Jon, List, Yes, the first part of that passage is quoted in the section on Peirce:
• http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth#Peirce I like that sense of “concordance” as it makes me think of a musical chord, in which a third note resolves the dyadic tension created by the other two. I think all this is worth looking into with fresh eyes — but my brain at the moment feels to be slogging through the neural equivalent of molasses, so I may be slow and intermittent about it. Here are the blog versions of my first 3 posts — I added more complete references to the last one. • https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/ • https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/14/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-2/ • https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/14/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-3/ Regards, Jon On 3/13/2017 6:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
List: As Val and Jon A. were perhaps fully aware, Peirce himself used "concordance" when discussing truth in his article, "Truth and Falsity and Error," for Baldwin's 1901 *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (CP 5.565, 568-570). Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth. A further explanation of what this concordance consists in will be given below ... To say that a proposition is true is to say that every interpretation of it is true. Two propositions are equivalent when either might have been an interpretant of the other ... When we speak of truth and falsity, we refer to the possibility of the proposition being refuted; and this refutation (roughly speaking) takes place in but one way. Namely, an interpretant of the proposition would, if believed, produce the expectation of a certain description of percept on a certain occasion. The occasion arrives: the percept forced upon us is different. This constitutes the falsity of every proposition of which the disappointing prediction was the interpretant. Thus, a false proposition is a proposition of which some interpretant represents that, on an occasion which it indicates, a percept will have a certain character, while the immediate perceptual judgment on that occasion is that the percept has not that character. A true proposition is a proposition belief in which would never lead to such disappointment so long as the proposition is not understood otherwise than it was intended. All the above relates to *complex truth*, or the truth of propositions. This is divided into many varieties, among which may be mentioned *ethical truth*, or the conformity of an assertion to the speaker's or writer's belief, otherwise called *veracity*, and *logical truth*, that is, the concordance of a proposition with reality, in such way as is above defined. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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