Jon AS, list, I anticipated this kind of puzzlement on the part of some readers, and that’s why I inserted this warning just before the Merrell quote: “(He uses the word ‘subject’ here in reference to the experiencing bodymind <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/bdy.htm#corp> , not to the part of a proposition which indicates its object.)” Peirce, as you know, generally avoids using the term “subject” in the way that Merrell does here, because he is usually talking logic rather than psychobiology or even biosemiotics, and doesn’t like the Kantian usage of “subjective” in philosophy. In Turning Signs, though, i found it impossible to avoid this usage because so many of my sources use the word that way (as per the link in my parenthetical warning). But I guess that warning, out of the context of TS, is not enough, so I must try to spell it out a little further.
JAS: According to Peirce, "a graph with three tails" (CP 1.347, 1903) is for a genuine triadic relation, which in his examples is labeled by a single letter and necessarily has three distinct logical subjects (i.e., lines of identity) attached to it. In this context, it corresponds to the relation of "representing" or (more generally) "mediating," and the three subjects are the sign, the object, and the interpretant. GF: Yes, a graph with three tails represents a genuine triadic relation; but here you are forgetting that a graph is itself a sign, and in this context (part of Lowell Lecture 3), Peirce does not use the “tripod” to represent the O-S-I relation. It represents a generic proposition with three subjects (the lines of identity) connected to a “spot” representing the predicate (and labelled with a letter). There is no way that a single graph can represent an interpretant as such, because the generation of an interpretant is a process, and the only way to represent a process in EGs is by means of the sequence of graphs determined by the transformation rules. What makes Merrell’s diagram unusual (and confusing) is that he embeds the tripod, which here does represent the O-S-I relation, into a diagram which represents a process. Moreover, his description of the semiosic process makes it almost entirely internal to the “subject” organism, except for the point of contact with its external world (object in Merrell’s diagram, which corresponds to the percept in perception). This ‘organic’ approach is common in biosemiotics <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ldm.htm#x10> but relatively rare in Peirce, especially in the minutely analytical approach to semiotic phenomena which he took in has later years. As for the conflation of interpreter and interpretant, Jon Awbrey and I have already posted a passage from 1866 where Peirce seems to make such a conflation (in the case of anthroposemiosis at least), and he did it again in 1868 (EP1:54, CP 5.313 ff.). Here again I read Peirce as affirming the continuity of interpreter and interpretant as an aspect of the continuity of semiosis as process. And again, this tends to get lost in the analytical study of semiosis, which necessarily involves making a lot of distinctions, but I don’t think he ever abandoned his sense of semiosis as a continuous process. This post is long enough already, so I’m going to leave it here, although it probably isn’t enough to solve all the puzzles in reading Merrell’s diagram. But it might help if you read that note in the “Comminding” section <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#x05> again with the above caveats in mind; and then, if more questions remain, repost them and I’ll try to clarify. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: 21-Jun-20 21:41 To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Communicating An Idea Gary F., List: I am puzzled by Merrell's incorporation of the "tripod" into his diagram, since there is no label at the center and two of the three "legs" are both attached to the "experiencing bodymind." According to Peirce, "a graph with three tails" (CP 1.347, 1903) is for a genuine triadic relation, which in his examples is labeled by a single letter and necessarily has three distinct logical subjects (i.e., lines of identity) attached to it. In this context, it corresponds to the relation of "representing" or (more generally) "mediating," and the three subjects are the sign, the object, and the interpretant. I am also puzzled by Merrell's accompanying explanation, because it states that the "effector organ" of the "experiencing bodymind" is what "engenders an interpretant," and that this interpretant "acts as mediator between the sign and its object." According to Peirce, the sign itself determines the interpretant on behalf of the object, and thus mediates between the object and the interpretant. CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907) CSP: As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is active, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected. (EP 2:544n22, 1906) I am further puzzled by Merrell's conflation of the interpreter with the interpretant. According to Peirce, "a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant" (CP 4.536, 1906). In other words, the interpretant is not the interpreter itself, but rather the sign's effect on the interpreter; and the interpretant is not necessarily another sign, it can instead be merely a feeling or an exertion. In short, while Merrell's Figure 28 combines Jakob van Uexküll’s Umwelt circle with a sign model, I am honestly having trouble seeing how he can justifiably claim that it is Peirce's sign model. To be clear, I am not suggesting that this precludes it from being interesting and useful for certain purposes, only that I find the attribution to Peirce misleading. For comparison, attached is a diagram reflecting what I currently understand to be a Peircean sign model. The object determines the sign to determine the interpretant, such that the sign mediates between the object and the interpretant. The object is the essential ingredient of the utterer, and the interpretant is the essential ingredient of the interpreter. The commens is the overlap between the utterer and the interpreter, the one mind into which they are fused or welded by the sign. When there is no utterer--for "such signs as symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of experiences serving as premisses, etc." (EP 2:404, 1907)--the corresponding (dashed) oval is erased, and there is obviously also no commens. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sun, Jun 21, 2020 at 6:06 AM <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Jon, Gary, list, For my purposes in Turning Signs (other than quoting Peirce), the term “retroduction” works better than “abduction” because its prefix is more metaphorical, so that it integrates better with the central diagram of biosemiosis which I call the meaning cycle <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#meancyc> . It’s the part of the cycle complementary to the “prediction” practiced by anticipatory systems. This past week i've been revisiting some variants of that diagram found in my sources, starting with Robert Rosen's “modeling relation” diagram which was the original inspiration for mine. There's a note in the “Comminding” section <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#x05> which shows how Rosen's diagram of the modeling process in scientific inquiry also communicates the biosemiotic idea of anticipatory systems. I've added to that a diagram (with explanation) by Floyd Merrell which clarifies, among other things, the Peircean idea that an interpreter is also an interpretant sign – an idea discussed on the list this past week. Merrell's is also the only cyclic process diagram i know of that includes the “tripod” diagram of the O-S-I relation. I thought some list members might be interested in that, hence the link above. (There are also some links within the text itself that might be helpful in exploring the ideas.) Gary f.
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