> On Dec 12, 2016, at 12:10 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > > I think we need to distinguish between pragmaticist meaningfulness, - clarity > of conceivable, imaginable practical implications - and questions of > methodeutic economy of inquiry >
Oh, I agree that’s the distinction scientists should be making. I don’t think it’s the distinction they do typically make. Woit’s “not even wrong” complaint about string theory isn’t a criticism of economy of inquiry but of meaningfulness itself. Smolin makes similar moves in his book against string theory. To be fair to Woit though, if there’s not even an in principle way to “make a difference” with string theory, to what degree can we apply the pragmatic maxim to it? String theory becomes a difference that doesn’t make a difference. I’d add that this is a place where Peirce’s limited use of the maxim for meaning and say James willingness to use it more for truth and include the psychological state of the believer as a difference matter a great deal. That is those who see a difference in meaning in the math are typically following a more James’ view of “will to believe.” Those who adopt the “not even wrong” are perhaps following Peirce somewhat. The difference being that if string theory is a highly mathematical metaphysical theory that perhaps Peirce still applies. I’m not sure how he applies mind you. I’m just willing to adopt an at least abductive argument for string theory if someone can make it. So whether string theory is the type of bad metaphysics the pragmatic maxim was meant to clear away seems a matter of possible debate. I’ll confess I know just enough string theory to be dangerous. So I don’t have an opinion here.
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