Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 2:07 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 8:43 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 11:27 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>>> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

>>>
>>> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split
>>> locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to
>>> prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
>>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
>>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
>>> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> It is paragraphs like this that seem to me to appeal to magic:
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>  "It is only when Alice and Bob interact that correlations are
>> established. Let us assume for the moment that both Alice and Bob always
>> push their buttons before interacting. The magical rule is that an Alice is
>> allowed to interact with a Bob if and only if they jointly satisfy the
>> conditions of the nonlocal box set out in Table 1
>> 
>> .
>> "For example, if Alice pushes button 1, she splits. Consider the Alice
>> who sees green. Her system can be imagined to carry the following rule: You
>> are allowed to interact with Bob if either he had pushed button 0 on his
>> box and seen green, or pushed button 1 and seen red. Should this Alice ever
>> come in presence of a Bob who had pushed button 1 and seen green, she would
>> simply not become aware of his presence and could walk right through him
>> without either one of them noticing anything. Of course, the other Alice,
>> the one who had seen red after pushing button 1, would be free to shake
>> hands with that Bob."
>>
>> "When they meet, the correlations they experience are simply due to the
>> matching rule that determines which Alices are allowed to interact with
>> which Bobs,"
>>
>>
> The scenario described in the paper isn't meant to be an account of
> reality, it's a contrived scenario stated up front to be an imaginary
> universe. The paper is meant to show that Bell does not disprove local
> realism, only local hidden variables with single definite outcomes of
> measurement.
>
> As for the magic, there is magic as the Non-local boxes in the scenario
> operate by magic, and the rule that enforces consistency can be viewed as a
> a form of magic too.  In our world and in QM things are a bit different.
> Perfect functioning non-local boxes are not possible, at best we can
> violate Bell's inequality by 10% using entanglement.  If one uses entangled
> particles to build approximately functioning non-local boxes, then the rule
> that prevents interacting with incompatible branches is the same
> consistency rule that ensures if you make the repeated measurements of the
> same observable you get consistent results.  In the case of the entangled
> particles, they have both already interacted (they'be both already measured
> each other), so measuring one and finding it to be spin down, tells you
> already the other one is spin up.  So when you Alice receives a radio
> message from Bob, she already knows the result.  You can view meeting the
> Bob as just another kind of measurement (and for the same observable).
>

That doesn't work for entangled particles in the singlet state either.
Since the measurements by Alice and Bob are independent, both can get
either up or down. They both split into two universes, separately and
locally. But when Alice-up, say, meets Bob, she splits according to his
result. So we get two possibilities: (Alice-up + Bob-up), and (Alice-up +
Bob-down). For the case of aligned S-G magnets, the (Alice-up + Bob-up)
combination is not possible. The impossibility of such a meeting requires
exactly the same magic as the Brassard et al. paper proposes.

Bruce.

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Re: STEP 3

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 8:28 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 13-08-2019 13:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >
> > Of course A(x) and B(x) refer to the same point on the screen. That is
> > not a collapse, that is just what the notation means.
>
> A(x) and B(x) considered as the representations of |A> and |B> in the
> position basis, i.e.  A(x) =  and B(x) =  are still orthogonal
> states, as they represent the orthogonal states |A> and |B>:
>
> 0 =  = Integral over x of d^3x =  Integral over x of
> A*(x)B(x) d^3x
>

I don't think this really works out. You are claiming that the integral of
the interference terms over the whole screen vanishes. If we look at the
usual derivation of the interference from two slits, we get something like

 Intensity I = 2 A^2 (sin^2(beta)/beta^2) (1 + cos(delta))

where the term involving the angle beta is the superposed diffraction
pattern from the finite width of the slits. The cos (delta) term is the
interference, but it has this form only in a small angle approximation, and
the phase difference delta is, of course, limited by the separation of the
slits. So, although the cos(delta) term may integrate to zero over small
angles, the presence of the diffraction envelope, and the limitations of
the small angle approximation, mean that is almost certainly will not
vanish when integrated over the whole screen.

So  will not vanish in general. Which is what I would have thought
because the paths through the separate slits are not independent -- each
particle essentially has to see both slits (go through both slits) in order
to maintain coherence. So they cannot be orthogonal (independent).

In practice, to see the interference pattern you need coherent illumination
over both slits. This is easy these days with lasers, but in older books,
coherence was ensured by having a preparatory single slit followed by
suitable condenser lenses. If the slits could be treated as independent
entities, this would not have been necessary.


But you interpret this as the total counts of particles on the entire
> screen not changing which you call an absence of interference. However
> interference is what we detect locally on each point on the screen. You
> can't say that for each point x0 on the screen,  A(x0) and B(x0) are
> particle states. These values are not the quantum states of the particle
> before it hits the screen,


No, they are the amplitudes of the wave function at each point on the
screen. This is what give the probability of the particle being detected
(by the screen) at this point.

Bruce

unless you would have done a measurement
> localizing the particle near x0.
>
> So, your argument only makes sense if you invoke collapse via a position
> measurement.
>

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 8:43 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 11:27 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>>
>>
>> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
>> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
>> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>>
>>
>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
>> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> It is paragraphs like this that seem to me to appeal to magic:
>
> Bruce
>
>  "It is only when Alice and Bob interact that correlations are
> established. Let us assume for the moment that both Alice and Bob always
> push their buttons before interacting. The magical rule is that an Alice is
> allowed to interact with a Bob if and only if they jointly satisfy the
> conditions of the nonlocal box set out in Table 1
> 
> .
> "For example, if Alice pushes button 1, she splits. Consider the Alice who
> sees green. Her system can be imagined to carry the following rule: You are
> allowed to interact with Bob if either he had pushed button 0 on his box
> and seen green, or pushed button 1 and seen red. Should this Alice ever
> come in presence of a Bob who had pushed button 1 and seen green, she would
> simply not become aware of his presence and could walk right through him
> without either one of them noticing anything. Of course, the other Alice,
> the one who had seen red after pushing button 1, would be free to shake
> hands with that Bob."
>
> "When they meet, the correlations they experience are simply due to the
> matching rule that determines which Alices are allowed to interact with
> which Bobs,"
>
>
The scenario described in the paper isn't meant to be an account of
reality, it's a contrived scenario stated up front to be an imaginary
universe. The paper is meant to show that Bell does not disprove local
realism, only local hidden variables with single definite outcomes of
measurement.

As for the magic, there is magic as the Non-local boxes in the scenario
operate by magic, and the rule that enforces consistency can be viewed as a
a form of magic too.  In our world and in QM things are a bit different.
Perfect functioning non-local boxes are not possible, at best we can
violate Bell's inequality by 10% using entanglement.  If one uses entangled
particles to build approximately functioning non-local boxes, then the rule
that prevents interacting with incompatible branches is the same
consistency rule that ensures if you make the repeated measurements of the
same observable you get consistent results.  In the case of the entangled
particles, they have both already interacted (they'be both already measured
each other), so measuring one and finding it to be spin down, tells you
already the other one is spin up.  So when you Alice receives a radio
message from Bob, she already knows the result.  You can view meeting the
Bob as just another kind of measurement (and for the same observable).

Jason

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 11:27 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>
>
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>
>
> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>
> Brent
>

It is paragraphs like this that seem to me to appeal to magic:

Bruce

 "It is only when Alice and Bob interact that correlations are established.
Let us assume for the moment that both Alice and Bob always push their
buttons before interacting. The magical rule is that an Alice is allowed to
interact with a Bob if and only if they jointly satisfy the conditions of
the nonlocal box set out in Table 1

.
"For example, if Alice pushes button 1, she splits. Consider the Alice who
sees green. Her system can be imagined to carry the following rule: You are
allowed to interact with Bob if either he had pushed button 0 on his box
and seen green, or pushed button 1 and seen red. Should this Alice ever
come in presence of a Bob who had pushed button 1 and seen green, she would
simply not become aware of his presence and could walk right through him
without either one of them noticing anything. Of course, the other Alice,
the one who had seen red after pushing button 1, would be free to shake
hands with that Bob."

"When they meet, the correlations they experience are simply due to the
matching rule that determines which Alices are allowed to interact with
which Bobs,"

Bruce

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:


I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.


I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split 
locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to 
prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.


I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes 
within the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, 
which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice 
and Bob.


Brent



Not convincing.

Bruce

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm

Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary
world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates
a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves
to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local
hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the
way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were
right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen
version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a
local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to
explain our views from first principles, without expecting
mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge
from the reader.

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

It postulates there is a change in the global state function which 
spreads at the speed of light and decoheres superpositions that are 
measured.


Brent

On 8/15/2019 4:25 PM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm


Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world.
Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell
inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk
the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in
the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the
celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come
to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the
completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided
one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our
journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles,
without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized
prior knowledge from the reader.

--
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.


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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 7:06:51 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>
>
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally 
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the 
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>
> Not convincing.
>
> Bruce
>

A black hole could do the trick. I have only looked at the first page of 
this, so I can't judge this deeply yet. I keep getting interrupted by 
things like phone calls and then my gallomph of a Labrador Retriever wanted 
attention.

LC
 

>  
>
>> LC
>>
>> On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
>>>
>>> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our 
>>> world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more 
>>> than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local 
>>> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along 
>>> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky 
>>> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their 
>>> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, 
>>> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our 
>>> journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without 
>>> expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from 
>>> the reader.
>>>
>>

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
incorrect pairs ever meeting.

Not convincing.

Bruce


> LC
>
> On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
>>
>> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our
>> world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more
>> than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local
>> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along
>> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky
>> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their
>> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory,
>> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our
>> journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without
>> expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from
>> the reader.
>>
>

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Lawrence Crowell]

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
>
> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our 
> world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more 
> than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local 
> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along 
> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky 
> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their 
> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, 
> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our 
> journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without 
> expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from 
> the reader.
>

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Re: STEP 3

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Aug 11, 2019 at 12:24 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 10 Aug 2019, at 20:34, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 9, 2019 at 10:20 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 9 Aug 2019, at 13:09, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>> 
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno,
>>>
>>> Forgive me if I have asked this before, but can you elaborate on the
>>> how/why the math suggests negative interference?
>>>
>>> I currently have no intuition for why this should be.
>>>
>>> I recall reading something on continuous probability as being more
>>> natural and leading to something much like the probability formulas in
>>> quantum mechanics. Is that related?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is not intuitive at all. With the UDA, we can have have the intuition
>>> coming from the first person indeterminacy on all all computational
>>> continuation in arithmetic, but in the AUDA (the Arithmetical UDA), the
>>> probabilities are constrained by the logic of self-reference G and G*. So
>>> the reason why we can hope for negative amplitude of probability comes from
>>> the fact that modal variant of the first person on the (halting)
>>> computations, which is given by the arithmetical interpretation of:
>>>
>>> []p & p
>>>
>>>  or
>>>
>>> []p & <>t
>>>
>>> or
>>>
>>> []p & <>t & p
>>>
>>>  With, as usual, [] = Beweisbar, and p is an arbitrary sigma_1 sentences
>>> (partial computable formula).
>>>
>>> They all give a quantum logic enough close to Dalla Chiara’s
>>> presentation of them, to have the quantum features like complimentary
>>> observable, and what I have called a sort of abstract linear evolution
>>> build on a highly symmetrical core (than to LASE: the little Schroeder
>>> equation: p -> []<>p, which provides a quantisation of the sigma_1
>>> arithmetical reality.
>>>
>>> It is mainly the presence of this quantisation which justify that the
>>> probabilities behave in a quantum non boolean way, but this is hard to
>>> verify because the nesting of boxes in the G* translation makes those
>>> formula … well, probably in need of a quantum computer to be evaluated. But
>>> normally, if mechanism (and QM) are correct this should work.
>>>
>>> This is explained with more detail in “Conscience et Mécanisme”.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> Thank you Bruno for your explanation and references.
>>
>>
>> Y’re welcome.
>>
>>
>> Regarding “Conscience et Mécanisme”, is there a web/html or English
>> version available?  Unfortunately my browser cannot do translations of PDFs
>> but can translate web pages.  If not don't worry, I can copy and paste into
>> a translator.
>>
>>
>> Yes, There is no HTML page for the long text. But you can consult also my
>> paper:
>>
>> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in
>> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381.
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993
>>
>> You will still need some background in quantum logic, like  the paper by
>> Goldblatt which makes the link between minimal quantum logic and the B
>> modal logic.
>>
>> There is also a paper by Rawling and Selesnick which shows how to build a
>> quantum NOT gate, from the Kripke semantics of the B logic. It is not
>> entirely clear if this can be used in arithmetic, because we loss the
>> necessitation rule in “our” B logic. Open problem. A positive solution on
>> this would be a great step toward an explanation that the universal machine
>> has necessarily a quantum structure and can exploit the “parallel
>> computations in arithmetic” in the limit of the 1p indeterminacy..
>>
>> Rawling JP and Selesnick SA, 2000, Orthologic and Quantum Logic: Models
>> and Computational Elements, Journal of the ACM, Vol. 47, n° 4, pp. 721-T51.
>>
>> Ask question, online or here. It *is* rather technical at some point.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> I've been reading those references, and have found a few more which might
> be related and of interest.  Effectively, they provide arguments for the
> quantum probability theory based on the requirement for continuous
> reversible operations, or the juxtaposition between finite
> information-carry capacity and smoothness.
>
>
> Lucien Hardy's "Quantum Theory From Five Reasonable Axioms"
> https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0101012
>
> The usual formulation of quantum theory is based on rather obscure axioms
> (employing complex Hilbert spaces, Hermitean operators, and the trace rule
> for calculating probabilities). In this paper it is shown that quantum
> theory can be derived from five very reasonable axioms. The first four of
> these are obviously consistent with both quantum theory and classical
> probability theory. Axiom 5 (which requires that there exists continuous
> reversible transformations between pure states) rules out classical
> probability theory. If Axiom 5 (or even just the word "continuous" from
> Axiom 5) is dropped then we obtain classical probability theory instead.
> This work provides some insight into the reasons quantum theory is the way
> it is. For example, it explains the 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Philip Thrift]

*"quantum theory is the science of preparing systems in one state and 
detecting them in another state; everything that happens in between is 
philosophy"*

- https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-of-physics-quantum-theory/

Everyone has their own breed of gremlins that operate "in between".

@philipthrift

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
>
> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our 
> world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more 
> than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local 
> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along 
> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky 
> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their 
> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, 
> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our 
> journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without 
> expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from 
> the reader.
>

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Local Realism and Bell

[Jason Resch]

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm

Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our
world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more
than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local
realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along
the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their
questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory,
provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our
journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without
expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from
the reader.

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Re: STEP 3

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Aug 2019, at 13:28, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 7:49 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 15 Aug 2019, at 02:54, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 10:10 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 14:42, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> 
>>> That is simply incorrect. I refer you again to Zurek, who works in a 
>>> basically Everettian framework, but he stresses the importance of 
>>> environmental induced superselection (einselection) in producing the 
>>> preferred pointer basis. This then breaks things, in the sense that no 
>>> other basis is stable against decoherence, and other sets of basis vectors 
>>> rapidly (in times of the order of femtoseconds) collapse on to the 
>>> preferred pointer states. This is the basis of the emergence of the 
>>> classical world from the quantum substrate. And this occurs in Everett's 
>>> relative state approach just as much as in a Copenhagen-like collapse 
>>> models.
>> 
>> That explains why the many histories will look classical. But if I observe a 
>> cat in the dead+alive state,
>> 
>> The point of the existence of a preferred basis is that you will never 
>> observe a cat in a "dead+alive" state.
> 
> If that is what you mean, we both agree that Everett + Zurek solves that 
> problem. But the point is that If I observe the cat with an apparatus 
> deciding between alive and dead, I will put myself in the corresponding 
> superposition, unless some physical collapse occurs, but then we are no more 
> in Everett’s QM (QM without collapse).
> 
> No, you do not see any superposition.

Yes. We agree on this. The point is that I will not see it, because I am part 
of it, nor because it would have disappeared in some way.


> The cat itself is never in a superposition because decoherence brings about a 
> definite live state or dead state.


So we do disagree, at least if you claim that the superposition state disappear 
and QM applies to the cat. 

If there is no wave collapse, saying that some unknown particle interacting 
with the cat demolished the superposition state means only that the particle 
has been entangled with the state of the cat, and that being unable to track 
that particle makes me unable to handle the superposition anymore, but this 
means that the cat remains superposed, the particle get also superposed, and my 
whole environment get superposed. By the double QM linearity, the superposition 
never disappeared at all. The cat + the particle + me + the universe evolved 
through a unitary rotation where I am locally described in the two terms of the 
wave: seeing the cat alive and seeing the cat dead.

Decoherence in Everett (entanglement), and in Zurek (at least the perhaps old 
paper I read) does not make the “other branches vanishing”, it makes just my 
alternate history inaccessible.




> By the time you open the box, you have also split according to the classical 
> basis,

Ah, but that was my point. 



> so your probability of seeing a live or dead cat is just the classical 
> ignorance probability.

Yes, like the H guy in Moscow and in Washington, already duplicated, but before 
they open the door of the reconstitution box (in the 2 cities). The H-guy is 
ignorant on which branch of the computation he/she belongs.




> Opening the box does not collapse anything.

Thanks for reassuring me. That was my point.



> The point is that even if there is some superposition, it lasts no more than 
> a few nanoseconds.

That is misleading, as some people will interpret this by a collapse. I am 
happy you reject that interpretation. I agree that, even we’ll before I open 
the box, I have already been multiplied, unless some engineer trick to isolate 
the cat completely, which is just impossible today.




> After that time, your position is one of classical ignorance -- you are 
> either in the branch with the live cat, or the branch with the dead cat.

Yes, like after the WM-duplication, I am either in Moscow or in Washington. 
Pure classical ignorance.



> Opening the box does not change your relative state, or collapse anything.

Exactly my point. 



> There is no "you" that is in a superposition of these branches (just as there 
> is no "you" that is in both Washington and Moscow in step 3).

Exactly. In the first person perspective. Obviously, the 3p observer which 
looks at the entire setup can see me in both cities.
The only difference with the superposition, is that the 3p-view is technically 
lost from the experimental local (first person plural) view.



> So it is just like someone tossing a classical coin that you can't see.

Yes.

We do agree! (I hope you agree with this).

Then with mechanism, we have a generalisation of the relative state approach, 
by taking all computations into account, a concept which makes sense through 
Church-Thesis, and if you accept that thesis, all 

Re: Stuff it

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Aug 2019, at 15:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 7:42:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 14 Aug 2019, at 12:39, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 5:06:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 11:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, August 12, 2019 at 4:17:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 12 Aug 2019, at 00:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 1:07:02 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 9 Aug 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> The Right Stuff
> Ned Markosian
> https://markosiandotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/right-stuff.pdf 
> 
> from https://markosian.net/online-papers/ 
> 
> 
> Things are also known as “objects” and “entities,” and stuff is also 
> known as
> “matter” and “material.”
> 
> This paper argues for including stuff in one’s ontology. The distinction
> between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different 
> ontologies
> of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure 
> stuff
> ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. (The paper 
> defends
> the latter.) Eleven different reasons for including stuff (in addition to 
> things)
> in one’s ontology are given (seven of which the author endorses and four 
> of
> which would be sensible reasons for philosophers with certain metaphysical
> positions that the author does not happen to hold). Then five objections 
> to
> positing stuff are considered and rejected.
 
 Honest and clear defence of stuff!. I appreciate his distinction between 
 things and stuff.
 
 So with mechanism, we can say:  many things no stuff! 
 (Many things like numbers, machines, persons,  physical objects, physical 
 experiences, etc.),
 
 
 Feel free to defend any of the eleven reason he gave. Up to now (I read 
 slowly) I am not  convinced.
 
 I am more sure that 2+2=4 than of the existence of plumb, .. not 
 mentioning the existence of a  plumber !
 
 Bruno
 
 
  I don't know about a plumb, but of a plum, I am more sure of any of my 
 experiences of eating a plum than 2+2=4.
>>> 
>>> But the experience of eating a plum is not a proof that the plum is made of 
>>> matter. I dreamed a lot eating things, for example. A first person 
>>> experience never proves anything, except the existence of that experience 
>>> for the one who remember it.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 2+2=4 is a heuristic of mathematical language. Useful for us, but not 
 "real" like a plum-eating experience.
>>> 
>>> With mechanism, we do have an explanation of where such experience come 
>>> from.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 Language bewilders us, and thus we talk and write and think of things, but 
 it's the plum stuff that matters.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Then mechanism is false. Maybe, but the evidences side with mechanism, not 
>>> with materialism. Yes, language bewllders us in making us believe in stuff, 
>>> but if digital mechanism is correct, all the argument you might find for 
>>> better are find by your counterpart in arithmetic, and here we know that 
>>> they are invalid, but that shows that your intuition is not well sustained, 
>>> or that mechanism is false (and the “you” in arithmetic becomes p-zombies.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> This is the whole panpsychism (here the Galen Stawson, Philip Goff, Hedda 
>>> Hassel Mørch‏, ... materialist panpsychist kind, not the idealist version 
>>> of maybe a few) enterprise.
>>> 
>>> Either:
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is true.
>>> 
>>>or
>>> 
>>> Panpsychism is true.
>> 
>> 
>> Why?
>> 
>> It seems to me that if Mechanism is false, *many* different sorts of 
>> non-mechanist theory can be true, including pure arithmetical one, or set 
>> theoretical one.
>> 
>> With Non-Mechanism, weak materialism *might* become consistent, but that 
>> does not (yet) make it  necessarily true.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Basically, you replace mechanism with an experiential mechanism 
>> (e-mechanism), where 
>> 
>>   Φ+Ψ: both numbers (information) and [real!] qualia (experience) are 
>> processed.
>> 
>> Now matter (in the panpsychist view) supplies Φ+Ψ but maybe there's an 
>> alternative.
>> 
>> It comes down to what real Ψ is.
>> 
>> 
>> A recent paper from Hedda Hassel Mørch here:
>> 
>> https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCTPP.pdf 
>> 
>> 
>> A real Ψ vs an illusory or simulated Ψ is the key issue.
> 
> 
> Hmm…. With digital mechanism, the simulation concerns the machine ([]p, [] is 
> Gödel’s universal Löbian predicate: it is a Universal machine 

Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Aug 2019, at 16:22, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 6:37 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > I don’t *assume* the physical. By this I don’t mean that the physical does 
> > not exist.
> 
> Then I don't know what you mean.


I mean that I believe in the physical reality, but I do not necessarily believe 
that the physical reality is the fundamental reality. Like I tend to believe 
that the human biological reality emerges from the physical reality, I am aware 
that if we assume Mechanism, the physical reality has to emerges from 
arithmetic, or more precisely from some intensional variant of the 
Gödel-Löb-Solovay (known as GLS, or G*).




> 
> > Eventually I show that it is derivable from the laws of the observable for 
> > the universal machine.
> 
> Physical objects are observable, pure numbers are not and neither is a 
> universal machine unless its made of physical objects. 

We might argue differently. Look at experimental physicists. They measure 
numbers only, and they infer relation between numbers. That those number 
corresponds to some reality is possible, but not obvious, and certainly more so 
with quantum mechanics, which behaves already much more like Mechanism suggest, 
as a measure theory on locally accessible histories/computations (with a notion 
of first person plural view).

This explains the physical observable without the need to commit oneself 
ontologically in a primitively physical reality. The laws of physics have a 
reason, in the mechanist setting.





>  
> >> You speak of several areas where induction is used but apparently there 
> >> are so many "very different" things about the two types of induction that 
> >> you are unable to specify a single one. I would really like to know which 
> >> one does not involve the core concept that things usually continue. 
> 
> > Mathematical induction is only a set of induction rules or axioms, used in 
> > theoretical deduction.
> 
> The fundamental axiom of any form of induction is the same, things usually 
> continue. For animals induction is even more important than deduction even 
> though if you follow it for long enough eventually it will always fail. It 
> won't work forever but it will give you a very good winning streak.

Yes, inference inductive is done all the time, and mathematical induction has 
some relation with this, but is different, and used in deduction, where 
inductive inference is never valid as a deduction. I just point on the fact 
that induction and inductive inference are different notions (even if related 
philosophically).



>  
> > It is used in applied mathematics, and it is studied in theoretical 
> > learning theory. I mentioned often the paper by Case and Smith, for a very 
> > good introduction to learning (and extrapolating, …) theory. 
> 
> Animals have been using induction to their advantage for at least 500 million 
> years and they didn't need a paper by Case and Smith to do it.

Atoms have been around since a longer time, and they didn’t need Bohr, 
Heisenberg, de Broglie’s papers to do what they do. 
Your argument are weird.




>  
> >> An infinity? There may or may not be an infinity of John Clarks in the 
> >> Multiverse but there is not even one John Clark in arithmetic; 
> 
> > When you say “yes” to the *digitalist* doctor,
> 
> And I have in effect said yes to the digitalist* doctor.
>  
> > you bet that you will survive
> 
> It's the very best sort of bet. If I win I receive a infinitely large 
> jackpot. If I don't win then I've lost nothing except $80,000 and I can 
> afford that. 


That is a bit like 0 and 1, in a context where there are many more 
possibilities in between the jackpot and some putative inexistence. You have no 
idea who  will be the doctor who would reconstitute you, nor his intent, and 
life might be not so rosy, if not hellish when you see what humans can do to 
their fellow. 




> 
> > through the fact that some reconstitution of yourself will keep intact the 
> > digital (and thus arithmetical) relations at some relevant level. 
> 
> I'm betting that certain atoms don't have my name scratched on them and atoms 
> are generic. I'm betting that the key aspect of what makes me be me is not 
> the particular atoms that make up my body right now but the related 
> orientation the atoms have with each each other, and that is information can 
> be stored digitally. I'm betting that is the road to immortality if such a 
> road exists.

With mechanism, we are already immortal. Our digital information is store in 
the many number relations, and execute in all possible relative computational 
histories, and there is an infinity of such histories realised in all the 
models of arithmetic.

Technological immortality is complaisance in the Samsara and procrastination of 
the Nirvana.





> 
> >> If you're reading this then right now the proof they exist is LITERALLY 
> >> right in front of your face because your computer is a 

Re: STEP 3

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 7:49 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 15 Aug 2019, at 02:54, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 10:10 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 14:42, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>
>> That is simply incorrect. I refer you again to Zurek, who works in a
>> basically Everettian framework, but he stresses the importance of
>> environmental induced superselection (einselection) in producing the
>> preferred pointer basis. This then breaks things, in the sense that no
>> other basis is stable against decoherence, and other sets of basis vectors
>> rapidly (in times of the order of femtoseconds) collapse on to the
>> preferred pointer states. This is the basis of the emergence of the
>> classical world from the quantum substrate. And this occurs in Everett's
>> relative state approach just as much as in a Copenhagen-like collapse
>> models.
>>
>>
>> That explains why the many histories will look classical. But if I
>> observe a cat in the dead+alive state,
>>
>
> The point of the existence of a preferred basis is that you will never
> observe a cat in a "dead+alive" state.
>
>
> If that is what you mean, we both agree that Everett + Zurek solves that
> problem. But the point is that If I observe the cat with an apparatus
> deciding between alive and dead, I will put myself in the corresponding
> superposition, unless some physical collapse occurs, but then we are no
> more in Everett’s QM (QM without collapse).
>

No, you do not see any superposition. The cat itself is never in a
superposition because decoherence brings about a definite live state or
dead state. By the time you open the box, you have also split according to
the classical basis, so your probability of seeing a live or dead cat is
just the classical ignorance probability. Opening the box does not collapse
anything. The point is that even if there is some superposition, it lasts
no more than a few nanoseconds. After that time, your position is one of
classical ignorance -- you are either in the branch with the live cat, or
the branch with the dead cat. Opening the box does not change your relative
state, or collapse anything. There is no "you" that is in a superposition
of these branches (just as there is no "you" that is in both Washington and
Moscow in step 3). So it is just like someone tossing a classical coin that
you can't see.

Bruce

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Path Integrals and Reality

[Philip Thrift]

*Path Integrals and Reality*
Adrian Kent
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.6565.pdf

The ultimate vision of those who take path integral quantum theory as 
fundamental to all of physics is a path integral formulation of quantum 
gravity and quantum cosmology. It hardly needs saying that it would be very 
interesting to explore the possibilities opened up by real path quantum 
theory in this context, the range of potentially natural distance functions 
between cosmological paths, and the possibility of using the path 
probability postulate [above] and the properties of distance functions to 
allow rigorous definitions and calculations.

@philipthrift

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Re: STEP 3

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Aug 2019, at 02:54, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 10:10 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 12 Aug 2019, at 14:42, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> 
>> That is simply incorrect. I refer you again to Zurek, who works in a 
>> basically Everettian framework, but he stresses the importance of 
>> environmental induced superselection (einselection) in producing the 
>> preferred pointer basis. This then breaks things, in the sense that no other 
>> basis is stable against decoherence, and other sets of basis vectors rapidly 
>> (in times of the order of femtoseconds) collapse on to the preferred pointer 
>> states. This is the basis of the emergence of the classical world from the 
>> quantum substrate. And this occurs in Everett's relative state approach just 
>> as much as in a Copenhagen-like collapse models.
> 
> That explains why the many histories will look classical. But if I observe a 
> cat in the dead+alive state,
> 
> The point of the existence of a preferred basis is that you will never 
> observe a cat in a "dead+alive" state.

If that is what you mean, we both agree that Everett + Zurek solves that 
problem. But the point is that If I observe the cat with an apparatus deciding 
between alive and dead, I will put myself in the corresponding superposition, 
unless some physical collapse occurs, but then we are no more in Everett’s QM 
(QM without collapse).

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: STEP 3

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Aug 2019, at 18:37, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, August 13, 2019, John Clark  > wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 9:40 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> On 7 Aug 2019, at 15:08, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>  
> >> What exactly is the difference between something that it is impossible in 
> >> principle to detect and something that does not exist?
>  
> > It is like the difference between the human existence and the human non 
> > existence, for an alien situated in a very far away galaxy. The fact that 
> > this alien cannot detect us does not make the human disappearing. 
> 
> You're dodging the question. We can certainly detect ourselves, and it is not 
> impossible in principle for a alien in a distant galaxy to detect us, and 
> that is very different from your silly phantom computations that pure numbers 
> are suposed to be able to perform. 
> 
> > It is like the other side of the moon before we built rocket. 
> 
> Nobody ever said there was a philosophical problem in observing the far side 
> of the moon, it was always just a matter of engineering, but no amount of 
> engineering can make your ridiculous phantom calculations real. If they 
> existed it would be possible in principle to count the number of angels that 
> were sitting on the head of a pin, but your non-material Turing Machine is 
> hopeless. 
> 
> 
> The conversation was about other branches of the wavefunction.  (Which I 
> think you believe in despite not being able to see, nor them being able to 
> make a CPU useful to you).

Well seen. 

Bruno



> 
> Jason
> 
>  
> John K Clark 
> 
> 
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>  
> .
> 
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Re: STEP 3

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Aug 2019, at 16:53, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> Nobody ever said there was a philosophical problem in observing the far side 
> of the moon, it was always just a matter of engineering, but no amount of 
> engineering can make your ridiculous phantom calculations real.


There is a philosophical problem even on milk in the fridge when the fridge is 
close. We can use Einstein’s reality principle, but as you know, this leads to 
other problem, and people different on the existence or not of a collapse. Yes, 
those are not problem if we adopt a FAPP-philosophy.




> If they existed it would be possible in principle to count the number of 
> angels that were sitting on the head of a pin,

With mechanism, that is the same as the problem of how much bits or qubits we 
can process in a volume similar to the head of a pin. It makes sense.




> but your non-material Turing Machine is hopeless. 

Then Church, Turing, Post, Kleene, Gödel and many more are all hopeless, in 
fact elementary arithmetic becomes hopeless.

Bruno






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Re: Standard Model & Higgs Boson

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, August 10, 2019 at 10:43:39 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> In what way does the Standard Model imply the existence of the Higgs 
> Boson? TIA.
>



The "Higgs boson" is already a component of the Standard Model.

 The Standard Model includes members of several classes of elementary 
particles:
  
   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_Model#Particle_content

The Higgs boson 
plays a unique role in the Standard Model
is a key building block in the Standard Model

So the Higgs boson is already there in the Standard Model.

The Standard Model is one big mess.

@philipthrift
 

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Re: Standard Model & Higgs Boson

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 9:40:45 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 3:56:39 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Saturday, August 10, 2019 at 10:43:39 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>> In what way does the Standard Model imply the existence of the Higgs 
>>> Boson? TIA.
>>>
>>
>> I have been around the block on this. The Higgs field breaks the 
>> electroweak symmetry U(2) = SU(2)xU(1) the transferring 3 Goldstone boson 
>> components to the weak interaction bosons as longitudinal components. A 
>> quantum field with a longitudinal component usually has a mass. 
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
> Bear with me; what is electroweak symmetry, and why does it need to be 
> broken? TIA, AG 
>

What is the contribution of the Higgs Field, as a per cent, to the vacuum 
energy? Isn't the Higgs field, a defacto introduction to an ether theory? 
Isn't the vacuum energy another name for the Cosmological Constant? TIA, AG 

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