Jon,
Pardon me from barging in, but I've been vaguely following this thread, and
your question:
"How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call it red …?"
kind of broke through the haze.
I don't think the universal of Peirce's realism in this case would be the
"red" as an attribute of stop signs. Rather the concept, or diagram of
possibilities, would be "color," a universal that mediates between "things"
in general and some things, like stop signs, that are "red" rather than
some other color. We apply the concept of color, to the extent we
comprehend that diagram of possibilities, to things and some of those
things come out more red than others. Peirce's contention, as I understand
him, is that such a mediating concept or universal is real.
In general, I would argue that Peirce's notion of "universal" needs to be
associated with thirdness rather than firstness. Thus, for a quality like
"red" itself to be taken as a universal it would have to be seen, not as an
attribute, but as a diagram of possibilities mediating between "red things"
and the consequences, whatever might be, of "being red". It's a little
harder for me to envision a diagram of that sort, but I'm guessing Philip
Morris employed some such concept (universal?) in deciding on a red package
for their cigarettes.
Anyway, I'd be interested in your take on this approach.
Thanks,
Tom
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 5:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Clark, John S., List:
>
> But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal
> "red" is *not *defined by the collection of all red things, and the
> universal "lion" is *not* defined by the collection of all lions.
> Rather, each universal/general is a *continuum *that encompasses all *possible
> *reds or all *possible* lions. Between any two *actual *reds or *actual
> *lions,
> there is an inexhaustible supply of *potential *reds or *potential *lions
> that would be intermediate between them. What kind of diagram does each of
> these universals/generals specify accordingly? What significant relations
> does it embody? How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call
> it red, or an animal at the zoo to a diagram when we call it a lion?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but
>> I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.
>>
>> JFS: Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
>> every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
>> ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
>> you interpret the specification: Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
>> law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
>>
>>
>> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
>> "lion"? How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
>> lion, to such a diagram?
>>
>>
>> I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a
>> specification of the locations of all red things.
>>
>> This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite
>> what it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would
>> seem to require an infinite space.
>>
>
>
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