Signs are logical arguments...except when they aren't. The issue is whether Signs correspond to real.
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by *all who investigate*, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. Best, Jerry On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 4:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry C., List: > > Again, Val invoked consensus and correspondence, not coherence and > correspondence. Frankly, I am not sure exactly what to make of "truth by > concordance"; I am hoping that Val and/or Jon A. will elaborate on what > they meant by that suggestion. I now see that perhaps you were proposing > "order" and "index" as two possible synonyms for "concordance." I took > them to be invoking it more as "agreement," given the reference to "triple > correspondence" in a triadic relation; i.e., consistency of the sign, > object, and interpretant. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 4:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon: >> >> the phrase: >> >> "by adding, Truth by "concordance” " >> >> What is your interpretation of this phrase? >> >> (Within philosophical writings, the two principle theories of truth are >> referred to as “coherence” and “correspondence”. In my view, CSP focused >> his logic on correspondence between signs and logical arguments.) >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Jerry C.: I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no >> mention of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon >> A. and Val. Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together? >> >> Val: Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence >> and pragmatic/instrumental theories of truth as espoused by nominalists. >> Again, I am inclined to agree with Forster that Peirce's realist approach >> satisfies all of these, rather than reducing truth to only one of them. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> List: >>> >>> I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion. >>> >>> Concordance? >>> “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics? >>> “Index" as a categorization? >>> >>> Are propositions inferred by “concordances”? >>> >>> Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together? >>> Can anyone expand on this proposal? >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>> > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> > >>> > Dear Jon and Peirces, >>> > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories >>> of truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by >>> "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence"). >>> > val daniel >>> > >>> > E. Valentine Daniel >>> > Professor of Anthropology >>> > 958 Schermerhorn Ext., >>> > Columbia University >>> > New York, 10027 >>> > >>> > (917) 741-7764 >>> > [email protected] >>> > >>> >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> Peircers, >>> >> >>> >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me >>> >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging, >>> >> so I started a blog series for attempting that: >>> >> >>> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-o >>> f-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/ >>> >> >>> >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by >>> ignoring [Peirce]” >>> >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a >>> “Procrustian bed >>> >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have >>> more to say >>> >> in that regard if I can get to it. >>> >> >>> >> Regards, >>> >> >>> >> Jon >>> >> >>> >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >>> >>> Peircers, >>> >>> >>> >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted >>> >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other >>> >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of >>> >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions, >>> >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal >>> >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence. >>> >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to >>> >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean >>> >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another >>> >>> name for a triadic relation. >>> >>> >>> >>> Note. The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks >>> >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions >>> >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively. >>> >>> >>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth >>> >>> >>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_the >>> ory_of_truth >>> >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> >>> >>> Jon >>> >> >>> >> -- >>> >> >>> >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ >>> >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey >>> >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey >>> >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA >>> >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >>> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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