Mike, list: I think that we are each using terms differently. As you say,
these differences have to be made clear.
1) For example, my understanding of realism is that it affirms that generals
have a functional formative reality; this function is to be transformed from
this potentiality into non-general existential actual individual 'examples' of
that generality.
This is not, perhaps, the same meaning as 'real', which might refer instead to
the individual materially existent unit of that potential generality.
In my view, unicorns, as general mental concepts function within the realm of
realism. They DO transform into 'non-general existential actual individual
examples' of that generality. The fact that they remain conceptual rather than
material does not take away this reality. They are not universal; I doubt if
such concepts as 'unicorn' appear in the mindset of the Bantu or Dobe !Kung,
but they are an integral part of the Western ideology. To deny concepts within
the realm of realism seems to me to be a movement, as you say, to nominalism
and materialism.
I believe this follows within Peirce's view that even if the general does not
become instantiated into an Interpretant - this does not take away its
'realism'. My point is that realism, as a domain of generality, includes both
that which can become material and that which can become only conceptual.
2) With regard, Mike, to your outline of:
"Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn" as the
Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the
Object? I think the only real that exists within the triad is the Object,
unless we make the Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects" of our
attention."
I'm puzzled by the triadic format of the above. I would agree that the Dynamic
Object is 'the idea of a unicorn'. I'm not sure what you mean by 'unicorn as
the Representamen'..unless you mean the general concept of unicorn as held
within a community of people [this list for example]. I don't see, however,
that JonAS, is the Interpretant. Do you mean his own personal concept of
'unicorn'? And I would think that the 'realism of a unicorn' is held within
the general habit of thought within the Representamen.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Mike Bergman
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2017 1:43 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from
AI perspective
Hi Jon,
On 2/10/2017 11:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:
I guess the reason for my first two questions was unclear. You said that
the "idea of a unicorn" is real, so I asked what you meant by "idea," and you
replied that your first reaction was to treat it as a possibility. I thus
(perhaps mis)interpreted you to be saying that the "possibility of a unicorn"
is real.
I don't know, Jon. Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn"
as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, take "unicorn"
as the Object? I think the only real that exists within the triad is the
Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects"
of our attention.
This actually gets to the major topic of this list over the past chunk of
time, namely Nominalists v Realists.
My initial sets of questions in this thread were geared to questioning what
is real, and what is not. It seems fundamental that the definition and
demarcation of real needs to be a starting point in that discussion. I was
perceiving, and responses to this thread tend to affirm, that when we talk
about "Realism" there is not even necessarily agreement about what that means.
What was also evident as this discussion unfolded is that the names of things
were also confusing our ability to think about those things. All of us know
that unicorns don't exist, and because our label "unicorns" is obviously so
similar, we assert unicorns are not real. Well, if we take the name (as a type)
and its analogies (such as horses, cows, marmosets), it is clear that unicorns
are not real. They do not share the aspects of tangibility, actuality,
perceptabiity, etc., that we associate with "real" things like four-legged
mammals. But we can actually depict, describe and discuss unicorns, because we
have a firm idea of what being a unicorn means. The "idea", "what that means",
is the object represented by the term "unicorn". That object is real, (because
it can be a part of meaningful argument), even though if limited to thought and
imagination.
I know everyone on this list recoils in horror to be labeled a nominalist,
but this example shows just how subtle and pernicious nominalism is. It
pervades our thought in sometimes less than obvious ways.
If we accept that thought and (some, Peirce's qualifier) generals are real,
then it is legitimate to ask what the boundaries are of the "real" definition.
I have been arguing for a broad view. I still honestly do not know how to
define or segregate a general that is not real. Unicorns, included.
But, whether my definition or boundaries is "correct" or not on this
question, it still seems like the whole Nominalist v Realist discussion can not
be grounded until the protagonists agree upon the meaning of terms. Names as
indexicals are one way to help cut through the confusion. Agreement on what is
real is another.
I'm pretty sure a topic like this is not going to get resolved in this
current thread.
MB: You continue the same error of understanding, in my view, by using
the label unicorn as the idea of the thing unicorn.
How so? As you said, this is tricky, and I would like to understand what
you mean by this distinction, as well as the specific error that you perceive
me to be making.
I'm not in your head, but I think you are letting a nominalistic view of
"unicorn" as a representative term point to an animal analogue that under no
empirical basis is known to exist. Because no such animal exists, you maintain
that unicorns are not real.
But what if the unicorn is not a real animal, but merely a label to the idea
of an idealized animal, one with a twisted nose horn to boot? That animal does
not exist, is a fiction of someone's imagination, and even though a
not-uncommon referent by many, is not actual. As an animal this object is not
real, but it is an idea, and an idea that is widely understood by many. We can
talk about and reason about unicorns, just as we can for Mars or gravity or
sustainability, all also things that we either accept as things vouched by
others or the product of thought. None of us have experienced Mars, or
understand gravity or sustainability directly. Yet these are real, are they not?
So, to sum, if you can define what is real and what is not, then you can
likely discriminate what is a name versus what is real. That is the root of the
Nominalist v Realist question.
Thanks, Mike
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 11:00 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:
Hi Jon,
On 2/10/2017 10:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:
Would you say, then, that all possibilities are real? Do you think
that a unicorn is the kind of thing that he would have characterized as a real
possibility?
No, and I did not say earlier that all possibilities are real; actually,
the opposite. Possibilities, Firstness, are building blocks or raw qualia that
may be seen once a particular is evident or expressed.
You continue the same error of understanding, in my view, by using the
label unicorn as the idea of the thing unicorn. I admit, it is a tricky part of
Peirce's view. And, per my first paragraph, the possibility focus is misplaced.
Can you suggest some passages in Peirce's writings where he
distinguished "the objective real" from "the subjective real," or at least
defined the latter?
No, as I thought I indicated, I can not. This perspective is a
supposition on my part based on other similar distinctions
(objective-subjective) Peirce made. It is just a logical way to address the
question you asked, that I think is a strong abduction. In fact, this gets to
the heart of my original article: How can one be informed by Peirce to address
new questions that he himself had not already considered?
Thanks, Mike
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 10:02 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com>
wrote:
Hi Jon,
On 2/10/2017 9:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:
Briefly ...
MB: The "idea of a unicorn" is real ...
I find this more plausible than the notion that unicorns themselves
are real, but I am curious--in this context, do you mean "idea" as "the
substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy," or as "that whose Being
consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any
person's faculty or impotence to represent it" (CP 6.452; 1908)?
Hmm, the "unitary thought or fancy" is an interesting case, but my
first reaction is to treat it as a possibility and not an instantiation.
Fruitful example . . .
To use distinctions CSP sometimes used himself, one might say there
is both the objective real, which is the sense in CP 6.452, but also the
subjective real, such as the unicorn. Now, the subjective real can also be a
belief of nearly everyone, such as I know what you mean when you refer to
"unicorn", or by only a few or one, such as my own reality is the only true one.
Thanks, Mike
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 7:53 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com>
wrote:
Hi Jon,
Not to carry this thread beyond some useful threshold, see below:
On 2/10/2017 7:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:
I suspect that the questions of whether all generals are real
and whether the fictional is real are connected. If some generals are
fictional, and nothing fictional is real, then some generals are not real. As
an example, "unicorn" is a general term for something that is fictional, and
most people would probably say that "a unicorn has one horn" is a true
proposition. Does this mean that unicorns are real? Most people would
presumably deny this.
I keep coming back to Peirce's definitions of "real" and
"fictive" that I quoted previously. The distinction is whether the characters
of the object in question depend on what a person or finite group of people
thinks about them. A unicorn has one horn only because people have agreed to
this as part of the definition for a certain kind of imaginary (i.e.,
non-existent) thing. By contrast, an Indian rhinoceros has one horn regardless
of what anyone thinks about it. People having thoughts about unicorns does not
make them real, and the Indian rhinoceros would be real even if no one ever
actually had any thoughts about it.
Unicorns are the perfect case! We have never actually seen one.
But, we can describe one, perhaps write long, learned articles about them,
render them so their icon is clear, and even discuss them in this thread. That
is real. Now, the character of this unicorn thing is that it has many
characteristics of cloved mammals, but also has a nasal horn, perhaps twisted,
and lives in the forest. And, oh, by the way, this thing is not actual or has
not been known to tangibly exist. In short, we can call this character either
fictive or imaginary.
The way to break through this understanding is to see the term
"unicorn" as the mere token, or "unicorns" as the type. The "idea of a unicorn"
is real, perhaps in a related way to why the "idea of gravity" is real. The
habitual aspect of gravity may be stronger than unicorns, but a lot of
consensus has gone into deciding what all of this means. That strikes me as
real, and if I asked CSP about it he would agree, but he would also point out
subtleties that I glaringly missed. I might smile or not in reaction.
As for fallibility, our current inability to be absolutely
certain about the reality of something has no bearing on whether it is, in
fact, real.
Sorry, I probably was not clear. I was bringing up the question
of fallibility in terms of the "some generals are not real" discussion, not as
you refer.
I'm happy to let this thread dye. Thanks for your input!
Mike
Thanks for the additional comments on indexicals; again,
interesting stuff!
Regards,
Jon S.
--
__________________________________________
Michael K. Bergman
CEO Cognonto and Structured Dynamics
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://structureddynamics.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__________________________________________
--
__________________________________________
Michael K. Bergman
CEO Cognonto and Structured Dynamics
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://structureddynamics.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__________________________________________
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