> On Mar 19, 2017, at 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
> 
> Re: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth 
> <http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth>
> 
> I have been giving another look at the InterSciWiki (ISW) article on the
> “Pragmatic Theory Of Truth” (PTOT) and I think it will be worth the time
> to clean it up and develop it further.  The plan that usually works best
> from me is to revise the content on the wiki and serialize it on my blog.
> 
> The PTOT article derives from the last Wikipedia revision I edited:

I think one thing that has to be kept clear is well made in that link. Dewey’s 
Warranted Assertability simply is different from what Peirce does. Of course 
this idea of warrant becomes important for Putnam as well. I’ll leave James out 
of the discussion because he just seems pretty inconsistent sometimes adopting 
a very Peircean conception and sometimes a much more short term functional 
conception of truth.

Peirce’s notion largely comes out of the idea that for a difference to be a 
difference it must make a difference and that those differences over time act 
on inquirers. 

The problem, that many brought up over the past few days, is the issue of 
information loss. That is Peirce’s faith really seems to presuppose a lot about 
both how signs act but also the persistence of the information of a sign. The 
problem is this is of course the problem of repetition being so important for 
effects and knowledge. Peirce gets the idea of habit right but I’m not sure 
he’s thought through the implications of erratic patterns of repetition and its 
implication for knowledge.


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