Edwina, List: As I have noted before when making this substitution, Peirce defined logic (in the broad sense) *as *semeiotic and beliefs *as *habits. The subject matter of normative science consists of the relations of phenomena to ends, and the *ideal *end of semiosis is the development of habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience--including, but not limited to, true beliefs. Again, this is a regulative *hope*, not something that will ever *actually *be achieved.
Turning to metaphysics, the habit-taking tendency is the primordial law of mind, from which all physical laws--*inveterate *habits--are derived (cf. CP 6.24-25; 1891). However, as you rightly point out, freedom and spontaneity still prevent their *complete *induration (cf. CP 6.201; 1898). Hence recognizing that a Sign is an Entelechy (3ns), as Peirce himself explicitly did, does not at all deny the Reality of Form (1ns) and Matter (2ns); on the contrary, I see it as an integral aspect of his robust *three*-Category realism. Regards, Jon S. On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 9:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List- > > With regard to the statement by Jon: > > "My long-term objective in all of this remains to understand how semeiotic > may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable establishment of > habits (cf. CP 3.429; 1896). That includes the inveterate habits of > matter, as well as the self-controlled habits of Persons." > > The actual reference to Peirce is not about semeiotic but about logic: > "Logic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable > establishment of beliefs". 3.429 > > Semeiosis is actually a 'far-from-equilibrium' or unstable process, > functioning within three, not one, but three modal categories. Only one of > them, Thirdness, refers to habits or stability. The vital, absolutely > necessary mode of Firstness , inserts the capacity to break up, modify, > adapt, change, evolve, those habits. And the equally necessary mode of > Secondness locates both Firstness and Thirdness within individual, diverse, > local, interactive, networking instantiations of both habits and novelty. > > To reduce semiosis to only one of the three modal categories is setting up > an idealistic ontology - and this is not, in my view, Peircean semiosis. > > Edwina >
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