Gary and list,
I think you hit upon a critical point about genuine doubt in abduction. A genuine inquirer is noticing something that goes against what he genuinely believes, more correctly a genuine paradox, and is attempting a genuine re-ordering of his experience that would resolve the wonder. It is the case that if that genuine inquirer is genuinely concerned that that inquirer would do a genuine search about what others know or have said, in order to discredit his own genuine hypothesis. If he finds none, then the hypothesis survives. One problem is that it can lead to numerous conspiracy theories and even arguments over what even suffices as "evidence". Moreover, one should always ask the question, “well, why haven’t others noticed what I see?” in order to exclude trivial theories. Yet, if the hypothesis is of such a nature that the genuine assertion is intelligible, that is, accessible to interrogation and susceptible to classification (that the desire to know can be realized), then that simply adds to the genuine love for that genuine abduction. That is, the possibility for resolution of the tension between icon and index actually contributes to the inquirer conceiving of his hypothesis with favor. Yet, not everyone cares to regard this genuine doubt to be important, or are busily preoccupied with other important components that require detailing so as not to notice it. Yet, Peirce thought it important enough (necessary) to include it in CP 5.189. So, why is that a big deal? Well, consider the following, which illustrates his nature as a careful writer: “*I can hardly be supposed to have selected the unusual word “uberty” instead of “fruitfulness” merely because it is spelled with half as many letters. Observations may be as fruitful as you will, but they cannot be said to be gravid with young truth in the sense in which reasoning may be, not because of the nature of the subject it considers, but because of the manner in which it is supported by the ratiocinative instinct.”* Now, given this, why would he include surprise and suspect in something that he says is “the normative form of abduction, the form to which abduction ought to conform”? I submit that surprise and suspect ought to be viewed with reverence. My *hypothesis*, which should incite genuine doubt, is that it ought to be considered as a single term of an inverted syllogism and that this was Peirce’s intention. So, what are the consequences of taking this view? One would be that it can be ordered according to the rules of syllogism such that B can be labeled "predicate" in the syllogistic sense. But where is the knock-down evidence for this to be found if Peirce is now silent? He does not speak. In Leo Strauss’ *Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed*, from Persecution and the Art of Writing where he gives the account of esoteric/exoteric writing, he cites Maimonides: “*If you wish to grasp the totality of what this treatise contains, so that nothing of it will escape you, then you must connect its chapters one with another; and when reading a given chapter, your intention must be not only to understand the totality of the subject of the chapter, but also to grasp each word that occurs in it in the course of the speech, even if that word does not belong to the intention of the chapter. For the diction of this Treatise has not been chosen at haphazard, but with great exactness and exceeding precision, and with care to avoid failing to explain any obscure point. And nothing has been mentioned out of its place, save with a view to explaining some matter in its proper place*.” CP 5.189 ought to be read with logographic necessity. That is the "rule" put forth; the hypothesis to be tested. You are B. Can I convince you to go from surprise to suspect? What is the interpretant (What is CP 5.189)? What is the truth? Best, Jerry Rhee On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 11:42 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Ben, list, > > You gave Peircean examples whereas the rule (or law) is *already known* > either before or after the surprising fact. This seems all well and good to > me for certain types of abductions, say, those involved in sleuthing, > Sherlock Holmes style. > > But what of those inquiries in which the rule (law) is *not* known, *but > is exactly the hypothesis* of the inquirer? This is to say that > scientists sometimes come to uncover laws hitherto unkown or unrecognized > (such as those hypothesized by Newton, Darwin, Einstein, Planck, etc.) > > I have sometimes thought that in *that* context--that is, of someone > hypothesizing a law *not* previously known--that, modifying the 1878 bean > example you gave: > > Suppose I enter a room and there find a number of bags, containing > different kinds of beans. On the table there is a handful of white beans; > and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans > only. I at once infer as a probability, or a fair guess, that this handful > was taken out of that bag. This sort of inference is called _*making an > hypothesis*_. It is the inference of a _*case*_ from a _*rule*_ and _ > *result*_. (CSP) > > > the situation might look something like this (although I'm not sure that > any bean example will quite do for this purpose. > > Suppose I enter a room and find a large number of bags which I know to > contain different kinds of beans. Near one bag I find a handful of white > beans (the surprising fact) and I make the supposition (the hypothesis) > that *that* particular bag of beans is all white. I examine the bag of > beans (make my experiment) and find that the bag in question does indeed > contain only white beans (the rule). (GR) > > > Well, it may turn out that I know beans about abduction, but it does seem > to me that the scientifically most fruitful and significant hypotheses are > those where the law (rule) is *not* know in advance and is only supposed > by the scientist, again, exactly *as the hypothesis*. > > Peirce gives an example of that kind of hypothesis, one which is, shall we > say, *fresh *at the time (the rule or law not being previously known): > > Fossils are found; say, remains like those of fishes, but far in the > interior of the country. To explain the phenomenon we suppose the sea once > washed over the land (CP 2.625). > > > Now suppose that a historian of the region in which those fish fossils > were found, himself finding documents showing that a large caravan of > traders had brought large quantities of dried fish into that region, > pooh-poohs my *sea washing over the land *hypothesis, which I have > already imagined (for some good reasons) to have happened in other parts of > the world as well. Thus, as other investigators find many other places, > including deserts, etc., containing many fish fossils where there was no > possibility of any fish trade occurring, my hypothesis takes hold and is in > time accepted quite generally by the scientific community. > > (Another, not unrelated example, would be that of continental drift.) > > It seems to me that Peirce intended to cover both kinds of hypotheses even > in his bean illustrations as he offers examples of both (the fossil example > is preceded by what I referred to above as a sleuthing type of example). > Any help which you or others can offer towards clarifying this matter--of > someone hypothesizing a rule or law not previously known--would be > appreciated. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 11:49 AM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Hi, Gary, >> >> Here the known rule is "All the beans from this bag are white." The >> hypothesis is "These beans are from this bag." From there one may deduce >> implications of these beans' being from this bag, tests of which would >> usefully corroborate the rule if the rule were in doubt, but would not, of >> itself, fully confirm it. To confirm it well, one would want to find some >> way to check the beans currently in the bag, perhaps even track down (by >> evidence other than their whiteness) beans taken from the bag in the past >> and observing whether they're white, or at least whether fair samples are >> consistently white. But is there any reason in Peirce's example to suppose >> that it's in question whether all the beans in the bag are white? >> >> In the 1878 beans example, Peirce says, >> >> Suppose I enter a room and there find a number of bags, containing >> different kinds of beans. On the table there is a handful of white beans; >> and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans >> only. I at once infer as a probability, or a fair guess, that this handful >> was taken out of that bag. This sort of inference is called _*making an >> hypothesis*_. It is the inference of a _*case*_ from a _*rule*_ and _ >> *result*_. >> [ https://books.google.com/books?id=u8sWAQAAIAAJ&jtp=472 ] >> >> In that example, the reasoner finds the bag of white beans _*after*_ the >> observation of white beans on the table. Still, the rule that all that >> bag's beans are white is not a conjecture, but an observation (if the >> reasoner has observed all the beans in that bag). As a perceptual judgment, >> it is essentially abductive, but it is not in doubt, and it really doesn't >> make a difference to the idea of hypothesis whether the rule came to be >> known before or after the surprising observation. The hypothesis in >> question is, instead, that the beans on the table are from the bag of white >> beans. >> >> In 1903, Peirce discusses the case where a rule (or law) already known _ >> *before*_ the surprising observation >> >> [....] The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new >> discovery, into order; that is, to form a general conception embracing >> them. In some cases, it does this by an act of _*generalization *_. In >> other cases, no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts >> that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known >> is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis, so that the >> phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite >> likely, or even would be a necessary result. This synthesis suggesting a >> new conception or hypothesis, is the Abduction. [....] >> (From "Syllabus", 1903, EP 2:287 >> http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-syllabus-syllabus-course-lectures-lowell-institute-beginning-1903-nov-23-some >> ) >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On 4/25/2016 4:20 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> Ben, you wrote: >> >> Many of Peirce's examples of abductive inference involve merely the >> extension of a known rule to cover a surprising case. The beans example is >> classic, from 1878 in "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis". >> >> All the beans from this bag are white. >> These beans are white. >> ∴ these beans are from this bag.' >> >> Again, I don't think that it's a matter of "merely the extension of a >> known rule," but rather of the *supposition* that there *is* a rule >> (i.e., my hypothesis should it be shown to be true through experimental >> testing, say). That rule was *not* earlier known, but now--if my >> hypothesis is valid--it is known. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 >> <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:43 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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