along that Peirce clearly had a specific >> *deductive* syllogism in mind when he wrote EP 2.414, not the form of >> inference for abduction that we find in CP 5.189. I and others have also >> pointed out that, contrary to treating surprise and suspect as a single >> term within the reasoning process, abduction is motivated by the former to >> dissolve it by producing the latter. Why do you find this >> role insufficient and/or unsatisfying? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >>
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