Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Helmut Raulien]

Ben, list,

Your fourism I find interesting, and it reminds me of Peirces four methods of fixating belief. Would that be justified, and, to loosely do the following connections: Will with tenacity, ability with authority, affectivity with a-priori, and cognition with the scientific method?

Now, only by the way, because I do not know whether the fourism I will mention now has to do with your fourism: In semiotics, I sometimes think, you might find a sort of fourism as well: Apart from the object and the representamen, there are perhaps two things that both would apply to the Peircean thirdness: reason (cause), and result. Result may be the same as interpretant. The reason (to connect representamen with object) mostly lies in the person or entity of the interpreter, I guess. This interpreting system or person, though, is not regarded for necessary to look at it, I guess, by Peirce. But if it would, would it be a fourism, or remain triadism, because reason and result both are thirdness? I dont know.

Best,

Helmut

 

, 22. Mai 2016 um 00:04 Uhr
 "Benjamin Udell" <baud...@gmail.com wrote:

Jon A.S., list,

I discussed it many years ago on peirce-l. I don't know how much of what I said then I'd still say now. Generally I'm doubtful of ideas of the true as a species of the good or vice versa. I suspect that that's like trying to see momentum as a species of energy, or vice versa.

I'm a 'four-ist'. I came to Peirce originally because I couldn't find any serious philosophical fourists, so I searched the Internet for "trichotomy," and soon found Joe Ransdell's Arisbe website. I liked the way that Peirce pursued a recurrent logical pattern.

Here's an example of how I look at things.

will, conation      strong - ethics, character, etc.
ability, dealing    apt - competency
affectivity            good (healthy, as in a healthy appreciation) - sensibility, aesthetics, values
cognition             true - intelligence, knowledge, logic

So it would be difficult to use my ideas to resolve an issue within Peircean philosophy.

I've some websites where I discuss these things, but I haven't gotten into a classification of normatives there. If they're to be ordered, then I think it should be the above order or the reverse of the above order.

I touch on related issues in
https://tetrast2.blogspot.com/2013/04/methods-of-learning.html

also
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/2005/03/periodic-table-of-aspects-of-humanity.html

Best, Ben

On 5/21/2016 2:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Ben U., List:

You hinted at what I think is the key issue for me right now--if logic is a species of ethics (theory), then it seems to me that inquiry is a species of ingenuity (practice), rather than the other way around.  With that in mind ...

BU:  For my own part, I already would do the classification and ordering of the normative sciences (esthetics, ethics, logic) differently, but that's a topic from the past and maybe for the future and maybe not.

Can you point me to where I can find your past discussion(s) of this?  I am interested in learning how and why you would classify and order the normative sciences differently from Peirce.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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