Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[Mike Bergman]

Hi Edwina, Thanks, I like your explanations, which probably fit better with standard Peircean arguments. Please see my comments below: On 2/11/2017 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Mike, list:  I think that we are each using terms differently. As you say, these differences have to be made clear.   1) For example, my understanding of realism is that it affirms that generals have a functional formative reality; this function is to be transformed from this potentiality into non-general existential actual individual 'examples' of that generality.   This is not, perhaps, the same meaning as 'real', which might refer instead to the individual materially existent unit of that potential generality.   In my view, unicorns, as general mental concepts function within the realm of realism. They DO transform into 'non-general existential actual individual examples' of that generality. The fact that they remain conceptual rather than material does not take away this reality. They are not  universal; I doubt if such concepts as 'unicorn' appear in the mindset of the Bantu or Dobe !Kung, but they are an integral part of the Western ideology. To deny concepts within the realm of  realism seems to me to be a movement, as you say, to nominalism and materialism.   I believe this follows within Peirce's view that even if the general does not become instantiated into an Interpretant - this does not take away its 'realism'.  My point is that realism, as a domain of generality, includes both that which can become material and that which can become only conceptual. I agree with how you treat the conceptual unicorn. But I think the distinction between real and realism is strained. I have been arguing that the real is so even if a thought or conceptual; being material may be a character of something, but is not a requisite for it being 'real'. I think we both would agree that Peirce holds beliefs guide both knowledge and action. To my mind, that makes them as real as anything else, even though beliefs are not material, and most believers believe that their beliefs are not provably true.   2) With regard, Mike, to your outline of: "Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn" as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the Object? I think the only real that exists within the triad is the Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects" of our attention."   I'm puzzled by the triadic format of the above. I would agree that the  Dynamic Object is 'the idea of a unicorn'. I'm not sure what you mean by 'unicorn as the Representamen'..unless you mean the general concept of unicorn as held within a community of people [this list for example].  I don't see, however, that JonAS, is the Interpretant. Do you mean his own personal concept of 'unicorn'?  And I would think that the 'realism of a unicorn' is held within the general habit of thought within the Representamen. I probably do not have the mastery of sign terminology to explain this better. The symbol "unicorn" in this instance is the Representamen. How do we interpret that symbol? I am suggesting, as do you, that the correct Dynamical Object is the 'idea of a unicorn', which we agree is real. If, instead, we interpret the symbol "unicorn" as a cloved mammal with a twisted horn, we begin conflating the name with the object. Since we know that unicorns have never been verified to exist and are extremely likely to not be actual, we act to materialize the object (analogous to other things such as deer or horses that share many characters) and now call it not real. This is a subtle way by which nominalism can confuse our interpretation of whether something is real or not. (Under this interpretation, then, you may have Interpretants that are shaded more towards nominalism, whereas others are shaded to realism. It is one reason to argue against the nominalistic context.) As I stated before, materialism is not a requirement for real in my judgment. I'm sure there is a more precise way to use Peirce's sign terminology to explain this better. Sorry that I keep stumbling around on this topic. I'm also happy to stop beating a dead unicorn. Thanks, Mike   Edwina             ----- Original Message ----- From: Mike Bergman To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2017 1:43 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective Hi Jon, On 2/10/2017 11:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Mike, List: I guess the reason for my first two questions was unclear.  You said that the "idea of a unicorn" is real, so I asked what you meant by "idea," and you replied that your first reaction was to treat it as a possibility.  I thus (perhaps mis)interpreted you to be saying that the "possibility of a unicorn" is real. I don't know, Jon. Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn" as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the Object? I think the only real that exists within the triad is the Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects" of our attention. This actually gets to the major topic of this list over the past chunk of time, namely Nominalists v Realists. My initial sets of questions in this thread were geared to questioning what is real, and what is not. It seems fundamental that the definition and demarcation of real needs to be a starting point in that discussion. I was perceiving, and responses to this thread tend to affirm, that when we talk about "Realism" there is not even necessarily agreement about what that means. What was also evident as this discussion unfolded is that the names of things were also confusing our ability to think about those things. All of us know that unicorns don't exist, and because our label "unicorns" is obviously so similar, we assert unicorns are not real. Well, if we take the name (as a type) and its analogies (such as horses, cows, marmosets), it is clear that unicorns are not real. They do not share the aspects of tangibility, actuality, perceptabiity, etc., that we associate with "real" things like four-legged mammals. But we can actually depict, describe and discuss unicorns, because we have a firm idea of what being a unicorn means. The "idea", "what that means", is the object represented by the term "unicorn". That object is real, (because it can be a part of meaningful argument), even though if limited to thought and imagination. I know everyone on this list recoils in horror to be labeled a nominalist, but this example shows just how subtle and pernicious nominalism is. It pervades our thought in sometimes less than obvious ways. If we accept that thought and (some, Peirce's qualifier) generals are real, then it is legitimate to ask what the boundaries are of the "real" definition. I have been arguing for a broad view. I still honestly do not know how to define or segregate a general that is not real. Unicorns, included. But, whether my definition or boundaries is "correct" or not on this question, it still seems like the whole Nominalist v Realist discussion can not be grounded until the protagonists agree upon the meaning of terms. Names as indexicals are one way to help cut through the confusion. Agreement on what is real is another. I'm pretty sure a topic like this is not going to get resolved in this current thread. MB:  You continue the same error of understanding, in my view, by using the label unicorn as the idea of the thing unicorn. How so?  As you said, this is tricky, and I would like to understand what you mean by this distinction, as well as the specific error that you perceive me to be making.  I'm not in your head, but I think you are letting a nominalistic view of "unicorn" as a representative term point to an animal analogue that under no empirical basis is known to exist. Because no such animal exists, you maintain that unicorns are not real. But what if the unicorn is not a real animal, but merely a label to the idea of an idealized animal, one with a twisted nose horn to boot? That animal does not exist, is a fiction of someone's imagination, and even though a not-uncommon referent by many, is not actual. As an animal this object is not real, but it is an idea, and an idea that is widely understood by many. We can talk about and reason about unicorns, just as we can for Mars or gravity or sustainability, all also things that we either accept as things vouched by others or the product of thought. None of us have experienced Mars, or understand gravity or sustainability directly. Yet these are real, are they not? So, to sum, if you can define what is real and what is not, then you can likely discriminate what is a name versus what is real. That is the root of the Nominalist v Realist question. Thanks, Mike   Thanks, Jon S. On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 11:00 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: Hi Jon, On 2/10/2017 10:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Mike, List: Would you say, then, that all possibilities are real?  Do you think that a unicorn is the kind of thing that he would have characterized as a real possibility? No, and I did not say earlier that all possibilities are real; actually, the opposite. Possibilities, Firstness, are building blocks or raw qualia that may be seen once a particular is evident or expressed. You continue the same error of understanding, in my view, by using the label unicorn as the idea of the thing unicorn. I admit, it is a tricky part of Peirce's view. And, per my first paragraph, the possibility focus is misplaced. Can you suggest some passages in Peirce's writings where he distinguished "the objective real" from "the subjective real," or at least defined the latter? No, as I thought I indicated, I can not. This perspective is a supposition on my part based on other similar distinctions (objective-subjective) Peirce made. It is just a logical way to address the question you asked, that I think is a strong abduction. In fact, this gets to the heart of my original article: How can one be informed by Peirce to address new questions that he himself had not already considered? Thanks, Mike Thanks, Jon S. On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 10:02 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: Hi Jon, On 2/10/2017 9:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Mike, List: Briefly ... MB:  The "idea of a unicorn" is real ... I find this more plausible than the notion that unicorns themselves are real, but I am curious--in this context, do you mean "idea" as "the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy," or as "that whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it" (CP 6.452; 1908)? Hmm, the "unitary thought or fancy" is an interesting case, but my first reaction is to treat it as a possibility and not an instantiation. Fruitful example . . .   To use distinctions CSP sometimes used himself, one might say there is both the objective real, which is the sense in CP 6.452, but also the subjective real, such as the unicorn. Now, the subjective real can also be a belief of nearly everyone, such as I know what you mean when you refer to "unicorn", or by only a few or one, such as my own reality is the only true one. Thanks, Mike Thanks, Jon S. On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: Hi Jon, Not to carry this thread beyond some useful threshold, see below: On 2/10/2017 7:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Mike, List: I suspect that the questions of whether all generals are real and whether the fictional is real are connected.  If some generals are fictional, and nothing fictional is real, then some generals are not real.  As an example, "unicorn" is a general term for something that is fictional, and most people would probably say that "a unicorn has one horn" is a true proposition.  Does this mean that unicorns are real?  Most people would presumably deny this. I keep coming back to Peirce's definitions of "real" and "fictive" that I quoted previously.  The distinction is whether the characters of the object in question depend on what a person or finite group of people thinks about them.  A unicorn has one horn only because people have agreed to this as part of the definition for a certain kind of imaginary (i.e., non-existent) thing.  By contrast, an Indian rhinoceros has one horn regardless of what anyone thinks about it.  People having thoughts about unicorns does not make them real, and the Indian rhinoceros would be real even if no one ever actually had any thoughts about it. Unicorns are the perfect case! We have never actually seen one. But, we can describe one, perhaps write long, learned articles about them, render them so their icon is clear, and even discuss them in this thread. That is real. Now, the character of this unicorn thing is that it has many characteristics of cloved mammals, but also has a nasal horn, perhaps twisted, and lives in the forest. And, oh, by the way, this thing is not actual or has not been known to tangibly exist. In short, we can call this character either fictive or imaginary. The way to break through this understanding is to see the term "unicorn" as the mere token, or "unicorns" as the type. The "idea of a unicorn" is real, perhaps in a related way to why the "idea of gravity" is real. The habitual aspect of gravity may be stronger than unicorns, but a lot of consensus has gone into deciding what all of this means. That strikes me as real, and if I asked CSP about it he would agree, but he would also point out subtleties that I glaringly missed. I might smile or not in reaction. As for fallibility, our current inability to be absolutely certain about the reality of something has no bearing on whether it is, in fact, real. Sorry, I probably was not clear. I was bringing up the question of fallibility in terms of the "some generals are not real" discussion, not as you refer. I'm happy to let this thread dye. Thanks for your input! Mike Thanks for the additional comments on indexicals; again, interesting stuff! Regards, Jon S. ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- __________________________________________ Michael K. Bergman CEO Cognonto and Structured Dynamics 319.621.5225 skype:michaelkbergman http://cognonto.com http://structureddynamics.com http://mkbergman.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman __________________________________________

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