Edwina, List: 1. Respectfully, I asked you to *make your case* for that position, not simply *reassert *it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic Indexical Legisign *can *be "the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"; please *explain *it to me.
2. What is your *warrant *for taking Peirce's explicit designation of the universe as a Symbol and an Argument to be "mere metaphoric rhetoric"? Again, please *explain *it to me, rather than just *asserting *it. Since "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551; 1906), why should we treat *any *of the ten Sign classes as confined to *human conceptual* semiosis? 3. I have freely admitted a strong bent for abstract analysis, rather than the more concrete approach that Gary R. (for example) ably practices, and I have also acknowledged its limitations. Such differences are precisely why *collaboration *is such an important aspect of the List--genuinely seeking to engage in *shared *inquiry and *learn *from each other, rather than dogmatically maintaining our pre-established views. I am actually *very *interested in exploring the nature and function of perfect Signs and Quasi-minds within concrete semiosis, but for me, coming up with clear definitions of those terms is the first step. Thanks, Jon S. On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 5:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list > > 1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its qualities > that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect sign' cannot > fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential graphs. > > 2. I really don't see Peirce's use of the word 'symbol' or 'argument' in > this selection as meaning the same as is meant in the ten classes of signs. > I consider his use here as mere metaphoric rhetoric and not as a semiotic > analysis of the Universe. > > If you read his definitions of these two terms as used within semiosis, > you will see that the 'symbol' is an intellectual construct, it refers to > "the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of > general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as > referring to that Object" 2.249. > > And the same thing with the Argument, which is equally an intellectual > construct.[see 2.251-3]. > > Therefore, these two terms refer to human conceptual semiosis and not to > physic-chemical or biological semiosis. > > 3. The problem I have with your approach to these definitions is that they > seem purely abstract and theoretical and confined to words; i.e., > substituting one set of words for another set of words. > > I don't know what you see as the function of these terms; you don't seem > interested in examining 'what is a perfect sign' within the semiosic > universe and how and why does it even exist and operate. > > And- ; what is the function of a 'quasi-mind' within semiosis. Why and how > does it emerge and function? You don't seem involved in this aspect. > > Edwina > > On Tue 20/02/18 5:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, List: > > Setting aside our different models of semiosis, and simply looking at > Peirce's own words ... > > 1. "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of > Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). Are you prepared to claim that a > Rhematic Indexical Legisign is the sheet of assertion of Existential > Graphs? If so, then please make your case for that position. If not, then > a Rhematic Indexical Legisign cannot be what Peirce meant by "perfect > sign." > > 2. "... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's > purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol > must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its > Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities > play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe--that > Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903). > Since Peirce calls the entire universe a Symbol and an Argument, he > obviously did not confine Symbols and Arguments to human conceptual > semiosis. Why should we? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> list - >> >> I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us has >> different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'. >> >> Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function as >> the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II]. The >> Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within that >> semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a triadic >> relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called its >> interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the representamen >> determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the >> same object for some interpretant" [1.541]. This relational, dynamic nature >> must be acknowledged. >> >> Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process, then, I >> consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical Legisign', for, in >> my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by Peirce : connection to >> object [indexical]; aging [within the legisign]; and local individualism >> [within the rhematic local interpretation]. >> >> What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the localization >> of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic interaction between Utterer >> and Interpreter and thus - such an interaction would have two quasi-minds. >> I don't see why this localization of mind, which I see as the quasi-mind, >> is ALSO a perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic Indexical Legisign >> which is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten classes [includes all >> three categorical modes]. >> >> In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to humans >> but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of quasi-minds' >> consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are 'intricately' >> connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's view that the >> quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote] appears as a Symbol and >> Argument - which would confine it to human conceptual semiosis. >> >> I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from some >> posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a quasi-mind >> and a perfect sign. >> >> Edwina >> >
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