Edwina, Jon, list,

Edwina, all the things that you question, disagree, or reject here will be
found in Peirce. He himself, for example, says that 'the subject matter of
normative science consists of the relations of phenomena to ends'.

Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development of habits that
would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including, but not
limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean notion concerning an
asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry towards the Truth such that Truth
== Reality. It is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view as Reality in Peirce's
sense itself involves all three categories, not just 3ns.

Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in consideration of just
those habits of thought and action which, through hetero- and
homo-correction (science as critical commonsense writ large) tend toward a
belief wholly congruent with Reality, whatever you, I, Jon, or any given
community of inquirers might think.

It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is the primordial law
of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of Mind" (1892). Habits,
3ns, in the involutional sense I recently commented on as it appears in
"The Logic of Mathematics," involve the other two categories
quasi-necessarily.

Finally, it is Peirce who calls the Sign an entelechy.

You may disagree with all of this, but it is not the mere opinion of Jon,
but in all the cases just commented on, it is Peirce's stated view.

As for the scope of "Sign," I had thought that you and Jon had come to an
agreement on this some time ago.

There appears to be considerable animus in this on-going debate which seems
even to cloud good sense, a debate which now three list members, including
me, have suggested it would be in the interest of the list to cease.

Best,

Gary





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> I have no idea what you mean by 'the subject matter of normative science
> consists of the relations of phenomena to ends'.
>
> And I disagree that the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development of
> habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including,
> but not limited to, true beliefs'.  This is your personal belief and as I
> said before, it aligns with the Hegelian/theistic focus on 'the final
> perfection' of synthesis. I don't agree that the formation of such habits
> is a 'regulative hope'  [in whose mind?]. A universe which is immune to
> experience is the antithesis of Peirce's pragmaticism.
>
> I disagree that the habit-taking tendency is the primordial law of mind -
> and I don't read 6.24-6 as saying that. When Peirce says that 'matter is
> effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws' [6.26] this was to
> reject Cartesian dualism of mind and matter with each independent of the
> other. His rejection of this independence does not mean that habits are
> primary.
>
> And I reject your interpretation that the Sign is an entelechy. Again,
> with the confusion over the meaning of the term 'Sign' - I don't know
> whether you are referring to the irreducible triad which is the Sign of
> DO-[IO-R-II] or only the Representamen. Both the triad and the
> Representamen necessarily operate in any of the three categorical modes.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Fri 06/04/18 11:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> As I have noted before when making this substitution, Peirce defined logic
> (in the broad sense) as semeiotic and beliefs as habits.  The subject
> matter of normative science consists of the relations of phenomena to ends,
> and the ideal end of semiosis is the development of habits that would
> never be confounded by subsequent experience--including, but not limited
> to, true beliefs.  Again, this is a regulative hope, not something that
> will ever actually be achieved.
>
> Turning to metaphysics, the habit-taking tendency is the primordial law of
> mind, from which all physical laws--inveterate habits--are derived (cf.
> CP 6.24-25; 1891).  However, as you rightly point out, freedom and
> spontaneity still prevent their complete induration (cf. CP 6.201;
> 1898).  Hence recognizing that a Sign is an Entelechy (3ns), as Peirce
> himself explicitly did, does not at all deny the Reality of Form (1ns) and
> Matter (2ns); on the contrary, I see it as an integral aspect of his robust
> three-Category realism.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 9:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List-
>>
>> With regard to the statement by Jon:
>>
>> "My long-term objective in all of this remains to understand how
>> semeiotic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable
>> establishment of habits (cf. CP 3.429; 1896).  That includes the inveterate
>> habits of matter, as well as the self-controlled habits of Persons."
>>
>> The actual reference to Peirce is not about semeiotic but about logic:
>> "Logic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable
>> establishment of beliefs". 3.429
>>
>> Semeiosis is actually a 'far-from-equilibrium' or unstable process,
>> functioning within three, not one, but three modal categories. Only one of
>> them, Thirdness, refers to habits or stability. The vital, absolutely
>> necessary mode of Firstness , inserts the capacity to break up, modify,
>> adapt, change, evolve, those habits. And the equally necessary mode of
>> Secondness locates both Firstness and Thirdness within individual, diverse,
>> local, interactive, networking instantiations of both habits and novelty.
>>
>> To reduce semiosis to only one of the three modal categories is setting
>> up an idealistic ontology - and this is not, in my view, Peircean semiosis.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>
>
>
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