Ben, list: I am missing something..You wrote: "The object of a sign is ultimately the universe of discourse of said object."
My view is that the object of a representamen is NOT the 'universe of discourse'; that sounds, to me, like the Interpretant. I can see that the Interpretant, within a collective population, is 'the universe of discourse of said object'. Certainly, that Interpretant can then become the Object in the triad of O-R-I.... I don't think that a unicorn has to materially exist in order to be 'real'; it can be a mental concept that might, eventually, become material [as you note, by some evolutionary adaptation]. After all, at one time, the airplane was a concept and then, became materially 'real'. I also still think there is a difference between the terms of 'realism' and 'real' and if by 'real' we mean objectively materially existent - then, this confines the 'real' to the material world, and leaves out 'realism' which refers to generals..which can never 'exist' per se. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Benjamin Udell To: [email protected] Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2017 1:45 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective Mike, list, I think that you're putting the cart before the unicorn. The idea of the unreal a.k.a. fictitious in Peirce begins as the idea of the object of a false proposition, an idea rooted, for Peirce, not in ontology but in logic and its presuppositions, to which ontology is posterior. There are true general propositions if and only if there are real generals. There are false general propositions if and only if there are fictitious, a.k.a. unreal, generals. If there were no false general propositions, then science would have little if any purpose, since it would be unable to err about generals even if it wanted to. No more proofs by reduction to absurdity. The object of a sign is ultimately the universe of discourse of said object. If it is false that there has existed a unicorn, then a universe of discourse in which there has existed a unicorn is an unreal, fictitious universe of discourse. For Peirce, logic and reason presuppose that, for a proposition to be true, it must not depend on what we think of it, likewise for its object to be real, it must not depend on what we think of it; for it to be real, it must also be cognizable, such that sufficient inquiry would find it inevitably, sooner or later. The presuppositions of fallibilism and cognizabilism are both needed in order to keep the way of inquiry unbarred. After that, we can bring all kinds of nuances in, e.g., a universe of discourse that is at least a coarse-grained version of our actual world in the vast majority of respects, except in containing a unicorn. People could argue about whether a unicorn's evolution is feasible or probable. If it were significantly feasible or probable, we could say that the unicorn species (as a kind of form) is a really feasible or probable possibility, and we could dub animals belonging to the predecessor species that would evolve into unicorns as "unicorniferous" or suchlike, and regard that as a property as real as the hardness of a diamond even if nothing ever happens to try to scratch that diamond. We could regard the capacity for harboring unicorns as a real property of the Earth. Suppose that a highly intelligent observer were on Earth hundreds of millions of years ago, when animals first emerged onto land. That observer might have predicted that flying animals would evolve some day. It's happened at least four times, so it seems quite feasible. A square circle, on the other hand, is _necessarily_ unreal by the definitions of the terms (if a square were defined not as an equilateral rectangle but as an equiangular equilateral quadrilateral, then I suppose something could be both a circle and a kind of degenerate square in some non-Euclidean space). Even in mathematics it's not always so cut-and-dried, e.g., the case of zero to the zeroth power, and there the issue is not simply a touch of the arbitrary in the definition of an object (still, mathematicians seem to regard 0⁰ as most "naturally" equal to 1 rather than equal to 0 or undefined). Of course then there are the mathematical intuitionists. Most mathematicians aren't intuitionists, but the intuitionists and some others convinced most mathematicians to prefer constructive proofs. If we get into that subject, I'm afraid I'll get lost. The more specialized discussions of what is real in various domains usually involves some applications of philosophical thinking. I've seen the theory of limits referred to as "the metaphysics of mathematical analysis" and the philosopher Berkeley actually did motivate work there. The idea that the unicorn or its species is real because of a corresponding factor or style in thought and culture involves the kind of equivocation about the term "unicorn" that people often delight in. "Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus." http://www.google.com/search?q=%22Yes%2C+Virginia%2C+there+is+a+Santa+Claus%22 . The 1947 movie _Miracle on 34th Street_ plays on it too, particularly in the trial scenes. I used to go along with that kind of realism about Santa Claus, Cthulhu https://www.google.com/search?q=Yes%2C+Virginia%2C+there+is+a+Cthulhu , and others, in a kind of rebellious spirit, but their 'reality' depends too much on what actual people think of them. They are dreams, nightmares, make-believes, etc., real in the way that dreams and nightmares are, thoughts that take place on actual dates, classes of such thoughts, etc. Best, Ben On 2/11/2017 10:44 AM, Mike Bergman wrote: Hi Edwina, Thanks, I like your explanations, which probably fit better with standard Peircean arguments. Please see my comments below: On 2/11/2017 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Mike, list: I think that we are each using terms differently. As you say, these differences have to be made clear. 1) For example, my understanding of realism is that it affirms that generals have a functional formative reality; this function is to be transformed from this potentiality into non-general existential actual individual 'examples' of that generality. This is not, perhaps, the same meaning as 'real', which might refer instead to the individual materially existent unit of that potential generality. In my view, unicorns, as general mental concepts function within the realm of realism. They DO transform into 'non-general existential actual individual examples' of that generality. The fact that they remain conceptual rather than material does not take away this reality. They are not universal; I doubt if such concepts as 'unicorn' appear in the mindset of the Bantu or Dobe !Kung, but they are an integral part of the Western ideology. To deny concepts within the realm of realism seems to me to be a movement, as you say, to nominalism and materialism. I believe this follows within Peirce's view that even if the general does not become instantiated into an Interpretant - this does not take away its 'realism'. My point is that realism, as a domain of generality, includes both that which can become material and that which can become only conceptual. I agree with how you treat the conceptual unicorn. But I think the distinction between real and realism is strained. I have been arguing that the real is so even if a thought or conceptual; being material may be a character of something, but is not a requisite for it being 'real'. I think we both would agree that Peirce holds beliefs guide both knowledge and action. To my mind, that makes them as real as anything else, even though beliefs are not material, and most believers believe that their beliefs are not provably true. 2) With regard, Mike, to your outline of: "Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn" as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the Object? I think the only real that exists within the triad is the Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects" of our attention." I'm puzzled by the triadic format of the above. I would agree that the Dynamic Object is 'the idea of a unicorn'. I'm not sure what you mean by 'unicorn as the Representamen'..unless you mean the general concept of unicorn as held within a community of people [this list for example]. I don't see, however, that JonAS, is the Interpretant. Do you mean his own personal concept of 'unicorn'? And I would think that the 'realism of a unicorn' is held within the general habit of thought within the Representamen. I probably do not have the mastery of sign terminology to explain this better. The symbol "unicorn" in this instance is the Representamen. How do we interpret that symbol? I am suggesting, as do you, that the correct Dynamical Object is the 'idea of a unicorn', which we agree is real. If, instead, we interpret the symbol "unicorn" as a cloved mammal with a twisted horn, we begin conflating the name with the object. Since we know that unicorns have never been verified to exist and are extremely likely to not be actual, we act to materialize the object (analogous to other things such as deer or horses that share many characters) and now call it not real. This is a subtle way by which nominalism can confuse our interpretation of whether something is real or not. (Under this interpretation, then, you may have Interpretants that are shaded more towards nominalism, whereas others are shaded to realism. It is one reason to argue against the nominalistic context.) As I stated before, materialism is not a requirement for real in my judgment. I'm sure there is a more precise way to use Peirce's sign terminology to explain this better. Sorry that I keep stumbling around on this topic. I'm also happy to stop beating a dead unicorn. Thanks, Mike Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Mike Bergman To: [email protected] Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2017 1:43 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective Hi Jon, On 2/10/2017 11:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Mike, List: I guess the reason for my first two questions was unclear. You said that the "idea of a unicorn" is real, so I asked what you meant by "idea," and you replied that your first reaction was to treat it as a possibility. I thus (perhaps mis)interpreted you to be saying that the "possibility of a unicorn" is real. I don't know, Jon. Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn" as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the Object? I think the only real that exists within the triad is the Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects" of our attention. This actually gets to the major topic of this list over the past chunk of time, namely Nominalists v Realists. My initial sets of questions in this thread were geared to questioning what is real, and what is not. It seems fundamental that the definition and demarcation of real needs to be a starting point in that discussion. I was perceiving, and responses to this thread tend to affirm, that when we talk about "Realism" there is not even necessarily agreement about what that means. What was also evident as this discussion unfolded is that the names of things were also confusing our ability to think about those things. All of us know that unicorns don't exist, and because our label "unicorns" is obviously so similar, we assert unicorns are not real. Well, if we take the name (as a type) and its analogies (such as horses, cows, marmosets), it is clear that unicorns are not real. They do not share the aspects of tangibility, actuality, perceptabiity, etc., that we associate with "real" things like four-legged mammals. But we can actually depict, describe and discuss unicorns, because we have a firm idea of what being a unicorn means. The "idea", "what that means", is the object represented by the term "unicorn". That object is real, (because it can be a part of meaningful argument), even though if limited to thought and imagination. I know everyone on this list recoils in horror to be labeled a nominalist, but this example shows just how subtle and pernicious nominalism is. It pervades our thought in sometimes less than obvious ways. If we accept that thought and (some, Peirce's qualifier) generals are real, then it is legitimate to ask what the boundaries are of the "real" definition. I have been arguing for a broad view. I still honestly do not know how to define or segregate a general that is not real. Unicorns, included. But, whether my definition or boundaries is "correct" or not on this question, it still seems like the whole Nominalist v Realist discussion can not be grounded until the protagonists agree upon the meaning of terms. Names as indexicals are one way to help cut through the confusion. Agreement on what is real is another. I'm pretty sure a topic like this is not going to get resolved in this current thread. MB: You continue the same error of understanding, in my view, by using the label unicorn as the idea of the thing unicorn. How so? As you said, this is tricky, and I would like to understand what you mean by this distinction, as well as the specific error that you perceive me to be making. I'm not in your head, but I think you are letting a nominalistic view of "unicorn" as a representative term point to an animal analogue that under no empirical basis is known to exist. Because no such animal exists, you maintain that unicorns are not real. But what if the unicorn is not a real animal, but merely a label to the idea of an idealized animal, one with a twisted nose horn to boot? That animal does not exist, is a fiction of someone's imagination, and even though a not-uncommon referent by many, is not actual. As an animal this object is not real, but it is an idea, and an idea that is widely understood by many. We can talk about and reason about unicorns, just as we can for Mars or gravity or sustainability, all also things that we either accept as things vouched by others or the product of thought. None of us have experienced Mars, or understand gravity or sustainability directly. Yet these are real, are they not? So, to sum, if you can define what is real and what is not, then you can likely discriminate what is a name versus what is real. That is the root of the Nominalist v Realist question. Thanks, Mike Thanks, Jon S. On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 11:00 PM, Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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