Gary F., List: GF: I anticipated this kind of puzzlement on the part of some readers, and that’s why I inserted this warning just before the Merrell quote
I took that warning into account, which is why I talked about the "experiencing bodymind" rather than the "subject." I assume that Merrell is referring to what Peirce typically calls the "interpreter," at least in his later writings. GF: Yes, a *graph *with three tails represents a genuine triadic relation; but here you are forgetting that a *graph *is itself a sign, and in this context (part of Lowell Lecture 3), Peirce does not use the “tripod” to represent the O-S-I relation. It represents a generic *proposition *with three *subjects *(the lines of identity) connected to a “spot” representing the *predicate *(and labelled with a letter). I am not forgetting or overlooking any of that. In CP 1.345-347 (1903), Peirce is talking about genuine triadic relations, and "representing" or (more generally) "mediating" is just such a relation with three subjects--the sign, its object, and its interpretant. Hence the proposition expressed by the relevant graph is "a sign represents its object to its interpretant" or "a sign mediates between its object and its interpretant." What still puzzles me accordingly about Merrell's incorporation of the "tripod" into his diagram is his evident association of both a sign and its interpretant with the "experiencing bodymind"; as you put it, "his description of the semiosic process makes it almost entirely internal to the 'subject' organism." GF: There is no way that a single *graph* can represent an *interpretant *as such, because the generation of an interpretant is a *process*, and the only way to represent a process in EGs is by means of the *sequence *of graphs determined by the transformation rules. My understanding is that real *semeiosis *is a continuous process, while an individual sign token's determination of an individual interpreter to an individual (dynamical) interpretant is a discrete *event *that we prescind from that process. The interpretant *itself *is neither a process nor an event, but rather the resulting *effect *of a particular sign token on a particular interpreter--either a feeling, an exertion, or another sign; again, something discrete that we prescind from the continuous process of real semeiosis. That being the case, a single graph *can *represent an interpretant when it is a sign, especially when it is a proposition; for example, the interpretant of an argumentation is its conclusion. GF: Here again I read Peirce as affirming the *continuity *of interpreter and interpretant as an aspect of the continuity of semiosis as process. I agree, but I believe that we must still carefully distinguish an *interpreter *as a quasi-mind from an *interpretant *as a determination of that quasi-mind by a sign. On the other hand, as I have noted previously, according to Peirce a "quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906); so there is a sense in which, at any given moment, an interpreter is the *combined *interpretant of *all *the signs that have previously determined it. "For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*" (CP 4.550, 1906). Is this what you have in mind? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 10:47 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon AS, list, > > I anticipated this kind of puzzlement on the part of some readers, and > that’s why I inserted this warning just before the Merrell quote: “(He > uses the word ‘subject’ here in reference to the experiencing bodymind > <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/bdy.htm#corp>, not to the part of a proposition > which indicates its object.)” Peirce, as you know, generally avoids using > the term “subject” in the way that Merrell does here, because he is usually > talking logic rather than psychobiology or even biosemiotics, and doesn’t > like the Kantian usage of “subjective” in philosophy. In *Turning Signs*, > though, i found it impossible to avoid this usage because so many of my > sources use the word that way (as per the link in my parenthetical > warning). But I guess that warning, out of the context of *TS*, is not > enough, so I must try to spell it out a little further. > > JAS: According to Peirce, "a graph with three tails" (CP 1.347, 1903) is > for a genuine triadic relation, which in his examples is labeled by a > single letter and necessarily has three *distinct *logical subjects > (i.e., lines of identity) attached to it. In this context, it corresponds > to the relation of "representing" or (more generally) "mediating," and the > three subjects are the sign, the object, and the interpretant. > > > > GF: Yes, a *graph* with three tails represents a genuine triadic > relation; but here you are forgetting that a *graph* is itself a sign, > and in this context (part of Lowell Lecture 3), Peirce does *not* use the > “tripod” to represent the O-S-I relation. It represents a generic > *proposition* with three *subjects* (the lines of identity) connected to > a “spot” representing the *predicate* (and labelled with a letter). There > is no way that a single *graph* can represent an *interpretant* as such, > because the generation of an interpretant is a *process*, and the only > way to represent a process in EGs is by means of the *sequence* of graphs > determined by the transformation rules. > > What makes Merrell’s diagram unusual (and confusing) is that he embeds the > tripod, which here *does* represent the O-S-I *relation*, into a diagram > which represents a *process*. Moreover, his description of the semiosic > process makes it almost entirely internal to the “subject” organism, except > for the point of contact with its external world (*object* in Merrell’s > diagram, which corresponds to the *percept* in perception). This > ‘organic’ approach is common in biosemiotics > <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ldm.htm#x10> but relatively rare in Peirce, > especially in the minutely analytical approach to semiotic phenomena which > he took in has later years. > > As for the conflation of interpreter and interpretant, Jon Awbrey and I > have already posted a passage from 1866 where Peirce seems to make such a > conflation (in the case of anthroposemiosis at least), and he did it again > in 1868 (EP1:54, CP 5.313 ff.). Here again I read Peirce as affirming the > *continuity* of interpreter and interpretant as an aspect of the > continuity of semiosis as process. And again, this tends to get lost in the > analytical study of semiosis, which necessarily involves making a lot of > distinctions, but I don’t think he ever abandoned his sense of semiosis as > a continuous process. > > This post is long enough already, so I’m going to leave it here, although > it probably isn’t enough to solve all the puzzles in reading Merrell’s > diagram. But it might help if you read that note in the “Comminding” > section <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#x05> again with the above > caveats in mind; and then, if more questions remain, repost them and I’ll > try to clarify. > > Gary f. >
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