John S., List: Thank you, this is very helpful.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 11:54 AM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon A.S., Clark, list, > > I started writing this note several days ago, but I got sidetracked > with other commitments. > > My main interest (at the moment) is in the following slides, which > I presented in 2015, and which I am now developing into a longer > article: http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf > > The issues in those slides are the focus of what I was trying to say. > > Jon > >> As I understand it, diagrams are icons, at least predominantly; >> but rather than its object's qualities, a diagram embodies >> the significant relations among its parts. >> > > That's fine. I don't object to that way of talking about them. > What I wanted to distinguish are icons derived from sensations > and icons (or diagrams) constructed (or imagined) by further > processing. > > Jon > >> In a sense, then, one can abstract a diagram from an image by >> ignoring the singular determinations of the latter that have >> no bearing on whatever general properties of the former are >> significant for one's purposes. >> > > I agree that is one way of deriving a diagram in imagination. > > Clark > >> I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of >> realism/nominalism. >> > > Yes. I prefer realism, but my ppe.pdf slides avoid that distinction. > > JFS > >> Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, >>> and every particular is something we classify by relating it >>> to some diagram ... >>> >> > MG Murphey > >> Mr. Arthur Burks has termed the icon a "specific universal" since it >> is a specific thing which can stand for any member of a class ... >> For in constructing the icon, we do not construct one particular case >> under the hypothesis, we rather construct any particular case under >> the hypothesis. >> > > Jon > >> Would you mind elaborating, perhaps including some specific examples? >> > > There are many examples in the ppe.pdf slides: Slides 9 & 10 for > icons and diagrams. Slide 20 to 31 show Euclid's diagrams (unchanged) > used as diagrams in existential graphs. Slide 39 for the role that > icons play in generalized existential graphs. > > I don't really like the terms 'universal' and 'particular', which > are not Peircean terms. I discussed that issue in the article > http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf > > But following is my rationale for using those words in that note: > > 1. In a generalized existential graph, a diagram with appropriate > indexicals (links to lines of identities) can serve as the > definition of a relation. > > 2. since relations are often used to represent universals, an icon > with N attached links (indexicals) can be considered as a > representation of an N-adic relation. > > 3. A very simple icon, such as a patch of red, when attached > to a line of identity in an existential graph, may be used > to represent a monadic predicate named 'is-red'. > > 4. In generalized existential graphs (as I define them in ppe.pdf), > an icon (or diagram or image or whatever you want to call it) > together with N "pegs" (connections to lines of identity) may be > used anywhere that an N-adic relation may be used. > > John >
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