Hi Jon, Sorry to get back to you as late this on a question as pertinent as that. I've been on the road. I should have mentioned "coherence" as, indeed it is, the foundation of nominalism's theory of truth. As I read Peirce, if find "concordance" subsuming coherence but exceeds mere coherence (the 'ungrounded' symbolic) and includes the assent of what we loosely call signs of nature, predominantly constituted of indexical signs. This is a preliminary attempt on my part to make the distinction between mere coherence (achievable nay and in language alone) and concordance (which includes the extra-linguistic and meta;inguistic aspects of our work as well. val
> On Mar 13, 2017, at 4:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jerry C.: I am a bit puzzled by your questions, since there was no mention > of "order," "index," or "inferring" in the preceding posts by Jon A. and Val. > Which three concepts are you seeking to bind together? > > Val: Besides consensus and correspondence, you left out the coherence and > pragmatic/instrumental theories of truth as espoused by nominalists. Again, > I am inclined to agree with Forster that Peirce's realist approach satisfies > all of these, rather than reducing truth to only one of them. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > List: > > I am a bit puzzled by this suggestion. > > Concordance? > “Order” (inferring numerical order and mathematics? > “Index" as a categorization? > > Are propositions inferred by “concordances”? > > Or what is the glue that binds the three concepts together? > Can anyone expand on this proposal? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > On Mar 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, E Valentine Daniel <[email protected] > > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > > Dear Jon and Peirces, > > I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of > > truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by > > "concordance" (what you, Jon, call "triple correspondence"). > > val daniel > > > > E. Valentine Daniel > > Professor of Anthropology > > 958 Schermerhorn Ext., > > Columbia University > > New York, 10027 > > > > (917) 741-7764 <tel:%28917%29%20741-7764> > > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > > > >> On Mar 13, 2017, at 9:00 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected] > >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> > >> Peircers, > >> > >> Looking over these old articles it occurs to me > >> there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging, > >> so I started a blog series for attempting that: > >> > >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/ > >> > >> <https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/> > >> > >> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring > >> [Peirce]” > >> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a > >> “Procrustian bed > >> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more to > >> say > >> in that regard if I can get to it. > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> Jon > >> > >> On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > >>> Peircers, > >>> > >>> I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted > >>> trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other > >>> than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of > >>> their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions, > >>> especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal > >>> character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence. > >>> To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to > >>> keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean > >>> “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another > >>> name for a triadic relation. > >>> > >>> Note. The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks > >>> tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions > >>> of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively. > >>> > >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth > >>> <http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth> > >>> > >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth > >>> <http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth> > >>> > >>> Regards, > >>> > >>> Jon > >> > >> -- > >> > >> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > >> <https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/> > >> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > >> <https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey> > >> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > >> <https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey> > >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > >> <http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA> > >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > >> <https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache>
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