Tom, List: It is no intrusion at all, I welcome your input!
I think that both "red" and "color" are universals, or rather generals as Peirce typically preferred to call them. Each names a continuum of possible instantiations, and the one for red is part of the one for color, consistent with his definition of a continuum as "that which has parts, all of which have parts of the same kind." Both 1ns and 3ns are general, but in different ways; Peirce called them "negative" and "positive" generality, respectively. I would appreciate it if you could elaborate on your suggestion that a concept is "a diagram of possibilities." What is the object of such a diagram? What are its parts? What are the significant relations among them that the diagram embodies? How does such a diagram mediate between red things and the consequences of being red, such as primarily reflecting broad-spectrum light at a wavelength between 620 and 750 nm? Thanks, Jon S. On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 9:29 AM, Tom Gollier <tgoll...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, > > Pardon me from barging in, but I've been vaguely following this thread, > and your question: > > "How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call it red …?" > > kind of broke through the haze. > > I don't think the universal of Peirce's realism in this case would be the > "red" as an attribute of stop signs. Rather the concept, or diagram of > possibilities, would be "color," a universal that mediates between "things" > in general and some things, like stop signs, that are "red" rather than > some other color. We apply the concept of color, to the extent we > comprehend that diagram of possibilities, to things and some of those > things come out more red than others. Peirce's contention, as I understand > him, is that such a mediating concept or universal is real. > > In general, I would argue that Peirce's notion of "universal" needs to be > associated with thirdness rather than firstness. Thus, for a quality like > "red" itself to be taken as a universal it would have to be seen, not as an > attribute, but as a diagram of possibilities mediating between "red things" > and the consequences, whatever might be, of "being red". It's a little > harder for me to envision a diagram of that sort, but I'm guessing Philip > Morris employed some such concept (universal?) in deciding on a red package > for their cigarettes. > > Anyway, I'd be interested in your take on this approach. > > Thanks, > Tom > > On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 5:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Clark, John S., List: >> >> But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the >> universal "red" is *not *defined by the collection of all red things, >> and the universal "lion" is *not* defined by the collection of all >> lions. Rather, each universal/general is a *continuum *that encompasses >> all *possible *reds or all *possible* lions. Between any two *actual *reds >> or *actual *lions, there is an inexhaustible supply of *potential *reds >> or *potential *lions that would be intermediate between them. What kind >> of diagram does each of these universals/generals specify accordingly? >> What significant relations does it embody? How are we relating a stop sign >> to a diagram when we call it red, or an animal at the zoo to a diagram when >> we call it a lion? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >> >>> On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John >>> Sowa--but I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he >>> meant by this. >>> >>> JFS: Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and >>> every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram >>> ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way >>> you interpret the specification: Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a >>> law of nature that is independent of anything we may say? >>> >>> >>> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal >>> "lion"? How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular >>> lion, to such a diagram? >>> >>> >>> I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a >>> specification of the locations of all red things. >>> >>> This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite >>> what it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would >>> seem to require an infinite space. >>> >>
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