date:20190623

Re: The Science of Consciousness, Interlaken 2019

2019-06-23 Thread Philip Thrift

On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 6:51:38 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 6:19:34 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>>
>> What is a "proto"experience ?
>>
>
>
> *Panprotoexperientialism* basically combines *panexperientialism* and 
> *panprotopsychism*.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Panexperientialism
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#PanpVersPanp 
>
>
> At the Interlaken TSC conference, there is a workshop
>
>- Panpsychism and Dual Aspect Monism – organized by Philip Goff, 
>Durham University  [details] 
>
>
>
> I haven't looked at the papers, but there are probably several in the 
> "pan-" area.
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
Here is one (from the abstracts of the *TSC2019 *conference), though I 
would still take a "particles [particle-histories] vs. fields" approach

*A Field Response to the Combination Problem for Panpsychism*
Laura Weed

The combination problem has been identified by William James, David 
Chalmers, and many others as a significant problem for panpsychism, because 
it is not apparent how small psychons, however conceived, could combine to 
form larger selves, while retaining the qualia values and quiddities of the 
psychons. I will argue in this paper that the problem arises from taking an 
excessively entitative view of the nature of both physical things, as they 
are ordinarily conceived, and mental things, as they are ordinarily 
conceived. I will argue that conceiving of physical and mental things 
rather as fields will alleviate some of the puzzles that have traditionally 
arisen in the literature concerning the physical and the mental. First, I 
will outline a metaphysics of fields, then I will address the details of 
David Chalmers’ analysis of the combination problem, to show how a 
metaphysics of fields mutes the force of many of his worries about that 
problem for panpsychism.

A Metaphysics of Fields

Most metaphysicians in Western Philosophy have followed the lead of 
Aristotle or Plato and discussed metaphysics in terms of either 
Aristotelian entities or Platonic properties. Indeed, the psychons rejected 
by James and Chalmers, are usually thought of as either very small metal 
entities or very small mental properties. A metaphysics of fields, in 
contrast, will think of mental activity as a dynamic relationship among 
attractors, within energy fields, which may or may not also contain 
entities and properties. The model
for mental activity will have more in common with electromagnetism or 
gravity, than with quarks and atoms, and will be composed of processes, 
forces and activities rather than things or properties. Also, fields are 
not quite Russellian structures, or the entities of structural realism of 
the type espoused by Ladyman and Ross, although they might contain or 
generate such structures at times.

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a296928d-e890-4db6-b59f-9e6ea1b3b68d%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Eternal return

2019-06-23 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Yeah, Frank Tipler proposed this more seriously, and Sabine Hossenfelder, more 
recently., speculatively, via quantum mechanics. Many trans-humanists hate this 
proposal because, hey, no continuity. Years ago, philosopher, Robert Nozick 
proposed a pragmatic, closest continuer hypothesis. Basically, In the US we say 
jokingly, "close enough for government work." 

-Original Message-
From: Eva 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Sun, Jun 23, 2019 9:41 am
Subject: Eternal return

Given that time is irreversible, and global entropy always increase:

1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being, or 
humanity will be annihilated? 

2. In principle, if system is annihilated then it is irreversible - a system 
with the same internal structure may be created, but it will not be the very 
same system, it may be (at most) perfectly isomorphic, but it will not share 
the same identity?

So, for example, if I die, and hypothetically, in the distant future, an exact 
copy of my body will be made than it will be an exact copy of my body and 
consciousness, but not my current identity, so my consciousness will not 
reappear after my death like from deep sleep.

I would like to ask you - in your opinion, my two above conclusions are correct?

I'm sorry for bothering you with this question, I have encountered statements 
that every situation, and every particular life, return endlessly because the 
time is infinite, but the number of possibile configurations of atoms is 
finite. This idea is terrible. I don't want repeat my life forever :(

Some people also talk about "eternal return" in the context of 4D block 
universe theory where every situation is timless.

P.S. 

I've previously made a similar topic in context of Peter Rowlands 
"Zero-totality"
works but it did not appeared after sending :(

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6f68dc29-a311-4980-a955-4e71991ef5cc%40googlegroups.com.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1296321060.848703.1561355491939%40mail.yahoo.com.

Re: Huh? (was Allah nonsense)

2019-06-23 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Only if it works for you, otherwise, there's no point. If you don't like pasta, 
nobody can make you like pasta. Ok, maybe rigatoni?

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, Jun 23, 2019 7:40 am
Subject: Re: Huh? (was Allah nonsense)

On 23 Jun 2019, at 01:36, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
If God does not exist, or does exist in a fashion we cannot grasp, or is 3 
people/entities. or is Hindu and many many-we don't get a choice, and nobody 
asked us to vote. If you want to honor God, help somebody out (materialism!)..  

Why honour God? Why worship God? For a platonism, God is the truth we search, 
the truth which remains when the lies dies out. To honour truth? If this means 
to stop lying, that could be nice, and very useful to help everybody out.
Bruno

"But don't it make you want to rock and roll
All night long
Mohammed's Radio
I heard somebody singing sweet and soulful
On the radio, Mohammed's RadioYou know, the Sheriff's got his problems too
He will surely take them out on you
In walked the village idiot and his face was all aglow
He's been up all night listening to Mohammed's Radio"Warren Zevon,, Mohammad's 
Radio 1976

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Fri, Jun 21, 2019 7:33 am
Subject: Re: Huh? (was Allah nonsense)

On 20 Jun 2019, at 20:23, Lawrence Crowell  
wrote:
On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 10:37:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jun 2019, at 14:05, John Clark  wrote:
Bruno Marchal Wrote:

> Jesus (which I think has never claim to be literally a god).

What are you talking about? Jesus not only claimed to be a god he claimed to be 
THE God, son of the Father and partner (or something) of the Holy Ghost which 
were all part of the Holy Trinity. You must have heard of the Holy Trinity, the 
3 persons in one God crap, Christianity's pathetic attempt to have its cake and 
eat it too and have the advantages of both monotheism and polytheism. 
Officially the 3 persons are supposed to be equal but I always felt the Holy 
Ghost was the junior partner, the Ringo Star of the Holy Trinity, the Garfunkel 
in Simon and Garfunkel.

References? I have search any indications that Jesus claimed this, but the 
references comes aways after 529.You persists in defending the official 
doctrine of the christians, the one imposed by terror and authoritative 
argument. 
The trinity might have come from Plotinus three hypostases, and St-Augustin has 
used them to make sense of it (the christian trinity).
Mathematical logic is born from a more recent discussion, between Anglican 
Unionist and Anglican trinitarian. Just to introduced more rigor in that 
discussion. See the book of Daniel J. Cohen:
Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
Bruno

Mark 14:62 And Jesus said, I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the 
right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.

Moses in שְׁמוֹת (Shemot) or Exodus is addressed by God as "I am." To even just 
say "I am" amounts to declaring oneself God. The Gospels have a number of 
instances with Jesus saying this.

Even if some time traveller show me Jesus transforming water into wine, I would 
believe that the most plausible explanation is that Jesus is a good 
prestidigitator.
And the Moses quote, as well as what you say about the Gospel confirms my 
feeling, which is that by “I am” or “I am God”, Jesus just makes the usual 
claim of those having a mystic, or spcyhdelic, experience. He is not calming 
that he, and only he, is the literal son of God. They seems to say the normal 
things, which is that we are gods. All of us. With mechanism, that includes 
bacteria and any universal number. But we better no say it, and let people to 
discover this by themselves (it belongs to G* minus G).
Bruno

LC
-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/221f4fb2-fb65-4caf-916b-67a0c18ace4d%40googlegroups.com.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4ABDB89E-149C-4610-B4A0-E98308774504%40ulb.ac.be.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2030601173.5

Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

2019-06-23 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

On top of all this, Bruno, they have become less shrewd and more bumbling, like 
the generation of leaders before WW1. 

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sun, Jun 23, 2019 7:36 am
Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

On 23 Jun 2019, at 01:29, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:

Heh! Bruno, in the USA it's all about money, which is symbolic, or is it? 

Money is like love and energy. It can be exchanged, it can grows, and it is 
problematic when you have none.

The rich buy the politicians to fill their pockets more, but also buy power. If 
the US is the home spot of the Constitution, or the US Civil War, it is also 
the home of Tammany Hall, and Chicago ($$$). "It's a plutocracy, madame, if you 
can keep it?"  -Reacted, Ben Franklin. 

In Europa, the lobbying is more restricted, (but not enough), and I think 
lobbying should never be financial. Financial lobbying is fraud made legal. 
Money is not the problem. Money based on lies and propaganda is the problem, 
and financial lobbying aggravates this a lot, I would say.
Bruno

Zuck, and not just him,  is confronted to the not easy delineation between 
freedom of speech and defamation.
Bruno

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Fri, Jun 21, 2019 7:23 am
Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

On 20 Jun 2019, at 20:43, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
Well, they defame themselves, and successfully bribe politicians. 
Interestingly, they have all, regardless of party, in the US, have left the 
nationalist camp. entirely. This will cause an effect, opening the path for 
antitrust laws. Barring this, the legality of how the 1st amendment in the US 
is affected, will come into play.

OK.
Bruno 

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Thu, Jun 20, 2019 6:17 am
Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

On 19 Jun 2019, at 05:15, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
Oh, why not both, 

OK.

especially when that defender of freedom, Zuck pushes his Libra :-) ?

Zuck, and not just him,  is confronted to the not easy delineation between 
freedom of speech and defamation.
Bruno

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Tue, Jun 18, 2019 5:52 am
Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

On 13 Jun 2019, at 19:19, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
Yes Bruno, back in the day, one of my college profs termed ideologies, to be a 
faith movement. 

I would say that ideologues are blind faith, or dogma. Ideas are better, but 
faith is personal, and we need it to go out of bed every morning.

Hence, Lysenko, Stalin, Mao, and in my view, progressivism (like Juncker, like 
Soros) push for their faith movement.  

Faith movement makes no sense, but I guess I quibble on vocabulary here.

That is my dig, but also an honest observation. As we say in the US, 
ideologists aren't playing with a full deck. 

Yes, it is “bad faith”, or just a trick to steal your money.
Bruno

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Thu, Jun 13, 2019 7:27 am
Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

On 12 Jun 2019, at 05:09, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
iI like the Pastafatians. However I am not against religion, just the mentality 
of the fanatic. Fanaticism usually means If you don't obey us, we will kill 
youThis mentality is not just hugely, seen, among the Islamists.But also, their 
political chums, the Progressives (socialists & communists who are funded by 
billionaires)There is also, surprisingly to myself, great self-righteousness 
expressed by this lot, in excess, of the Christian fundamentalist.Beyond this, 
if Atheism works for you? Spectacular. If doing religious craps allow one to 
enjoy some psycho-social activity? Splendid.I do love Outre' observations by 
some physicists, because it permits our species to break free. I mean it's 
physics, it's either going to work or not, right? On the other hand, a gigantic 
budget would be required to test some conjectures. 

Yes, the problem is not any domain per se, but the fanaticism of those who 
claim to know the truth, again, that works for any domain.
But sometimes, a political authoritative regime choose some domain to make 
truth claim, like Lyssenko in USSR genetics, or like with the frequent use of 
religion by unscrupulous manipulators.
People who claim not having a religion are usually people not aware of their 
hypotheses. They take something fro granted, unconsciously. It is normal, as we 
have plausibly been “programmed” in that way, for survival purposes.
Bruno 

-Original Message-
From: Philip Thrift 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Tue, Jun 11, 2019 4:07 pm
Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

On Tuesday, June 11, 2019 at 2:31:52 PM UTC-5, spudb...@aol.com wrote:
"One man's theology is another man's belly laugh." -Lazarus Long aka Robert 
Heinlein

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-06-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 6/23/2019 5:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2019, at 21:49, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 6/21/2019 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2019, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

To disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from the
expected value,

To make my point more strongly, that is the wrong way round.
Observation of statistics far from the expected value is what would
be required to confirm MWI.

I don’t see this at all.

The fact that we don't observe such results is the strongest
possible case against MWI!

The probability to see a deviation is the same in both Everett, and
Copenhagen. The deviation expected is the same, so if there is a
deviation, it can hardly be used to claim one theory is more correct
than the other.

But as Bruce points out Tegmark's machine gun experiment is
effectively being carried out by each of us.

That is quantum immortality. On this list I have defend this, but
Tegmark rejected it, and claimed that the survival to quantum suicide
does not entail quantum immortality. He might have changed his mind
since, perhaps.

So if each of us lives on a million years in some branch of the MW,
then each of us will experience 99.9% of our life as a very old
person among people younger than 100yrs.

Unless there are intimidate realities in between Earth and Heaven.

It would still imply that each person would experience only a small part
of their existence surrounded by other persons whose age differed by
less that 120yr from their own. And so each of us should be surprised
that we find ourself in exactly that kind of world.

Brent

That is the whole subject of mathematical theology. Computer science
justifies jumps and intermediate realities. It is not an obvious
subjects, but the nuances given by incompleteness provides some light.
Some personal experience, like with some plants, can help, but can
also mislead. Nothing is obvious, and everything requires a lot of work.

Bruno

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c0263226-63a2-183b-2e0b-c093be94bc20%40verizon.net
.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FDF9CDE1-D3EA-45F6-8DEC-20659FC0F1B9%40ulb.ac.be
.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c4f526ad-1ed0-d143-328c-5409fd16b642%40verizon.net.

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

2019-06-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 That sounds a bit observer dependent.

Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine 
perspective. An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the 
material modes of the self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or 
[]p & <>t & p).


Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
physical world.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/40792d73-e1bf-b0d2-de47-434be6bd6fce%40verizon.net.

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-06-23 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Jun 22, 2019 at 11:20 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 6/21/2019 4:57 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> From the first person point of view, after all, the probability is not
> known in advance.
>
>
> I'm not sure what "known" means in that.  If you toss a coin to you "know
> in advance" the probability of heads in 1/2?
>

You generally assume this if you can assume that the coin is fair. But
there is no sense in which you actually 'know' this.



Not all unlikely events are governed by quantum probabilities. Most are
> just due to good old classical chance.
>
>
> That's not really clear to me.  "Good old classical chance" is just
> quantifying ignorance.  At a fundamental level there must be either
> inherent chance, QM, or determinism.
>

"Good old classical chance" is ignorance of the detailed initial
conditions. It is assumed that "classical" refers to the determinism that
reigns in classical physics.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRTRqoFpLH3AOsSttUgPYVyiPp44xrDOvFzOxHTWdyAsg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: The Science of Consciousness, Interlaken 2019

2019-06-23 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 6:19:34 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> What is a "proto"experience ?
>


*Panprotoexperientialism* basically combines *panexperientialism* and 
*panprotopsychism*.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Panexperientialism
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#PanpVersPanp 


At the Interlaken TSC conference, there is a workshop

   - Panpsychism and Dual Aspect Monism – organized by Philip Goff, Durham 
   University  [details] 
   


I haven't looked at the papers, but there are probably several in the 
"pan-" area.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/84d928d2-3699-48fb-8c31-d2202b6d09b0%40googlegroups.com.

Re: The Science of Consciousness, Interlaken 2019

2019-06-23 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

What is a "proto"experience ?

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/37451449-0f82-4c7a-b746-e81ab42e60eb%40googlegroups.com.

Re: The Science of Consciousness, Interlaken 2019

2019-06-23 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 4:52:02 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> [image: Full poster.png]
>
>
> My poster for TSC.
>



"Emergence" seems similar to "fusion" (of [proto]experiences) of 
https://heddahasselmorch.com/ .

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a6f32214-8903-4a2f-bfa5-5ace09c48677%40googlegroups.com.

Re: The Science of Consciousness, Interlaken 2019

2019-06-23 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

Right-click -> Copy image location, to see the full picture in a new tab.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fc187b8e-f872-4a4a-977c-6e9230c2a5af%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Eternal return

2019-06-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 6/21/2019 9:27 AM, Eva wrote:

Given that time is irreversible, and global entropy always increase:

1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being, or
humanity will be annihilated?

2. In principle, if system is annihilated then it is irreversible - a system
with the same internal structure may be created, but it will not be the very
same system, it may be (at most) perfectly isomorphic, but it will not share
the same identity?

Atoms of the same kind are identical. So if, for example, your body was
recreated, atom for atom, it would as identical as you are identical to
the Eva of a few minutes ago.

So, for example, if I die, and hypothetically, in the distant future, an exact
copy of my body will be made than it will be an exact copy of my body and
consciousness, but not my current identity, so my consciousness will not
reappear after my death like from deep sleep.

It would have your current identity, because it would have your current
memories. However these would be inconsistent with it's existence in
the far future...so it would be mismatched to reality.

I would like to ask you - in your opinion, my two above conclusions are correct?

I'm sorry for bothering you with this question, I have encountered statements
that every situation, and every particular life, return endlessly because the
time is infinite, but the number of possibile configurations of atoms is
finite. This idea is terrible. I don't want repeat my life forever :(

Nietzsche's eternal return contemplated everything, not just you,
repeating. But in that case how could it be known to be a repetition.
It would the same the unique "return" by the identity of
indiscernibles. Anyway, Nietzsche just meant it as thought experiment
to test your evaluation of your life.

Brent

Some people also talk about "eternal return" in the context of 4D block
universe theory where every situation is timless.

P.S.

I've previously made a similar topic in context of Peter Rowlands
"Zero-totality"
works but it did not appeared after sending :(

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97b9d3bf-b091-cd6f-47e7-da3a34a47e51%40verizon.net.

Re: A purely relational ontology?

2019-06-23 Thread PGC



On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 12:15:15 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Jun 2019, at 18:18, PGC > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 12:56:59 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 17:20, PGC  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 3:58:17 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Now that does not make sense to me, but this is because your ontology is 
>>> unclear for me. Your text is not quite helpful, and I might ask you to 
>>> formalise your ontology and perhaps the phenomenology too, to make precise 
>>> sense on this. It is unclear how you would test experimentally such 
>>> statements.
>>>
>>
>> You "might" ask him. I would advise against such a move as he may reverse 
>> the question and ask you something equivalent. E.g. he may ask: Can you 
>> show me Bell's theorem in the combinator thread or using any equivalent 
>> universal machinery? Just to make precise sense of things? To see in action 
>> how to test such statements, ontologies, phenomenologies experimentally, in 
>> a formal setting of your choice, beyond retrodiction on others' work? PGC
>>
>>
>> This is done in detail in my papers (and longer test).
>>
>> If you are interested, I can expand this here.
>>
>
> You demand formal precision from other's claims and you "read my papers" 
> me without titles, pages, or exact references? 
>
> Nobody has to give you permission to expand, you do so or you don't. Let's 
> see Bell in combinators then and as many longer tests as you like. Since 
> it's all done and obvious, it's a simple copy and paste matter. PGC
>
>
>
> As I have explained in some posts, we can start from any universal 
> machinery, be them given by the natural numbers with addition and 
> multiplication, or by the combinators with applications. Then we extend 
> this with classical logical induction axioms. For example, for the numbers:
>
> P(0) & [For all n (P(n) -> P(s(n)))] ->. For all n P(n),
>
> Or for the combinators:
>
> P(K) & P(S) & [For all x y ((P(x) & P(y)) -> P(xy)) -> For all x P(x).
>
> P is for any first order formula in the language.
>
> That leads to the Löbian machine, who provability predicate obeys to the 
> “theology” G*.
>
> The material modes are given by the first person modes ([]p & p, []p & 
> <>t, []p & <>t & p). Incompleteness imposes that those modes obeys very 
> different logics, despite G* show them extensional equivalent: it is the 
> same part of the arithmetical reality (the sigma_1 one) seen in very 
> different perspective.
>
> A simple Bell’s inequality is (A & B) => (A & C) v (B & ~C).
>
> Using the inverse Goldblatt representation of quantum logic in the modal 
> logic B, the arithmetical rendering of that inequality is
>
> []<>A & []<>B => []([]<>A & []<>B) v [([]<>B & []~[]<>C)
>
> With the box and the diamond being the modal boxes of the logic of the 
> martial modes described above.
>
> There are very few reason that this inequality is obeyed, and it is 
> expected that the material modes do violate Bel’s inequality, but 
> unfortunately, the nesting of boxes when tested on a G* theorem prover 
> makes this not yet solved. It is intractable on today’s computer. This is 
> not a bad sign, actually, in the sense that the quantum tautologies 
> *should* be only tractable on a quantum computer, if the material modes 
> would really be the one of nature, assuming quantum mechanics correct.
>
> See for example, for more details: (or my long French text “Conscience et 
> Mécanisme).
>
> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in 
> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381.
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 
>
Eric Vandenbussche has solved some open problems when working toward that 
> solution.
>

As stated previously, tractability is not clear. And while your account may 
suffice to you: There is no global conspiracy of physicalists that is 
holding platonists hostage, the jury is still out - even by your own 
measure, in domains of description of your personal choosing - as the 
notions in your thought experiments along with the testability implied by 
your reasoning, in particular duplicating machines and ideally working 
quantum computers, do not exist at present. They may exist at some point, 
but even if progress in those domains seems plausible, everybody with a bit 
of experience under the sun knows what happens when wishes get fulfilled. 

It's not simple to convince stakeholders like universities, governments, 
public institutions, scientists, and private companies to divert resources 
towards what is still on the philosophical drawing board, if it is even 
tractable at all. Everybody is risk averse, we all appear to die, and the 
notion that some ideological conspiracy is preventing a more genuine ideal 
fundamental mathematicalism from establishing itself is just, as Russell 
would say "rather baroque". Like the AGI guys, I hope they make progress 
towards some

Re: Eternal return

2019-06-23 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 8:41:54 AM UTC-5, Eva wrote:
>
> Given that time is irreversible, and global entropy always increase: 
>
> 1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being, 
> or humanity will be annihilated?  
>
> 2. In principle, if system is annihilated then it is irreversible - a 
> system with the same internal structure may be created, but it will not be 
> the very same system, it may be (at most) perfectly isomorphic, but it will 
> not share the same identity? 
>
> So, for example, if I die, and hypothetically, in the distant future, an 
> exact copy of my body will be made than it will be an exact copy of my body 
> and consciousness, but not my current identity, so my consciousness will 
> not reappear after my death like from deep sleep. 
>
>
> I would like to ask you - in your opinion, my two above conclusions are 
> correct? 
>
>
>
> I'm sorry for bothering you with this question, I have encountered 
> statements that every situation, and every particular life, return 
> endlessly because the time is infinite, but the number of possibile 
> configurations of atoms is finite. This idea is terrible. I don't want 
> repeat my life forever :( 
>
> Some people also talk about "eternal return" in the context of 4D block 
> universe theory where every situation is timless. 
>
> P.S. 
>
>
> I've previously made a similar topic in context of Peter Rowlands 
> "Zero-totality" 
> works but it did not appeared after sending :( 
>

There is Poincare recurrence, where for N distinct quantum states or units 
of phase space volume occupied the recurrence time is on the order of T = 
10^Ndt, for dt the increment of time fundamental to state changes. This 
might mean dt is the Planck unit of time 10^{-43}sec This is then a huge 
time if one considers the observable universe with 10^{80} particles, and 
so this time is 10^{10^{80}}dt. But this is not all, for we may have to 
consider quantum recurrence time that would be 10^T or 10^{10^{10^{80}}}dt, 
which curiously is the lower bound on the stability of the de Sitter 
vacuum. 

To make things a bit more bizarre, if space is flat and infinite R^3 then 
there will be regions out there with duplicates of you. With the 
equivalence of space and time the closest should be around 10^{10^{80}}dx 
for dx the elementary unit of distance most identified as the Planck length 
10^{-33}cm. So duplicates of this local world and ourselves may not just be 
a recurrence in time, but in space as well.

LC

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97c4e283-4722-4658-9e31-465b4b9670ab%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Zero-totality

2019-06-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sun, 23 Jun 2019 at 23:41, Eva  wrote:

> Hello
>
> I want to talk with you about Dr. Peter Rowlands works, which I find very
> fascinating.
>
> Here is his talk about foundations od physical laws:
> https://youtu.be/BGAopIzAjyk
>
> Here is paper:
>
> https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphy.2017.00028/full
>
>
> One of his main idea is that sum of everything in nature equal zero.
>
>
> Here are some of his other statemants:
>
> - time is irreversible and absolutely
>   continuous (can't be measured and
>   divided)
> - global entropy always increases
> - everything in nature constantly strives
>   towards self-annihilation with the rest
>   of Universe or the universal vacuum.
>
> My conclusions from the above are as follows:
>
> 1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being,
> or humanity will be annihilated.
>
> 2. In principle, if system is annihilated then it is irreversible - a
> system with the same internal structure may be created, but it will not be
> the very same system, it may be (at most) perfectly isomorphic, but it will
> not share the same identity.
>
> So, for example, if I die, and hypothetically, in the distant future, an
> exact copy of my body will be made than it will be an exact copy of my body
> and consciousness, but not my current identity, so my consciousness will
> not reappear after my death like from deep sleep.
>
>
> I would like to ask you, are my conclusions solid?
>
> In the past I have encountered statements that every situation, and every
> particular life, return endlessly because the time is infinite, but the
> number of possibile configurations of atoms is finite. This idea is
> terrible.
>
> Some people also talk about "eternal return" in the context of 4D block
> universe theory where every situation is timless, but this does not worry
> me because this is justified on the basis of special relativity theory
> which does not contain the "absolutely continuous" concept of time.
>
> What do you think about it?


I don’t see why you say that an exact copy of your body, including your
consciousness, would not be a continuation of your current identity. That
would be like saying that every time you go to sleep you wake up with a
different identity, but you believe and everyone else believes it is the
same one: how is it different to it actually being the same one, and why
should you care?
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWcrNDnZj7-tbuwJ%2BXfXMbDZbtwjZv54QeBxtaX33Z-pg%40mail.gmail.com.

Observation versus assumption (was: anecdote of Moon landing)

2019-06-23 Thread John Clark

I changed the title of this thread, I don't even know what the old one
means.

On Sun, Jun 23, 2019 at 8:31 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *the natural transplant you mention might be the result of an analog,
> continuous process. *It would make a difference if all the decimals plays
> a role in consciousness.
>

Even if you ignore the fact that it has been experimentally proven that
Bell's Inequality is violated and you claim there if a difference between
one Hydrogen atom and another, that is to say somewhere along that infinite
sequence of digits there is a difference, what you say makes no sense. The
atoms in my brain HAVE been replaced and yet I know for a FACT I have
survived; I *don't* know for a fact that the same is true for you but I
think it's reasonable to assume it is. So even if there is something analog
going on inside an atom, if we're talking about consciousness and survival
it's irrelevant.

> *>Of course, Darwin theory of evolution would become inconsistent, but
> logically, we cannot exclude the possibility*
>

If a mathematical statement, even a well formed grammatically correct one,
contradicts a well established observation then it would be logical to
conclude the statement does not correspond with reality; after all every
language can write fiction as well as nonfiction.  The fiction could be fun
to read and the very best might even have some sort of vague poetic
relationship to a truth, but there is not a literal correspondence to
reality.

>> Even if a Hydrogen atom has some secret analog process going on inside
>> of it when one atom gets replaced by another atom, that is to say when one
>> analog process gets replaced by another analog process, I *STILL*
>>  survive.
>
>
> *> That is the mechanist assumption. You can truncate the infinite decimal
> expansion in the analog process running a brain.*
>

It's not an assumption it's a *OBSERVATION*! Atoms in my brain have been
replaced many many times and yet my consciousness has continued. My only
*ASSUMPTION* is that you are like me and are also conscious.

>> So that hypothetical secret mysterious analog process is the Hydrogen
>> atom's business not mine, it has nothing to do with me.
>
>
>
> *> Assuming that you substitution level is above the truncation of the
> decimals used in the atom. But a non computationalist can assert that his
> consciousness requires all decimals. *
>

Then the non computationalist must logically conclude that he is not
conscious. I thought solipsists were bad but at least they thought they
were conscious even if nobody else was, but your non computationalist
doesn't even think he is conscious. How a non conscious person is able to
think of anything I will leave as an exercise for the reader.

> >>> In which theory?
>>
>>

>> In the very controversial theory that says if I have observed X then I
>> have observed X.
>
>
>
> *>You cannot observe a philosophical assumption. *
>

You can observe that a philosophical assumption is dead wrong, such as the
philosophical assumption that an infinite string of digits in an analog
process is always needed to continue consciousness.

> >> Proof is not the ultimate, direct experience outranks it, and I have
>> direct experience I have survived despite numerous brain transplant
>> operations.
>
>

> *Yes, and that is good for you,** but* [...]
>

But nothing! It's good enough for me to say yes to the doctor and it's good
enough for me to say yes to being frozen. And if your experience has been
similar to mine, if your consciousness has also continued despite your many
brain transplant operations, and if you are a true fan of logic, then you
must conclude it's good enough for you too.

> *> Personal experience is not available when doing science,*
>

True, and that is exactly why no consciousness theory ever devised is
scientific, and none every will be. But theories about how intelligence
works are most certainly scientific.

>> It doesn't matter if I can communicate my reason for saying yes to the
>> doctor (or yes to being frozen). I have no obligation to justify my actions
>> to you or anybody; based on the evidence I have at my command it is the
>> logical thing to do.
>
>
> > *Personally, perhaps. Not sure about the guy above, though.*
>

I'm not sure about the other guy either, he might be a zombie for all I
know, everybody except me might be, all I know for certain is I'm not. The
other guy is going to have to make his own decision, I can't help him,
nobody can.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv36KYSMKyLDQ5BQnn_oZ5JnOXiJsgOrL11m2K9gxUxDaQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: A purely relational ontology?

2019-06-23 Thread Tomas Pales

On Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 4:15:43 AM UTC+2, Pierz wrote:
>
>
> Of course, a purely relational ontology necessarily involves an infinite 
> regress of relationships, but it seems to me that we must choose our poison 
> here - the magic of intrinsic properties, or the infinite regress of only 
> relational ones. I prefer the latter.
>

I wouldn't say that the former is "magic" but I would say that the latter 
doesn't seem to make sense :) There can be relations between relations, or 
relations between structures/sets of relations, but there must also be 
non-relations in which all relations are ultimately grounded. Without 
non-relations, the whole edifice of relations seems to collapse because the 
relations are ultimately undefined. This is not a problem of an infinite 
chain of objects or of a circular chain of objects; the problem is that the 
objects (relations) are undefined.

But I would not say that non-relations are more fundamental or real than 
relations or vice versa. Rather I would say that one cannot exist without 
the other; they are on the same ontological footing, so to speak. 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6887cc2f-e12b-4c75-8b34-0e36dbb982ba%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Eternal return

2019-06-23 Thread Russell Standish

On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 09:27:49AM -0700, Eva wrote:
> Given that time is irreversible, and global entropy always increase:
> 
> 1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being, or 
> humanity will be annihilated? 
> 
> 2. In principle, if system is annihilated then it is irreversible - a system 
> with the same internal structure may be created, but it will not be the very 
> same system, it may be (at most) perfectly isomorphic, but it will not share 
> the same identity?
> 
> So, for example, if I die, and hypothetically, in the distant future, an 
> exact copy of my body will be made than it will be an exact copy of my body 
> and consciousness, but not my current identity, so my consciousness will not 
> reappear after my death like from deep sleep.
> 
> 
> I would like to ask you - in your opinion, my two above conclusions are 
> correct?
> 

If functionalism were true (a popular position here, and implied by
computationalism), then the exact copy (even near enough copy) will be
identical to you, and your conclusion would be incorrect. If this new
copy follows a slightly different path (perhaps because of a sightly
different environment, or just instrinsic randomness), then your life
continues.

Of course this means an eternal return. But it is nothing to fear - you
will not experience your life over again - each time you will
experience you life as having been lived once, albeit most likely immortally.



-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190623135218.GA24600%40zen.

Re: Eternal return

2019-06-23 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

Have a look at my paper "The Problem of the Self" for some of your wonders: 
https://philpeople.org/profiles/cosmin-visan

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/084d06f3-c7fe-4626-a211-c89686a29c69%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Eternal return

2019-06-23 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

Time is a quale in consciousness.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7c7c5e17-51d7-4c71-80e2-70b5054bdd38%40googlegroups.com.

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 23 Jun 2019, at 12:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 3:55:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> For logical reason, when we assume the digital mechanist hypothesis, we just 
> cannot assume more than (very) elementary arithmetic.
> 
> The physical reality, to be explained, will need much more than arithmetic, 
> but it belongs to the phenomenology of the creature whose existence comes 
> from elementary arithmetic. There is no *ontological* physical reality: it is 
> determine by the statistics on all computations whose existence comes from 
> arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent).
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It could that all physical reality can be modeled by the SKI combinator 
> calculus but with the added P (irreducible randomness) combinator, so it 
> becomes SKIP:
> 
> 
> https://poesophicalbits.blogspot.com/2013/06/skip-probabilistic-ski-combinator.html
>  
> 
> 
> But this leaves "Galileo's error" unaddressed, so ontological (and 
> irreducible) experientialities (or qualia) are assumed. Thus the prospect for 
> an experiential combinator calculus …

Why adding those things when we can explain them without ontological 
commitment. Only to claim that we are not Turing emulable?

Of course Mechanism might be wrong, but without any evidences for this, all 
ontological enrichment on the arithmetical reality seems quite speculative to 
me.
To be franc, I fear that the motivation is a form of racism, the deny that some 
entities would be able to think/be-conscious, just because they have a very 
different skin that our’s.

Bruno






> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/24d69634-fb9c-46d1-9a5d-d2942b37875f%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6D7489F3-2681-4F4A-A99E-2F539886D9C6%40ulb.ac.be.

Zero-totality

2019-06-23 Thread Eva

Hello

I want to talk with you about Dr. Peter Rowlands works, which I find very
fascinating.

Here is his talk about foundations od physical laws:
https://youtu.be/BGAopIzAjyk

Here is paper:

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphy.2017.00028/full

One of his main idea is that sum of everything in nature equal zero.

Here are some of his other statemants:

- time is irreversible and absolutely
continuous (can't be measured and
divided)
- global entropy always increases
- everything in nature constantly strives
towards self-annihilation with the rest
of Universe or the universal vacuum.

My conclusions from the above are as follows:

1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being, or
humanity will be annihilated.

I would like to ask you, are my conclusions solid?

In the past I have encountered statements that every situation, and every
particular life, return endlessly because the time is infinite, but the number
of possibile configurations of atoms is finite. This idea is terrible.

Some people also talk about "eternal return" in the context of 4D block
universe theory where every situation is timless, but this does not worry me
because this is justified on the basis of special relativity theory which does
not contain the "absolutely continuous" concept of time.

What do you think about it?

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6a3b81e2-d373-4175-b9b4-3cfae82b5cd7%40googlegroups.com.

Eternal return

2019-06-23 Thread Eva

Given that time is irreversible, and global entropy always increase:

1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being, or
humanity will be annihilated?

I would like to ask you - in your opinion, my two above conclusions are correct?

Some people also talk about "eternal return" in the context of 4D block
universe theory where every situation is timless.

P.S.

I've previously made a similar topic in context of Peter Rowlands
"Zero-totality"
works but it did not appeared after sending :(

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6f68dc29-a311-4980-a955-4e71991ef5cc%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 23 Jun 2019, at 13:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 6:27:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Jun 2019, at 14:38, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 6:22:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 19:42, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 12:32:20 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 10:28:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 20 Jun 2019, at 12:52, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 Logic is mere heuristics.
>>> 
>>> I don’t understand this. 
>>> 
>>> Logic is a branch of mathematics, which can be used correctly or 
>>> incorrectly, like all branches of mathematics.
>>> 
>>> In that branche, we study many different sorts of logics, like in Algebra 
>>> we study many different sorts of algebraic systems.
>>> 
 
 It is not Holy Writ the LORD God wrote into Stone Tablets.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Of course. Especially that there are a lot of Logics. But in computer 
>>> science and in math we use classical logic, not because it would be more 
>>> true, but because it is simpler, even to explain the non classical logics, 
>>> that we might need in some domain.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Logic is a branch of mathematics [correct], and mathematics is a genre of 
>>> fiction. 
>>> 
>>> @philipthrift
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Isn't it odd [back to the Topic] that some think that the Bible and Qur'an 
>>> are (texts in a genre of) fiction, but mathematical texts are not?
>> 
>> The bible suggests that PI is equal to 3. 
>> 
>> Measurement, or calculation suggests that PI is bigger than 3. Reflexion and 
>> reasoning explains that PI is not rational, nor algebraical, etc.
>> 
>> I understand that mathematics is concerned with immaterial things. Calling 
>> them fiction a priori beg the question of the Aristotelian/platonic divide. 
>> Fiction usually refer to false, and so might be abusive in this context.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> It seems like a funny term to apply.
> 
> Funny? OK. But, Imo, also misleading, especially in this “postmodern era” 
> which relativize truth too much, except the material universe, which, when we 
> assume Mechanism, is precisely more fictional than arithmetic.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I still don't know what "assume Mechanism" means.

?

I have recently explained this. As I said, it YD, i.e. the “yes doctor” 
hypothesis that we can survive with a digital brain or body (or body + finite 
part of the environment). I add CT to make clear that I use “digital machine” 
in the precise mathematical sense of Turing.

I know you don’t like CT. Is that the problem? Or is it YD? 


> 
> It sounds like "assume Turing Machine". (to apply as a model to what domain, 
> though?)

That would be like the “strong AI” thesis, which assumes that some Turing 
machine can think, or be conscious. That does not imply Mechanism, because the 
fact that machine can think does not entail logically that only machine can 
think.



> 
> (Physicists today tend to think reality is a Turing Machine. That's "assuming 
> Mechanism”.)


Yes, but this Digital Physicalist hypothesis cannot work. If the physical 
universe is a machine, or the output of a machine, that would trivially entail 
Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical reality cannot be a machine 
a priori, given that to get any piece, even of the physical vacuum, we would 
need to execute the entire universal dovetailing to get the first person 
indeterminacy right. So Digital Physics is inconsistent all by itself. It 
entails mechanism, and mechanism entails its contrary, so it entails its 
contrary. Digital-physics entails not-digital-physics. Now, the non computable 
aspect of physics might be just that first person indeterminacy, as QM and 
Mechanism suggests.

Bruno

> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/89d6d9c8-91a7-4599-bb0c-aaf548a1a3f2%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/061B961D-FD24-4F1E-A174-0D0E90FEAB75%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 22 Jun 2019, at 13:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 8:20:04 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
>  "Good old classical chance" is just quantifying ignorance.  At a fundamental 
> level there must be either inherent chance, QM, or determinism.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> That's true.
> 
> Stochastic processes [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stochastic_process 
> ] are, primarily, 
> "approximate" models of phenomena that are extremely complex (too complex to 
> model), but still deterministic.
> 
> It is assumed that only (possible) source of actual stochasticity is from 
> quantum events, but science news stories about how large molecules can 
> exhibit quantum behavior bleeds that randomness into the "macro" world.
> 
> I think the only alternative to "true" randomness is the MWI, which 
> physicists like SeanCarroll like ("The Many-Worlds formulation of quantum 
> mechanics Is probably correct", June 30, 2014). Ironically, the word 
> "probably" is in his assertion. William James said aversion to randomness is 
> superstition.

There are many sort of randomness. Using Chuch-Turing thesis, there is the 
algorithmic notion of incompressibility, where a finite sequence is random if 
there is no algorithm much shorter than the sequence generating it, and 
infinite sequence are Random if almost all its initial segment are random. That 
is the most clear definition I know.

Then, there is randomness due to ignorance of initial condition in chaotic 
setting, like the random coin, or the water drops in some setting. This is 
often consider as not a “true” randomness, but it has its role.

Then there is quantum randomness, which with the MWI is arguably equivalent to 
some sort of first person indeterminacy on self-multiplication, restricted to a 
universal wave (written in any base). Again, this once can be considered purely 
subjective/first person.

Then there is the comp randomness, which generalise the preceding one on 
arithmetic, indeed of the wave. Same remarks.

I think that the trouble James would allude too, is when we argue for genuine 
3p physical randomness, which invites the belief in events without a cause, 
which is close to magic.

Bruno

> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3c4a2c00-647c-4759-a54e-ed186ce6703a%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D64E44C0-DAD9-4AFE-A5F4-1E5C5D4A6C15%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 21 Jun 2019, at 22:24, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2019 5:50 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:35 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 21 Jun 2019, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> To disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from the expected 
>>> value,
>>> 
>>> To make my point more strongly, that is the wrong way round. Observation of 
>>> statistics far from the expected value is what would be required to confirm 
>>> MWI.
>> 
>> I don’t see this at all.
>> 
>> You obviously have not grasped the argument. In the single world picture, 
>> there is an objective probability, so all observations must confirm this 
>> probability, within statistical errors. In MWI all outcomes occur with 
>> probability one, so all possible sequences of results are certain to occur. 
>> If one sees a sequence that is improbable on the single world view, it is 
>> more likely that one is observing one of the certainly existing sequences in 
>> MWI.
> 
> More likely than one is observing a low probability sequence in CI?  
> No...exactly the same degree of likely.
> 
>> 
>>> The fact that we don't observe such results is the strongest possible case 
>>> against MWI!
>> 
>> ?
>> 
>> The probability to see a deviation is the same in both Everett, and 
>> Copenhagen.
>> 
>> That is not the case. Because in Everett there is no objective probability 
>> for the occurrence. Or at least, observation cannot establish such a single 
>> probability value -- all outcomes are realised for certain, and one does not 
>> have any independent evidence about what branch one is on. In the single 
>> world model, there is a theoretical probability, and all observations must 
>> be dependent on this underlying distribution.
> 
> In Everett exactly the same distribution is found by assuming the branches 
> conform to the Born rule.  I agree that MWI has a problem in modeling 
> probabilities which are real numbers for example, which require effectively 
> infinite numbers of branches to be modeled by branch counting.  But in 
> Bruno's theory he has already assumed infinitely many worlds (computations).

Just to insist on key point, even if not relevant here. I do not assume any 
computations. I prove there existence from very elementary arithmetic, and that 
is hardly original, it is well done in Tarski, Mostowski, Robinson papers 
(republished in a thin Dover book).


> 
>>  
>> The deviation expected is the same, so if there is a deviation, it can 
>> hardly be used to claim one theory is more correct than the other. 
>> 
>> The deviation is more likely in many worlds, since one can be on any branch 
>> in that theory. Deviations are more common.
> 
> That's not true.  MWI uses the same Born rule.  That's one of the criticisms 
> of it: that it cannot derive the Born rule and so doesn't really add anything 
> empirically testable.

Yes. If Bruce was correct, we would have a new mean to test MWI.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Bruce 
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
>> .
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS1YVYVHKoKfeGitrmSZQWZCC2SgWj1Ui8N7pECzfhqvg%40mail.gmail.com
>>  
>> .
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/91e06cc4-26f5-5311-1c78-3e39ec766fd8%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C122C6C6-31DC-4491-85EE-C6274E3E25D3%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 21 Jun 2019, at 21:49, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2019 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Jun 2019, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> To disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from the expected 
>>> value,
>>> 
>>> To make my point more strongly, that is the wrong way round. Observation of 
>>> statistics far from the expected value is what would be required to confirm 
>>> MWI.
>> 
>> I don’t see this at all.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> The fact that we don't observe such results is the strongest possible case 
>>> against MWI!
>> 
>> ?
>> 
>> The probability to see a deviation is the same in both Everett, and 
>> Copenhagen. The deviation expected is the same, so if there is a deviation, 
>> it can hardly be used to claim one theory is more correct than the other. 
> 
> But as Bruce points out Tegmark's machine gun experiment is effectively being 
> carried out by each of us. 

That is quantum immortality. On this list I have defend this, but Tegmark 
rejected it, and claimed that the survival to quantum suicide does not entail 
quantum immortality. He might have changed his mind since, perhaps. 



> So if each of us lives on a million years in some branch of the MW, then each 
> of us will experience 99.9% of our life as a very old person among people 
> younger than 100yrs.

Unless there are intimidate realities in between Earth and Heaven. That is the 
whole subject of mathematical theology. Computer science justifies jumps and 
intermediate realities. It is not an obvious subjects, but the nuances given by 
incompleteness provides some light. Some personal experience, like with some 
plants, can help, but can also mislead. Nothing is obvious, and everything 
requires a lot of work. 

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c0263226-63a2-183b-2e0b-c093be94bc20%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FDF9CDE1-D3EA-45F6-8DEC-20659FC0F1B9%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 21 Jun 2019, at 15:57, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 7:58 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> > CT might be refuted tomorrow, or in ten thousand years.
> 
> I doubt it. Oracles that can do more than a Turing Machine, such as one that 
> can solve the Halting Problem, produce logical paradoxes.

No. Turing used them to show only that a Turing machine using the Halting 
Problem is still incomplete, and that it cannot solve the Total-code problems, 
for example.

The oracle does not introduce any paradox, on the contrary, they are used to 
study the degrees of unsolvability. 

>  
> > And the natural transplant you mention might be the result of an analog, 
> > continuous process.
> 
> That wouldn't make any difference even if it was true which it almost 
> certainly isn’t.

It would make a difference if all the decimals plays a role in consciousness. 
Of course, Darwin theory of evolution would become inconsistent, but logically, 
we cannot exclude the possibility (even if one disbelieve in it personally).

> Even if a Hydrogen atom has some secret analog process going on inside of it 
> when one atom gets replaced by another atom, that is to say when one analog 
> process gets replaced by another analog process, I STILL survive.

That is the mechanist assumption. You can truncate the infinite decimal 
expansion in the analog process running a brain.

> So that hypothetical secret mysterious analog process is the Hydrogen atom's 
> business not mine, it has nothing to do with me.

Assuming that you substitution level is above the truncation of the decimals 
used in the atom. But a non computationalist can assert that his consciousness 
requires all decimals. That provides a model in which mechanism is false, which 
explains why we have to make clear that we *assume* that this is not the case.

That can be used to save the notion of some ontological matter, because that 
can singularise a mind on a body. Once you make the digital truncation, your 
prediction needs to be made, in principle, by taking into account all the 
stories with different decimals expansion below the truncation level, and if 
that is a continuum, as it needs to singularize consciousness on a unique body, 
I violates Mechanism.

> 
> >> It's far more than just strong evidence, we have rock solid proof for 
> >> Mechanism as you have defined it, or at least I have.
> 
> > In which theory?
> 
> In the very controversial theory that says if I have observed X then I have 
> observed X.

You cannot observe a philosophical assumption. We cannot observe universals, or 
laws. We can infer them from a finite number of observation, but it is 
inductive inference. That is never provable.

>  
> > A proof is done in a theory.  
> 
> Proof is not the ultimate, direct experience outranks it, and I have direct 
> experience I have survived despite numerous brain transplant operations. 

Yes, and that is good for you, but in science, we cannot refer to personal 
experience to commit oneself ontologically. 

>  
> > What I can show is that Mechanism has to be false in any theory which 
> > commit itself in an ontology richer than RA,
> 
> Then without even reading a word of what you claim to have shown we can 
> immediately conclude that whatever it is you say it MUST be nonsense because 
> we know from direct experience that Mechanism, as you have defined it, is 
> true.

Yes, we can know that, like the guy who claims, after getting his artificial 
digital brain: “yes, I can assert that I have completely survived and …krikgrl 
…yes, I can assert that I have completely survived and …krikgrl …yes, I can 
assert that I have completely survived and …krikgrl …yes, I can assert that I 
have completely survived and …krikgrl …yes, I can assert that I have completely 
survived and …krikgrl …yes, I can assert that I have completely survived and 
…krikgrl …yes, I can assert that I have completely survived and …krikgrl …yes, 
I can assert that I have completely survived and …krikgrl …yes, I can assert 
that I have completely survived and …krikgrl …yes, I can assert that I have 
completely survived and …krikgrl …

Personal experience is not available when doing science, except as reports, 
confirming a theory, not as a proof that the theory is correct, or is not an 
assumption (my point).

> 
> > You have, I think, rock solid evidence, but no evidence at all can prove 
> > anything more than the existence of your consciousness for you. By “proof” 
> > I mean communicable proof to another.
> 
> It doesn't matter if I can communicate my reason for saying yes to the doctor 
> (or yes to being frozen). I have no obligation to justify my actions to you 
> or anybody; based on the evidence I have at my command it is the logical 
> thing to do.   

Personally, perhaps. Not sure about the guy above, though. He seems locally 
convinced that he has survived, but nearby people can doubt it.

> 
> >> and it's a

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 21 Jun 2019, at 15:03, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:29 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 21 Jun 2019, at 08:49, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>  
> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
>> On 6/20/2019 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 After all, repetitions of the relevant interactions are happening all the 
 time: and not just in our controlled experiments. How can there be such 
 things as objective probabilities in the MWI scenario? How can we use 
 experimental evidence to support theories when we do not know whether our 
 observer probabilities are representative or not?
>>> 
>>> The same as in any probabilistic theory.  We repeat it so many times that 
>>> we have statistics that we can compare to the theoretical distribution.  
>>> The same way you would test your theory that a coin was fair.
>>> 
>>> In other words, MWI is experimentally disconfirmed.
>> How so?  In repeated experiments I'm aware of (and a lot of photons go thru 
>> Aspect's EPR experiments) the statistics are consistent with the theory.  To 
>> disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from the expected value, 
>> which is why Tegmark proposed his machine gun suicide experiment.
>> 
>> If you observe statistics far from those expected under the Born Rule you 
>> just assume that your calculation of the wave function is in error! 
>> 
>> If MWI is true, then you would expect that in at least some cases, the Born 
>> Rule would be disconfirmed. There necessarily exists branches of the wave 
>> function in which this is the case. How can you be sure that were are not on 
>> such a branch?
>> 
>> On some branches, you can send a large number of photons to your half 
>> silvered mirror, and observe that the results conform to binomial statistics 
>> with p = 0.5. But then next long sequence of photons will all go just one 
>> way, casting doubt on your earlier statistics. Since such branches 
>> necessarily exist under MWI, how can one ever have confidence in the results 
>> of any quantum experiment?
>> 
>> In other words, in order to do experiments in quantum optics, one has to 
>> assume that MWI is false.
> 
> I don’t see this at all. In the iterated duplication experience, it is true 
> that there is a guy who saw only Moscow, but there are few chance it belongs 
> to the random sample that we use when verifying statistics,
> 
> You are using the 3p perspective to interpret a 1p probability -- you make 
> the mistake that you often accuse others of making.

I use the 3p perspective to defined the 1p probability.



>  
> and if he does, well, he will feel alone, and not convince its peers. That 
> works for both Everett, digital mechanism, but also any applied probability 
> experience. We can always expect deviation. The point is that we should not 
> count on it. That is why, even if Everett is true, you will take the lift and 
> not jump out of the window.
> 
> But you do not jump out of the window because you believe that the laws of 
> classical physics apply. This is not a quantum choice, so Everett is 
> irrelevant.

I am alluding to the fact that some believe that we survive if we jump out of 
the window. François Englert asked me that very question, but he get convinced 
that we do indeed survive, but with a relative quantum probability of being 
injured badly. That is made clear by moving the windows from low stories to 
high stories. Of course we suppose here that the macro-quasi-classical world 
are retrievable from the first person perspective when “run” by the universal 
wave of Everett.




>  
> That is why in the iterated self-duplication version, I ask question like 
> “what is the better bet, white noise of a the binary expansion of PI?”. Then 
> the verification is made on some sample, and most will confirms “white 
> noise”, and virtually none will confirm “binary expansion of PI”.
> 
> I am talking about experiments in quantum optics, not your toy duplication 
> thought experiments.

The point of the dialog is that with mechanism, they should be the same.


>  
> Bruce, your answer “I don’t know the probabilities” is strictly speaking 
> correct … for all application of probability. It trivialise applied 
> probability theory, it seems to me.
> 
> It does not trivialise probability in the single world picture, in which 
> theories give probabilities that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by 
> experiments. It only shows that probabilities have no meaning in MWI where 
> all outcomes are certain to occur.

In the 3p perspective, but I insist: the probabilities are on the 1p 
perspective, both in Everett and in the duplication experiences.




> In the classical duplication situation, the 1p understanding of probability 
> is closer to how probability is used in science than the 3p notion that you 
> are seeking to impose.

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 21 Jun 2019, at 14:50, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:35 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 21 Jun 2019, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> To disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from the expected 
>> value,
>> 
>> To make my point more strongly, that is the wrong way round. Observation of 
>> statistics far from the expected value is what would be required to confirm 
>> MWI.
> 
> I don’t see this at all.
> 
> You obviously have not grasped the argument. In the single world picture, 
> there is an objective probability, so all observations must confirm this 
> probability, within statistical errors.

So, if you predict a laser beam split in two on a half-minor, seeing it going 
only on one branch would be a confirmation? That is weird.

> In MWI all outcomes occur with probability one,

In the 3_1 picture, but the first person (plural) does not live all experience, 
and Everett, or the mechanist indeterminacy, is concerned only with the first 
person prediction. 

> so all possible sequences of results are certain to occur.

Not in the first person view, which is what matter.

> If one sees a sequence that is improbable on the single world view, it is 
> more likely that one is observing one of the certainly existing sequences in 
> MWI.

Yet, the first person probabilities must be the same as in the objective 
probability case. You have the same chance to be the 1/100 copy that to get the 
1/100 singular outcome. If you get it, you have no means to ascertain that it 
comes from objective bad luck relatively to a singular events, or just first 
person bad luck in a multiplication experiment. Both probabilities are given by 
the same binomial distribution.

> 
>> The fact that we don't observe such results is the strongest possible case 
>> against MWI!
> 
> ?
> 
> The probability to see a deviation is the same in both Everett, and 
> Copenhagen.
> 
> That is not the case. Because in Everett there is no objective probability 
> for the occurrence.

There is an objective account of the first person probability.

> Or at least, observation cannot establish such a single probability value -- 
> all outcomes are realised for certain,

Not from the relative first person perspective.

> and one does not have any independent evidence about what branch one is on. 
> In the single world model, there is a theoretical probability, and all 
> observations must be dependent on this underlying distribution.
>  
> The deviation expected is the same, so if there is a deviation, it can hardly 
> be used to claim one theory is more correct than the other. 
> 
> The deviation is more likely in many worlds, since one can be on any branch 
> in that theory. Deviations are more common.

There is a debate on how the probabilities emerge in QM, even with the MW, but 
if you take the simple frequency operator approach, like in Preskill’s course, 
the probabilities are the same as in single world QM. I don’t see why the fact 
that all outcomes are realised would change the first person confirmation. 
P(Moscow) = P(Washington) = 1/2 in self-duplication, independently of the fact 
that we could decide to reconstitute or not the candidate randomly on one 
branch.

Bruno

> 
> Bruce 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS1YVYVHKoKfeGitrmSZQWZCC2SgWj1Ui8N7pECzfhqvg%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BA36081E-F176-49CD-87DE-E747B8C46045%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

2019-06-23 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 6:27:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Jun 2019, at 14:38, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 6:22:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 19:42, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 12:32:20 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 10:28:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 20 Jun 2019, at 12:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 *Logic is mere heuristics.*


 I don’t understand this. 

 Logic is a branch of mathematics, which can be used correctly or 
 incorrectly, like all branches of mathematics.

 In that branche, we study many different sorts of logics, like in 
 Algebra we study many different sorts of algebraic systems.


 It is not Holy Writ the LORD God wrote into Stone Tablets.



 Of course. Especially that there are a lot of Logics. But in computer 
 science and in math we use classical logic, not because it would be more 
 true, but because it is simpler, even to explain the non classical logics, 
 that we might need in some domain.


 Bruno



>>>
>>> *Logic is a branch of mathematics* [correct], and mathematics is a 
>>> genre of fiction. 
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Isn't it odd [back to the Topic] that some think that the Bible and 
>> Qur'an are (texts in a genre of) fiction, but mathematical texts are not?
>>
>>
>> The bible suggests that PI is equal to 3. 
>>
>> Measurement, or calculation suggests that PI is bigger than 3. Reflexion 
>> and reasoning explains that PI is not rational, nor algebraical, etc.
>>
>> I understand that mathematics is concerned with immaterial things. 
>> Calling them fiction a priori beg the question of the Aristotelian/platonic 
>> divide. Fiction usually refer to false, and so might be abusive in this 
>> context.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> It seems like a funny term to apply. 
>
>
> Funny? OK. But, Imo, also misleading, especially in this “postmodern era” 
> which relativize truth too much, except the material universe, which, when 
> we assume Mechanism, is precisely more fictional than arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
I still don't know what "assume Mechanism" means.

It sounds like "assume Turing Machine". (to apply as a model to what 
domain, though?)

(Physicists today tend to think reality *is* a Turing Machine. That's 
"assuming Mechanism".)


@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/89d6d9c8-91a7-4599-bb0c-aaf548a1a3f2%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Huh? (was Allah nonsense)

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 23 Jun 2019, at 01:36, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> If God does not exist, or does exist in a fashion we cannot grasp, or is 3 
> people/entities. or is Hindu and many many-we don't get a choice, and nobody 
> asked us to vote. If you want to honor God, help somebody out 
> (materialism!)..  

Why honour God? Why worship God? For a platonism, God is the truth we search, 
the truth which remains when the lies dies out. To honour truth? If this means 
to stop lying, that could be nice, and very useful to help everybody out.

Bruno




> 
> "But don't it make you want to rock and roll
> All night long
> Mohammed's Radio
> I heard somebody singing sweet and soulful
> On the radio, Mohammed's Radio
> You know, the Sheriff's got his problems too
> He will surely take them out on you
> In walked the village idiot and his face was all aglow
> He's been up all night listening to Mohammed's Radio"
> Warren Zevon,, Mohammad's Radio 1976
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Fri, Jun 21, 2019 7:33 am
> Subject: Re: Huh? (was Allah nonsense)
> 
> 
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 20:23, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 10:37:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 14:05, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
>>> 
>>> > Jesus (which I think has never claim to be literally a god).
>>> 
>>> What are you talking about? Jesus not only claimed to be a god he claimed 
>>> to be THE God, son of the Father and partner (or something) of the Holy 
>>> Ghost which were all part of the Holy Trinity. You must have heard of the 
>>> Holy Trinity, the 3 persons in one God crap, Christianity's pathetic 
>>> attempt to have its cake and eat it too and have the advantages of both 
>>> monotheism and polytheism. Officially the 3 persons are supposed to be 
>>> equal but I always felt the Holy Ghost was the junior partner, the Ringo 
>>> Star of the Holy Trinity, the Garfunkel in Simon and Garfunkel.
>> 
>> References? I have search any indications that Jesus claimed this, but the 
>> references comes aways after 529.
>> You persists in defending the official doctrine of the christians, the one 
>> imposed by terror and authoritative argument. 
>> 
>> The trinity might have come from Plotinus three hypostases, and St-Augustin 
>> has used them to make sense of it (the christian trinity).
>> 
>> Mathematical logic is born from a more recent discussion, between Anglican 
>> Unionist and Anglican trinitarian. Just to introduced more rigor in that 
>> discussion. See the book of Daniel J. Cohen:
>> 
>> Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
>> Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> Mark 14:62 And Jesus said, I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting on 
>> the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.
>> 
>> Moses in שְׁמוֹת (Shemot) or Exodus is addressed by God as "I am." To even 
>> just say "I am" amounts to declaring oneself God. The Gospels have a number 
>> of instances with Jesus saying this.
> 
> Even if some time traveller show me Jesus transforming water into wine, I 
> would believe that the most plausible explanation is that Jesus is a good 
> prestidigitator.
> 
> And the Moses quote, as well as what you say about the Gospel confirms my 
> feeling, which is that by “I am” or “I am God”, Jesus just makes the usual 
> claim of those having a mystic, or spcyhdelic, experience. He is not calming 
> that he, and only he, is the literal son of God. They seems to say the normal 
> things, which is that we are gods. All of us. With mechanism, that includes 
> bacteria and any universal number. But we better no say it, and let people to 
> discover this by themselves (it belongs to G* minus G).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> LC
>> 
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
>> .
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/221f4fb2-fb65-4caf-916b-67a0c18ace4d%40googlegroups.com
>>  
>> .
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4ABDB89E-149C-4610-B4A0-E98308774504%40ulb.ac.be
>  
>

Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 23 Jun 2019, at 01:29, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
>> Heh! Bruno, in the USA it's all about money, which is symbolic, or is it?

Money is like love and energy. It can be exchanged, it can grows, and it is 
problematic when you have none.




>> The rich buy the politicians to fill their pockets more, but also buy power. 
>> If the US is the home spot of the Constitution, or the US Civil War, it is 
>> also the home of Tammany Hall, and Chicago ($$$). "It's a plutocracy, 
>> madame, if you can keep it?"  -Reacted, Ben Franklin. 

In Europa, the lobbying is more restricted, (but not enough), and I think 
lobbying should never be financial. Financial lobbying is fraud made legal. 

Money is not the problem. Money based on lies and propaganda is the problem, 
and financial lobbying aggravates this a lot, I would say.

Bruno




> Zuck, and not just him,  is confronted to the not easy delineation between 
> freedom of speech and defamation.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Fri, Jun 21, 2019 7:23 am
> Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity
> 
> 
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 20:43, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Well, they defame themselves, and successfully bribe politicians. 
>> Interestingly, they have all, regardless of party, in the US, have left the 
>> nationalist camp. entirely. This will cause an effect, opening the path for 
>> antitrust laws. Barring this, the legality of how the 1st amendment in the 
>> US is affected, will come into play.
> 
> OK.
> 
> Bruno 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> To: everything-list > >
>> Sent: Thu, Jun 20, 2019 6:17 am
>> Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity
>> 
>> 
>>> On 19 Jun 2019, at 05:15, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> Oh, why not both,
>> 
>> OK.
>> 
>> 
>>> especially when that defender of freedom, Zuck pushes his Libra :-) ?
>> 
>> 
>> Zuck, and not just him,  is confronted to the not easy delineation between 
>> freedom of speech and defamation.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> -Original Message-
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> To: everything-list >> >
>>> Sent: Tue, Jun 18, 2019 5:52 am
>>> Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity
>>> 
>>> 
 On 13 Jun 2019, at 19:19, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 >>> > wrote:
 
 Yes Bruno, back in the day, one of my college profs termed ideologies, to 
 be a faith movement.
>>> 
>>> I would say that ideologues are blind faith, or dogma. Ideas are better, 
>>> but faith is personal, and we need it to go out of bed every morning.
>>> 
>>> 
 Hence, Lysenko, Stalin, Mao, and in my view, progressivism (like Juncker, 
 like Soros) push for their faith movement. 
>>> 
>>> Faith movement makes no sense, but I guess I quibble on vocabulary here.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 That is my dig, but also an honest observation. As we say in the US, 
 ideologists aren't playing with a full deck. 
>>> 
>>> Yes, it is “bad faith”, or just a trick to steal your money.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 
 -Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
 To: everything-list >>> >
 Sent: Thu, Jun 13, 2019 7:27 am
 Subject: Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity
 
 
> On 12 Jun 2019, at 05:09, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  > wrote:
> 
> iI like the Pastafatians. However I am not against religion, just the 
> mentality of the fanatic. 
> Fanaticism usually means If you don't obey us, we will kill you
> This mentality is not just hugely, seen, among the Islamists.
> But also, their political chums, the Progressives (socialists & 
> communists who are funded by billionaires)
> There is also, surprisingly to myself, great self-righteousness expressed 
> by this lot, in excess, of the Christian fundamentalist.
> Beyond this, if Atheism works for you? Spectacular. If doing religious 
> craps allow one to enjoy some psycho-social activity? Splendid.
> I do love Outre' observations by some physicists, because it permits our 
> species to break free. I mean it's physics, it's either going to work or 
> not, right? On the other hand, a gigantic budget would be required to 
> test some conjectures. 
 
 Yes, the problem is not any domain per se, but the fanaticism of those who 
 claim to know the truth, again, that works for any domain.
 
 But sometimes, a political authoritative regime choose some domain to make 
 truth claim, like Lyssenko in USSR genetics,

Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 21 Jun 2019, at 14:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 6:22:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 19:42, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 12:32:20 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 10:28:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 12:52, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Logic is mere heuristics.
>> 
>> I don’t understand this. 
>> 
>> Logic is a branch of mathematics, which can be used correctly or 
>> incorrectly, like all branches of mathematics.
>> 
>> In that branche, we study many different sorts of logics, like in Algebra we 
>> study many different sorts of algebraic systems.
>> 
>>> 
>>> It is not Holy Writ the LORD God wrote into Stone Tablets.
>> 
>> 
>> Of course. Especially that there are a lot of Logics. But in computer 
>> science and in math we use classical logic, not because it would be more 
>> true, but because it is simpler, even to explain the non classical logics, 
>> that we might need in some domain.
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Logic is a branch of mathematics [correct], and mathematics is a genre of 
>> fiction. 
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Isn't it odd [back to the Topic] that some think that the Bible and Qur'an 
>> are (texts in a genre of) fiction, but mathematical texts are not?
> 
> The bible suggests that PI is equal to 3. 
> 
> Measurement, or calculation suggests that PI is bigger than 3. Reflexion and 
> reasoning explains that PI is not rational, nor algebraical, etc.
> 
> I understand that mathematics is concerned with immaterial things. Calling 
> them fiction a priori beg the question of the Aristotelian/platonic divide. 
> Fiction usually refer to false, and so might be abusive in this context.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> It seems like a funny term to apply.

Funny? OK. But, Imo, also misleading, especially in this “postmodern era” which 
relativize truth too much, except the material universe, which, when we assume 
Mechanism, is precisely more fictional than arithmetic.

Bruno



> Hartry Field [1] introduced it as a "philosophy of mathematics", and Mark 
> Balaguer [2] gave it prominence in a book and the SEP.
> 
> Fictionalism is the most pragmatic alternative to Platonism (as Balaguer 
> argues). One can  be a constructivist or formalist in some way, but 
> fictionalism leaves all of mathematics intact, except for its semantics.
> 
> [1] https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/hartry-field.html 
> 
> [2] http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer 
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/882ae719-b41c-423f-8492-f0b16fbaca79%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/88C6541C-1FB8-4DAB-8483-ABE5EE136508%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: A purely relational ontology?

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 21 Jun 2019, at 18:18, PGC  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 12:56:59 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 17:20, PGC > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 3:58:17 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Now that does not make sense to me, but this is because your ontology is 
>> unclear for me. Your text is not quite helpful, and I might ask you to 
>> formalise your ontology and perhaps the phenomenology too, to make precise 
>> sense on this. It is unclear how you would test experimentally such 
>> statements.
>> 
>> You "might" ask him. I would advise against such a move as he may reverse 
>> the question and ask you something equivalent. E.g. he may ask: Can you show 
>> me Bell's theorem in the combinator thread or using any equivalent universal 
>> machinery? Just to make precise sense of things? To see in action how to 
>> test such statements, ontologies, phenomenologies experimentally, in a 
>> formal setting of your choice, beyond retrodiction on others' work? PGC
> 
> This is done in detail in my papers (and longer test).
> 
> If you are interested, I can expand this here.
> 
> You demand formal precision from other's claims and you "read my papers" me 
> without titles, pages, or exact references? 
> 
> Nobody has to give you permission to expand, you do so or you don't. Let's 
> see Bell in combinators then and as many longer tests as you like. Since it's 
> all done and obvious, it's a simple copy and paste matter. PGC

As I have explained in some posts, we can start from any universal machinery, 
be them given by the natural numbers with addition and multiplication, or by 
the combinators with applications. Then we extend this with classical logical 
induction axioms. For example, for the numbers:

P(0) & [For all n (P(n) -> P(s(n)))] ->. For all n P(n),

Or for the combinators:

P(K) & P(S) & [For all x y ((P(x) & P(y)) -> P(xy)) -> For all x P(x).

P is for any first order formula in the language.

That leads to the Löbian machine, who provability predicate obeys to the 
“theology” G*.

The material modes are given by the first person modes ([]p & p, []p & <>t, []p 
& <>t & p). Incompleteness imposes that those modes obeys very different 
logics, despite G* show them extensional equivalent: it is the same part of the 
arithmetical reality (the sigma_1 one) seen in very different perspective.

A simple Bell’s inequality is (A & B) => (A & C) v (B & ~C).

Using the inverse Goldblatt representation of quantum logic in the modal logic 
B, the arithmetical rendering of that inequality is

[]<>A & []<>B => []([]<>A & []<>B) v [([]<>B & []~[]<>C)

With the box and the diamond being the modal boxes of the logic of the martial 
modes described above.

There are very few reason that this inequality is obeyed, and it is expected 
that the material modes do violate Bel’s inequality, but unfortunately, the 
nesting of boxes when tested on a G* theorem prover makes this not yet solved. 
It is intractable on today’s computer. This is not a bad sign, actually, in the 
sense that the quantum tautologies *should* be only tractable on a quantum 
computer, if the material modes would really be the one of nature, assuming 
quantum mechanics correct.

See for example, for more details: (or my long French text “Conscience et 
Mécanisme).

Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in 
Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993

 Eric Vandenbussche has solved some open problems when working toward that 
solution. 

Bruno

> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/aea32e3c-111f-4820-ae85-5d0b1d419e06%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/45610823-D386-4F15-9987-9239C6B6A58E%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

2019-06-23 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 3:55:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> For logical reason, when we assume the digital mechanist hypothesis, we 
> just cannot assume more than (very) elementary arithmetic.
>
> The physical reality, to be explained, will need much more than 
> arithmetic, but it belongs to the phenomenology of the creature whose 
> existence comes from elementary arithmetic. There is no *ontological* 
> physical reality: it is determine by the statistics on all computations 
> whose existence comes from arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent).
>
>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
It could that all *physical* reality can be modeled by the SKI combinator 
calculus but with the added P (irreducible randomness) combinator, so it 
becomes *SKIP*:


https://poesophicalbits.blogspot.com/2013/06/skip-probabilistic-ski-combinator.html

But this leaves "Galileo's error" unaddressed, so ontological (and 
irreducible) experientialities (or qualia) are assumed. Thus the prospect 
for an *experiential *combinator calculus ...

@philipthrift


 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/24d69634-fb9c-46d1-9a5d-d2942b37875f%40googlegroups.com.

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

2019-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 21 Jun 2019, at 00:38, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 8:43:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 00:26, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 6:02:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Jun 2019, at 02:14, Lawrence Crowell > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> The stochastic aspects of QM emerge in measurement, where the modulus 
>>> square of amplitudes are probabilities and there are these random outcomes. 
>>> The measurement of a quantum state is not a quantum process, but has 
>>> stochastic outcomes predicted by QM. Based on the Hamkin's work where I 
>>> only looked at the slides and not yet the paper, it seems possible to do 
>>> this with quantum computer.
>>> 
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-queen-mary-university-of-london-june-2019/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> slides:
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-QMUL-2019-1.pdf
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I wrote a couple of elementary Python codes for the QE machine IBM has to 
>>> prepare states and run then through Hadamard gates. The thought occurred to 
>>> me that this Quining could be done quantum mechanically as a set of 
>>> Hadamard gates that duplicate a qubit or an bipartite entangled qubit. This 
>>> is a part of my ansatz that a measurement is a sort of Gödel numbering of 
>>> quantum states as qubit data in other quantum states.
>>> Quantum computations are mapped into an orthomodular lattice that does not 
>>> obey the distributive property. The distributive law of p and (q or r) = (p 
>>> and q) or (p and r) fails. The reason is due to the Heisenberg uncertainty 
>>> principle. Suppose we let p = momentum in the interval [0, P], q = position 
>>> in the interval [-x, x] and r = particle in interval [x, y]. The 
>>> proposition p and (q or r) is true if this spread in momentum [0, P] is 
>>> equal to the reciprocal of the spread of position [-x, y] with
>>> P = ħ/sqrt(y^2 + x^2).
>>> The distributive law would then mean
>>> P = ħ/|y| or P = ħ/|x|
>>> which is clearly false. This is the major difference with quantum logic and 
>>> Boolean classical logic. These lattices of quantum logic have polytope 
>>> realizations.
>>> This is in fact another way of realizing that QM can't be built up from 
>>> classical physics. If this were the case then quantum orthomodular 
>>> lattices, which act on convex sets on L^p spaces with p = ½ would be 
>>> somehow built from lattices acting on convex sets with p → ∞. This is for 
>>> any deterministic system, whether Newtonian physics or a Turing machine. It 
>>> is this flip between convex sets that is difficult to understand. With p = 
>>> ½ and the duality between two convex sets as 1/p + 1/q = 1 the dual to QM 
>>> also has L^2 measure. This is spacetime with the Gaussian interval. For a p 
>>> → ∞ the dual is q = 1 which is a purely stochastic system, say an idealized 
>>> set of dice or roulette wheel with no deterministic predictability.
>>> The point of Quining statements quantum mechanically is that this might be 
>>> a start for looking at a quantum measurement as a way that quantum states 
>>> encode qubit information of other quantum states. It is a sort of Gödel 
>>> self-reference, and my suspicion is the so called measurement problem is 
>>> not solvable. The decoherence of states is then a case where p = ½ → 1 with 
>>> an outcome. That is pure randomness.
>> 
>> With mechanism, that randomness is reduced into the indeterminacy in 
>> self-multiplication experience. It come from the many-histories internal 
>> interpretation of arithmetic, in which all sound universal numbers 
>> converges. The quantum aspect of nature is just how the (sigma_1) 
>> arithmetical reality looks like from inside. This explains where the 
>> apparent collapse comes from, in a similar way than Everett, but it explains 
>> also where the wave comes from. Eventually quantum mechanics is just a modal 
>> internal view of arithmetic, or anything Turing equivalent. The math, and 
>> quantum physics confirms computationalism up to now, where physicalism and 
>> materialism are inconsistent, or consciousness or person eliminative.
>> 
>> 
>> Thanks for addressing this.
>> 
>> I guess in a way I do not entirely understand this. The above illustration 
>> is the main difference between Boolean and quantum logic.
> 
> OK. I have no problem with this. I agree and understand that quantum logic 
> cannot be embedded or extended into a classical logic. This is related to the 
> fact that there is no local hidden variable theory compatible with the 
> quantum experiments.
> 
> But this does not mean that quantum logic can

37 matches

Mail list logo