BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, List-

        With regard to the statement by Jon:

        "My long-term objective in all of this remains to understand how
semeiotic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable
establishment of habits (cf. CP 3.429; 1896).  That includes the
inveterate habits of matter, as well as the self-controlled habits of
Persons."

        The actual reference to Peirce is not about semeiotic but about
logic: "Logic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable
establishment of beliefs". 3.429

        Semeiosis is actually a 'far-from-equilibrium' or unstable process,
functioning within three, not one, but three modal categories. Only
one of them, Thirdness, refers to habits or stability. The vital,
absolutely necessary mode of Firstness , inserts the capacity to
break up, modify, adapt, change, evolve, those habits. And the
equally necessary mode of Secondness locates both Firstness and
Thirdness within individual, diverse, local, interactive, networking
instantiations of both habits and novelty.  

        To reduce semiosis to only one of the three modal categories is
setting up an idealistic ontology - and this is not, in my view,
Peircean semiosis.

        Edwina
 On Fri 06/04/18  9:20 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 List:
 Gary R. and I had an off-List exchange yesterday, and we both wished
afterwards that portions of it had been on-List.  See below for the
edited version.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 5:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary:
 I agree that defining boundaries (or a "threshold") for semiosis is
"very tricky stuff."  That is why I have recently sought to boil it
down to a (relatively) simple, single instance, rather than tackling
bigger questions like the ones that you are raising.
 Where does Lane discuss the "would-be" in analyzing Peirce's
"extreme realism"?  His new book, perhaps?  Maybe I should request it
through Interlibrary Loan.
 My long-term objective in all of this remains to understand how
semeiotic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable
establishment of habits (cf. CP 3.429; 1896).  That includes the
inveterate habits of matter, as well as the self-controlled habits of
Persons.  My NA essay addresses many of the cosmological aspects, and
now I am wrestling with the ontological ones. 
 Regards,
 Jon 
 On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 4:17 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon, 
 You wrote:  I considered responding to your earlier reply to Jeff
about the example of the ripples on the water, if that is what you
had in mind.  The status of a potential Sign is tricky, since--as I
said in my own reply to Jeff-- semiosis does not occur until a Sign
actually determines an Interpretant. 
 Take, for simplicity's sake, the case of the book that was uncovered
after 100s of years. Certainly there was much semiosis happening
around the very creation of that book, the Sign (the book) had
already actually  determined perhaps many an Interpretant including
those of its author and perhaps colleagues and others who had read
it. The case of ripples on the water is trickier, while my
hypothetical example of the naturalist setting up cameras around the
lake merely sidesteps the issue. Still, the ripples were eventually
interpreted, and to say that there was no semiosis before then, well,
I think it's more like the creation of the book just mentioned (and
who knows if certain woodland creatures don't interpret
ripples--perhaps otters or beavers--in some way?) All very tricky
stuff in my thinking. 
 JAS: I used to think (with Short) that the interpretability of a
Sign corresponds to its Immediate Interpretant, but lately I am more
inclined to associate it with the Final Interpretant based on
Peirce's statement, "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant
is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it would determine in the interpreter
if there were one" (EP 2:409; 1907). 
 Robert Lane makes a great deal of the "would be" in analyzing
Peirce's "extreme realism." These would-be's are in that more fully
developed metaphysical view real, just as the diamond example
(reconsidered by Peirce later in his career) would really be a
diamond *if* it were ever uncovered (like the book example above,
perhaps like the sign that is the rippling of the water). In the
earlier version of the diamond example Peirce gives it no ontological
status, brackets it, or better, suspends it in a kind of metaphysical
limbo, until (if) it is actually uncovered (and, say, can be tested).
But in his later correction of this view he says that, as a would-be,
it really always-already has all the characters that a diamond has,
and so it is real even uncovered. So, I guess I'm saying that this
may parallel the reality of signs which are not (yet) interpreted,
but have the potential to be. I'm certain that semiosis did occur
before the book was discovered; I'm less certain about the ripples on
the lake. 
 Best,
 Gary
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690
 On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 10:53 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary:
 I considered responding to your earlier reply to Jeff about the
example of the ripples on the water, if that is what you had in mind.
 The status of a potential Sign is tricky, since--as I said in my own
reply to Jeff-- semiosis does not occur until a Sign actually
determines an Interpretant.  I used to think (with Short) that the
interpretability of a Sign corresponds to its Immediate Interpretant,
but lately I am more inclined to associate it with the Final
Interpretant based on Peirce's statement, "If a sign has no
interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it would
determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409; 1907).
 Thanks,
 Jon 


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------
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[5]
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