Edwina, List,
my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans,
Gene, List:
Your comments are well-taken. I did not mean to imply that the growth of
knowledge is the *only *manifestation of the growth of reasonableness,
although I now can see how it came across that way.
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosoph
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Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often
quote from Peirce,
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely ph
Dear Edwina,
Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be
“reasonableness energizing in the world.”
Not “universe.”
I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given
that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious
atheist,” tho
John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”
The expectations for communic
Gary F., List:
GF: In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.)
which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used
and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
without regard to the motives which originally governed its sele
John S., Helmut, Edwina, List:
JFS: Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
Technically anything that can affect our sense organs is a *replica *of a
Qualisign/Mark, the peculiar kind of Sinsign/Token that embodies
John S., Helmut, List:
Of course, Peirce famously argued for the *Reality *of God, not the *existence
*of God. He explained why in one of the manuscript drafts of "A Neglected
Argument."
CSP: Thus, He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular
Existent (meaning by an Existent, or obj
Edwina, List:
ET: Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'.
I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is
"God's purpose" as "the development of Reason." CP 1.615 (1903) continues
Jon Alan,
The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In
Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is
constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood
as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of
that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A
type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.
So- I'm unsure of your point.
I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents]
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Jon, list: And here is a key difference.
Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the uni
John, List,
I think so, after your proof!
Best, Helmut
08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr
"John F Sowa"
On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> but the law itself at work.
I agree.
> So law is all type, there are no token
On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work.
I agree.
So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
of efficient causation. Is my guess.
For a law of science, the proposition that st
John, List,
Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate
Jon and Edwina,
Jon
I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified
Gary F., List:
There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is
the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" cons
Edwina, Jon S, List,
Edwina wrote:
Yes, in my view, all three categories were present from the very beginning
of our existing universe. BUT, I define them all therefore, as primordial,
because I cannot see that any category/thing..was prior to the
existential emergence of the Universe. That inclu
Edwina, Gary F., List:
GF: Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws
of nature would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out
its conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols,
though not conventional, and (as constituents of an
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And here we still have a sticking point. Jon wrote:
"So I agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is primordial overall,
but I think that both of us agree with Edwina that all three
Categories were present from t
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Jon, list - hmm - that is interesting and I'd agree; the Dynamic
Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also Thirdness.
This enables individual organisms, when they interact with another
external organism, to
Edwina, John S., List:
JFS: Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes
reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real
aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a
law until somebody states it as such.
I agree, and I am st
Gary R., Edwina, Clark, List:
Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas,
or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns, "whatever has
its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of pe
List,
I've dug around and found some old information about the Humboldt U.
Peirce archive. It was built with the cooperation of the Peirce Edition
Project. From PEP head André De Tienne's report to the Charles S. Peirce
Society 21 February 2013
http://peircesociety.org/minutes/cspsminutes_201
Edwina, Jon S.,
As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I supplied is
“that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous.” If
all thought is in signs, all reasoning and all knowledge is in signs. If we ask
what kind of sign the laws of nature
Thanks for the references.
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 07 April 2017 6:30 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correl
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