Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
David, Thanks for the feedback. I'm not suggesting that non-existence/radical absence contains a property or definition because I agree that it would then not be non-existence. I'm suggesting that non-existence is the complete description/definition of what is present and can therefore be considered an existent state. Also, because we're talking about non-existence, we have to reify it (by saying it is, what is present, etc.) in order to even discuss it, but non-existence itself doesn't have that property. So, when I say that non-existence is the complete description of what is present, by necessity, I'm jumping back and forth between two meanings of non-existence. The first non-existence in the phrase refers to non-existence itself and what is present is our mind's conception of non-existence. We're stuck having to do this because we exist, but non-existence itself, and not our mind's conception of non-existence doesn't have this dependence. Thanks! Roger From: David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, August 9, 2011 9:49 AM Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? On 9 August 2011 07:36, Roger roger...@yahoo.com wrote: I always like to distinguish between the mind's conception/perception of a thing and the thing itself. So, I'd say that a thing can exist even if its properties are unknown to us (ie, to our mind's conception of the thing) but those properties have to be known, or be part of, the thing itself in order to be properties of that thing. I think this is real important in thinking about nothing or non-existence. Next to our minds, which exist, nothing/ non-existence just looks like the lack of existence, or nothing. But, non-existence itself, not our mind's conception of non-existence, completely describes or defines what is present and is therefore an existent state. Agreed on the distinction between a conception and what it (may) ultimately refer to. However, I'm not really convinced of its centrality in this case. The nothing that is here juxtaposed with something is surely intended to rule out any state whatsoever, including any properties or definitions thereof. For example, in the face of such radical absence, even the truth that 17 is prime would be in abeyance (although I suspect Bruno might say that this is evidence enough that the concept fails to refer). To be sure, given the brute fact that there IS something, such radical non-existence may indeed be excluded as a matter of fact. That is, the IDEA of nothing as the radical absence of any state of affairs whatsoever may indeed lack any referent in actuality. But notwithstanding this, any less radical proposal fails to exhaust the concept at its logical limit (e.g. in your very reliance on the formulation defines what is present). And the dizzying prospect of that ultimate conceptual limit is, rightly or wrongly, what troubles us when we encounter the canonical question. David Brent, Thanks for the comment! I always like to distinguish between the mind's conception/perception of a thing and the thing itself. So, I'd say that a thing can exist even if its properties are unknown to us (ie, to our mind's conception of the thing) but those properties have to be known, or be part of, the thing itself in order to be properties of that thing. I think this is real important in thinking about nothing or non-existence. Next to our minds, which exist, nothing/ non-existence just looks like the lack of existence, or nothing. But, non-existence itself, not our mind's conception of non-existence, completely describes or defines what is present and is therefore an existent state. Thanks! Roger On Aug 8, 1:59 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/7/2011 11:40 PM, Roger wrote: Hi. I used to post to this list but haven't in a long time. I'm a biochemist but like to think about the question of Why is there something rather than nothing? as a hobby. If you're interested, some of my ideas on this question and on Why do things exist?, infinite sets and on the relationships of all this to mathematics and physics are at: https://sites.google.com/site/ralphthewebsite/ An abstract of the Why do things exist and Why is there something rather than nothing? paper is below. Thank you in advance for any feedback you may have. Sincerely, Roger Granet (roger...@yahoo.com) Abstract: In this paper, I propose solutions to the
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Aug 2011, at 20:56, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Aug 2011, at 21:50, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and explains how consciousness emerges from numbers, How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is already assumed at the start? In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at some level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories about its origin. That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to have a past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent parts. In the past, it was already there as a possibility. OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this below. Yeah, the problem is that consciousness emerging from arithmetics means just that we manage to point to its existence within the theory. Er well, OK. But arithmetic explains also why it exist, why it is undoubtable yet non definable, how it brings matter in the picture, etc. Well, if I try to interpret your words favourably I can bring myself to agree. But I will insist that it only explains why it exists (ultimately because of itself), and does not make sense without consciousness. I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your theory is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would I believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way* (namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)? Why do I believe that Benjayk exists, independently of me? I think because you have the sense of seperate existence and take that to be an accurate reflection of how the world works on the deepest level. I think it is an unfounded belief, ultimately. Our independence is relative. I believe we really are fundamentally the same being in different expressions. Bruno Marchal wrote: Why do some people believe in God? I guess because they need something to believe in that there is something beyond themselves. Which makes sense, as long as you think you are seperate from God. As you begin to see you aren't, there is no need to believe in God as an act of faith, because you aware that you already experience God. Bruno Marchal wrote: Why do some people believe in a physical universe, prior to the apparition of life? Evidence seems to suggest that the physical universe existed before life appeared, so this is reasonable belief in my opinion. Bruno Marchal wrote: Why do some people believe that 17 is prime, prior to everything? I don't know, maybe because of treating numbers as some kind of God. I don't see how they could be prior to everything. I don't know what this would even mean. Bruno Marchal wrote: We cannot prove those statements, except in theories which postulate a realm which transcend us. If we don't do that we fall into solipsism. Yeah, sure. Ego solipsism is riduculous, but consciousness solispism is obvious, honestly. I amness (being oneself) is all that is - everything is itself. Bruno Marchal wrote: And about the truth of 17 is prime, you can know it by reflection, if you agree with simple statement like 0 ≠ s(x), etc. That why I postulate explicitly those little statements on which every one agree, except sunday-philosopher (I am serious here). Sure, I agree with that. Bruno Marchal wrote: I think you are confusing (like all beginners in logic) the level and the metalevel. The TOE I am isolating from the comp hypothesis does not assume consciousness, because that would mean it would have some sentence like consciousness exists, but it contains only strings like 0 ≠ s(x), s(x) = s(y) - x = y, ... The consciousness you mention is used implicitly at the meta-level, it is not assumed in the theory. I get that. But just because we don't explicitly assume something in theory, doesn't make the theory independent of that which isn't explicitly assumed, but assumed even before making the theory. You talk as if the meta-level can just be ignored within the theory, which doesn't work. The theory itself arises within the meta-level, and thus it is a mistake to pretend it can be conceived apart from it. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: We have no reason to suppose this expresses something more fundamental, that is, that consciousness literally emerges from arithmetics. Honestly, I don't even know how to interpret this literally. It means that the arithmetical reality is full of conscious entities of many sorts, so that we don't have to postulate the existence of consciousness, nor matter, in the ontological part of the TOE. We recover them, either intuitively, with the non-zombie rule, or formally,
Re: bruno list
On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 3:29 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: There are differences between people that do not make a difference to their intelligence or (by assumption) their consciousness. Definitely. But only certain kinds of differences. Some differences which might seem insignificant to us, like an extra chromosome or deficiency of a neurotransmitter can make a huge difference/ If it makes a difference to neurotransmission it may make a difference to cognition. Whether it makes a difference or not is to be empirically determined. It's the same for a car, a heart or a brain. The DNA in the nucleus does not seem to take any direct part in neurotransmission according to the scientific evidence, but you claim to have special knowledge that it does. An amputee does not behave in the same way as an intact person under all circumstances but he can participate in a conversation and solve problems, so the fact that he is an amputee does not affect his intelligence. Right, but an amputated limbic system would affect his intelligence. As might a lack of cytoplasm in the neurons. I'm not saying that human- like consciousness can only exist within a human brain, just that the further from a human brain you get, the less like a human it is likely to be. If you use another species neurons to make a human-like brain, that might work. If you use another self-replicating molecule to make human-like neurons, that might work too. Making a logical schematic of the brain's assumed functions though it not likely to be successful if implemented on inorganic, solid state microelectronics though. A claim you make with no empirical evidence. You may as well say that amputees are unconscious despite appearances to the contrary. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 09 Aug 2011, at 21:13, meekerdb wrote: What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist? I haven't seen any evidence yet. Mathematical objects are inventions of our minds dependent on language. Are you not confusing human mathematical theories and the arithmetical reality, which does not depend on any language? The part of the brain treating numbers is quite different than the part handling the words. The twin prime conjecture seems to me independent of any language used to describe it. They made be said to exist in Platonia or in some other way, but I think it is a confusion to suppose they exist in the sense of physical objects. You are right, numbers certainly do not exist in the same sense as an electron or a chair or table. Brent, I did reply to your remarks on the UDA, so I am not sure what I have to conclude? Are you thinking that we are infinite physical object? Computationalism has to be false to put sense of your reply. This is implicit in many remark that you did recently. If we are machine, the physical universe is a mathematical sum on infinities of digital computations (in the sense of Church Turing Post: nothing physical there). So an electron is a much higher level cognitive object than a number. Note that I do agree with you, and I insist, that physical existence and mathematical existence (if that means something) are *quite* different things. With comp mathematical existence is just arithmetical existence. It is Ex ... P(x) , with x in N. And physical existence is a high level inside construct, with inside cporresponding to the abstract sum operator given by modalities like BDp (the quantization of p) with a new box B given by Bp Dp (with the old Beweisbar B of Gödel, and D = ~B~). So physical existence will be described by a modal expression of the form BD(Ex ... BD P(x) ...), which is quite different from Ex ... P(x) ... If we are machine you have to add some magic in both mind and matter to save the mind-brain identity. OK? If you are not OK with this, let me ask you again two questions which I do not remember clear answers for. Let us say that a physical universe is *robust* if it executes a universal dovetailer. Let us call physical ultrafinitism the doctrine that there is a *primitive* and *non robust* physical universe. Do you agree that UDA1-7 shows that either physical ultrafinitism is true or physics is a branch of theoretical computer science. If you agree with this, and still believe that comp is true (I can survive with a digital brain/body/environment), it means that you disagree with the UDA step 8 (which eliminates the physical ultrafinitism move). The only point in the step 8 (movie graph argument, MGA) which I think should be made more clear is that computationalism entails the 323- principle. I recall for others what is the 323-principle: 323-principle: We assume comp. and the physical supervenience thesis (sup-phys). Suppose that a computer processes a particular computation C on which a particular experience E supervenes on (by sup-phys). We are told that during C, the computer does never use the register 323. The 323-principle asserts that consciousness will still supervene on C', which is the computation done by the same computer, in exactly the same condition than before except that the register 323 has been withdrawn. If you agree that comp + sup-phys entails the 323 principle, step 8 of UDA becomes straightforward, and it is hard for me to believe than you still accept comp, and yet believe in some primary notion of physical existence. But your reply to Jason witnesses that you seem to believe in such a notion, so probably you believe that comp does not entail the 323-principle. This seems to me an attribution of a non Turing emulable role for the register 323 in the computation C. It leads also to attributing a physical role to something having no relevant, with respect to the computation C, physical activity at all. I don't see how I could still say yes to the digitalist doctor in virtue of having in my skull a machine doing the same computation as my brain at the correct substitution level. This should also be taken into account in some post by Stathis, which I find not always enough clear, especially when he mentions the *behavior* of an entity. Does it means all possible behaviors, or one counterfactually correct behavior or particular behavior related to a particular computation? Some human behavior (like sleeping-dreaming) can easily be emulated by machines which are so elementary that it makes no sense to attribute or associate any form of consciousness to them, at least in virtue of comp. I do agree with his conclusion in his conversation with Craig though, but they seems sometimes to rely on an identity thesis between particular work of a machine and possible
Re: Computation = Information processing
On Aug 10, 1:30 am, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Sounds ok to me, although I would still say that the cosmos is more than just information. I think of Sense (+chance) as the invariance (+variance) between Essence (significance) and Existence (entropy). Which would make Significance (information) the variance between Sense and Existence. Entropy then would be the variance between Sense and Essence, ie, what is not made significant through time is lost to entropy. Of course. That information has to have a referent or at best it is just randomness. But have you ever noticed that one thing about noise is that you cannot distinguish one kind of noise from another (up to isomorphisms of its power law scaling). It does seem to violate that 'difference that makes a difference... Hi Stephen, The idea of noise being indistinguishable from other noise I might attribute to perception. Like if your perception made all of history available to you as a single simultaneous information space, so that you could see how any particular set of noise came about, wouldn't that make noise just a ciphered appearance for phenomena outside of possible recognition rather than an absolute, objective informationlessness. All noise would be equal given that they are all part of the set of patterns which cannot be recognized in any way. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 4:54 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: There's the rub. What counts as overall? Can I replace one hemisphere of the brain that is functionally identical at its boundaries and guarantee that there is no change in consciousness? Yes. Suppose your right hemisphere is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at its boundaries but has a qualitatively different consciousness. The left half of your left visual field will then look different, by definition if the visual qualia are different. But your left hemisphere receives the usual signals through the corpus callosum, so you state via the speech centres in that hemisphere that everything looks exactly the same. In other words you can't notice any change in your consciousness due to the functionally identical replacement. I would say that if you continue to behave normally and you notice no change in your consciousness then there *is* no difference in your consciousness. The volume of replaced tissue can be made larger and larger until the limit is reached where the whole brain is replaced, leaving only the muscles and sensory organs (and of course these too can eventually be replaced). If the person's behaviour is unchanged then his consciousness is also unchanged, Of course one's consciousness is changed all the time, but perception, experience, and learning. And consequently their behavior is presumably changed too. So when you refer to the person's behavior being unchanged you mean something rather vague and fuzzy like his character. I'm speculating that within that vague domain there might be room for quite a bit of qualia change that would depend on the internal implementation. The qualia would change only if the replacement were not functionally different. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 4:54 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: There's the rub. What counts as overall? Can I replace one hemisphere of the brain that is functionally identical at its boundaries and guarantee that there is no change in consciousness? Yes. Suppose your right hemisphere is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at its boundaries but has a qualitatively different consciousness. The left half of your left visual field will then look different, by definition if the visual qualia are different. But your left hemisphere receives the usual signals through the corpus callosum, so you state via the speech centres in that hemisphere that everything looks exactly the same. In other words you can't notice any change in your consciousness due to the functionally identical replacement. I would say that if you continue to behave normally and you notice no change in your consciousness then there *is* no difference in your consciousness. I am not certain of this. Imagine two instances of the Chinese room. In one Searle uses a simple calculator, and in another he emulates the mind of a mathematician. The only questions permitted to be entered are simple formulas like 7*3 or 8+4. The qualia of the mathematicians mind should be different than that of the calculator, despite the same outputs for the same inputs. Similarly, the left hemisphere might implement some superintelligence which experiences much more, but is deciding to fool the right hemisphere into thinking all is well. I would say a better way to determine if the same qualia are established is to make sure the same computations are performed, but this is tricky to, as there may be different substitution levels tht are equivalent from the perspective of the mind. For example, a Turing machine implemented in the game of life implemented on an Atari might be equivalent, despite that at the lowest level the computer is only performing calculations of the game of life, but to the mind executing on the Turing machine the information represented and the relations are preserved. Not understanding the idea of a equivalent computations with respect to some level is what I think drove Putnam away from functionalism. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 10, 9:55 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. Suppose your right hemisphere is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at its boundaries but has a qualitatively different consciousness. To me this is like saying 'suppose the Eastern United States is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at it's boundaries but has a qualitatively different culture. The left half of your left visual field will then look different, by definition if the visual qualia are different. But your left hemisphere receives the usual signals through the corpus callosum, The diplomatic relations with Europe will then be different, by definition if the diplomatic culture is different. But the Western U.S. receives the usual traffic across the Mississippi River, so you state via the speech centres in that hemisphere that everything looks exactly the same. so the Eastern media reports the news that the diplomatic situation with Europe has not changed. In other words you can't notice any change in your consciousness due to the functionally identical replacement. I would say that if you continue to behave normally and you notice no change in your consciousness then there *is* no difference in your consciousness. In other words Americans can't notice any change in their culture due to the functionally identical replacement. You would say that if the US continues to behave normally and it notices no change in it's culture then there *is* no difference in it's culture. Can you see why that's a rather oversimplified and misleading thought experiment? If you replace a civilization of living organisms with a machine, you have changed it's culture already. The intelligence of the system isn't limited to the physical relations between the neurons, it's millions of nodes of sensitivity all corroborating experiences about the interior and exterior worlds. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
On 9 August 2011 18:16, Roger Granet roger...@yahoo.com wrote: So, when I say that non-existence is the complete description of what is present, by necessity, I'm jumping back and forth between two meanings of non-existence. The first non-existence in the phrase refers to non-existence itself and what is present is our mind's conception of non-existence. We're stuck having to do this because we exist, but non-existence itself, and not our mind's conception of non-existence doesn't have this dependence. I've read the above several times and, sadly, I still have no clear idea of what you could possibly mean. You say that: what is present is our mind's conception of non-existence. Substituting this in your formulation then gives: non-existence is the complete description of our mind's conception of non-existence. Is this what you meant to say? If so, I can see why you say it is an existent state, but I still can't see how you defend such a state as equivalent to radical absence of all states. Indeed, the two ideas seem in direct contradiction. David David, Thanks for the feedback. I'm not suggesting that non-existence/radical absence contains a property or definition because I agree that it would then not be non-existence. I'm suggesting that non-existence is the complete description/definition of what is present and can therefore be considered an existent state. Also, because we're talking about non-existence, we have to reify it (by saying it is, what is present, etc.) in order to even discuss it, but non-existence itself doesn't have that property. So, when I say that non-existence is the complete description of what is present, by necessity, I'm jumping back and forth between two meanings of non-existence. The first non-existence in the phrase refers to non-existence itself and what is present is our mind's conception of non-existence. We're stuck having to do this because we exist, but non-existence itself, and not our mind's conception of non-existence doesn't have this dependence. Thanks! Roger From: David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, August 9, 2011 9:49 AM Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? On 9 August 2011 07:36, Roger roger...@yahoo.com wrote: I always like to distinguish between the mind's conception/perception of a thing and the thing itself. So, I'd say that a thing can exist even if its properties are unknown to us (ie, to our mind's conception of the thing) but those properties have to be known, or be part of, the thing itself in order to be properties of that thing. I think this is real important in thinking about nothing or non-existence. Next to our minds, which exist, nothing/ non-existence just looks like the lack of existence, or nothing. But, non-existence itself, not our mind's conception of non-existence, completely describes or defines what is present and is therefore an existent state. Agreed on the distinction between a conception and what it (may) ultimately refer to. However, I'm not really convinced of its centrality in this case. The nothing that is here juxtaposed with something is surely intended to rule out any state whatsoever, including any properties or definitions thereof. For example, in the face of such radical absence, even the truth that 17 is prime would be in abeyance (although I suspect Bruno might say that this is evidence enough that the concept fails to refer). To be sure, given the brute fact that there IS something, such radical non-existence may indeed be excluded as a matter of fact. That is, the IDEA of nothing as the radical absence of any state of affairs whatsoever may indeed lack any referent in actuality. But notwithstanding this, any less radical proposal fails to exhaust the concept at its logical limit (e.g. in your very reliance on the formulation defines what is present). And the dizzying prospect of that ultimate conceptual limit is, rightly or wrongly, what troubles us when we encounter the canonical question. David Brent, Thanks for the comment! I always like to distinguish between the mind's conception/perception of a thing and the thing itself. So, I'd say that a thing can exist even if its properties are unknown to us (ie, to our mind's conception of the thing) but those properties have to be known, or be part of, the thing itself in order to be properties of that thing. I think this is real important in thinking about nothing or non-existence. Next to our minds, which exist, nothing/ non-existence just looks like the lack of existence, or nothing. But, non-existence itself, not our mind's conception of non-existence, completely describes or defines what is present and is therefore an existent state. Thanks! Roger On Aug 8, 1:59 pm, meekerdb
logic and physicists
I believe Bruno said this. Could whomever did say that expand upon the phrase? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 12:48 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. Suppose your right hemisphere is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at its boundaries but has a qualitatively different consciousness. The left half of your left visual field will then look different, by definition if the visual qualia are different. But your left hemisphere receives the usual signals through the corpus callosum, so you state via the speech centres in that hemisphere that everything looks exactly the same. In other words you can't notice any change in your consciousness due to the functionally identical replacement. I would say that if you continue to behave normally and you notice no change in your consciousness then there *is* no difference in your consciousness. I am not certain of this. Imagine two instances of the Chinese room. In one Searle uses a simple calculator, and in another he emulates the mind of a mathematician. The only questions permitted to be entered are simple formulas like 7*3 or 8+4. The qualia of the mathematicians mind should be different than that of the calculator, despite the same outputs for the same inputs. It's not the same outputs for the same inputs, since the mathematician has far more elaborate mental states even if he just answers 21 and 12. For example, he may be thinking about how boring the questions are and about what he is going to have for lunch. So if part of the mathematician's brain were replaced with a calculator it isn't the case that neither his behaviour would change nor would he notice that anything had changed. Similarly, the left hemisphere might implement some superintelligence which experiences much more, but is deciding to fool the right hemisphere into thinking all is well. Suppose your left hemisphere is replaced with a superintelligent AI that easily models the behaviour of your bilogical brain and interacts appropriately with your right hemisphere, but in addition has various lofty thoughts of its own. The result would then be that you, Jason Resch, would continue to behave normally and not notice any change in your consciousness. However, there will also be this separate intelligence which happens to reside in your head, and will choose whether or not to communicate with you. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 1:20 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Aug 10, 9:55 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. Suppose your right hemisphere is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at its boundaries but has a qualitatively different consciousness. To me this is like saying 'suppose the Eastern United States is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at it's boundaries but has a qualitatively different culture. The left half of your left visual field will then look different, by definition if the visual qualia are different. But your left hemisphere receives the usual signals through the corpus callosum, The diplomatic relations with Europe will then be different, by definition if the diplomatic culture is different. But the Western U.S. receives the usual traffic across the Mississippi River, so you state via the speech centres in that hemisphere that everything looks exactly the same. so the Eastern media reports the news that the diplomatic situation with Europe has not changed. In other words you can't notice any change in your consciousness due to the functionally identical replacement. I would say that if you continue to behave normally and you notice no change in your consciousness then there *is* no difference in your consciousness. In other words Americans can't notice any change in their culture due to the functionally identical replacement. You would say that if the US continues to behave normally and it notices no change in it's culture then there *is* no difference in it's culture. Can you see why that's a rather oversimplified and misleading thought experiment? If you replace a civilization of living organisms with a machine, you have changed it's culture already. The intelligence of the system isn't limited to the physical relations between the neurons, it's millions of nodes of sensitivity all corroborating experiences about the interior and exterior worlds. Not a good analogy since the US is not conscious as a single entity. Please explain what would you think would happen if you replaced part of your brain with an unconscious component that interacted normally with the surrounding neurons. Would you say I feel different or would you say I feel exactly the same as before? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/10/2011 10:27 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 1:20 AM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Aug 10, 9:55 am, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. Suppose your right hemisphere is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at its boundaries but has a qualitatively different consciousness. To me this is like saying 'suppose the Eastern United States is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at it's boundaries but has a qualitatively different culture. The left half of your left visual field will then look different, by definition if the visual qualia are different. But your left hemisphere receives the usual signals through the corpus callosum, The diplomatic relations with Europe will then be different, by definition if the diplomatic culture is different. But the Western U.S. receives the usual traffic across the Mississippi River, so you state via the speech centres in that hemisphere that everything looks exactly the same. so the Eastern media reports the news that the diplomatic situation with Europe has not changed. In other words you can't notice any change in your consciousness due to the functionally identical replacement. I would say that if you continue to behave normally and you notice no change in your consciousness then there *is* no difference in your consciousness. In other words Americans can't notice any change in their culture due to the functionally identical replacement. You would say that if the US continues to behave normally and it notices no change in it's culture then there *is* no difference in it's culture. Can you see why that's a rather oversimplified and misleading thought experiment? If you replace a civilization of living organisms with a machine, you have changed it's culture already. The intelligence of the system isn't limited to the physical relations between the neurons, it's millions of nodes of sensitivity all corroborating experiences about the interior and exterior worlds. Not a good analogy since the US is not conscious as a single entity. Please explain what would you think would happen if you replaced part of your brain with an unconscious component that interacted normally with the surrounding neurons. Would you say I feel different or would you say I feel exactly the same as before? Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 8/9/2011 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote: That is explained as an illusion in GR for an eternal black hole. In Susskinds theory the in-falling person is both smeared (in strings) on the horizon and *also* destroyed in the singularity, so that when the BH evaporates the information is recovered. While I don't understand all the details of Susskind's theory, my understanding was that Susskind is generally accepted to have won his bet with Stephen Hawking in so far as information is not destroyed in black holes. Incidentally, I have a paper written by a friend who explains in fairly easily understood mathematics (some calculus needed) why Susskind's idea of black hole complementarity is probably wrong. It's in PDF and is only 107Kb. I'll send it to anyone who's interested. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 8/10/2011 7:21 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 12:48 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. Suppose your right hemisphere is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at its boundaries but has a qualitatively different consciousness. The left half of your left visual field will then look different, by definition if the visual qualia are different. But your left hemisphere receives the usual signals through the corpus callosum, so you state via the speech centres in that hemisphere that everything looks exactly the same. In other words you can't notice any change in your consciousness due to the functionally identical replacement. I would say that if you continue to behave normally and you notice no change in your consciousness then there *is* no difference in your consciousness. I am not certain of this. Imagine two instances of the Chinese room. In one Searle uses a simple calculator, and in another he emulates the mind of a mathematician. The only questions permitted to be entered are simple formulas like 7*3 or 8+4. The qualia of the mathematicians mind should be different than that of the calculator, despite the same outputs for the same inputs. It's not the same outputs for the same inputs, since the mathematician has far more elaborate mental states even if he just answers 21 and 12. For example, he may be thinking about how boring the questions are and about what he is going to have for lunch. So if part of the mathematician's brain were replaced with a calculator it isn't the case that neither his behaviour would change nor would he notice that anything had changed. But his behavior is exactly the same. Your are evading the hypothesis by counting internal thoughts as behavior. As noted before behavior is fuzzy. You could try defining same behavior to mean same output for all possible inputs; but it's not clear that all possible inputs is a coherent concept. From a more empirical standpoint you really mean something more vague and same behavior means similar to past behavior such that his friends don't think he's had a personality change. But that, I think, leaves a lot of room for differences of qualia. Similarly, the left hemisphere might implement some superintelligence which experiences much more, but is deciding to fool the right hemisphere into thinking all is well. Suppose your left hemisphere is replaced with a superintelligent AI that easily models the behaviour of your bilogical brain and interacts appropriately with your right hemisphere, but in addition has various lofty thoughts of its own. The result would then be that you, Jason Resch, would continue to behave normally and not notice any change in your consciousness. Why would he not notice? Who is he? You seem to invoke the Cartesian theatre where noticing takes place and so the AI part isn't noticed because it doesn't go to the theater. Brent However, there will also be this separate intelligence which happens to reside in your head, and will choose whether or not to communicate with you. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/10/2011 8:20 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? Onward! Stephen Your just confusing things. It's a hypothetical. Craig holds that only organic kinds of things can be conscious, so hypothetically one could make a functionally identical (input/output) component that was not conscious. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Please explain what would you think would happen if you replaced part of your brain with an unconscious component that interacted normally with the surrounding neurons. Would you say I feel different or would you say I feel exactly the same as before? Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? There is no test, it is just assumed for the purpose of the thought experiment that the component lacks the special sauce required for consciousness. We could even say that the component works by magic to avoid discussions about technical difficulties, and the thought experiment is unaffected. The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
David, I believe you're right that I misspoke in my previous posting. Thanks. What I meant was that if we consider non-existence itself and not our mind's conception of non-existence, then that non-existence itself (ie, that complete lack of all matter, energy, time, space, ideas, mathematical constructs, and of minds to try and conceive this lack of all.) completely defines or describes the entirety of what is actually physically present. There's nothing else there other than the complete lack of all. Because it is the complete description of what is physically present, it is an existent state. I put physically in quotes here not to try and linguistically reify non- existence, but because in order to even consider non-existence itself, we have to have some physical condition to refer to. Overall, what this means is that our mind's conception of non- existence is of just plain nothingness. But, non-existence itself is actually an existent state and can really therefore be called something instead of nothing. This means that non-existence itself really does have a referent in actuality (the phrase you mentioned previously). Thanks. Roger On Aug 10, 11:40 am, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 9 August 2011 18:16, Roger Granet roger...@yahoo.com wrote: So, when I say that non-existence is the complete description of what is present, by necessity, I'm jumping back and forth between two meanings of non-existence. The first non-existence in the phrase refers to non-existence itself and what is present is our mind's conception of non-existence. We're stuck having to do this because we exist, but non-existence itself, and not our mind's conception of non-existence doesn't have this dependence. I've read the above several times and, sadly, I still have no clear idea of what you could possibly mean. You say that: what is present is our mind's conception of non-existence. Substituting this in your formulation then gives: non-existence is the complete description of our mind's conception of non-existence. Is this what you meant to say? If so, I can see why you say it is an existent state, but I still can't see how you defend such a state as equivalent to radical absence of all states. Indeed, the two ideas seem in direct contradiction. David David, Thanks for the feedback. I'm not suggesting that non-existence/radical absence contains a property or definition because I agree that it would then not be non-existence. I'm suggesting that non-existence is the complete description/definition of what is present and can therefore be considered an existent state. Also, because we're talking about non-existence, we have to reify it (by saying it is, what is present, etc.) in order to even discuss it, but non-existence itself doesn't have that property. So, when I say that non-existence is the complete description of what is present, by necessity, I'm jumping back and forth between two meanings of non-existence. The first non-existence in the phrase refers to non-existence itself and what is present is our mind's conception of non-existence. We're stuck having to do this because we exist, but non-existence itself, and not our mind's conception of non-existence doesn't have this dependence. Thanks! Roger From: David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, August 9, 2011 9:49 AM Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? On 9 August 2011 07:36, Roger roger...@yahoo.com wrote: I always like to distinguish between the mind's conception/perception of a thing and the thing itself. So, I'd say that a thing can exist even if its properties are unknown to us (ie, to our mind's conception of the thing) but those properties have to be known, or be part of, the thing itself in order to be properties of that thing. I think this is real important in thinking about nothing or non-existence. Next to our minds, which exist, nothing/ non-existence just looks like the lack of existence, or nothing. But, non-existence itself, not our mind's conception of non-existence, completely describes or defines what is present and is therefore an existent state. Agreed on the distinction between a conception and what it (may) ultimately refer to. However, I'm not really convinced of its centrality in this case. The nothing that is here juxtaposed with something is surely intended to rule out any state whatsoever, including any properties or definitions thereof. For example, in the face of such radical absence, even the truth that 17 is prime would be in abeyance (although I suspect Bruno might say that this is evidence enough that the concept fails to refer). To be sure, given the brute fact that there IS something, such
