Clark, List, I think this revision of my last post is a little less awkward:
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/25/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-8/ Being one who sees more continuity of development than radical reconstruction in Peirce’s thought over his lifetime, what I do see changing through the years is the greater diversity of his audiences as the river of his work flows from its constant sources to the alluvial delta he left later generations to sift. The greatest share of emphatic variance in what he writes is explained more by variations in whom he addresses than what he is trying to communicate. Drawing the conclusion for the present case, my initial guess would be that any apparent conversion to modal realism is more likely explained by an increasing need to underscore attitudes of mind that are simply tacit in the scientific application of formal logic, mathematics, probability, and statistics. Okay, I will keep trying to make that clearer ... To put things more plainly, it's a routine observation that we have no need for moods and tenses in actually doing mathematics, that is, in developing the consequences of given axioms, constructing formal models, or applying models and theories to the applicable phenomena. Theories of change, intention, and possibility can all be expressed in present tense indicative mood. Regarding change, intention, and possibilities as real or not is independent of the linguistic forms we happen to use in their description. Audiences, interpreters, receivers are neither right nor wrong. It is only that one audience may require us to articulate what goes without saying, what is understood in another. It may be useful exercise to unfold the implicatures and presuppositions that are taken for granted in another discourse situation, but giving a name to one's habitual position is not the same thing as a change of address. So, yes, I would have to say that Peirce was a realist about possibilities, and patterns of possibilities, from the start. That much is simply implicit in his mathematical approach to logic, probability, and information. Regards, Jon On 3/26/2017 12:12 AM, CLARK GOBLE wrote: > > I certainly don’t dispute that - it’s completely my view as well for the most part. With regards to modal realism I > suspect the question is when did he have something like modal realism - which seems there by the early 1890s and > perhaps 1880s - and when is it full bodied modal realism. It’s a difficult question and since there are almost always > explicit references from the late 1890’s onward it’s just easier to use those and avoid controversy. > > My own feeling is that most of the mature view was in place by the time he switched the pragmatic maxim to > counterfactuals even if he didn’t necessarily treat those possibilities as real in a robust sense. I think the logic > of his work pushed him there. Put an other way he may not necessarily have thought through all the implications of > his logic or, as you note, simply didn’t have the right audience to make them clear. > > While the logic of modal realism is in place with the shift of the maxim to counterfactuals, it seems to me it’s his > thinking through the issues of universals to particulars where he saw Berkeley and even Scotus as too nominalistic > that I think the full transformation occurs. But it seems a gradual one of recognition rather than substantial change > to the logic of his argument. (IMO) But of course his main engagement with Berkeley is quite early - 1871. > > http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_48/v2_48.htm > > Is this sufficient for full bodied modal realism? Perhaps we can read it that way although I’m not sure I’d want to > defend the thesis. (I’m open if others have defended it for the period prior to 1897) > -- inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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