Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

[LizR]

On 6 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that
>> is still being debated. Tegmark's "mathematical universe hypothesis"
>> suggests that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless
>> mathematical structure.
>>
>> To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block
>> universe of special relativity already suggests something similar to this.
>> In relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time manifold,
>> and hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged within this
>> structure.
>>
>
> This is not true. Causality is still a fundamental consideration in SR,
> and that carries over into the basic structure of quantum field theory.
> Even within the block universe model, the light cone structure of spacetime
> is fundamental. The light cone encapsulates the fundamental insight of SR
> that causal influences cannot propagate faster than the speed of light --
> the light cone is the limiting extent of causal structure. The laws of
> physics consistent with this structure in SR and beyond are have a (local)
> Lorentz symmetry, which preserves the causal structure between different
> Lorentz frames. The distinction between time-like and space-like
> separations of events is aa fundamental tenet of physical law.
>
> None of this contradicts what I said. All I am concerned with is that SR
indicates that events are embedded in a 4D continuum. Describing how
they're embedded doesn't change that.

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[Bruce Kellett]

meekerdb wrote:

On 6/5/2015 4:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 6/5/2015 12:22 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 , meekerdb > wrote:


>> It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified
approximation of what. And we both agree that a electronic
computer is vastly more complex than it's logical schematic,
so why can we make a working model of the complex thing but
not make a working model of the simple thing when usually it's
easier to make a simple thing than a complex thing? The only
answer that comes to mind is that particular simplified
approximation is just too simplified and just too approximate
to actually do anything. That simplification must be missing
something important, matter that obeys the laws of physics.

> The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are
mathematical abstractions.


Mathematicians are always saying that mathematics is a language, but 
what would be the consequences if that were really true? The best 
way known to describe the laws of physics is to write then in the 
language of mathematics, but a language is not the thing the 
language is describing.


I agree the laws of physics are descriptions we invent; but even so 
they are abstractions and not material and what they define is only 
an approximation to what happens in the world.  That's what makes 
them useful - they let us make predictions while leaving out a lot of 
stuff.


So what is this "lot of stuff" that the mathematical abstractions 
leave out? In response you your initial point that "the laws of 
physics are mathematical abstractions", the obvious questions is 
"Abstractions from what?"


Abstractions from physical events.  We find we can leave out stuff like 
the location (and so conserve momentum) and the position of distant 
galaxies and the name of the experimenter and which god he prays to 
etc.  Of course what we can leave out and what we must include is part 
of applying the theory.  Physicists work by considering simple 
experiments in which they can leave out as much stuff they're not 
interested in as possible in order to test their theory.  Engineers 
don't get to be so choosy about what's left out; they have to consider 
what events may obtain.  But they also get to throw in "safety factors" 
to mitigate their ignorance.


In other words, in this account, the pre-existing physical world is 
taken as a given, from which laws are simplified abstractions. Fine, 
that's the way I think it is.


Bruce

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[meekerdb]

On 6/5/2015 4:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 6/5/2015 12:22 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 , meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


>> It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified
approximation of what. And we both agree that a electronic
computer is vastly more complex than it's logical schematic,
so why can we make a working model of the complex thing but
not make a working model of the simple thing when usually it's
easier to make a simple thing than a complex thing? The only
answer that comes to mind is that particular simplified
approximation is just too simplified and just too approximate
to actually do anything. That simplification must be missing
something important, matter that obeys the laws of physics.

> The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are
mathematical abstractions.


Mathematicians are always saying that mathematics is a language, but what would be the 
consequences if that were really true? The best way known to describe the laws of 
physics is to write then in the language of mathematics, but a language is not the 
thing the language is describing.


I agree the laws of physics are descriptions we invent; but even so they are 
abstractions and not material and what they define is only an approximation to what 
happens in the world.  That's what makes them useful - they let us make predictions 
while leaving out a lot of stuff.


So what is this "lot of stuff" that the mathematical abstractions leave out? In response 
you your initial point that "the laws of physics are mathematical abstractions", the 
obvious questions is "Abstractions from what?"


Abstractions from physical events.  We find we can leave out stuff like the location (and 
so conserve momentum) and the position of distant galaxies and the name of the 
experimenter and which god he prays to etc.  Of course what we can leave out and what we 
must include is part of applying the theory.  Physicists work by considering simple 
experiments in which they can leave out as much stuff they're not interested in as 
possible in order to test their theory.  Engineers don't get to be so choosy about what's 
left out; they have to consider what events may obtain.  But they also get to throw in 
"safety factors" to mitigate their ignorance.


Brent



Bruce



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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[Bruce Kellett]

meekerdb wrote:

On 6/5/2015 12:22 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 , meekerdb > wrote:


>> It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified
approximation of what. And we both agree that a electronic
computer is vastly more complex than it's logical schematic,
so why can we make a working model of the complex thing but
not make a working model of the simple thing when usually it's
easier to make a simple thing than a complex thing? The only
answer that comes to mind is that particular simplified
approximation is just too simplified and just too approximate
to actually do anything. That simplification must be missing
something important, matter that obeys the laws of physics.

> The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are
mathematical abstractions.


Mathematicians are always saying that mathematics is a language, but 
what would be the consequences if that were really true? The best way 
known to describe the laws of physics is to write then in the language 
of mathematics, but a language is not the thing the language is 
describing.


I agree the laws of physics are descriptions we invent; but even so they 
are abstractions and not material and what they define is only an 
approximation to what happens in the world.  That's what makes them 
useful - they let us make predictions while leaving out a lot of stuff.


So what is this "lot of stuff" that the mathematical abstractions leave 
out? In response you your initial point that "the laws of physics are 
mathematical abstractions", the obvious questions is "Abstractions from 
what?"


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

[Bruce Kellett]

LizR wrote:
This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that 
is still being debated. Tegmark's "mathematical universe hypothesis" 
suggests that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless 
mathematical structure.


To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block 
universe of special relativity already suggests something similar to 
this. In relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time 
manifold, and hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged 
within this structure.


This is not true. Causality is still a fundamental consideration in SR, 
and that carries over into the basic structure of quantum field theory. 
Even within the block universe model, the light cone structure of 
spacetime is fundamental. The light cone encapsulates the fundamental 
insight of SR that causal influences cannot propagate faster than the 
speed of light -- the light cone is the limiting extent of causal 
structure. The laws of physics consistent with this structure in SR and 
beyond are have a (local) Lorentz symmetry, which preserves the causal 
structure between different Lorentz frames. The distinction between 
time-like and space-like separations of events is aa fundamental tenet 
of physical law.


Bruce

Presumably the arrangement has abstract reasons 
(i.e. what we call the laws of physics, whatever they turn out to be). 
So even in SR, causality in effect takes a back seat, becoming the 
result of how observers are embedded in a "timeless" structure. Of 
course in this case, time still exists as a dimension, as it was in 
Newtonian physics. But even in Newtonian physics, Laplace imagined the 
past and future would be "already there" as far as a sufficiently 
godlike intellect was concerned.


So Newton and Einstein imagined that events were embedded in a physical 
structure, but that they were "already there" in the sense of being 
emergent from the laws of physics plus initial conditions.


ISTM that moving causation into a purely abstract realm is just one more 
step in this process, and a logical one (though obviously one that needs 
to be tested against reality).


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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[Bruce Kellett]

LizR wrote:
On 6 June 2015 at 07:22, John Clark > wrote:


On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 , meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> > It's very relevant if you want to know what is a
simplified approximation of what. And we both agree that a
electronic computer is vastly more complex than it's logical
schematic, so why can we make a working model of the complex
thing but not make a working model of the simple thing when
usually it's easier to make a simple thing than a complex
thing? The only answer that comes to mind is that particular
simplified approximation is just too simplified and just too
approximate to actually do anything. That simplification
must be missing something important, matter that obeys the
laws of physics.

>  The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are
mathematical abstractions.

Mathematicians are always saying that mathematics is a language, but
what would be the consequences if that were really true? 

I'm not sure that mathematicians say this (well, Galileo did, iirc, but 
generally they don't).
 
The best way known to describe the laws of physics is to write then

in the language of mathematics, but a language is not the thing the
language is describing. A book about Napoleon may be written in the
English Language, but the English Language is not Napoleon and
mathematics may not be the physical universe.  Or maybe it is. As
I've said many times I'm playing devil's advocate here, maybe
mathematics really is more fundamental than physics but if it is it
has not been proven.

I doubt anything could prove this if it's still being debated even 
though physics has been based on maths for 300 years.


I think you will find that physics has been based on experience, and the 
the experience/experiments have been codified/described by mathematics. 
To say that is "has been based on maths" is a gross distortion of the facts.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

[LizR]

This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that is
still being debated. Tegmark's "mathematical universe hypothesis" suggests
that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical
structure.

To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block universe
of special relativity already suggests something similar to this. In
relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time manifold, and
hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged within this
structure. Presumably the arrangement has abstract reasons (i.e. what we
call the laws of physics, whatever they turn out to be). So even in SR,
causality in effect takes a back seat, becoming the result of how observers
are embedded in a "timeless" structure. Of course in this case, time still
exists as a dimension, as it was in Newtonian physics. But even in
Newtonian physics, Laplace imagined the past and future would be "already
there" as far as a sufficiently godlike intellect was concerned.

So Newton and Einstein imagined that events were embedded in a physical
structure, but that they were "already there" in the sense of being
emergent from the laws of physics plus initial conditions.

ISTM that moving causation into a purely abstract realm is just one more
step in this process, and a logical one (though obviously one that needs to
be tested against reality).

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[LizR]

On 6 June 2015 at 09:46, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 6/5/2015 12:22 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
>  On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 , meekerdb  wrote:
>
>  >> It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified
>> approximation of what. And we both agree that a electronic computer is
>> vastly more complex than it's logical schematic, so why can we make a
>> working model of the complex thing but not make a working model of the
>> simple thing when usually it's easier to make a simple thing than a complex
>> thing? The only answer that comes to mind is that particular simplified
>> approximation is just too simplified and just too approximate to actually
>> do anything. That simplification must be missing something important,
>> matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>
>
>
>>   > The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are
>> mathematical abstractions.
>>
>
>  Mathematicians are always saying that mathematics is a language, but
> what would be the consequences if that were really true? The best way known
> to describe the laws of physics is to write then in the language of
> mathematics, but a language is not the thing the language is describing.
>
>
> I agree the laws of physics are descriptions we invent; but even so they
> are abstractions and not material and what they define is only an
> approximation to what happens in the world.  That's what makes them useful
> - they let us make predictions while leaving out a lot of stuff.
>
> I know what you mean, but this statement could be considered a bit
misleading. Unlike the other branches of science, physics at least tries to
be a complete description. Of course it fails in practice, but (very much
in theory) a TOE would describe everything - it would in principle be like
"Laplace's demon" (though possibly only for a multiverse).

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[LizR]

On 6 June 2015 at 07:22, John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 , meekerdb  wrote:
>
> >> It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified
>> approximation of what. And we both agree that a electronic computer is
>> vastly more complex than it's logical schematic, so why can we make a
>> working model of the complex thing but not make a working model of the
>> simple thing when usually it's easier to make a simple thing than a complex
>> thing? The only answer that comes to mind is that particular simplified
>> approximation is just too simplified and just too approximate to actually
>> do anything. That simplification must be missing something important,
>> matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>
>
>
>> > The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are
>> mathematical abstractions.
>>
>
> Mathematicians are always saying that mathematics is a language, but what
> would be the consequences if that were really true?
>

I'm not sure that mathematicians say this (well, Galileo did, iirc, but
generally they don't).


> The best way known to describe the laws of physics is to write then in the
> language of mathematics, but a language is not the thing the language is
> describing. A book about Napoleon may be written in the English Language,
> but the English Language is not Napoleon and mathematics may not be the
> physical universe.  Or maybe it is. As I've said many times I'm playing
> devil's advocate here, maybe mathematics really is more fundamental than
> physics but if it is it has not been proven.
>

I doubt anything could prove this if it's still being debated even though
physics has been based on maths for 300 years.

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[meekerdb]

On 6/5/2015 12:22 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 , meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

>> It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified 
approximation of
what. And we both agree that a electronic computer is vastly more 
complex than
it's logical schematic, so why can we make a working model of the 
complex thing
but not make a working model of the simple thing when usually it's 
easier to
make a simple thing than a complex thing? The only answer that comes to 
mind is
that particular simplified approximation is just too simplified and 
just too
approximate to actually do anything. That simplification must be missing
something important, matter that obeys the laws of physics.

> The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are 
mathematical abstractions.


Mathematicians are always saying that mathematics is a language, but what would be the 
consequences if that were really true? The best way known to describe the laws of 
physics is to write then in the language of mathematics, but a language is not the thing 
the language is describing.


I agree the laws of physics are descriptions we invent; but even so they are abstractions 
and not material and what they define is only an approximation to what happens in the 
world.  That's what makes them useful - they let us make predictions while leaving out a 
lot of stuff.


Brent

A book about Napoleon may be written in the English Language, but the English Language 
is not Napoleon and mathematics may not be the physical universe.


Or maybe it is. As I've said many times I'm playing devil's advocate here, maybe 
mathematics really is more fundamental than physics but if it is it has not been proven.


  John K Clark


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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 , meekerdb  wrote:

>> It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified
> approximation of what. And we both agree that a electronic computer is
> vastly more complex than it's logical schematic, so why can we make a
> working model of the complex thing but not make a working model of the
> simple thing when usually it's easier to make a simple thing than a complex
> thing? The only answer that comes to mind is that particular simplified
> approximation is just too simplified and just too approximate to actually
> do anything. That simplification must be missing something important,
> matter that obeys the laws of physics.



> > The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are
> mathematical abstractions.
>

Mathematicians are always saying that mathematics is a language, but what
would be the consequences if that were really true? The best way known to
describe the laws of physics is to write then in the language of
mathematics, but a language is not the thing the language is describing. A
book about Napoleon may be written in the English Language, but the English
Language is not Napoleon and mathematics may not be the physical universe.


Or maybe it is. As I've said many times I'm playing devil's advocate here,
maybe mathematics really is more fundamental than physics but if it is it
has not been proven.

  John K Clark

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Do you agree that the simulated "john Clark" will still complain that
> matter is missing in computation, despite we know that he refers to number
> relations, without knowing it?


If the simulation had been done correctly then the simulated John Clark
will have the same opinions I do including reservations about computations
being made without matter. If the simulation was being performed on a
computer made of matter then the reservations were justified, if the
simulation was being performed by pure mathematics and nothing else then
they were not.

  John K Clark





>

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 8:15 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Turing machine are not made of matter,
>

If it's not made of matter then it's not a machine it's a "Turing
Something" and it can't do a damn thing.


> > and computation is definable in arithmetic, just using the symbol s, 0,
> + * and the usual logical symbol.
>

YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION!!


> > But the point is that we don"t have to made them once you agree that
> 2+2=4 does not depend on matter,
>

But I don't agree that must be true, it's the very point we're debating. If
4 physical things did not exist in the physical universe or even 2 I don't
know if 2+2 would equal 4 or not and neither do you. If it does then
mathematics is more fundamental if it doesn't then physics is.

  John K Clark

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> "Event" is a physical notion. Algorithmic non compressibility is an
> mathematical notion.
>

An event is just a place and a time; are you saying that mathematics is
incapable of handling 4 coordinates?


> >> Nothing caused the 9884th digit of a random number to be a 6 rather
>> than some other digit, and that is the one and only reason it is NOT
>> algorithmically incompressible. But something did cause the 9884th digit of
>> PI to be a 4 and not some other digit, and that's why PI IS algorithmically
>> compressible.
>
>
> > I have a counter-example to your claim. Fix a universal system. It
> determines completely its Chaitin number, yet it is algorithmically
> incompressible.
>

I don't know what you mean by "fix" but if something requires an infinite
number of steps to determine what it will do its not very deterministic.

> In some post you argued once that comp1 is trivial,
>

Bullshit. I have never argued anything about "comp1" and never will because
I'm sick to death with "comp" of any variety.

>> If time or space is quantized as most physicists think it is then the
>> real numbers are just a simplified approximation of what happens in the
>> physical world.
>
>
> > Typically, physical quantization is defined by using complex numbers.
>

Because even if space and time are quantized the discrete steps are so
little that complex numbers are a good approximation of the physical world
unless you're dealing with things that are ultra super small.


> > But again, the point was just that CT does not refer to physics.
>

Bullshit.

>> Computationalism says you can make matter behave intelligently if you
>> organize it in certain ways,
>
>
> > That is a rephrasing of computationalism, and what you say follow from
> it, but the more precise and general version is that you stay conscious
> [...]
>

To hell with consciousness! Figure out how intelligence works and then
worry about consciousness.

>> maybe that matter is primitive and maybe it is not but there has been a
>> enormous amount of progress in recent years with AI demonstrating that
>> Computationalism is probably true. There has been zero progress
>> demonstrating that mathematics can behave intelligently.
>
>
> > Mathematics does not belong to the category of things which can behave.
>

That is a HUGE admission on your part, if it is true (and I don't know if
it is or not) then the debate is over and physics is more fundamental than
mathematics.  End of story.


> > But mathematics, and actually just arithmetic can define relative
> entities behaving relatively to universal number
>

And I can define a new integer that has never been seen before, I call it
"fluxdige" and it's definition is that it's equal to 2+2 but it's not equal
to 4. You can't make a calculation with a definition!

>> Nobody has shown the existence of primitive mathematics either.
>
>
> > Primitive means that we have to assume it. Logicians have prove that
> arithmetic, or universality, is primitive in the sense that you cannot
> derive arithmetic, or the existence of universal numbers, without assuming
> less than that.
>

When Peano came up with the integers he had to first assume that the number
1 existed and then he came up with rules to generate its successor, but if
the physical universe did not exist, if there were ZERO things in it, then
it's not at all obvious that the number 1 would exist. Maybe it would and
maybe it wouldn't, I don't know. One of your Greek buddies Socrates said
that the first step toward wisdom is knowing when you don't know.  So if
Socrates was right then I'm wiser than you are.

> Computations have been discovered in mathematics. All textbooks in the
> filed explains that.
>

You can't make a computation with a textbook!

> You can't make a calculation with a definition!
>
>
> > You can.
>

Then stop talking about it and just do it!


> > And if it is simple enough, you can do that mentally. You will tell me
> that in this case we still need a physical brain
>

Indeed I will.

> but this can be a local relative notion,
>

Local? A good rule of thumb is that if a theory says "Local" means the
entire multiverse then things may be getting out of hand.

>> I say "compute" means figuring out an answer, nobody has ever done this
>> without using matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>
>
> > You are right, but this does not prove that the notion of matter is used
> in the definition of computation.
>

Who cares about the damn definition? You can't make a computation with a
definition!


> > To do something materially we need matter
>

Yes, but if mathematics is more fundamental than physics it's not obvious
why that should be the case.


> > PA and formal systems compute things without doing the computation
> physically.
>

Bullshit.


> > Kleene invented his famous predicate and got his normal form theorem for
> the computable function by using the arithmetical existence of the
> computations only.
>

Then 

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[meekerdb]

On 6/4/2015 10:33 PM, John Clark wrote:

Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

>> The physical device is far more complex than the algorithm, 
astronomically more
complex, so you tell me which is a simplified approximation of which.

> The physical device is no more relevant to the algorithm than any other 
universal
system. 

Yes, an algorithm is a simplified approximation of the way a real computer works, and in 
general good simplified approximations work with a large number of real world situations.


> You can implement the factorial in fortran, and you can implement fortran 
in lisp,
and you can implement lisp 

Correct again, but whatever language you implement your algorithm in it must be 
implemented in matter that obeys the laws of physics because you can't make a 
calculation with software alone.


> The level of complexity is not relevant here.


It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified approximation of what. And 
we both agree that a electronic computer is vastly more complex than it's logical 
schematic, so why can we make a working model of the complex thing but not make a 
working model of the simple thing when usually it's easier to make a simple thing than a 
complex thing? The only answer that comes to mind is that particular simplified 
approximation is just too simplified and just too approximate to actually do anything. 
That simplification must be missing something important, matter that obeys the laws of 
physics.


The trouble with this argument is that the laws of physics are mathematical 
abstractions.

Brent

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Notion of (mathematical) reason

[Pzomby]

Hi Bruno:

 

You made this statement recently in "the scope of physical law" thread .  
"There is no event notion in mathematics, nor is there any notion of cause, 
unless you enlarge the notion of cause to the notion of (mathematical) 
reason."  .

 

You appear to be stating that mathematics exists in a timeless universe (no 
event notion), which makes sense.  This would leave mathematics in a role 
of modeling/describing or measuring both instantiations of causes and their 
effects/events.  You further refer to "the notion of (mathematical) 
reason".  

 

Question: If chains of causes are preceded by chains of reasons (and your 
reference to mathematics) doesn't that infer some form of duality?  IOW, 
the duality being (a) abstract reasons (that precede causes) and (b) their 
complementary realities (effects/events).  

 

Thanks. 

Pzomby  

 

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2015, at 07:33, John Clark wrote:


Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> The physical device is far more complex than the algorithm,  
astronomically more complex, so you tell me which is a simplified  
approximation of which.


> The physical device is no more relevant to the algorithm than any  
other universal system.
Yes, an algorithm is a simplified approximation of the way a real  
computer works, and in general good simplified approximations work  
with a large number of real world situations.


And so can be indeopendent of them, and belong to another realm, like  
logic and arithmetic. But, actually, you are wrong. Computations have  
been discovered by mathematicians (who were unaware of Babbage), and  
computer have been constructed after.




> You can implement the factorial in fortran, and you can implement  
fortran in lisp, and you can implement lisp
Correct again, but whatever language you implement your algorithm in  
it must be implemented in matter that obeys the laws of physics  
because you can't make a calculation with software alone.




But the goal of making real-life computations is not our goal. Your  
remark remains non relevant.
Eventually we will have to explain "real-life appearances" by an  
internal statistics on the computations existing in arithmetic.






> The level of complexity is not relevant here.

It's very relevant if you want to know what is a simplified  
approximation of what. And we both agree that a electronic computer  
is vastly more complex than it's logical schematic, so why can we  
make a working model of the complex thing but not make a working  
model of the simple thing when usually it's easier to make a simple  
thing than a complex thing? The only answer that comes to mind is  
that particular simplified approximation is just too simplified and  
just too approximate to actually do anything. That simplification  
must be missing something important, matter that obeys the laws of  
physics.


If you agree that the math notion of computation miss something  
(matter), then you agree that they are mathematical. Now, when a the  
Milky Way is emulated by arithmetic below our substitution level,  
explain me how the simulated humans can guess that matter is missing.  
Do you agree that the simulated "john Clark" will still complain that  
matter is missing in computation, despite we know that he refers to  
number relations, without knowing it?


Bruno





  John K Clark

  John K Clark




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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2015, at 06:59, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 , Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> The point is just that the notion of computation, once you agree  
with Church-Turing thesis, is made into a purely arithmetical notion.


That is incorrect. The Church-Turing thesis says that a function on  
the positive and negative integers is computable if and only if it  
is computable on a Turing Machine; and if the Turing Machine is not  
made of matter that obeys the laws of physics then the "machine" is  
useless because it does absolutely positively nothing.



I begin to think that you are attempting to become the champion of  
nonsense.


Turing machine are not made of matter, and computation is definable in  
arithmetic, just using the symbol s, 0, + * and the usual logical  
symbol. We can even eliminate the "A" (for all) quantifier.






> You can define computable and finite piece of computation by one  
precise combinators, or one precise number, or one precise  
diophantine polynomials, etc.


YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION!!


But the point is that we don"t have to made them once you agree that  
2+2=4 does not depend on matter, and that is the case, by definition  
of the notions involved.






> You are the one invoking some God (Matter) capable of making some  
computation more real than others.


It could not be clearer that some calculations ARE more real than  
others.


Relatively? Sure. I have to pay by national taxes, that's real and  
important to avoid real problems, but that is not relevant. Again, you  
beg the question if you say that the physical computations are more  
real. you could say that only those blessed by the Pope are really  
real ...




Matter can make calculations that I can see, but your calculations  
are invisible;


Like the numbers. But in the computation which exist in arithmetic,  
some emulate person seeing object.


You could say that there is no real driving car, or any movement, in a  
block-universe, as there is no time there, and we need time to
measure the presence of movement. But we have no problem because those  
notions are relative. Similarly here. That is why the notions of  
points of view is capital in the computationalist approach.



the transubstantiation in the Catholic Mass that turns bread and  
wine into the body and blood of Jesus Christ is also invisible.  As  
I've said, being invisible and being nonexistent look rather similar


Assuming some aristotelian theological dogma.







> comp, explains the physical, from machine self-referential  
properties, and so can be translated in arithmetic to give the  
proposition logic of physics.


  I don't care, I'm not interested in "comp".



Then why do you participate in this list where comp and its (meta)- 
physical consequences are discussed since about 20 years?


- You agree with the multiverse. Some (rare) physicists have  
criticized my thesis (without reading it) because they were told that  
I defend Everett, and that was enough for them, (which, btw, is false,  
as I do not defend any thesis).
- You agree with comp, and might be said being, like Hal Finney,  a  
real comp practitioners.

- You agree that physics might not be fundamental.

So what?

You would disagree only because you would have found a flaw in step 3,  
without ever being able to convince anyone on this?


or because, CT would use physics? (But you have not find "serious"  
confirmation on this on the net, and still deny).


or you want just be disagreeable?

or what?

I tell you that I can decompose step 3 in smaller steps, ... but  
recently, even 14 years old children told me that this was necessary  
only for the 12 years old one! Indeed, if you take the definition  
which are given, this is 3p obvious (and you said so yourself), so  
nobody in this list or elsewhere understand why you don't move on the  
other steps. Yet, you keep the tone "everyone know that this is just  
peepee". That shows that it is purely rhetorical dismiss.


I am not sure I can see what is your problem.
It does look personal, given the constant ad hominem way of addressing  
the posts.


Bruno






  John K Clark



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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Jun 2015, at 19:54, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 >>> or A string which is not algorithmically compressible,

>> Yes, that is a very good example of an event without a cause.


> "Event" is a physical notion. Algorithmic non compressibility is  
an mathematical notion.


Nothing caused the 9884th digit of a random number to be a 6 rather  
than some other digit, and that is the one and only reason it is NOT  
algorithmically incompressible. But something did cause the 9884th  
digit of PI to be a 4 and not some other digit, and that's why PI IS  
algorithmically compressible.



I have a counter-example to your claim. Fix a universal system. It  
determines completely its Chaitin number, yet it is algorithmically  
incompressible. Same with "Post number": that one is compressible, yet  
most of its digital are not computable, although completely  
deterlmined, if you agree that a close machine (a machine activated on  
some input) either stop or does not stop.





  But that is not yet proven too, as comp implies there is  
something non computable, but it might be just the FPI and the  
quantum FPI confirms this.
>> I don't care, I'm not interested in "comp" or of the Foreign  
Policy Institute.




>  If you don't care, you would abandon the idea of showing that  
comp1 does not imply comp2


And I'm even less interested in "comp1" and "comp2" whatever the  
hell they are supposed to be.


In some post you argued once that comp1 is trivial, and that we need  
to be irrational to believe in the negation of computationalism.

So you start again your dismissive rhetorical maneuvers.






>>>   Physics use a lot of non computable things in the background.

>>  Name one.

> The set of real numbers.

If time or space is quantized as most physicists think it is then  
the real numbers are just a simplified approximation of what happens  
in the physical world.


Typically, physical quantization is defined by using complex numbers.



Even mathematicians are starting to have reservations about the real  
numbers, even   Gregory Chaitin has started to distrust them and  
ironically his greatest claim to fame came from discovering (or  
maybe inventing) a particular real number, the Omega.


Mathematicians have some problem with the real numbers since the  
beginning. Most are solved by method usuallu judged to rough, like an  
axiomatic set theory, etc. It is on analysis that intuitionist  
mathematics and clmassical mathematics differ the most. In theoretical  
computer science we can justify the needs of non constructive method,  
as very often there is provably no constructive tools available, and  
it is part of the subject. But again, the point was just that CT does  
not refer to physics. And yes CT entails incompleteness and the  
existence of non computable functions and of algorithmically non  
soluble problems.








 It is intuitively obvious that no computation can be made  
without the use of matter that obeys the laws of physics.


>>> "made" is ambiguous.

>> Bullshit.


> Did you mean "made" in the physical reality, by a physical  
universal machine,


Of course I mean that!

> or did you mean "made" by a immaterial universal machine, like  
Robinson Arithmetic?


Of course I don't mean that, unless you know how to build a  
immaterial machine with material! Couldn't you have figured this out  
by yourself?


It is easy to implement an immaterial machine with matter, like you  
can represent the abstract number 2 with two pebbles.







> I say that computationalism is false, because you use primitive  
matter.


Computationalism says you can make matter behave intelligently if  
you organize it in certain ways,


That is a rephrasing of computationalism, and what you say follow from  
it, but the more precise and general version is that you stay  
conscious (and don't see any difference) when simulated at the right  
level (which existence is assumed), and that will entail that we can't  
distinguish a physical computation from a purely arithmetical one, by  
pure introspection (without clues from observation).





maybe that matter is primitive and maybe it is not but there has  
been a enormous amount of progress in recent years with AI  
demonstrating that Computationalism is probably true. There has been  
zero progress demonstrating that mathematics can behave intelligently.


Mathematics does not belong to the category of things which can behave.
But mathematics, and actually just arithmetic, can define relative  
entities behaving relatively to universal number, and that is known  
since Post, Turing, etc.





> Why should we abandon computationalism, given that nobody has ever  
show the existence of primitive matter?


Nobody has shown the existence of primitive mathematics either.


Primitive means that we have to assume it. Logicians have prove that  
arithmetic, or universality, is primitive in the sense that you cannot  
derive