Clark, list,
Yes, the different kinds of universe of discourse is indeed a "tricky
bit" as you put it. If the sign's object is ultimately the universe of
which the special object is a member, or part, then is there any reason
for the sign not to be the universe of signs of which the special sign
is a member or part?
I guess that as a practical matter a given universe of signs would be a
system of signs shared by utterer and interpreter. But how would it be
picked out? A universe of objects is indicated, if not by an index in a
proposition itself, still by an index in the environment, said Peirce.
Then there is also the universe of marks a.k.a. characters. I guess
various universes or systems of signs would be reduced versions of
Peirce's third universe of experience. What about a univese of
interpretants? Would this just be a universe of signs in a different
relation? At least sometimes it could be a different system of signs. In
"A Neglected Argument..." Peirce says, "The third Universe comprises
everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections
between different objects, especially between objects in different
Universes."
You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think
most of the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms."
Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in the
particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes tempting
kind of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. (Diving is
okay, sinking is not so good.)
On 2/13/2017 6:54 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
On Feb 11, 2017, at 12:59 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On the sign's object as ultimately the universe of discourse of the
(more explicit) object, I was discussing Peirce's view.
1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:492
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-letters-william-james-6
A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined
(i.e., specialized, _/bestimmt/_) by something other than itself,
called its Object (or, in some cases, as if the Sign be the
sentence “Cain killled Abel,” in which Cain and Abel are equally
Partial Objects, it may be more convenient to say that that which
determines the Sign is the Complexus, or Totality, of Partial
Objects. And in every case the Object is accurately the Universe
of which the Special Object is member, or part), while, on the
other hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the
determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the
Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately
by the Object.
[End quote]
For example, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto,
but not only about Pluto.
This gets at the importance of a kind of holism for Peirce that
surprisingly doesn’t get remarked upon as much as Quine’s. (Even
though people pointed out the parallel to Quine who then wrote a paper
about his ignorance of Peirce)
The tricky bit is really the different types of universes of
discourses. We talked about that just a few weeks ago so I’ll not
bring it up again. But I completely agree with you that we can’t
really separate out the type of generality and reality without talking
about these universes. Like you I tend to think most of the debate on
all this depends upon equivocation over terms. That’s why the
pragmatic maxim comes in handy as it cuts confusion between say an
unicorn of a novel’s fictional world from an unicorn in the regular
world by asking how we’d measure it.
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