Jon A.S., list,
In this thread (and an offline exchange) Jon has been proposing the
hypothesis that every quasi-mind (as Peirce uses the term) is a perfect
sign as Peirce defines that term. He has challenged me to refute this
hypothesis by giving an example of a quasi-mind that is not a perfect sign.
There are several I could give, but Ive chosen one that Peirce gives in a
draft letter to Lady Welby, dated March 9, 1906, from L 463. Here is the
context:
[[ A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a
sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered
self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking
requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a
determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
determinable sign. Consider for example a blank-book. It is meant to be
written in. Words written in that in due order will have quite another force
from the same words scattered accidentally on the ground, even should these
happen to have fallen into collections which would have a meaning if written
in the blank-book. ]]
This blank-book is an example of a quasi-mind. Let us test the hypothesis
that it is a perfect sign as defined by Peirce (EP2:545).
Is the blank-book the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which
its occurrence carries with it? Well, its occurrence carries no signs other
than its blankness, its determinability, the fact that it is meant to be
written in. This could be called an aggregate in the sense that the
aggregate of x and nothing is x. But this does not contribute much to the
plausibility of the hypothesis.
Is the blank-book a perfect sign, in the sense that it involves the present
existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself? If
not, it must be an imperfect sign, one that involves the present existence
of other signs which are not ingredients of itself. So which is it? That
depends on whether we consider its blankness as a sign which is an
ingredient of the book; but this, like the question of whether it involves
the present existence of other signs, is difficult to decide, since the book
is blank. Again, this test does little to affect the plausibility of the
hypothesis.
Is the blank-book in a statical condition? It is, as long as it remains
blank; which would refute the hypothesis, because no perfect sign is in a
statical condition. We could try to avoid this by saying that it must be
physically embodied, and must therefore be changing all the time at the
atomic or subatomic level; but that would certainly be cheating, as this
level of physical embodiment is irrelevant to its functioning as a sign.
Then we could try postulating that the blank-book continues to be that
blank-book during and after the occurrence of writing in it just as in
Existential Graphs, the Sheet of Assertion continues to be the Sheet of
Assertion when graphs are scribed on it or erased from it and ignore the
static intervals before, between and after episodes of writing. Or we could
come to the simpler conclusion that a quasi-mind may not be a perfect sign.
The hypothesis that it must be a perfect sign is looking less plausible.
Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action
upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its
outlines becoming more indefinite. Is this true of the blank-book? Even if
we assume (charitably) that we are talking about the blank-book in its
dynamic, ever-changing state of actuality, its difficult to see how this
could be a true description of it, let alone why it must be true of it. The
hypothesis becomes that much less plausible.
On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its
object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs,
which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but
which had lain dormant. What kind of object could a blank-book have, that
would act upon it in this way, without any other signs being involved in
this actuality except such as are ingredients of itself? What kind of
energy does a blank-book have? Could we not have a quasi-mind which lacks
that energy?
In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind
we rather drolly call spontaneous, that is, they happen sua sponte but not
by its will. They are phenomena of growth. Does a blank-book grow
spontaneously, and unceasingly? Must every quasi-mind do that?
Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. Since this text (EP2:545) is Peirces
one and only definition of a perfect sign, we take this sentence as a fact
about perfect signs: they belong to the class of quasi-minds. Does this give
us any reason for believing, or even hypothesizing, that All quasi-minds are
perfect signs? I dont think so. But I do think we would need very good
reasons for limiting the signification of quasi-mind in that way, given
its importance as a term in Peirces late semiotic theory. And the only
justification Jon has offered for limiting it in that way, is that some of
the attributes of the perfect sign fit very conveniently with his
conception of a quasi-mind. I find this unpersuasive because some
attributes of signs in general fit with Peirces conception of quasi-mind,
as he says explicitly himself. So if we are looking for confirmations of
(and ignoring discrepancies with) Jons hypothesis, they are not hard to
find. But does Peirce say that any of the attributes which make the perfect
sign a distinctive member of the sign family are also attributes of every
quasi-mind? If he does, then its a plausible hypothesis that every
quasi-mind is a perfect sign. But you havent shown us where he does say
that, John, and based on the above, I would have to rate the plausibility of
that hypothesis rather low much too low to have any influence on what we
think Peirce means by quasi-mind.
Gary f.
} One hours reflection is preferable to seventy years of pious worship.
[Islamic hadith as quoted by Bahá'u'lláh] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
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