Clark, John S., List: But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal "red" is *not *defined by the collection of all red things, and the universal "lion" is *not* defined by the collection of all lions. Rather, each universal/general is a *continuum *that encompasses all *possible *reds or all *possible* lions. Between any two *actual *reds or *actual *lions, there is an inexhaustible supply of *potential *reds or *potential *lions that would be intermediate between them. What kind of diagram does each of these universals/generals specify accordingly? What significant relations does it embody? How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call it red, or an animal at the zoo to a diagram when we call it a lion?
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote: > On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but > I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this. > > JFS: Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and > every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram > ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way > you interpret the specification: Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a > law of nature that is independent of anything we may say? > > > What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal > "lion"? How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular > lion, to such a diagram? > > > I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a > specification of the locations of all red things. > > This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite > what it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would > seem to require an infinite space. >
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