list -
I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us
has different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'.
Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function
as the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II].
The Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within
that semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a
triadic relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called
its interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the
representamen determines its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" [1.541].
This relational, dynamic nature must be acknowledged.
Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process,
then, I consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical
Legisign', for, in my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by
Peirce : connection to object [indexical]; aging [within the
legisign]; and local individualism [within the rhematic local
interpretation].
What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the
localization of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic
interaction between Utterer and Interpreter and thus - such an
interaction would have two quasi-minds. I don't see why this
localization of mind, which I see as the quasi-mind, is ALSO a
perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic Indexical Legisign which
is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten classes [includes all
three categorical modes].
In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to
humans but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of
quasi-minds' consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are
'intricately' connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's
view that the quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote]
appears as a Symbol and Argument - which would confine it to human
conceptual semiosis.
I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from
some posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a
quasi-mind and a perfect sign.
Edwina
On Tue 20/02/18 1:53 PM , [email protected] sent:
Jon A.S., list,
In this thread (and an offline exchange) Jon has been proposing the
hypothesis that every quasi-mind (as Peirce uses the term) is a
“perfect sign” as Peirce defines that term. He has challenged me
to refute this hypothesis by giving an example of a quasi-mind that
is not a perfect sign. There are several I could give, but I’ve
chosen one that Peirce gives in a draft letter to Lady Welby, dated
March 9, 1906, from L 463. Here is the context:
[[ A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is
necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to
the better considered self of the immediate and of the general
future. Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if
external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This
quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign. Consider for
example a blank-book. It is meant to be written in. Words written in
that in due order will have quite another force from the same words
scattered accidentally on the ground, even should these happen to
have fallen into collections which would have a meaning if written in
the blank-book. ]]
This blank-book is an example of a quasi-mind. Let us test the
hypothesis that it is a perfect sign as defined by Peirce (EP2:545).
Is the blank-book “the aggregate formed by a sign and all the
signs which its occurrence carries with it”? Well, its occurrence
carries no signs other than its blankness, its determinability, the
fact that it is meant to be written in. This could be called an
“aggregate” in the sense that the aggregate of x and nothing is
x. But this does not contribute much to the plausibility of the
hypothesis.
Is the blank-book “a perfect sign, in the sense that it involves
the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients
of itself”? If not, it must be an imperfect sign, one that involves
the present existence of other signs which are not ingredients of
itself. So which is it? That depends on whether we consider its
blankness as a sign which is an ingredient of the book; but this,
like the question of whether it involves the present existence of
other signs, is difficult to decide, since the book is blank. Again,
this test does little to affect the plausibility of the hypothesis.
Is the blank-book “in a statical condition”? It is, as long as
it remains blank; which would refute the hypothesis, because “no
perfect sign is in a statical condition.” We could try to avoid
this by saying that it must be physically embodied, and must
therefore be changing all the time at the atomic or subatomic level;
but that would certainly be cheating, as this level of physical
embodiment is irrelevant to its functioning as a sign. Then we could
try postulating that the blank-book continues to be that blank-book
during and after the occurrence of writing in it —just as in
Existential Graphs, the Sheet of Assertion continues to be the Sheet
of Assertion when graphs are scribed on it or erased from it — and
ignore the static intervals before, between and after episodes of
writing. Or we could come to the simpler conclusion that a quasi-mind
may not be a perfect sign. The hypothesis that it must be a perfect
sign is looking less plausible.
“Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of
action upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are
wearing down, its outlines becoming more indefinite.” Is this true
of the blank-book? Even if we assume (charitably) that we are talking
about the blank-book in its dynamic, ever-changing state of actuality,
it’s difficult to see how this could be a true description of it,
let alone why it must be true of it. The hypothesis becomes that much
less plausible.
“On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted
upon by its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the
accretions of new signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle
energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant.” What kind
of object could a blank-book have, that would act upon it in this
way, without any other signs being involved in this actuality except
such as are ingredients of itself? What kind of “energy” does a
blank-book have? Could we not have a quasi-mind which lacks that
“energy”?
“In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of
the kind we rather drolly call spontaneous, that is, they happen sua
sponte but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth.” Does a
blank-book grow spontaneously, and unceasingly? Must every quasi-mind
do that?
“Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind.” Since this text (EP2:545)
is Peirce’s one and only definition of a “perfect sign,” we
take this sentence as a fact about perfect signs: they belong to the
class of quasi-minds . Does this give us any reason for believing, or
even hypothesizing, that All quasi-minds are perfect signs? I don’t
think so. But I do think we would need very good reasons for limiting
the signification of “quasi-mind” in that way, given its
importance as a term in Peirce’s late semiotic theory. And the only
justification Jon has offered for limiting it in that way, is that
some of the attributes of the “perfect sign” fit very
conveniently with his conception of a “quasi-mind.” I find this
unpersuasive because some attributes of signs in general fit with
Peirce’s conception of “quasi-mind,” as he says explicitly
himself. So if we are looking for confirmations of (and ignoring
discrepancies with) Jon’s hypothesis, they are not hard to find.
But does Peirce say that any of the attributes which make the
“perfect sign” a distinctive member of the sign family are also
attributes of every quasi-mind? If he does, then it’s a plausible
hypothesis that every quasi-mind is a perfect sign. But you haven’t
shown us where he does say that, John, and based on the above, I would
have to rate the plausibility of that hypothesis rather low — much
too low to have any influence on what we think Peirce means by
“quasi-mind.”
Gary f.
} One hour’s reflection is preferable to seventy years of pious
worship. [Islamic hadith as quoted by Bahá'u'lláh] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ Turning Signs gateway
Links:
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