Clark, List: At first glance, it seems to me that mapping John 1:1 to Peirce's Categories gives us something like, "In the beginning was the Word [Thirdness], and the Word was with God [Secondness], and the Word was God [Firstness]."
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Nov 2, 2016, at 2:07 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Potter writes: > > I would like to add here on my account that when it coms to understanding > the conditions of possibility of special disclosure or revelation in holy > persons or historical events, disclosure of God in the natural order is > first required as a real possibility since without it there would be no way > of telling what is allegedly disclosed in these persons and events is truly > God. Hence I have argued [in "Revelation and 'Natural' Knowledge of God"] > and would argue that some form of "natural knowledge" of God must be > possible if there is to be any "super-natural revelation." It seems to me > self-evident that in this matter dogmatism is unsatisfactory and an appeal > to privileged mystical arbitrary" (13). > > > In his response, Smith writes "What Potter is driving at here is not > wholly clear to me" (90). It is "wholly clear" to me either. Any thoughts? > > Just a guess that might be completely wrong. I think he puts quotes around > “supernatural” because he doesn’t subscribe to Hume’s conception of the > supernatural. (Neither does Peirce as I think I mentioned in a quote by him > Monday) That is if there is intervention it’s natural in the Peircean > sense. But if it is then it is an empirically analyzable phenomena. > Dogmatism or private mystical ‘senses’ are unsatisfactory because they > simply don’t engage with this empirical manifestation. > > Peirce seems to hint at this in the various places he’s skeptical of > scriptural accounts of Jesus or miracles. The reasons go back to his > objections to most belief in “The Fixation of Belief.” To simply trust the > account without reason is dogmatism and authoritarianism which are simply > not trustworthy. So his answer is that we don’t know. What he *doesn’t* say > though is that it is unknowable. That is assuming the events happened in a > fashion similar to what is described then under the pragmatic maxim we have > real differences that can give us knowledge. > > I’ve not read Potter here (although I will now check it out) but I bet > that’s the point he’s getting at. > > I actually bring this up in epistemological discussions quite often. > Rather than talking religion with all its baggage though I’ll bring up UFOs > which few believe in. Now I think most UFO accounts are either mistaken, > lies or delusion. But if I were walking alone in the woods and came upon a > space vehicle with clearly non-human intelligent beings at that point I > think I have experience to justify a belief in them. It may not be public > in the sense that scientific knowledge in but I’d have a very hard time > doubting. Especially if I did the usual inquiry to ensure I wasn’t > hallucinating, dreaming, or being misled in some fashion. > > As for the Gospel of John, Peirce refers to John as "the ontological > gospeler" whom he says made "the One Supreme Being, by whom all things have > been made out of nothing, to be cherishing love" (6.287). How this might > relate to the famous first chapter of that Gospel (which John Sowa also > pointed to) in consideration of our question, I'm uncertain. > > I think many of his views of love come out of John’s gospel. (Or at least > it sure seems that way to me) He also seems to ascribe fairly common > scholastic views here so I suspect that’s affecting him a great deal too. > But of course elsewhere he ties the Trinity (Father, Son, Holy Ghost) to > his categories. Again he’s not far off tradition here. Augustine famously > formulates the Trinity in terms of platonic conceptions of relation. At > time he also talks about how the “divine trinity of object, interpretant, > and ground… In many respects this trinity agrees with the Christian > trinity; indeed I am not aware that there are any points of disagreement…if > our former guess that reference to an interpretant is Paternity be right, > this would also be the *Son of God*. The ground being that, partaking of > which is requisite to any communication with Symbol, corresponds in its > function to the Holy Spirit.” (MS 359) > > Now while talking about the Son it doesn’t really tell us much about Jesus > but it does I think get at how God is love and how that manifests itself. I > think that effectively God as sign in Peirce’s conception of love and man > as sign differ only in terms of breadth. (Or at least it sure seems that > way to me) Love is thirdness for Peirce or evolution. Secondness or Son is > a bit trickier but I think the above clarifies that. This idea of > ‘reference to an interpretant’ relative to Jesus may clarify somewhat how > to see him. (Again I think the Buddha in many traditions occupies a similar > place) > > The problem in this (and I should hasten to add I’m far from a theologian > of traditional Christianity) is the issue of Jesus as mediator, thirdness > as mediator and spirit as mediator. But this is a problem in John itself - > especially where the spirit is portrayed as a mediator in John 16:5-15 > among other places. >
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