Dear John, Thomas, list:
To those who propose putting forth philosophical definitions for old terms, Peirce gives a kind of snarky response in “Mr. Peterson’s Proposed Discussion”. And yet, despite his awareness that *Symbols grow**… Omne symbolum de symbolo.* (7) <https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm#7> A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as *force, law, wealth, marriage,* bear for us very different meanings from those they bore to our barbarous ancestors. The symbol may, with Emerson’s sphynx, (8) <https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm#8> say to man, Of thine eye I am eyebeam. he says that Locke’s definition for “experience” ought to be left untouched. In “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, he gives several definitions for *hypothesis* in the footnotes. Best, Jerry R On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 1:43 PM, Thomas903 <ozzie...@gmail.com> wrote: > John Sowa, others ~ > > I wanted to comment on statements made last night about the meaning of > law-theory-hypothesis. For convenience (i.e., mine), I will address your > statements in a different order: 1-3-2. See below. > > Regards, > Tom Wyrick > > "Scientists make a three-way distinction of hypotheses, theories, and > laws: > 1. A law is a theory that has been thoroughly tested on some observable > phenomena and shown to be reliable in making predictions about the future > development of those phenomena." > > There are a lot of scientists, so I won't claim that all agree with a > single definition. But when I see the term "law" being used by scientists > (e.g., Kepler's Law), it is normally used to describe a physical-empirical > regularity. It is assumed that something causes/generates the regularity, > and that cause can (eventually) be formalized in a theory -- but the law > itself is a phenomenological description of reality. An empirical habit. > > Laws: Orbits are ellipses (Kepler's Law). If the price of good X > decreases, people buy more of good X (law of demand). If something can go > wrong, it will (Murphy's Law). These laws-regularities are not accompanied > by theories or tentative explanations (hypotheses). > > > "3. A hypothesis is any theory in the logicians' sense. No tests of > relevance or reliability have yet been made." > > This is broadly accurate, but lacks precision. An hypothesis is not "any > theory," but a proposed explanation (story) for the observed regularity-law > and/or "surprising facts" that depart from the law. Tests of > the hypothesis may or may not have been made; being tested does not > eliminate something from being an hypothesis. > > > "2. A theory is a hypothesis that ... has not yet been sufficiently > tested for it to be accepted as a law." > > This reads as though a moderate amount of hypothesis testing produces a > theory, then more testing produces a law. No cause and effect is hinted > at. The alternative view: A theory provides a widely-accepted causal > explanation for a physical regularity (law). A generally accepted theory > is the best causal explanation that society (scientists and practitioners) > can presently offer for the physical law and/or exceptions to it. > > ..... > > 4. A theory is the culmination of observation and measurement, hypothesis > construction, empirical testing, debate and discussion. As such, a theory > is an intellectual-capital good developed over time. There is no logical > activity known as "deduction" without first developing a "theoretical > model" that, when combined with relevant premises, generates syllogisms > (predictions, explanations) relating to a class of phenomena. > > > On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 9:11 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> On 12/12/2016 1:24 PM, Clark Goble wrote: >> >>> I don’t like the term “legitimate” precisely because it’s ambiguous. >>> However I think good theories are theories that allow us to inquire >>> about their truthfulness by making somewhat testable predictions. >>> >> >> I agree with both points. >> >> I think that some of the objections arise from different uses >> of the word 'theory'. Logicians typically use the word 'theory' >> for the deductive closure of a set of propositions called axioms. >> They impose no constraints the relevance or applicability of >> the axioms to any kind of phenomena. >> >> But scientists make a three-way distinction of hypotheses, >> theories, and laws: >> >> 1. A law is a theory that has been thoroughly tested on some >> observable phenomena and shown to be reliable in making >> predictions about the future development of those phenomena. >> >> 2. A theory is a hypothesis that has some relevance to some >> observable phenomena about which it makes some testable >> predictions. But its reliability has not yet been >> sufficiently tested for it to be accepted as a law. >> >> 3. A hypothesis is any theory in the logicians' sense. >> No tests of relevance or reliability have yet been made. >> >> This distinction allows anyone to suggest a hypothesis at >> any time -- there is no penalty for proposing something >> irrelevant or untestable. Then a community of inquirers may >> choose to collaborate in exploring some interesting hypotheses >> to determine which might be sufficiently promising for further >> development. >> >> John >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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