Jerry R., List: I just came across a couple of additional data points that seem relevant.
First, in CP 8.209 (1905): "... abduction is the inference of the truth of the minor premiss of a syllogism of which the major premiss is selected as known already to be true while the conclusion is found to be true." As in EP 2.414 (1908), Peirce is here referring to a valid *deductive* syllogism as spelled out in CP 2.623 (1878), not the *abductive* form of inference that we find in CP 5.189 (1903). Major premiss, known already to be true (CP 8.209) = circumstances of surprising fact's occurrence (EP 2.441) = Rule, "all beans from this bag are white" (CP 2.623) = M is P. Minor premiss, inferred to be true (CP 8.209) = credible conjecture or hypothesis (EP 2.441) = Case, "these beans are from this bag" (CP 2.623) = S is M. Conclusion, found to be true (CP 8.209) = observed surprising fact (EP 2.441) = Result, "these beans are white" (CP 2.623) = S is P. Second, in a 2008 *Transactions* article by Daniel J. McKaughan, "From Ugly Duckling to Swan: C. S. Peirce, Abduction, and the Pursuit of Scientific Theories," Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 454 (emphasis in original): "Rather than statements about what we are entitled or required to believe, abductions yield *recommendations about what courses of action to pursue* given our values and given the information and resources at our disposal ... The content of the conclusion [in CP 5.189; i.e., the minor premiss above] is not the hypothesis itself, but rather a suggestion that we look into it." He cites EP 2.287 and CP 2.662 as support for this. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 1:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry R., List: > > I appreciate your efforts to clarify where you would like to take this > discussion, but I must continue to confess that "I do not understand > you," although I would certainly not characterize myself as "an angry man" > in this context. :-) > > JR: "That is, the possibility for resolution of the tension between icon > and index actually contributes to the inquirer conceiving of his hypothesis > with favor." > > What icon? What index? What tension between them? > > JR: "My *hypothesis*, which should incite genuine doubt, is > that [surprise and suspect] ought to be considered as a single term of an > inverted syllogism and that this was Peirce’s intention." > > How do you propose that we should go about testing this hypothesis? I > have been explaining all along that Peirce clearly had a specific > *deductive* syllogism in mind when he wrote EP 2.414, not the form of > inference for abduction that we find in CP 5.189. I and others have also > pointed out that, contrary to treating surprise and suspect as a single > term within the reasoning process, abduction is motivated by the former to > dissolve it by producing the latter. Why do you find this > role insufficient and/or unsatisfying? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >
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