Mike, list,
I think that you're putting the cart before the unicorn. The idea of the
unreal a.k.a. fictitious in Peirce begins as the idea of the object of a
false proposition, an idea rooted, for Peirce, not in ontology but in
logic and its presuppositions, to which ontology is posterior. There are
true general propositions if and only if there are real generals. There
are false general propositions if and only if there are fictitious,
a.k.a. unreal, generals. If there were no false general propositions,
then science would have little if any purpose, since it would be unable
to err about generals even if it wanted to. No more proofs by reduction
to absurdity. The object of a sign is ultimately the universe of
discourse of said object. If it is false that there has existed a
unicorn, then a universe of discourse in which there has existed a
unicorn is an unreal, fictitious universe of discourse. For Peirce,
logic and reason presuppose that, for a proposition to be true, it must
not depend on what we think of it, likewise for its object to be real,
it must not depend on what we think of it; for it to be real, it must
also be cognizable, such that sufficient inquiry would find it
inevitably, sooner or later. The presuppositions of fallibilism and
cognizabilism are both needed in order to keep the way of inquiry unbarred.
After that, we can bring all kinds of nuances in, e.g., a universe of
discourse that is at least a coarse-grained version of our actual world
in the vast majority of respects, except in containing a unicorn. People
could argue about whether a unicorn's evolution is feasible or probable.
If it were significantly feasible or probable, we could say that the
unicorn species (as a kind of form) is a really feasible or probable
possibility, and we could dub animals belonging to the predecessor
species that would evolve into unicorns as "unicorniferous" or suchlike,
and regard that as a property as real as the hardness of a diamond even
if nothing ever happens to try to scratch that diamond. We could regard
the capacity for harboring unicorns as a real property of the Earth.
Suppose that a highly intelligent observer were on Earth hundreds of
millions of years ago, when animals first emerged onto land. That
observer might have predicted that flying animals would evolve some day.
It's happened at least four times, so it seems quite feasible. A square
circle, on the other hand, is _/necessarily/_ unreal by the definitions
of the terms (if a square were defined not as an equilateral rectangle
but as an equiangular equilateral quadrilateral, then I suppose
something could be both a circle and a kind of degenerate square in some
non-Euclidean space). Even in mathematics it's not always so
cut-and-dried, e.g., the case of zero to the zeroth power, and there the
issue is not simply a touch of the arbitrary in the definition of an
object (still, mathematicians seem to regard 0⁰ as most "naturally"
equal to 1 rather than equal to 0 or undefined). Of course then there
are the mathematical intuitionists. Most mathematicians aren't
intuitionists, but the intuitionists and some others convinced most
mathematicians to prefer constructive proofs. If we get into that
subject, I'm afraid I'll get lost. The more specialized discussions of
what is real in various domains usually involves some applications of
philosophical thinking. I've seen the theory of limits referred to as
"the metaphysics of mathematical analysis" and the philosopher Berkeley
actually did motivate work there.
The idea that the unicorn or its species is real because of a
corresponding factor or style in thought and culture involves the kind
of equivocation about the term "unicorn" that people often delight in.
"Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus."
http://www.google.com/search?q=%22Yes%2C+Virginia%2C+there+is+a+Santa+Claus%22
. The 1947 movie _Miracle on 34th Street_ plays on it too, particularly
in the trial scenes. I used to go along with that kind of realism about
Santa Claus, Cthulhu
https://www.google.com/search?q=Yes%2C+Virginia%2C+there+is+a+Cthulhu ,
and others, in a kind of rebellious spirit, but their 'reality' depends
too much on what actual people think of them. They are dreams,
nightmares, make-believes, etc., real in the way that dreams and
nightmares are, thoughts that take place on actual dates, classes of
such thoughts, etc.
Best, Ben
On 2/11/2017 10:44 AM, Mike Bergman wrote:
Hi Edwina,
Thanks, I like your explanations, which probably fit better with
standard Peircean arguments. Please see my comments below:
On 2/11/2017 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Mike, list: I think that we are each using terms differently. As you
say, these differences have to be made clear.
1) For example, my understanding of /realism/ is that it affirms that
generals have a functional formative reality; this function is to be
transformed from this potentiality into non-general existential
actual individual 'examples' of that generality.
This is not, perhaps, the same meaning as '/real',/ which might refer
instead to the individual _materially_ existent unit of that
potential generality.
In my view, unicorns, as general mental concepts function within the
realm of /realism/. They DO transform into 'non-general existential
actual individual examples' of that generality. The fact that they
remain /conceptual/ rather than /material/ does not take away this
/reality/. They are not _universal_; I doubt if such concepts as
'unicorn' appear in the mindset of the Bantu or Dobe !Kung, but they
are an integral part of the Western ideology. To deny concepts within
the realm of realism seems to me to be a movement, as you say, to
nominalism and materialism.
I believe this follows within Peirce's view that even if the general
does not become instantiated into an Interpretant - this does not
take away its 'realism'. My point is that realism, as a domain of
generality, includes both that which can become material and that
which can become only conceptual.
I agree with how you treat the conceptual unicorn. But I think the
distinction between real and realism is strained. I have been arguing
that the real is so even if a thought or conceptual; being material
may be a character of something, but is not a requisite for it being
'real'. I think we both would agree that Peirce holds beliefs guide
both knowledge and action. To my mind, that makes them as real as
anything else, even though beliefs are not material, and most
believers believe that their beliefs are not provably true.
2) With regard, Mike, to your outline of:
"Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn" as the
Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, take
"unicorn" as the Object? I think the only real that exists within the
triad is the Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the
Representamen as the "objects" of our attention."
I'm puzzled by the triadic format of the above. I would agree that
the Dynamic Object is 'the idea of a unicorn'. I'm not sure what you
mean by 'unicorn as the Representamen'..unless you mean the general
concept of unicorn as held within a community of people [this list
for example]. I don't see, however, that JonAS, is the Interpretant.
Do you mean his own personal concept of 'unicorn'? And I would think
that the 'realism of a unicorn' is held within the general habit of
thought within the Representamen.
I probably do not have the mastery of sign terminology to explain this
better. The symbol "unicorn" in this instance is the Representamen.
How do we interpret that symbol? I am suggesting, as do you, that the
correct Dynamical Object is the 'idea of a unicorn', which we agree is
real. If, instead, we interpret the symbol "unicorn" as a cloved
mammal with a twisted horn, we begin conflating the name with the
object. Since we know that unicorns have never been verified to exist
and are extremely likely to not be actual, we act to materialize the
object (analogous to other things such as deer or horses that share
many characters) and now call it not real. This is a subtle way by
which nominalism can confuse our interpretation of whether something
is real or not. (Under this interpretation, then, you may have
Interpretants that are shaded more towards nominalism, whereas others
are shaded to realism. It is one reason to argue against the
nominalistic context.) As I stated before, materialism is not a
requirement for real in my judgment.
I'm sure there is a more precise way to use Peirce's sign terminology
to explain this better. Sorry that I keep stumbling around on this
topic. I'm also happy to stop beating a dead unicorn.
Thanks, Mike
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Mike Bergman <mailto:[email protected]>
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Saturday, February 11, 2017 1:43 AM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's
"Mindset" from AI perspective
Hi Jon,
On 2/10/2017 11:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:
I guess the reason for my first two questions was unclear. You
said that the "idea of a unicorn" is real, so I asked what you
meant by "idea," and you replied that your first reaction was to
treat it as a possibility. I thus (perhaps mis)interpreted you to
be saying that the "possibility of a unicorn" is real.
I don't know, Jon. Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and
"unicorn" as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the
Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the Object? I think the only real
that exists within the triad is the Object, unless we make the
Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects" of our attention.
This actually gets to the major topic of this list over the past
chunk of time, namely Nominalists v Realists.
My initial sets of questions in this thread were geared to
questioning what is real, and what is not. It seems fundamental that
the definition and demarcation of */real/* needs to be a starting
point in that discussion. I was perceiving, and responses to this
thread tend to affirm, that when we talk about "Realism" there is
not even necessarily agreement about what that means.
What was also evident as this discussion unfolded is that the names
of things were also confusing our ability to think about those
things. All of us know that unicorns don't exist, and because our
label "unicorns" is obviously so similar, we assert unicorns are not
real. Well, if we take the name (as a type) and its analogies (such
as horses, cows, marmosets), it is clear that unicorns are not real.
They do not share the aspects of tangibility, actuality,
perceptabiity, etc., that we associate with "real" things like
four-legged mammals. But we can actually depict, describe and
discuss unicorns, because we have a firm idea of what being a
unicorn means. The "idea", "what that means", is the object
represented by the term "unicorn". That object is real, (because it
can be a part of meaningful argument), even though if limited to
thought and imagination.
I know everyone on this list recoils in horror to be labeled a
nominalist, but this example shows just how subtle and pernicious
nominalism is. It pervades our thought in sometimes less than
obvious ways.
If we accept that thought and (some, Peirce's qualifier) generals
are real, then it is legitimate to ask what the boundaries are of
the "real" definition. I have been arguing for a broad view. I still
honestly do not know how to define or segregate a general that is
not real. Unicorns, included.
But, whether my definition or boundaries is "correct" or not on this
question, it still seems like the whole Nominalist v Realist
discussion can not be grounded until the protagonists agree upon the
meaning of terms. Names as indexicals are one way to help cut
through the confusion. Agreement on what is real is another.
I'm pretty sure a topic like this is not going to get resolved in
this current thread.
MB: You continue the same error of understanding, in my view, by
using the label unicorn as the idea of the thing unicorn.
How so? As you said, this is tricky, and I would like to
understand what you mean by this distinction, as well as the
specific error that you perceive me to be making.
I'm not in your head, but I think you are letting a nominalistic
view of "unicorn" as a representative term point to an animal
analogue that under no empirical basis is known to exist. Because no
such animal exists, you maintain that unicorns are not real.
But what if the unicorn is not a real animal, but merely a label to
the idea of an idealized animal, one with a twisted nose horn to
boot? That animal does not exist, is a fiction of someone's
imagination, and even though a not-uncommon referent by many, is not
actual. As an animal this object is not real, but it is an idea, and
an idea that is widely understood by many. We can talk about and
reason about unicorns, just as we can for Mars or gravity or
sustainability, all also things that we either accept as things
vouched by others or the product of thought. None of us have
experienced Mars, or understand gravity or sustainability directly.
Yet these are real, are they not?
So, to sum, if you can define what is real and what is not, then you
can likely discriminate what is a name versus what is real. That is
the root of the Nominalist v Realist question.
Thanks, Mike
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 11:00 PM, Mike Bergman <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
