Ben, Clark, List: Peirce's comments about the phoenix do indeed seem relevant to the unicorn example and the nature of labels in general.
CSP: A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a General Term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign. Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind, in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in that mind to give rise to a General Concept. In this it differs from other Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns, including those which are Replicas of Rhematic Indexical Legisigns. Thus, the demonstrative pronoun "that" is a Legisign, being a general type; but it is not a Symbol, since it does not signify a general concept. Its Replica draws attention to a single Object, and is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually known to the auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word "camel" calls up the idea of a camel. The same thing is true of the word "phoenix." For although no phoenix really exists, real descriptions of the phoenix are well known to the speaker and his auditor; and thus the word is really affected by the Object denoted. (CP 2.261; 1903) A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that calls up the *idea *of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really *exists*, real *descriptions *of the unicorn are well known to the speaker and his/her auditor. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 12:05 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Clark, list, > > I haven't read very much on the problem of reference and generality with > respect to fictional characters, so I'm reluctant to say that it usually > comes down to equivocation over terms. Also I have in mind Peirce's > comment, I don't remember where, that the object determines the sign, even > when the sign in some sense brings the object into being (as with fictional > characters). There seems there something more in the problematics than a > routine equivocation problem. So I'm feeling cautious on the subject. > > Best, Ben > > On 2/14/2017 12:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > On Feb 14, 2017, at 10:28 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> You wrote, regarding universe of discourse, "Like you I tend to think >>> most of the debate on all this depends upon equivocation over terms." >>> >>> Actually I don't have an opinion on that, instead I thought that in the >>> particular discussion of unicorns, it depended on a sometimes tempting kind >>> of equivocation. We like ambiguities, puns, and so on. (Diving is okay, >>> sinking is not so good.) >>> >>> I was more thinking of the problem of reference & generality with >> respect to fictional creatures. Or was that what you didn’t have an opinion >> on? As I said I think pragmatic maxim offers the solution here. Although >> that too has some oddities in how Peirce applied it. (Thinking here of his >> example of the Phoenix) > >
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