SV: Civilization-level quantum suicide
Now, Mark Buda is either sarcastic or mad. I think he is pulling your leg here Bruno. -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 16 juli 2010 16:06 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Civilization-level quantum suicide On 16 Jul 2010, at 14:13, Mark Buda wrote: I came across this link some time ago and found it interesting: http://www.paul-almond.com/CivilizationLevelQuantumSuicide.htm In fact, I believe it is what introduced me to the term quantum suicide. I had been googling something I had been thinking about in the shower one day and to my surprise this guy had written a paper about it. What an amazing coincidence. My life since then has been an increasingly bizarre series of meaningful coincidences. Meaningful in a personal way that I can't explain easily. Bruno understands and can explain why I can't explain; it's to do with his G and G* logics. This is on the fringe of authoritative argument. But the upshot of it is this: I have found out what happens when you commit quantum suicide. You discover that you believe a contradiction, and that even though nothing about the world has changed, you understand the universe. That seems very weird. But you have a hard time explaining it. Because you discover that you are, in Bruno's terms, a Lobian machine interviewing itself for the laws of physics. But I am saying this to explain that we can use reason to understand where the laws of physics come from. Not to mystified people with a lack of explanation. But you can't get the laws of physics yourself, even though you have all the answers. On the contrary: you can. Everyone can. You cannot besure because you cannot know that you are correct, so the usual doubt of the cartesian scientist remains. Computationalism explains in detail why any form of certainty, when made public, is a symptom of non correctness. Because you don't care any more - you have a different motivation. You understand that since you have all the answers but none of the questions, I don't see any sense here. you need to talk to people. You figure out the right people to talk to because your intuition guides you, because that's what it's for. There are people all around the world killing themselves and each other for crazy reasons. Suicide bombers, for instance. People who read stuff about the 2012 Mayan calendar thing and kill themselves because they think the end of the world is coming. 2012 is the year of the election in France. The Maya consider their own prediction as a prediction that some reasonable man will arrive. They never talk of apocalypse. 2012 is like prohibition: making money by selling fears. They're right and wrong, and I understand why, but I can't explain it, and Bruno understands why. I guess I have been unclear at some point. I am just a poor scientist trying to be honest with myself and the others. But all that stuff happening around the world is happening for a reason, and it doesn't matter what you - you can't stop it. Neither can I. But you can listen to this and think about it, and do whatever you feel like doing: you will anyway. If any of you can help me contact Richard Dawkins and talk to him, I can explain all of this. Why do you want to convince Richard Dawkins? You give him credit. Actually you do his very own error, because when Dawkins try to convince the Christians that they are wrong on God, he gives them credit on their notion of God. No one care about fairy tales, once we tackle the fundamental question with the scientific (= modest, hypotheses-based) approach. I can explain all of it to anybody if they're willing to talk to me. But I have to talk face to face, because it's too hard for me, psychologically, to figure out how to put it in writing or over the phone, because a lot of human communication is non- verbal, and there's an evolutionary reason for that which is part of the whole thing. Restrain yourself to communicate what is communicable. And just hope that the people will figure out by themselves what is not communicable yet true (like consciousness to take the simplest candidate). Perhaps I sound mad, but I have a testable prediction: if I don't contact Richard Dawkins, sooner or later somebody, somewhere is going to be researching the 2012 Mayan calendar thing and be led, by an amazing chain of coincidences, to me. I don't believe in coincidence. Or better I believe coincidences are just that: coincidences. The brain has an habit to over-interpret coincidences, and if you search them, you will find more and more, and you will take the risk of believing anything, that is to become inconsistent. The prohibition of drugs is based on similar form of unsound reasoning. And I can explain how that works. Bruno, when you read this, you are literally
reality, a non-computable fractal ?
This looks interesting. Has it been noticed here? The Invariant Set Hypothesis: A New Geometric Framework for the Foundations of Quantum Theory and the Role Played by Gravity Authors: T.N.Palmer http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Palmer_T/0/1/0/all/0/1 (Submitted on 5 Dec 2008 (v1 http://arxiv.org/abs/0812.1148v1 ), last revised 17 Feb 2009 (this version, v3)) Abstract: The Invariant Set Hypothesis proposes that states of physical reality belong to, and are governed by, a non-computable fractal subset I of state space, invariant under the action of some subordinate deterministic causal dynamics D. The Invariant Set Hypothesis is motivated by key results in nonlinear dynamical-systems theory, and black-hole thermodynamics. The elements of a reformulation of quantum theory are developed using two key properties of I: sparseness and self-similarity. Sparseness is used to relate counterfactual states to points not on I thus providing a basis for understanding the essential contextuality of quantum physics. Self similarity is used to relate the quantum state to oscillating coarse-grain probability mixtures based on fractal partitions of I, thus providing the basis for understanding the notion of quantum coherence. Combining these, an entirely analysis is given of the standard mysteries of quantum theory: superposition, nonlocality, measurement, emergence of classicality, the ontology of uncertainty and so on. It is proposed that gravity plays a key role in generating the fractal geometry of I. Since quantum theory does not itself recognise the existence of such a state-space geometry, the results here suggest that attempts to formulate unified theories of physics within a quantum theoretic framework are misguided; rather, a successful quantum theory of gravity should unify the causal non-euclidean geometry of space time with the atemporal fractal geometry of state space. http://arxiv.org/abs/0812.1148 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Smolin's View of Time
How does this compare with Einstein´s discovery that there is no moment that is the same NOW for everyone? LN -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-l...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] För Kim Jones Skickat: den 2 januari 2009 04:01 Till: Everything List Ämne: Smolin's View of Time Edge Question 2009: What Will Change Everything? http://www.edge.org/q2009/q09_9.html#smolin What do we think about this? Smolin seems to disagree with most of what we are on about on this list. My mind remains open in all directions, particularly as Smolin appears to be enjoying substantial advances in his field of Quantum Gravitation. Does his argument about time have legs? Maybe we can get him back on this list to talk to us if we yell loud enough in his direction... regards, Kim LEE SMOLIN Physicist, Perimeter Institute; Author, The Trouble With Physics THE LIBERATION OF TIME I would like to describe a change in viewpoint, which I believe will alter how we think about everything from the most abstract questions on the nature of truth to the most concrete questions in our daily lives. This change comes from the deepest and most difficult problems facing contemporary science: those having to do with the nature of time. The problem of time confronts us at every key juncture in fundamental physics: What was the big bang and could something have come before it? What is the nature of quantum physics and how does it unify with relativity theory? Why are the laws of physics we observe the true laws, rather than other possible laws? Might the laws have evolved from different laws in the past? After a lot of discussion and argument, it is becoming clear to me that these key questions in fundamental physics come down to a very simple choice, having to do with the answers to two simple questions: What is real? And what is true? Many philosophies and religions offer answers to these questions, and most give the same answer: reality and truth transcend time. If something is real, it has a reality which continues forever, and if something is true, it is not just true now, it was always true, and will always be. The experience we have of the world existing within a flow of time is, according to some religions and many contemporary physicists and philosophers, an illusion. Behind that illusion is a timeless reality, in modern parlance, the block universe. Another manifestation of this ancient view is the currently popular idea that time is an emergent quality not present in the fundamental formulation of physics. The new viewpoint is the direct opposite. It asserts that what is real is only what is real in the moment, which is one of a succession of moments. It is the same for truth: what is true is only what is true in the moment. There are no transcendent, timeless truths. There is also no past. The past only lives as part of the present, to the extent that it gives us evidence of past events. And the future is not yet real, which means that it is open and full of possibilities, only a small set of which will be realized. Nor, on this view, is there any possibility of other universes. All that exists must be part of this universe, which we find ourselves in, at this moment. This view changes everything, beginning with how we think of mathematics. On this view there can be no timeless, Platonic, realm of mathematical objects. The truths of mathematics, once discovered, are certainly objective. But mathematical systems have to be invented-or evoked- by us. Once brought into being, there are an infinite number of facts which are true about mathematical objects, which further investigation might discover. There are an infinite number of possible axiomatic systems that we might so evoke and explore-but the fact that different people will agree on what has been shown about them does not imply that they existed, before we evoked them. I used to think that the goal of physics was the discovery of a timeless mathematical equation that was isomorphic to the history of the universe. But if there is no Platonic realm of timeless mathematical object, this is just a fantasy. Science is then only about what we can discover is true in the one real universe we find ourselves in. More specifically, this view challenges how we think about cosmology. It opens up new ways to approach the deepest questions, such as why the laws we observe are true, and not others, and what determined the initial conditions of the universe. The philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce wrote in 1893 that the only way of accounting for which laws were true would be through a mechanics of evolution, and I believe this remains true today. But the evolution of laws requires time to be real. Furthermore, there is, I believe, evidence on technical grounds that the correct formulations of quantum gravity and
SV: Little test
I got this and the others you mentioned. LN _ Från: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 8 april 2008 12:13 Till: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ämne: Little test Hi, Sorry but this is just a little test. I don't get any message from the everything-list since the 3 april, including mine, although I can see them in some archive. Actually I did not get any of: 2008/04/07 Re: An Equivalence Principle Colin Hales 2008/04/07 Re: Bostrom Paper Günther Greindl 2008/04/07 An Equivalence Principle Youness Ayaita 2008/04/06 Re: Neuroquantology John Mikes 2008/04/04 Re: Bostrom Paper Bruno Marchal 2008/04/03 Re: Bostrom Paper Stathis Papaioannou 2008/04/03 Re: Bostrom Paper Russell Standish Are there other people with mail problem? I thought it was my emailer, but it seems ok. I got the usual messages and spam. Thanks for suggestions, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Neuroquantology
If it had not been first of april that is... _ Från: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Michael Rosefield Skickat: den 1 april 2008 21:30 Till: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ämne: Re: Neuroquantology http://www.boingboing.net/2008/04/01/poltergeists-and-qua.html I think that answers that question On 28/03/2008, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I just had a cold call from an editor of a fairly new journal called NeuroQuantology (http://www.neuroquantology.com/), which has its focus area on the intersection of cognitive science and quantum physics. The nature of this topic, of cause, gives rise to no end of kookiness, but this doesn't mean there isn't a serious subject here waiting to be explored (indeed this is a major theme of my book Theory of Nothing). I was wondering if anyone has had experience of this journal, and whether its publishing standards are as rigorous as they claim. They claim to be indexed by ISI (they're not in the 2006 JCR, but since they only claimed to have just received ISI indexing, that is not suprising). Some of the paper titles look intriguing, but you have to register in order to download abstracts, so I haven't done that yet. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
assumptions
I think you are only discussing the meaning of the starting assumption here. Have you grasp the whole 8-steps argument? If I'm wrong or unclear just tell me where and let us discuss where the precise problems are. Please keep in mind that I am open to the idea that the physics extracted from comp is incompatible with the empirical physics making comp not sustain by empirical evidences. Perhaps you could also tell me what is your opinion on Everett or Deutsch. People who dislikes Everett's work could hardly appreciate mine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Oh, I am very much proEverett and proDeutsch and, I might add proStandish (having translated his book Theory of Nothing into swedish). And you are right of course, it was your assumptions I questioned... LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
[no subject]
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Fr=E5n: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] F=F6r Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 20 februari 2008 15:21 Till: [EMAIL PROTECTED] =C4mne: Re: UDA paper It arises from the fact that my classical state is duplicable... And of course your quantumstate is not... So your argument that the duplication can be said to be on any level, including a whole universe if need be, is not an airproof argument? LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Observer Moment = Sigma1-Sentences
Bruno says: ...the notion of computability is absolute. David Deutsch says: We see around us a computable universe; that is to say, of all possible mathematical objects and relationships, only an infinitesimal proportion are ever instantiated in the relationships of physical objects and physical processes. (These are essentially the computable functions.) Now it might seem that one approach to explaining that amazing fact, is to say the reason why physical processes conform to this very small part of mathematics, 'computable mathematics,' is that physical processes really are computations running on a computer external to what we think of as physical reality. But that relies on the assumption that the set of computable functions -- the Turing computable functions, or the set of quantum computable operations -- is somehow inherently privileged within mathematics. So that even a computer implemented in unknown physics (the supposed computer that we're all simulations on) would be expected to conform to those same notions of computability, to use those same functions that mathematics designates as computable. But in fact, the only thing that privileges the set of all computational operations that we see in nature, is that they are instantiated by the laws of physics. It is only through our knowledge of the physical world that we know of the difference between computable and not computable. So it's only through our laws of physics that the nature of computation can be understood. It can never be vice versa. http://www.qubit.org/people/david/Articles/PPQT.pdf If it is only through our knowledge of the physical world that we know of the difference between computable and not computable, and I don´t see any flaw in David´s argument that leads up to that statement, then the notion of computability definitely is not absolute. LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Rép : Observer Moment = Sigma1-Sentences
Le 12-août-07, à 18:00, John Mikes a écrit : Please, do not tell me that your theories are as well applicable to faith-items! Next time sopmebody will calculate the enthalpy of the resurrection. Frank Tipler calculated the probability of the resurrection in his last book The Physics of Christianity as follows: This probability is 10 raised to the power of -100. We must then raise this enormously small number to a power equal to the number of atoms in a human body, something like 10 raised to the power of 29. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Rép : Observer Moment = Sigma1-Sentences
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 13 augusti 2007 16:36 Till: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ämne: Re: Rép : Observer Moment = Sigma1-Sentences I don't think Church thesis can be grasped conceptually without the understanding that the class of programmable functions is closed for the diagonalization procedure. This is something I never grasped but would love to understand. LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Concerning the math, do you know the book by Torkel Franzen on the uses and misuses of Godel theorems? Despite some big mistake I will talk about, it is a quite excellent book which I would recommend I have read this book and would very much want to know what big mistake you are talking about. LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker Skickat: den 11 oktober 2006 06:12 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;) David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all computations - but it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different physical systems. And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine whether they calculate pi. But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious. Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? 'Calculating pi' in the final analysis can be satisfied by the system in question externalising its results (e.g. printing out the value of pi). But it isn't so simple to test a system that is claimed to be conscious. Be that as it may, would you be content with the conclusion that the 'properties' of materialism claimed to be jointly relevant to both computationalism and consciousness are purely relational? In this case, we needn't argue further. But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'. I would think that identifying the relata would be relevant to explaining a relation. But I agree that computation is mostly a matter of relations. What matter adds is that it allows the computation to be instantied. To dismiss it from the explanation seems like dismissing hydrogen and oxygen from an explanation of water. Brent Meeker A passage in Gary L. Drescher's book GOOD AND REAL. Demystifying pradoxes from physics to ethics. comes to mind. On page 324 he compares what he calls the spark of existence with the dualist' spark of awareness. And he continues: Both putative sparks face the same problem: even if they were real, we could not know of them, could not percieve them - because any such perception would constitute a miraclulous violation of the definitive physics equations that already specify all our thoughts and perceptions; percieving the extra spark would be responding to something beyond the equations themselves. Whatever it is that we percieve when we think we percieve the extraphysical or metaphysical spark, it cannot be something extraphysical or metaphysical. I think similar thinking goes behind the thinking of Deutsch and others as to why our universe is not distinguished from other possible ones. LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Maudlin's argument
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 7 oktober 2006 14:50 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Maudlin's argument Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: It exist a number which is equal to 5. I hope you agree with the fact that in this sense everybody is *arithmetical* platonist--~~~~--~~--~--~--- Not me... LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Barbour's mistake: An alternative to a timless Platonia
Only atheist have reason to dislike the consequence of comp. Not because they would be wrong, but because their belief in nature is shown to need an act of faith (and atheists hate the very notion of faith). Bruno That is the most absurd statement so far --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~--- --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: SV: Barbour's mistake: An alternative to a timless Platonia
To be an atheist means to deny God, not to believe i nature. Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 5 oktober 2006 17:07 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: SV: Barbour's mistake: An alternative to a timless Platonia Le 05-oct.-06, à 16:03, Lennart Nilsson a écrit : Only atheist have reason to dislike the consequence of comp. Not because they would be wrong, but because their belief in nature is shown to need an act of faith (and atheists hate the very notion of faith). Bruno That is the most absurd statement so far Unless you are confusing atheism and agnosticism, or ... you should explain why you find this absurd. the UDA precisely illustrates that the modest scientist should not take nature for granted. Of course by nature, I mean the aristotelian conception of nature as something primitive, i.e. which is at the root of everything else. This does not necessarily jeopardize the actual *theories* of nature, just the interpretation of those theories. This is a good thing given that physicists today admit there is no unanimity on the interpretation of physical theories. And I argue since that if we assume comp physics cannot be the fundamental science, it has to be derive from psychology, biology, theology, number theory, computer science, well chose your favorite name, they are all imprecise enough. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~--- --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: SV: Only logic is necessary?
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker Skickat: den 10 juli 2006 23:04 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: SV: Only logic is necessary? I'd say the decision to use classical logic is an assumption that you're applying it to sentences or propositions where it will work (i.e. declarative, timeless sentences), not an assumption about logic. Same for geometry. I use Euclidean geometry to calculate distances in my backyard, I use spherical geometry to calculate air-miles to nearby airports, I use WGS84 to calculate distance between naval vessels at sea. Brent Meeker Cooper says that all sentences have substans. The logic asumption is that there are some that have not and are timless. LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: SV: Only logic is necessary?
Cooper says that a formalist, with only formal constraints on his logic (such as consistensy) is at the mercy of the formalism itself. Such a formalism is allways a special case, but Cooper warns of the danger that classical logic is not recognized as such. He calls for a relativistic evolutionary logic where classical logic only would be justified for certain special classes of problems. An evolutionary metatheory of logic would recognize which those problems are. LN -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Jesse Mazer Skickat: den 10 juli 2006 03:06 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: SV: Only logic is necessary? Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: You misunderstand population models. It's not a question of what members of a species think or vote for; it's a matter of whether their logic will lead to their survival in the evolutionary biological sense. So the majority can be wrong. Cooper is making valid comments about *something*, but it isn't logic. Logic is what tells us the majority can be wrong Cooper is not talking about logic in the formal sense; he's talking about reasoning, making decisions, acting. This can be wrong in the sense that there is a better (in terms of survival) way of reasoning. I'm not sure that logic in the formal sense can be right or wrong; it's a set of conventions about language and inference. About the only standard I've seen by which a logic or mathematical system could be called wrong is it if it is inconsistent, i.e. the axioms and rules of inference allow everything to be a theorem. If this is all that Cooper is talking about, I probably wouldn't have any objection to it--but Lennart Nilsson seemed to be making much stronger claims about the contingency of logic itself based on his interpretation of Cooper. Jesse --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: SV: SV: Only logic is necessary?
You seem to think that evolution (or matter, or the multiverse) must adapt to a preordained logic. Adjusting, approximately, to a fixed metaphysical truth. -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För 1Z Skickat: den 10 juli 2006 15:58 Till: Everything List Ämne: Re: SV: SV: Only logic is necessary? Lennart Nilsson wrote: Cooper says that a formalist, with only formal constraints on his logic (such as consistensy) is at the mercy of the formalism itself. Meaning what ? That the formalism might not be giving answers that are really right ? How would we tell ? using some other logic ? Or empricial disproof ? But empirical disproof itself rests on the logical principle of non-contradiction. The only kind of logic that can be shown to be wrong is informal logic (e.g. the Wasson Test), which can be shown to be wrong using formal logic. He calls for a relativistic evolutionary logic where classical logic only would be justified for certain special classes of problems. An evolutionary metatheory of logic would recognize which those problems are. And would itself be ineveitably based on some kind of logic. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Only logic is necessary?
No, you have the burden of showing what possible worlds could possibly mean outside a real biological setting. Cooper shows that logical laws are dependent on which population model they refer to. Of course that goes for the notion of possibility also... LN -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För 1Z Skickat: den 8 juli 2006 22:38 Till: Everything List Ämne: Re: Only logic is necessary? Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 05-juil.-06, à 15:55, Lennart Nilsson a écrit : William S. Cooper says: The absolutist outlook has it that if a logic is valid at all it is valid period. A sound logic is completely sound everywhere and for everyone, no exceptions! For absolutist logicians a logical truth is regarded as 'true in all possible worlds', making logical laws constant, timeless and universal. Of course logical laws are true in all logically possible worlds is a (logical) tautology. An X-possible world is just a hypothetical state of affairs that does not contradict X-rules (X is usually logic or physics). Where do the laws of logic come from? he asks the absolutist. Bruno First you have to ask if they could possibly have been different. Then you have to ask what notion of possibility you are appealling to... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: SV: Only logic is necessary?
We use mathematics as a meta-language, just like you kan describe what is said in latin by using italian. That does not make italian logically/evolutionary prior to latin of course. -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Jesse Mazer Skickat: den 9 juli 2006 10:08 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: RE: SV: Only logic is necessary? Lennart Nilsson wrote: No, you have the burden of showing what possible worlds could possibly mean outside a real biological setting. Cooper shows that logical laws are dependent on which population model they refer to. Of course that goes for the notion of possibility also... That sounds incoherent to me...how can you even define population models without assuming various things about math and logic? Do you think the (mathematical) laws of population genetics have some sort of objective existence outside the human mind, but laws of math and logic themselves do not? Jesse --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Only logic is necessary?
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 9 juli 2006 14:10 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Only logic is necessary? Numbers per se are what make If being able to count an evolutionary advantage. Bruno This is precisely the notion Cooper undermines in his book... LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Only Existence is necessary?
I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our observations. -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 9 juli 2006 14:36 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Le 09-juil.-06, à 14:26, 1Z a écrit : So how do insubstantial numbers generate a substantial world ? I guess there is no substantial world and I explain in all details here http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ (and on this list) why insubstantial numbers generate inescapably, by the mixing of their additive and multiplicative structures, local coherent webs of beliefs in substantial worlds, and how the laws of physics must emerge (with comp) from those purely mathematical webs ... making comp testable in the usual Popperian sense. In that sense comp already succeeds some first tests. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: SV: Only logic is necessary?
I see from your questionmarks that an idea like Coopers, that logic is a branch of biology (the subtitle of the book The Evolution of reason) is out of bounds. Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 7 juli 2006 16:11 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: SV: Only logic is necessary? Le 06-juil.-06, à 21:49, Lennart Nilsson a écrit : Bruno; According to Cooper classical analysis is plain bad biology, ? and not a matter of subjective judgement or philosophical preferens (such as taking atithmetical truth for granted). ?? I think this is where he would say your whole castle in the sky tumbles, and that has nothing to do with trying to find a fault in your argument J ??? I don't understand what you are trying to say at all. Perhaps you could elaborate? What do you or Cooper mean by classical analysis is bad biology? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Only logic is necessary?
Bruno; According to Cooper classical analysis is plain bad biology, and not a matter of subjective judgement or philosophical preferens (such as taking atithmetical truth for granted). I think this is where he would say your whole castle in the sky tumbles, and that has nothing to do with trying to find a fault in your argument J Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 6 juli 2006 11:53 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Only logic is necessary? Le 05-juil.-06, à 15:55, Lennart Nilsson a écrit : William S. Cooper says: The absolutist outlook has it that if a logic is valid at all it is valid period. A sound logic is completely sound everywhere and for everyone, no exceptions! For absolutist logicians a logical truth is regarded as true in all possible worlds, making logical laws constant, timeless and universal. Where do the laws of logic come from? he asks the absolutist. Bruno? If you believe in the more primary notion of arithmetical truth (for example if you believe that proposition like 317 is prime are independent of you) then you can justify classical logic by the Plato Realm (perhaps limited to numbers and their relations), and the many logics will be filtered through the mind of the consistent extension of machines. Classical logic is the best tool machines can have to go beyond classical logics. But logic and logics are not fundamental, with comp those emerge from numbers. And nobody knows where numbers come from, and with comp, we can understand what it must be so. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~--- --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Only logic is necessary?
William S. Cooper says: The absolutist outlook has it that if a logic is valid at all it is valid period. A sound logic is completely sound everywhere and for everyone, no exceptions! For absolutist logicians a logical truth is regarded as true in all possible worlds, making logical laws constant, timeless and universal. Where do the laws of logic come from? he asks the absolutist. Bruno? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Only logic is necessary?
We are a quite sinple system (depicted in 3+1 D), so our logic is also pretty simple (one-way pragmatic). Actually Cooper shows that even our simple system is not classically logical... -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För John M Skickat: den 5 juli 2006 17:30 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Only logic is necessary? Lennart: J.Cohen and I.Stewart in their chef d'oeuvre Collapse of Chaos play around with aliens who they call Zarathustrans, and who display a different 'alien' logic. It is quite refreshing. You say: Sound? brings up the tune of the Latin maxim: mens sana in corpore sano assigning the 'mental' to the body we deal with. I reformulated this latter as: the mind is limited by the 'material' tools we use. Other tools? - maybe other logic, other math. A uiniverse IMO is structured by the ingredients it started with in the unlimited variability of infinite BigBangs (my narrative) consequently the relations of those different ingredients (universe-system, call it universe consciousness etc.) may evolve different self reflective complex conglomerates (like here: it is us humans) with accordingly shaped mentality (logic, math, etc.) We are a quite sinple system (depicted in 3+1 D), so our logic is also pretty simple (one-way pragmatic). Other universes may be more sophisticated and I have pity for those poor fellow (simpleminded) humans who may 'teleport' or 'duplicate' into such - much more sophisticated worlds and may become there their stupid bumsG with their memory-experience-logic luggage. John M --- Lennart Nilsson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: William S. Cooper says: The absolutist outlook has it that if a logic is valid at all it is valid period. A sound logic is completely sound everywhere and for everyone, no exceptions! For absolutist logicians a logical truth is regarded as 'true in all possible worlds', making logical laws constant, timeless and universal. Where do the laws of logic come from? he asks the absolutist. Bruno? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Do prime numbers have free will?
Nick Boström have been trying to calculate the probability that we live in a computer simulation. His answer to how you go about this (below) if we live in an infinite universe with infinite simulations seems to fit how one could do probabilities in a multiverse with an infinite number of universes as well. Lennart Nilsson To deal with these infinite cases, we need to do something like thinking in terms of densities rather than total populations. A suitable density-measure can be finite even if the total population is infinite. It is important to note that we to use some kind of density-measure of observation types quite independently of the simulation argument. In a Big World cosmology, all possible human observations are in fact made by somebody somewhere. (Our world is may well be a big world, so this is not a farfetched possibility.). To be able to derive any observational consequences from our scientific theories in a Big World, we need to be able to say that certain types of observations are more typical than others. (See my paper Self-Locating Belief in Big Worlds for more details on this.) The most straightforward way of making this notion precise in an infinite universe is via the idea of limit density. Start by picking an arbitrary spacetime point. Then consider a hypersphere centered on that point with radius R. Let f(A) be the fraction of all observations that are of kind A that takes place within this hypersphere. Then expand the sphere. Let the typicality of type-A observations be the limit of f(A) as R---infinity. -Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker Skickat: den 6 april 2006 18:21 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Do prime numbers have free will? Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: 1) The reductionist definition that something is determined by the sum of atomic parts and rules. So how about this: EITHER something is determined by the sum of atomic parts and rules OR it is truly random. There are two mechanisms which make events seem random in ordinary life. One is the difficulty of actually making the required measurements, finding the appropriate rules and then doing the calculations. Classical chaos may make this practically impossible, but we still understand that the event (such as a coin toss) is fundamentally deterministic, and the randomness is only apparent. The other mechanism is quantum randomness, for example in the case of radioctive decay. In a single world interpretation of QM this is, as far as I am aware, true randomness. Unfortunately there is no way to distinguish true randomness from just unpredictable randomness. So there are theories of QM in which the randomness is just unpredictable, like Bohm's - and here's a recent paper on that theme you may find interesting: quant-ph/0604008 From: Gerard Hooft 't [view email] Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2006 18:17:08 GMT (23kb) The mathematical basis for deterministic quantum mechanics Authors: Gerard 't Hooft Comments: 15 pages, 3 figures Report-no: ITP-UU-06/14, SPIN-06/12 If there exists a classical, i.e. deterministic theory underlying quantum mechanics, an explanation must be found of the fact that the Hamiltonian, which is defined to be the operator that generates evolution in time, is bounded from below. The mechanism that can produce exactly such a constraint is identified in this paper. It is the fact that not all classical data are registered in the quantum description. Large sets of values of these data are assumed to be indistinguishable, forming equivalence classes. It is argued that this should be attributed to information loss, such as what one might suspect to happen during the formation and annihilation of virtual black holes. The nature of the equivalence classes is further elucidated, as it follows from the positivity of the Hamiltonian. Our world is assumed to consist of a very large number of subsystems that may be regarded as approximately independent, or weakly interacting with one another. As long as two (or more) sectors of our world are treated as being independent, they all must be demanded to be restricted to positive energy states only. What follows from these considerations is a unique definition of energy in the quantum system in terms of the periodicity of the limit cycles of the deterministic model. In a no-collapse/ many worlds interpretation there is no true randomness because all outcomes occur deterministically according to the SWE. However, there is apparent randomness due to what Bruno calls the first person indeterminacy: the observer does not know which world he will end up in from a first person viewpoint, even though he knows that from a third person viewpoint he will end up in all of them. I find the randomness resulting from first person indeterminacy in the MWI difficult to get my mind around
choice and the quantum
What on earth does the following footnote mean? Are we back to consciousness where the quantumbuck stops? /LN Understanding Deutsch's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse by Hilary Greaves Footnote 16 The following objection is sometimes raised against the decision-theoretic approach: in an Everettian context, all outcomes of a decision are realized, and therefore it simply does not make sense to make choices, or to reason about how one should act. If that is correct, then while we may agree that probability can in principle be derived from rationality, this is of no use to the Everettian, since (it is claimed) the Everettian cannot make sense of rationality itself. If this was correct, it would be a pressing 'incoherence problem' for the decision-theoretic approach. The objection, however, is simply mistaken. The mistake arises from an assumption that decisions must be modelled as Everettian branching, with each possible outcome of the decision realized on some branch. This is not true, and it is not at all what is going on in the decision scenarios Deutsch and Wallace consider. Rather, the agent is making a genuine choice between quantum games, only one of which will be realized (namely, the chosen game). To be sure, each game consists of an array of branches, all of which will, if that game is chosen, be realized. But this does not mean that all games will be realized. It is no less coherent for an Everettian to have a preference ordering over quantum games than it is for an agent in a state of classical uncertainty to have a preference ordering over classical lotteries.
Memory-prediction framework
Thoughts on the Memory-prediction framework in explaining intelligence anyone? Book: Jeff Hawkins On Intelligence
Has math landed?
Logician Bruno Marchal ended an email like this Sep 2002 "PS I have found a way to explain with knot theory what "logic" is,as a branch of math, by comparing propositions with knots, proofs withcontinuous deformation, and semantics with knot's invariants. As I saidbefore one of the difficulty for writing a paper is the misunderstandingbetween logicians and physicist ..." I recalled that when I read the following in the article "Dancing the quantum dream" from New Scientist 24th of January 2004: "performing measurements on a braided system of quantum particles can be equivalent to performing the computation that a particular knot encodes." Then I came to the part where the article says: "Freedman and Kitaev (who is now also at Microsoft Research), together with Michael Larson and Zhenghan Wang, both at Indiana University in Bloomington, have now shown how to build a "topological quantum computer" using technology that is available today (www.arxiv.org/quant-ph/0101025). It seems to be the one machine that could get useful quantum computers off the drawing board." And now I wonder: Is this the beginning of math as an empirical science? Lennart
Deutsch on SSA
Dear Russel Do you have any comment to this comment by Deutsch on another list about these matters? Regards Lennart - Original Message - From: David Deutsch [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 3:07 PM Subject: Re: The Turing Principle and the SSA On 31 Oct 2003, at 4:59 am, Brian Scurfield wrote: First, I think we should be careful to distinguish the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA) from the Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA). SSA: One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all observers in one's reference class. SSSA: Each observer-moment should reason as if it were randomly selected from its reference class. One problem with both of these is that there is no preferred meaning to sampling *randomly* from an infinite set, except in certain very special cases. A discrete infinity of copies of me is not one of those cases, so I don't think it is meaningful to select randomly from the set of all observers who will ever be created who are (in any sense) like me. So doesn't the thing fall down at the first hurdle? -- David Deutsch - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 5:45 AM Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor I disagree. You can only get an effect like this if the RSSA is invalid. You've been on this list long enough to remember the big debates about RSSA vs ASSA. I believe the ASSA is actually contrary to experience - but never mind - in order to get the effect you want you would need an SSA that is neither RSSA nor ASSA, but something *much* weirder. Cheers Saibal Mitra wrote: There have been many replies to this. I would say that you wouldn't expect to survive such accidents. Assume that we are sampled from a probability distribution over a set of possible states. E.g. in eternal inflation theories all possible quantum states the observable universe can be in are all realized, so all possible situations you can be in, do occur with some finite probability. In such theories you ''always'' exist. But this doesn't mean that if you are Mohammed Atta saying your prayer just before impact with the WTC, your next experience is that the plane has tunneled through the WTC without doing any harm. This is because there are many more Mohammed Attas in the universe that do not have this experience. So, you would ''survive'', but in a different branch with memory loss plus some aditional ''false'' memories. In that branch you wouldn't have been in that plane to begin with. You should think of yourself at any time as if you were chosen by a random generator sampled from a fixed probability distribution over the set of all possible states you can be in. The state that corresponds to you have experienced flying through the WTC is assigned an extremely small probability. How does this square with the normal experience of continuity through time? Well, every ''observer moment'' as chosen by the random generator has a memory of past experiences. So, if you go to bed now and wake up the next morning, you have the feeling of continuity, but this is only because the person waking up has the memory of going to bed. You could just as well say that the person going to bed survives in any one of the possible states he can be in. The state that happens to have the memory of going to bed is just one of these possible states. That particular state has the illusion of being the continuation of the first state. Oorspronkelijk bericht - Van: David Kwinter [EMAIL PROTECTED] Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: Friday, October 31, 2003 02:58 AM Onderwerp: Quantum accident survivor Another quickie: Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive) Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since there was at least one outcome where I survived, that TO ME I will always survive other such life/death branches? Furthermore if I witness a crash where someone dies can I assume that the victim will survive in their own world so far as at least one quantum branch of survivability seems possible? David Kwinter -- -- A/Prof Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 -- --
Fw: Something for Platonists
- Original Message - From: Lennart Nilsson [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2003 9:14 AM Subject: Something for Platonists Here is something from David Deutsch for Platonists to contemplate...I think LN We see around us a computable universe; that is to say, of all possible mathematical objects and relationships, only an in.nitesimal proportion are ever instantiated in the relationships of physical objects and physical processes. (These are essentially the computable functions.) Now it might seem that one approach to explaining that amazing fact, is to say the reason why physical processes conform to this very small part of mathematics, 'computable mathematics,' is that physical processes really are computations running on a computer external to what we think of as physical reality. But that relies on the assumption that the set of computable functions - the Turing computable functions, or the set of quantum computable operations - is somehow inherently privileged within mathematics. So that even a computer implemented in unknown physics (the supposed computer that we're all simulations on) would be expected to conform to those same notions of computability, to use those same functions that mathematics designates as computable. But in fact, the only thing that privileges the set of all computational operations that we see in nature, is that they are instantiated by the laws of physics. It is only through our knowledge of the physical world that we know of the di.erence between computable and not computable. So it's only through our laws of physics that the nature of computation can be understood. It can never be vice versa.
Not allowed
I have not recieved any mail fom this list for some days. Is it because it is not allowed by Quantum Constructor Theory? :-)
Re: Am I a token or a type?
The way I see it is that we DO have to run the UD on a VERY specialized machinery... :-) Lennart - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2002 4:01 PM Subject: Am I a token or a type? At 13:50 +0200 30/07/2002, Lennart Nilsson wrote: How can an abstraction be felt? This is not an easy question. Obviously, the more general question How can anything be felt? is not easy too. A related hard question is How can an abstraction feel?. My (short) answer was that from the many-philosophy point of view, it is difficult to make a clear line between a very specialized abstract type and a concrete token. I think this is related to Deutsch' fungibility notion. When you ask people why they believe in tokens (particular, singular instanciations of (abstract) types), in general they gives examples by referring to a concrete object like that chair, this house, etc. But we know, both from QM and/or comp that such object corresponds to an infinity of fungible incarnation of putative object which are really more like a observer relative information pattern. I would like to recommend in that setting the very interesting book by Derek Parfit ,Reasons and Persons (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), which subject, I think, overlaps many threads in both the FOR and Everything lists. Let me quote a rare but important passage where I *disagree* with Parfit. The passage comes from the section 99, Am I a Token or a Type?, page 296. Consider fifty replicas of Greta Garbo as she was at the age of 30. These would be well-described as different tokens of one person-type. As Williams claims, if the object of love is the person-type, this is very different from ordinary love. This would not be the kind of love which gives great importance to a shared history. If I lived in such a world, and I was one of a set of replicas, I might regard myself as a token of a type. Might I instead regard myself as *the type*? This would be a radical change. In one sense of the word `type', if I was a person type, I could not possibly cease to exist. Even if there are not now tokens of my person-type, there would still be this person type. A person-type would survive even the destruction of the Universe. This is because, in this sense, a type is an abstract entity, like a number. We could not possibly regard ourselves as abstract entities. This passage explains, imo, why Parfit, who really pushes the duplication thought experiment very far, has not foreseen neither the comp indeterminacy, nor the reversal. I don't think there is an absolute frontier between tokens and types. A token is just a very specialized type relatively to some distinguishing ability from the part of an observer. Something could be abstract from some point of view and concrete from another. (In a category theoretical approach an arrow concrete --- abstract would be a forgetful functors ?). As you see I am searching a way to explain why we don't need to run the UD without invoking the movie-graph argument or Maudlin's Olympia Machinery. (see ref in my thesis). There are plenty inspiring and intriguing thoughts in Parfit's book. I do not like his use of the reductionnist term, but I share almost all his moral and identity theories, despite the important,from the (meta)physical point of view, difference alluded above. Bruno -- http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
real and virtual
Title: Re: being inside a universe I have been trying to comprehend the UD-Argument of Brunos, following the links supplied at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3044.html, and I find myself accepting step 1 to 10, but not some of the conclusions. ANY virtual reconstitution and computational stories going thrue it necesseraly has a real (physical) interpretation. So when Bruno casts away the hardware and says that all is software this doesn´t follow with any necessity. So what is question 11, Bruno? Lennart
Re: JOINING posts
My formal education ended back in the beginnings of the seventies with a finished MA in sociology and an invitation to get a doctors degree at the University of Stockholm. But life got in the way. When my wife died two years ago I decided to write a book in order to understand better some of my thinkings during all those years. I finished the book in seven months and have since been trying to get it published. That has proven very hard since Swedish is a small language. Max Tegmark, who is swedish, even though he works in USA has read my manuscript and promised to write a forward if I could get a bookcompany to publish it. He said he was impressed and thought that my work was a fascinating hike in the territory between philosophy and physics and that it was full of original ideas! Unfortunately I don´t suppose many on this list is fluent in swedish, but to give you an idea where I´m at I can show you the bibliography from the book: Bibliografi Barrow, John D.: Universums födelse, Natur och Kultur, Stockholm 1995 Blackmore, Susan: The Meme Machine, Oxford University Press, New York 1999 Casti, John L.: Searching for certainty, Scribners, London 1992 Close, Frank: Lucifer´s Legacy, Oxford University Press, New York 2000 Davies, Paul: Superforce, Unwin Paperbacks, London 1985 Davies, P.C.W.; Brown J. (eds.): Superstrings - A Theory of Everything?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988 Dawkins, Richard: The Blind Watchmaker, Penguin Books, London 1988 Dawkins, Richard: Livets flod, Natur och Kultur, Stockholm 1996 Dennet, Daniel C.: Consciousness Explained, Penguin Books, London 1992 Dennet, Daniel C.: Darwin´s Dangerous Idea, Touchstone, New York 1996 Dennet, Daniel C.: Kinds of Minds - Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, BasicBooks, New York 1996 Deutsch, David: The Fabric of Reality, Penguin Books, London 1997 Gell-Mann, Murray: Kvarken och Jaguaren, ICA-förlaget, Västerås 1994 Greene, Brian: The elegant universe, W.W. Norton Company, New York 1999 Guttmann Y.M.: The concept of probability in statistical physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999 Hawking, Stephen W.: Kosmos - En kort historik, Rabén Prisma, Stockholm 1992 Hawking, Stephen W.: Svarta hål och universums framtid, Rabén Prisma, Stockholm 1994 Hoffmeyer, Jesper: Livstecken, Bonnier Alba, Stockholm 1997 Hutten, Ernest H.: The Ideas of Physics, Oliver Boyd, Edinburgh, 1967 Jaynes, Julian: The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 1982 Livio, Mario: The Accelerating Universe, John Wiley Sons, New York 2000 Monod, Jacques: Slump och nödvändighet, Aldus/Bonniers, Stockholm 1972 Smolin, Lee: Three Roads to Quantum Gravity, Weidenfeld Nicolson, London 2000 Wick, David: The Infamous Boundary, Springer-Verlag, New York 1995 Artiklar David Deutsch: Comment on 'Many Minds' Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics by Michael Lockwood, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 222-8 (1996) David Deutsch: Proceedings of the Royal Society A455, 3129-3197 Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions (1999) David Deutsch: Proceedings of the Royal Society A456, 1759-1774 Information Flow in Entangled Quantum Systems (2000) David Deutsch, Artur Ekert, Rossella Luppachini: Machines, Logic and Quantum Physics, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 3, 3 (September 2000) David Deutsch: The Structure of the Multiverse, opublicerad artikel som blev framsidesstoff i New Scientist (14 Juli 2001) Horava Witten: Eleven-dimensional supergravity on a manifold with boundary, Nucl. Phys. B475 (1996) Khoury, Ovrut, Steinhard, Turok: The Ekpyrotic Universe: Colliding Branes and the Origin of the Hot Big Bang, arXiv:hep-th/0103239 (Mars 2001) Tegmark Wheeler: 100 Years of the Quantum, Scientific American (Februari 2001) Max Tegmark: Is ``the theory of everything'' merely the ultimate ensemble theory?, Annals of Physics 270, 1-51 (November 1998) Michael Brooks: Enlightenment in the barrel of a gun, The Guardian (1997) Anne Runehov: Mind, Brain, Quantum Time: A Lockwoodian perspective, Magisteruppsats vis Stockholms Universitet Filosofiska Institutionen (1999) Steane van Dam: Quantum entanglement looks like telepathy when three physicist get together on a game show, Physics Today 35-39, (Februari 2000) Webbpublikationer E. T. Jaynes: Probability Theory: The Logic of Science, fragment till ett bokmanuskript från Juni 1994, PDF-format på webbadressen bayes.wustl.edu (Augusti 2001) Christoph Schiller: Motion Mountain - Hiking beyond space and time along the concepts of modern physics, lärobok i fysik under utarbetande, PDF-format på webbadressen dse.nl/motionmountain/welcome.html (Augusti 2001) - Original Message - From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 7:47 PM Subject: JOINING posts I find that I often have trouble understanding posts on this mailing list, given the wide range of intellectual ground that it covers. It seems that people
Re: Isn't this a good point
I might not be on the same side as you and Juergen Schmidhuber on this, but I AM on the same side as David Deutsch which is comforting. Recent progress in the quantum theory of computation has provided practical instances of this, and forces us to abandon the classical view that computation, and hence mathematical proof, are purely logical notions independent of that of computation as a physical process. Henceforward, a proof must be regarded not as an abstract object or process but as a physical process, a species of computation From David Deutsch's paper: Machines, Logic and Quantum Physics (http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/math.HO/9911150) - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Lennart Nilsson [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 3:16 PM Subject: Re: Isn't this a good point Lennart Nilsson wrote: I was under the impression that interaction has to do with information transfer and that that takes care of the fact that there cannot be an information transfer without physicalness. OK, but then you postulate something physical exists. Distinct memory states label and 'inhabit' different branches of Everett's 'Many Worlds' Universe. In this manner, the distinction between epistemology and ontology is washed away: There can be no information without physical representation. Persistence of correlations is all that is needed to recover 'familiar reality'. arXiv: quant- ph/ 0105127 v1 24 2001 I appreciate very much Zurek, but like almost all physicist he does postulate physicalness. I do not, if only because I would like an explanation of physicalness without reference to physical being. Also I showed that such reference cannot be used once we postulate the computationalist hypothesis (comp)in the cognitive science. Consult my URL for more explanations including discussions in this list. I am aware what I say is quite against the current paradigm, although this is a point where a lot agrees (in this list), including Juergen Schmidhuber whose work is also based on comp. The difference between Schmidhuber and me is that Juergen search prior for the right computation among all computations, and I search a (relative) measure on all computations. But we are both trying to explain physical appearances from the every computations exists where a computation is basically a collection of relatively related numbers (not an actual running of a concrete machine. Bruno -- http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Isn't this a good point
In the Motion Mountain project dse.nl/motionmountain/welcome.html Christoph Schiller defines existence such: (physical) existence is the ability to describe interactions. And furthermore explains this by saying: It is thus pointless to discuss whether a physical concept 'exists' or whether it is 'only' an abstraction used as a tool for descriptions of observations. The two possibilities coincide. The point of dispute can only be whether the descriptions provided by a concept is or is not precise. Isn't that a good point Lennart PS. Hello all! I'm an interested party from Sweden.
Re: Isn't this a good point
I was under the impression that interaction has to do with information transfer and that that takes care of the fact that there cannot be an information transfer without physicalness. At least according to this source: Distinct memory states label and 'inhabit' different branches of Everett's 'Many Worlds' Universe. In this manner, the distinction between epistemology and ontology is washed away: There can be no information without physical representation. Persistence of correlations is all that is needed to recover 'familiar reality'. arXiv: quant- ph/ 0105127 v1 24 2001 DECOHERENCE, EINSELECTION, AND THE QUANTUM ORIGINS OF THE CLASSICAL Wojciech Hubert Zurek - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Lennart Nilsson [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 11:38 AM Subject: Re: Isn't this a good point At 9:27 +0200 22/05/2002, Lennart Nilsson wrote (on the everything-list): In the Motion Mountain project dse.nl/motionmountain/welcome.html Christoph Schiller defines existence such: (physical) existence is the ability to describe interactions. And furthermore explains this by saying: It is thus pointless to discuss whether a physical concept 'exists' or whether it is 'only' an abstraction used as a tool for descriptions of observations. The two possibilities coincide. The point of dispute can only be whether the descriptions provided by a concept is or is not precise. Isn't that a good point!!! Sure. But I don't think my old friend Christoph really follows it :-) Also what is exactly an interaction? You should try to describe it without postulating implicitely physicalness if you don't want to apply 'exists' to physical concept. Perhaps Geometry of Interaction by the logician Jean Yves Girard is interesting from that point of view. In the same regard the work by another logician Vaughan Pratt on the mind/body problem (http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech) is quite relevant. Bruno
