Hi Jon, On 2/10/2017 11:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
I don't know, Jon. Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn" as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the Object? I think the only real that exists within the triad is the Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects" of our attention. This actually gets to the major topic of this list over the past chunk of time, namely Nominalists v Realists. My initial sets of questions in this thread were geared to questioning what is real, and what is not. It seems fundamental that the definition and demarcation of real needs to be a starting point in that discussion. I was perceiving, and responses to this thread tend to affirm, that when we talk about "Realism" there is not even necessarily agreement about what that means. What was also evident as this discussion unfolded is that the names of things were also confusing our ability to think about those things. All of us know that unicorns don't exist, and because our label "unicorns" is obviously so similar, we assert unicorns are not real. Well, if we take the name (as a type) and its analogies (such as horses, cows, marmosets), it is clear that unicorns are not real. They do not share the aspects of tangibility, actuality, perceptabiity, etc., that we associate with "real" things like four-legged mammals. But we can actually depict, describe and discuss unicorns, because we have a firm idea of what being a unicorn means. The "idea", "what that means", is the object represented by the term "unicorn". That object is real, (because it can be a part of meaningful argument), even though if limited to thought and imagination. I know everyone on this list recoils in horror to be labeled a nominalist, but this example shows just how subtle and pernicious nominalism is. It pervades our thought in sometimes less than obvious ways. If we accept that thought and (some, Peirce's qualifier) generals are real, then it is legitimate to ask what the boundaries are of the "real" definition. I have been arguing for a broad view. I still honestly do not know how to define or segregate a general that is not real. Unicorns, included. But, whether my definition or boundaries is "correct" or not on this question, it still seems like the whole Nominalist v Realist discussion can not be grounded until the protagonists agree upon the meaning of terms. Names as indexicals are one way to help cut through the confusion. Agreement on what is real is another. I'm pretty sure a topic like this is not going to get resolved in this current thread. I'm not in your head, but I think you are letting a nominalistic view of "unicorn" as a representative term point to an animal analogue that under no empirical basis is known to exist. Because no such animal exists, you maintain that unicorns are not real. But what if the unicorn is not a real animal, but merely a label to the idea of an idealized animal, one with a twisted nose horn to boot? That animal does not exist, is a fiction of someone's imagination, and even though a not-uncommon referent by many, is not actual. As an animal this object is not real, but it is an idea, and an idea that is widely understood by many. We can talk about and reason about unicorns, just as we can for Mars or gravity or sustainability, all also things that we either accept as things vouched by others or the product of thought. None of us have experienced Mars, or understand gravity or sustainability directly. Yet these are real, are they not? So, to sum, if you can define what is real and what is not, then you can likely discriminate what is a name versus what is real. That is the root of the Nominalist v Realist question. Thanks, Mike
-- __________________________________________ Michael K. Bergman CEO Cognonto and Structured Dynamics 319.621.5225 skype:michaelkbergman http://cognonto.com http://structureddynamics.com http://mkbergman.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman __________________________________________ |
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