> On Mar 26, 2017, at 1:45 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > > So, yes, I would have to say that Peirce was a realist about > possibilities, and patterns of possibilities, from the start. > That much is simply implicit in his mathematical approach to > logic, probability, and information.
Yes, from fairly early on he see mathematics as possibilities. I’m not sure the date on the earliest he makes that explicit. (Sorry - no time to look it up right now) I think my point about modal realism is more that connection between universals and particulars. Does he make that connection with mathematics early on? Again I don’t know. It’s one thing to speak about the nature of mathematics as possibilities and quite an other to speak about the relationship of mathematics to particulars. The old “why is the universe so mathematical.” Again I confess I’ve just not investigated the historical question here being more interested in the philosophy questions. If anyone else knows I am curious. That’s why I mentioned the review on Fraser since it seems to me his criticism of Berkeley’s platonism as nominalistic that gets at that issue.
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