Helmut, list,
My fours don't align with Peirce's four methods of inquiry. In
https://tetrast2.blogspot.com/2013/04/methods-of-learning.html , you'll
find Peirce's three inferior methods scattered around a large table at
the post's end. Peirce's fourth method, the scientific method, is also
there, more or less, as "cognitive assessment and testing." The post as
a whole is about four good methods of learning.
In semiotics, based on the idea that sign and interpretant do not convey
experience with their object, I add a fourth stage, a 'recognizant',
that does just that. There's a parallel with information theory's
scenario of source, encoding, decoding, destination.
Best, Ben
On 5/22/2016 4:04 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Ben, list,
Your fourism I find interesting, and it reminds me of Peirces four
methods of fixating belief. Would that be justified, and, to loosely
do the following connections: Will with tenacity, ability with
authority, affectivity with a-priori, and cognition with the
scientific method?
Now, only by the way, because I do not know whether the fourism I will
mention now has to do with your fourism: In semiotics, I sometimes
think, you might find a sort of fourism as well: Apart from the object
and the representamen, there are perhaps two things that both would
apply to the Peircean thirdness: reason (cause), and result. Result
may be the same as interpretant. The reason (to connect representamen
with object) mostly lies in the person or entity of the interpreter, I
guess. This interpreting system or person, though, is not regarded for
necessary to look at it, I guess, by Peirce. But if it would, would it
be a fourism, or remain triadism, because reason and result both are
thirdness? I dont know.
Best,
Helmut
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