Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 Jan 2017, at 00:27, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:



I would suggest that those other beings out in never-never-land, are  
not me, and I am not them.


Never-never land?

You need magic to distinguish you from those other beings. You might  
be right, but then computationalism is wrong.




The histories are experiences that I was never a part of.


How could that be? Which criteria could you use to assert you were not  
part of those histories? The memories are the same. You would be like  
the W guy saying that the M guy is not the H-guy, but then you cannot  
say yes to the digitalist surgeon.





Speaking with very smart space aliens might be an enjoyable  
substitute for a conversation with God. Like the saying goes,  
beggars can't be choosers.


OK, perhaps, I miss the relation with what you say above.

Are you OK with P = 1/2 in the WM-duplication? (UDA step 3)? Let us  
move slowly. Nothing is urgent.


Bruno








-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Jan 30, 2017 10:14 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 29 Jan 2017, at 16:28, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

So, just to be clear, the Boltzmann Brain(s) spun off from the  
thermodynamics of an absolute vacuum (as opposed to the false vacuum  
that is the Hubble Volume) would, if they existed, be persons.  
Bodies, with a sub-component, called a 'mind'?


Not really. They support mind, for a second. the probability that  
you are in a Boltzman brain, in the computationalist setting, is  
near zero. You, the person, is attached to *all$ histories, and  
those who win the measure play, are related to long, and interesting  
(in bennett sense) histories. To be conscious for a second, one  
brain is sufficient, but for two seconds, you need a long and  
complex histories, making you rare in your branch, et quite numerous  
relatively to that branch. QM does show a sort of solution (Feynman  
phase randomization) so we can expect to justify it through  
computationalism, assuming only arithmetic, and this actually works.  
The logic of the material points of views does show a quantum logic  
on which, hopefully, some equivalent of Gleason's theorem will hold.


A brain is never a person. A person owns a brain, and actually owns  
an infinity of brains, on which he is first person-undetermined. No  
need to invoke some God-like entities, like "universe" or "god": we  
must explain their appearances only from arithmetic/computer  
science. I am aware that this is counter-intuitive, but Pythagoras  
and Plato warned us that the fundamental reality might be quite  
different from what we see/observe/measure, etc.


Bruno







-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sun, Jan 29, 2017 8:19 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 27 Jan 2017, at 13:57, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

What about Boltzmann Brains?
Do you view these as mindful observers?


I don't see any brain as mindful observers. Only a person is  
mindful, and they own brains, which are just tools making that  
person able to interact with some stable collection of universal  
entities.


The UD generates all Boltzmann brains, but to be conscious, you need  
more than a brain, you need a sheaf of normal (gaussian)  
computations (measure 1, or 1 - epsilon). And, you, that is the  
person, are not attached to any brain per se, but only to a  
succession of brain state compute by a stable universal environment,  
which lacks (by definition) for Boltzmann brains. That reduce the  
Boltzmann brain problem in physics to justifying the appearance of  
brain in arithmetic (the white rabbit problem).To simplify; we might  
say that you need an infinity of brains belonging to an infinity of  
stable computations. That such infinities exist and have a quantum  
logic suggests that computationalism might be correct.


Bruno






-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 2:07 pm
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 26 Jan 2017, at 17:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

If dreaming is a function of biological things,


It depends on how you define biological. If you define it like me  
with a theorem in arithmetic/computer-science, of intensional  
numbers (relative codes, like DNA, or programs) which can  
reprodruces themselves with respect to other universal numbers,  
physical or not, then, OK, like Bateson, psychology is a cousin of  
biology, and we use ineddded the same trick (Dx = xx -> DD = DD)  
both in abstract biology and in abstract psychology, ... and in  
abstract theology.




where then, might be the brain of the dreamer.

That does simply not exist. It is all in your brain (grin).

Re: Correction to MWI post

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

I would suggest that those other beings out in never-never-land, are not me, 
and I am not them. The histories are experiences that I was never a part of.
Speaking with very smart space aliens might be an enjoyable substitute for a 
conversation with God. Like the saying goes, beggars can't be choosers.


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Jan 30, 2017 10:14 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post




On 29 Jan 2017, at 16:28, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


So, just to be clear, the Boltzmann Brain(s) spun off from the thermodynamics 
of an absolute vacuum (as opposed to the false vacuum that is the Hubble 
Volume) would, if they existed, be persons. Bodies, with a sub-component, 
called a 'mind'? 



Not really. They support mind, for a second. the probability that you are in a 
Boltzman brain, in the computationalist setting, is near zero. You, the person, 
is attached to *all$ histories, and those who win the measure play, are related 
to long, and interesting (in bennett sense) histories. To be conscious for a 
second, one brain is sufficient, but for two seconds, you need a long and 
complex histories, making you rare in your branch, et quite numerous relatively 
to that branch. QM does show a sort of solution (Feynman phase randomization) 
so we can expect to justify it through computationalism, assuming only 
arithmetic, and this actually works. The logic of the material points of views 
does show a quantum logic on which, hopefully, some equivalent of Gleason's 
theorem will hold. 


A brain is never a person. A person owns a brain, and actually owns an infinity 
of brains, on which he is first person-undetermined. No need to invoke some 
God-like entities, like "universe" or "god": we must explain their appearances 
only from arithmetic/computer science. I am aware that this is 
counter-intuitive, but Pythagoras and Plato warned us that the fundamental 
reality might be quite different from what we see/observe/measure, etc. 


Bruno










 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Sun, Jan 29, 2017 8:19 am
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 27 Jan 2017, at 13:57, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

What about Boltzmann Brains? 
Do you view these as mindful observers?
 
 
 

 
 

 
 
I don't see any brain as mindful observers. Only a person is mindful, and they 
own brains, which are just tools making that person able to interact with some 
stable collection of universal entities.
 

 
 
The UD generates all Boltzmann brains, but to be conscious, you need more than 
a brain, you need a sheaf of normal (gaussian) computations (measure 1, or 1 - 
epsilon). And, you, that is the person, are not attached to any brain per se, 
but only to a succession of brain state compute by a stable universal 
environment, which lacks (by definition) for Boltzmann brains. That reduce the 
Boltzmann brain problem in physics to justifying the appearance of brain in 
arithmetic (the white rabbit problem).To simplify; we might say that you need 
an infinity of brains belonging to an infinity of stable computations. That 
such infinities exist and have a quantum logic suggests that computationalism 
might be correct.
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 2:07 pm
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 26 Jan 2017, at 17:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

 
If dreaming is a function of biological things,
 
 

 
 

 
 
It depends on how you define biological. If you define it like me with a 
theorem in arithmetic/computer-science, of intensional numbers (relative codes, 
like DNA, or programs) which can reprodruces themselves with respect to other 
universal numbers, physical or not, then, OK, like Bateson, psychology is a 
cousin of biology, and we use ineddded the same trick (Dx = xx -> DD = DD) both 
in abstract biology and in abstract psychology, ... and in abstract theology.
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 where then, might be the brain of the dreamer. 
 
 

 
 
That does simply not exist. It is all in your brain (grin).
 

 
 
If we except Babbage machine, computability and the notion of computation have 
been discovered by mathematical logicians working in the foundations of 
mathematics. Gödel discovered 95% of it, but missed it. Post, Church and Turing 
got it, and then many others, including Gödel who talk about a miracle (the 
closure of the set of partial computable function from Cantor Diagonalization).
 

 
 
(Very) Elementary Arithmetic is already Turing universal.
 

 
 
Whatever can be done by a universal system can be done by any other universal 
system.
 

 
 
So, if 

Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Jan 2017, at 16:28, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

So, just to be clear, the Boltzmann Brain(s) spun off from the  
thermodynamics of an absolute vacuum (as opposed to the false vacuum  
that is the Hubble Volume) would, if they existed, be persons.  
Bodies, with a sub-component, called a 'mind'?


Not really. They support mind, for a second. the probability that you  
are in a Boltzman brain, in the computationalist setting, is near  
zero. You, the person, is attached to *all$ histories, and those who  
win the measure play, are related to long, and interesting (in bennett  
sense) histories. To be conscious for a second, one brain is  
sufficient, but for two seconds, you need a long and complex  
histories, making you rare in your branch, et quite numerous  
relatively to that branch. QM does show a sort of solution (Feynman  
phase randomization) so we can expect to justify it through  
computationalism, assuming only arithmetic, and this actually works.  
The logic of the material points of views does show a quantum logic on  
which, hopefully, some equivalent of Gleason's theorem will hold.


A brain is never a person. A person owns a brain, and actually owns an  
infinity of brains, on which he is first person-undetermined. No need  
to invoke some God-like entities, like "universe" or "god": we must  
explain their appearances only from arithmetic/computer science. I am  
aware that this is counter-intuitive, but Pythagoras and Plato warned  
us that the fundamental reality might be quite different from what we  
see/observe/measure, etc.


Bruno








-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sun, Jan 29, 2017 8:19 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 27 Jan 2017, at 13:57, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

What about Boltzmann Brains?
Do you view these as mindful observers?


I don't see any brain as mindful observers. Only a person is  
mindful, and they own brains, which are just tools making that  
person able to interact with some stable collection of universal  
entities.


The UD generates all Boltzmann brains, but to be conscious, you need  
more than a brain, you need a sheaf of normal (gaussian)  
computations (measure 1, or 1 - epsilon). And, you, that is the  
person, are not attached to any brain per se, but only to a  
succession of brain state compute by a stable universal environment,  
which lacks (by definition) for Boltzmann brains. That reduce the  
Boltzmann brain problem in physics to justifying the appearance of  
brain in arithmetic (the white rabbit problem).To simplify; we might  
say that you need an infinity of brains belonging to an infinity of  
stable computations. That such infinities exist and have a quantum  
logic suggests that computationalism might be correct.


Bruno






-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 2:07 pm
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 26 Jan 2017, at 17:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

If dreaming is a function of biological things,


It depends on how you define biological. If you define it like me  
with a theorem in arithmetic/computer-science, of intensional  
numbers (relative codes, like DNA, or programs) which can  
reprodruces themselves with respect to other universal numbers,  
physical or not, then, OK, like Bateson, psychology is a cousin of  
biology, and we use ineddded the same trick (Dx = xx -> DD = DD)  
both in abstract biology and in abstract psychology, ... and in  
abstract theology.




where then, might be the brain of the dreamer.

That does simply not exist. It is all in your brain (grin).

If we except Babbage machine, computability and the notion of  
computation have been discovered by mathematical logicians working  
in the foundations of mathematics. Gödel discovered 95% of it, but  
missed it. Post, Church and Turing got it, and then many others,  
including Gödel who talk about a miracle (the closure of the set of  
partial computable function from Cantor Diagonalization).


(Very) Elementary Arithmetic is already Turing universal.

Whatever can be done by a universal system can be done by any other  
universal system.


So, if you are willing to admit that 2+2=4 and simlar propositions  
are independent of you, then you are forced to admit that all  
digital emulation of your brain are instantiated in term of some  
(true) number relation. Actually (and that is the (interesting)  
problem) there are infinitely many of them.





Can we contact the dreamer?


By amnesy and/or dissociation, you can go up to remember which  
universal person you are, perhaps. Sy hello to the *many* dreamers!





Is there a an analog of the dreamers, neurobiology? Numbers may  
generate reality, or so Tegmark has asserted.


And I have prove

Re: Correction to MWI post

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

So, just to be clear, the Boltzmann Brain(s) spun off from the thermodynamics 
of an absolute vacuum (as opposed to the false vacuum that is the Hubble 
Volume) would, if they existed, be persons. Bodies, with a sub-component, 
called a 'mind'? 



-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sun, Jan 29, 2017 8:19 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post




On 27 Jan 2017, at 13:57, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


What about Boltzmann Brains? 
Do you view these as mindful observers?






I don't see any brain as mindful observers. Only a person is mindful, and they 
own brains, which are just tools making that person able to interact with some 
stable collection of universal entities.


The UD generates all Boltzmann brains, but to be conscious, you need more than 
a brain, you need a sheaf of normal (gaussian) computations (measure 1, or 1 - 
epsilon). And, you, that is the person, are not attached to any brain per se, 
but only to a succession of brain state compute by a stable universal 
environment, which lacks (by definition) for Boltzmann brains. That reduce the 
Boltzmann brain problem in physics to justifying the appearance of brain in 
arithmetic (the white rabbit problem).To simplify; we might say that you need 
an infinity of brains belonging to an infinity of stable computations. That 
such infinities exist and have a quantum logic suggests that computationalism 
might be correct.


Bruno








 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 2:07 pm
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 26 Jan 2017, at 17:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

 
If dreaming is a function of biological things,
 
 

 
 

 
 
It depends on how you define biological. If you define it like me with a 
theorem in arithmetic/computer-science, of intensional numbers (relative codes, 
like DNA, or programs) which can reprodruces themselves with respect to other 
universal numbers, physical or not, then, OK, like Bateson, psychology is a 
cousin of biology, and we use ineddded the same trick (Dx = xx -> DD = DD) both 
in abstract biology and in abstract psychology, ... and in abstract theology.
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 where then, might be the brain of the dreamer. 
 
 

 
 
That does simply not exist. It is all in your brain (grin).
 

 
 
If we except Babbage machine, computability and the notion of computation have 
been discovered by mathematical logicians working in the foundations of 
mathematics. Gödel discovered 95% of it, but missed it. Post, Church and Turing 
got it, and then many others, including Gödel who talk about a miracle (the 
closure of the set of partial computable function from Cantor Diagonalization).
 

 
 
(Very) Elementary Arithmetic is already Turing universal.
 

 
 
Whatever can be done by a universal system can be done by any other universal 
system.
 

 
 
So, if you are willing to admit that 2+2=4 and simlar propositions are 
independent of you, then you are forced to admit that all digital emulation of 
your brain are instantiated in term of some (true) number relation. Actually 
(and that is the (interesting) problem) there are infinitely many of them.
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
Can we contact the dreamer?
 
 

 
 

 
 
By amnesy and/or dissociation, you can go up to remember which universal person 
you are, perhaps. Sy hello to the *many* dreamers!
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 Is there a an analog of the dreamers, neurobiology? Numbers may generate 
reality, or so Tegmark has asserted.
 
 

 
 
And I have proved it well before. It follows from Church Thesis, and a very 
minimal form of Occam razor for the believers-in-matter.
 

 
 
The numbers, or the combinators, etc. Any Church-Turing Universal 
number/machine/finite-system will do. 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 Wolfram also gets this, and I ask, imbecile that I am, ok, so what can we do 
with this? Can we contact the programmer?
 
 

 
 

 
 
If you want a mythology, one well suited for computationalism is that the Big 
Goddess made a great Garden/Game for her Son which only plays hide-and-seek 
with himself. The garden is very great, and God can lost itself very deeply 
indeed.
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 Hey, like Jürgen Schmidhuber has written of, A Great Programmer. 
 
 

 
 

 
 
Yes. The Universal Dovetailer is the (a) great programmer, if you want. It 
generates all programs and it executes them all, dovetailing on the executions 
so as not being trapped by non stopping executions, which exist and are not 
algorithmically recognizable (the price of universality). See my URL for a 
program and one initial execution.
 

 
 
But is a dumb program. It is equivalent to Robinson arithmetic (very elementary 
arithmetic, or PA without the induction axioms). It generate all dreams, with a 
mathematical complex redundan

Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Jan 2017, at 13:57, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


What about Boltzmann Brains?
Do you view these as mindful observers?



I don't see any brain as mindful observers. Only a person is mindful,  
and they own brains, which are just tools making that person able to  
interact with some stable collection of universal entities.


The UD generates all Boltzmann brains, but to be conscious, you need  
more than a brain, you need a sheaf of normal (gaussian) computations  
(measure 1, or 1 - epsilon). And, you, that is the person, are not  
attached to any brain per se, but only to a succession of brain state  
compute by a stable universal environment, which lacks (by definition)  
for Boltzmann brains. That reduce the Boltzmann brain problem in  
physics to justifying the appearance of brain in arithmetic (the white  
rabbit problem).To simplify; we might say that you need an infinity of  
brains belonging to an infinity of stable computations. That such  
infinities exist and have a quantum logic suggests that  
computationalism might be correct.


Bruno







-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 2:07 pm
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 26 Jan 2017, at 17:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

If dreaming is a function of biological things,


It depends on how you define biological. If you define it like me  
with a theorem in arithmetic/computer-science, of intensional  
numbers (relative codes, like DNA, or programs) which can  
reprodruces themselves with respect to other universal numbers,  
physical or not, then, OK, like Bateson, psychology is a cousin of  
biology, and we use ineddded the same trick (Dx = xx -> DD = DD)  
both in abstract biology and in abstract psychology, ... and in  
abstract theology.




where then, might be the brain of the dreamer.

That does simply not exist. It is all in your brain (grin).

If we except Babbage machine, computability and the notion of  
computation have been discovered by mathematical logicians working  
in the foundations of mathematics. Gödel discovered 95% of it, but  
missed it. Post, Church and Turing got it, and then many others,  
including Gödel who talk about a miracle (the closure of the set of  
partial computable function from Cantor Diagonalization).


(Very) Elementary Arithmetic is already Turing universal.

Whatever can be done by a universal system can be done by any other  
universal system.


So, if you are willing to admit that 2+2=4 and simlar propositions  
are independent of you, then you are forced to admit that all  
digital emulation of your brain are instantiated in term of some  
(true) number relation. Actually (and that is the (interesting)  
problem) there are infinitely many of them.





Can we contact the dreamer?


By amnesy and/or dissociation, you can go up to remember which  
universal person you are, perhaps. Sy hello to the *many* dreamers!





Is there a an analog of the dreamers, neurobiology? Numbers may  
generate reality, or so Tegmark has asserted.


And I have proved it well before. It follows from Church Thesis, and  
a very minimal form of Occam razor for the believers-in-matter.


The numbers, or the combinators, etc. Any Church-Turing Universal  
number/machine/finite-system will do.





Wolfram also gets this, and I ask, imbecile that I am, ok, so what  
can we do with this? Can we contact the programmer?



If you want a mythology, one well suited for computationalism is  
that the Big Goddess made a great Garden/Game for her Son which only  
plays hide-and-seek with himself. The garden is very great, and God  
can lost itself very deeply indeed.






Hey, like Jürgen Schmidhuber has written of, A Great Programmer.


Yes. The Universal Dovetailer is the (a) great programmer, if you  
want. It generates all programs and it executes them all,  
dovetailing on the executions so as not being trapped by non  
stopping executions, which exist and are not algorithmically  
recognizable (the price of universality). See my URL for a program  
and one initial execution.


But is a dumb program. It is equivalent to Robinson arithmetic (very  
elementary arithmetic, or PA without the induction axioms). It  
generate all dreams, with a mathematical complex redundancy. But he  
does not thought about itself, and is not aware of its universality.  
For this, you need to add the beliefs in the induction axioms,  
making them Löbian, dreamers.
The Universal dovetailer executes (without understanding) all Löbian  
dreamers, but is not a Löbian machine itself.





For me, all I can handle is PowerShell...maybe.

You are without any doubt Universal, so you can emulate all  
universal system, given enough time and space, and/or numbers. And  
you are Löbian, I am pretty sure. You might probably blind yourself  
with unnecessary prejudices, plausibly invented by your lo

Re: Correction to MWI post

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

What about Boltzmann Brains?
Do you view these as mindful observers?



-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 2:07 pm
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post




On 26 Jan 2017, at 17:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


 
If dreaming is a function of biological things,





It depends on how you define biological. If you define it like me with a 
theorem in arithmetic/computer-science, of intensional numbers (relative codes, 
like DNA, or programs) which can reprodruces themselves with respect to other 
universal numbers, physical or not, then, OK, like Bateson, psychology is a 
cousin of biology, and we use ineddded the same trick (Dx = xx -> DD = DD) both 
in abstract biology and in abstract psychology, ... and in abstract theology.






 where then, might be the brain of the dreamer. 



That does simply not exist. It is all in your brain (grin).


If we except Babbage machine, computability and the notion of computation have 
been discovered by mathematical logicians working in the foundations of 
mathematics. Gödel discovered 95% of it, but missed it. Post, Church and Turing 
got it, and then many others, including Gödel who talk about a miracle (the 
closure of the set of partial computable function from Cantor Diagonalization).


(Very) Elementary Arithmetic is already Turing universal.


Whatever can be done by a universal system can be done by any other universal 
system.


So, if you are willing to admit that 2+2=4 and simlar propositions are 
independent of you, then you are forced to admit that all digital emulation of 
your brain are instantiated in term of some (true) number relation. Actually 
(and that is the (interesting) problem) there are infinitely many of them.








Can we contact the dreamer?





By amnesy and/or dissociation, you can go up to remember which universal person 
you are, perhaps. Sy hello to the *many* dreamers!








 Is there a an analog of the dreamers, neurobiology? Numbers may generate 
reality, or so Tegmark has asserted.



And I have proved it well before. It follows from Church Thesis, and a very 
minimal form of Occam razor for the believers-in-matter.


The numbers, or the combinators, etc. Any Church-Turing Universal 
number/machine/finite-system will do. 








 Wolfram also gets this, and I ask, imbecile that I am, ok, so what can we do 
with this? Can we contact the programmer?





If you want a mythology, one well suited for computationalism is that the Big 
Goddess made a great Garden/Game for her Son which only plays hide-and-seek 
with himself. The garden is very great, and God can lost itself very deeply 
indeed.










 Hey, like Jürgen Schmidhuber has written of, A Great Programmer. 





Yes. The Universal Dovetailer is the (a) great programmer, if you want. It 
generates all programs and it executes them all, dovetailing on the executions 
so as not being trapped by non stopping executions, which exist and are not 
algorithmically recognizable (the price of universality). See my URL for a 
program and one initial execution.


But is a dumb program. It is equivalent to Robinson arithmetic (very elementary 
arithmetic, or PA without the induction axioms). It generate all dreams, with a 
mathematical complex redundancy. But he does not thought about itself, and is 
not aware of its universality. For this, you need to add the beliefs in the 
induction axioms, making them Löbian, dreamers.
The Universal dovetailer executes (without understanding) all Löbian dreamers, 
but is not a Löbian machine itself.








For me, all I can handle is PowerShell...maybe. 



You are without any doubt Universal, so you can emulate all universal system, 
given enough time and space, and/or numbers. And you are Löbian, I am pretty 
sure. You might probably blind yourself with unnecessary prejudices, plausibly 
invented by your local predators, as well as the predators of your ancestors, 
or something.


I mean even if computationalism is false, your Turing universality is a 
provable fact. Then computationalism says that your local body is not more than 
Universal. That leads to testable physical constraints, and indeed we got the 
quantum aspect: statistic on computations + a logic which makes it 
quantum-like. So, the idea is not yet refuted, and is, to my knowledge, the 
only precise theory of quanta (physics) and qualia (psychology, theology).


It is up to the believer in God or Matter to explain how their favorite 
divinity manage to interfere with the computations which are in arithmetic (a 
non controversial facts, both historically and factually). Let us just compute 
and compare, like modest scientists do. An evidence that the observable world 
departs from the physics in the head of the universal numbers *would be* an 
evidence for some God or some Matter, or some "Bostromian" malevolent 
emulations. Bu

Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Jan 2017, at 17:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


If dreaming is a function of biological things,



It depends on how you define biological. If you define it like me with  
a theorem in arithmetic/computer-science, of intensional numbers  
(relative codes, like DNA, or programs) which can reprodruces  
themselves with respect to other universal numbers, physical or not,  
then, OK, like Bateson, psychology is a cousin of biology, and we use  
ineddded the same trick (Dx = xx -> DD = DD) both in abstract biology  
and in abstract psychology, ... and in abstract theology.





where then, might be the brain of the dreamer.


That does simply not exist. It is all in your brain (grin).

If we except Babbage machine, computability and the notion of  
computation have been discovered by mathematical logicians working in  
the foundations of mathematics. Gödel discovered 95% of it, but missed  
it. Post, Church and Turing got it, and then many others, including  
Gödel who talk about a miracle (the closure of the set of partial  
computable function from Cantor Diagonalization).


(Very) Elementary Arithmetic is already Turing universal.

Whatever can be done by a universal system can be done by any other  
universal system.


So, if you are willing to admit that 2+2=4 and simlar propositions are  
independent of you, then you are forced to admit that all digital  
emulation of your brain are instantiated in term of some (true) number  
relation. Actually (and that is the (interesting) problem) there are  
infinitely many of them.






Can we contact the dreamer?



By amnesy and/or dissociation, you can go up to remember which  
universal person you are, perhaps. Sy hello to the *many* dreamers!





Is there a an analog of the dreamers, neurobiology? Numbers may  
generate reality, or so Tegmark has asserted.


And I have proved it well before. It follows from Church Thesis, and a  
very minimal form of Occam razor for the believers-in-matter.


The numbers, or the combinators, etc. Any Church-Turing Universal  
number/machine/finite-system will do.





Wolfram also gets this, and I ask, imbecile that I am, ok, so what  
can we do with this? Can we contact the programmer?



If you want a mythology, one well suited for computationalism is that  
the Big Goddess made a great Garden/Game for her Son which only plays  
hide-and-seek with himself. The garden is very great, and God can lost  
itself very deeply indeed.







Hey, like Jürgen Schmidhuber has written of, A Great Programmer.



Yes. The Universal Dovetailer is the (a) great programmer, if you  
want. It generates all programs and it executes them all, dovetailing  
on the executions so as not being trapped by non stopping executions,  
which exist and are not algorithmically recognizable (the price of  
universality). See my URL for a program and one initial execution.


But is a dumb program. It is equivalent to Robinson arithmetic (very  
elementary arithmetic, or PA without the induction axioms). It  
generate all dreams, with a mathematical complex redundancy. But he  
does not thought about itself, and is not aware of its universality.  
For this, you need to add the beliefs in the induction axioms, making  
them Löbian, dreamers.
The Universal dovetailer executes (without understanding) all Löbian  
dreamers, but is not a Löbian machine itself.






For me, all I can handle is PowerShell...maybe.


You are without any doubt Universal, so you can emulate all universal  
system, given enough time and space, and/or numbers. And you are  
Löbian, I am pretty sure. You might probably blind yourself with  
unnecessary prejudices, plausibly invented by your local predators, as  
well as the predators of your ancestors, or something.


I mean even if computationalism is false, your Turing universality is  
a provable fact. Then computationalism says that your local body is  
not more than Universal. That leads to testable physical constraints,  
and indeed we got the quantum aspect: statistic on computations + a  
logic which makes it quantum-like. So, the idea is not yet refuted,  
and is, to my knowledge, the only precise theory of quanta (physics)  
and qualia (psychology, theology).


It is up to the believer in God or Matter to explain how their  
favorite divinity manage to interfere with the computations which are  
in arithmetic (a non controversial facts, both historically and  
factually). Let us just compute and compare, like modest scientists  
do. An evidence that the observable world departs from the physics in  
the head of the universal numbers *would be* an evidence for some God  
or some Matter, or some "Bostromian" malevolent emulations. But there  
are just none yet.


Bruno







-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 10:26 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 25 Jan 2017,

Re: Correction to MWI post

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

If dreaming is a function of biological things, where then, might be the brain 
of the dreamer. Can we contact the dreamer? Is there a an analog of the 
dreamers, neurobiology? Numbers may generate reality, or so Tegmark has 
asserted. Wolfram also gets this, and I ask, imbecile that I am, ok, so what 
can we do with this? Can we contact the programmer? Hey, like Jürgen 
Schmidhuber has written of, A Great Programmer. For me, all I can handle is 
PowerShell...maybe. 
 
 
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 10:26 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post




On 25 Jan 2017, at 21:25, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


Sounds like a Lôbian device is a necessity, in this facet of the MWI? If they 
don't form naturally, God sets us in motion so we can invent them. 




If you agree that 2+2=4 and the like, we don't need to invoke (any) God. 
Referential numbers provably exists, and all those having rich cognitive 
abilities, like belieeing in the induction axioms, are provably Löbian. God 
needs only to create the natural numbers, with addition and multiplication. But 
the numbers themselves can only hope to be correct.




Moreover, they imply that we get Everett's and Wheeler's universe to function 
by supplying more observers. I am guessing the mightier the observer, the more 
clout they have to change things, split things off, etc. Larry Krauss once 
joked, that astronomers shouldn't peer back in time, because they might cause 
the universe to collapse. 



No worry :) 


... because there are no universe, only dreams. But below our substitution 
level, the dreams seems to cohere enough to allow long, perhaps infinite, 
sharable "video games", and we extrapolate them into "physical universe" 
(assuming computationalism if this needs to be repeated). We can't collapse 
that. It belongs to a realm which is "out of time", "out of space".


Bruno




 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 11:09 am
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 25 Jan 2017, at 13:17, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

Wishful thinking gives a sense of direction, 
 

 
 
Wishes can do that. 
 

 
 
Wishful thinking leads to believe in things which do not exist, and eventually 
to disarrays and difficulties.
 

 
 

 
 
 
science tells how long it may take to get there.
 
 

 
 
It can also say if "there" is accessible at all.
 

 
 

 
 
To be sure, as I explained sometimes, notably in the second part of Sane04, 
there might be a sort of wishful thinking at the bottom of reality, in the 
sense that if you convince rationally a Löbian entity that If ever she believes 
in Santa Klaus, Santa Klaus exist, then she will believe in Santa Klaus. That 
is actually Löb's theorem, but the comparison with wishful thinking, or with 
the placebo, is a bit metaphorical. Löb's theorem is still very amazing. The 
machine rational beliefs are close for the rule 
 

 
 
[]p -> p
 
-
 
 p
 

 
 
Put in another way: []([]p -> p) -> []p is true about the machine. That is 
Löb's formula (with "[]" put for Gödel's provability predicate of the entity). 
It happens that not only it is true, but it is provable too by the Löbian 
entity (machine or divine being). It is the main axiom of the modal logic G 
(and G*).
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 5:46 am
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

 
Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking, 
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic idealism, 
don't you?
 
 

 
 
Yes. I think so.
 

 
 
Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se. Truth is 
not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily wishful thinking. 
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they don't exist.  
 

 
 
Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have still to accept 
their physical existence because they do interfere statistically. If not you 
need a theory like Bohm, with the known difficulties which are insuperable in 
the relativistic domain, or use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a 
dualism, a god playing dice, action at distance, fuzz

Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Jan 2017, at 21:25, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Sounds like a Lôbian device is a necessity, in this facet of the  
MWI? If they don't form naturally, God sets us in motion so we can  
invent them.



If you agree that 2+2=4 and the like, we don't need to invoke (any)  
God. Referential numbers provably exists, and all those having rich  
cognitive abilities, like belieeing in the induction axioms, are  
provably Löbian. God needs only to create the natural numbers, with  
addition and multiplication. But the numbers themselves can only hope  
to be correct.



Moreover, they imply that we get Everett's and Wheeler's universe to  
function by supplying more observers. I am guessing the mightier the  
observer, the more clout they have to change things, split things  
off, etc. Larry Krauss once joked, that astronomers shouldn't peer  
back in time, because they might cause the universe to collapse.


No worry :)

... because there are no universe, only dreams. But below our  
substitution level, the dreams seems to cohere enough to allow long,  
perhaps infinite, sharable "video games", and we extrapolate them into  
"physical universe" (assuming computationalism if this needs to be  
repeated). We can't collapse that. It belongs to a realm which is "out  
of time", "out of space".


Bruno





-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 11:09 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 25 Jan 2017, at 13:17, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Wishful thinking gives a sense of direction,

Wishes can do that.

Wishful thinking leads to believe in things which do not exist, and  
eventually to disarrays and difficulties.




science tells how long it may take to get there.

It can also say if "there" is accessible at all.


To be sure, as I explained sometimes, notably in the second part of  
Sane04, there might be a sort of wishful thinking at the bottom of  
reality, in the sense that if you convince rationally a Löbian  
entity that If ever she believes in Santa Klaus, Santa Klaus exist,  
then she will believe in Santa Klaus. That is actually Löb's  
theorem, but the comparison with wishful thinking, or with the  
placebo, is a bit metaphorical. Löb's theorem is still very amazing.  
The machine rational beliefs are close for the rule


[]p -> p
-
 p

Put in another way: []([]p -> p) -> []p is true about the machine.  
That is Löb's formula (with "[]" put for Gödel's provability  
predicate of the entity). It happens that not only it is true, but  
it is provable too by the Löbian entity (machine or divine being).  
It is the main axiom of the modal logic G (and G*).


Bruno




-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 5:46 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking,  
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic  
idealism, don't you?


Yes. I think so.

Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se.  
Truth is not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily  
wishful thinking.


Bruno




-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they  
don't exist.


Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have  
still to accept their physical existence because they do interfere  
statistically. If not you need a theory like Bohm, with the known  
difficulties which are insuperable in the relativistic domain, or  
use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a dualism, a god  
playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.


Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already  
in arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.


Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe?  
Again, that leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter  
in psychology.




I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land.

This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe  
in (at least one) universe playing a fundamental role ..



Ya got wormholes, I'm interested.

... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question.  
The whole point is that this question (the number of universe) is  
amenable to empirical refutation. With computationalism, to put it  
bluntly: there are zero universe, only a reality emerging from 

Re: Correction to MWI post

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Sounds like a Lôbian device is a necessity, in this facet of the MWI? If they 
don't form naturally, God sets us in motion so we can invent them. Moreover, 
they imply that we get Everett's and Wheeler's universe to function by 
supplying more observers. I am guessing the mightier the observer, the more 
clout they have to change things, split things off, etc. Larry Krauss once 
joked, that astronomers shouldn't peer back in time, because they might cause 
the universe to collapse. 



-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 11:09 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post




On 25 Jan 2017, at 13:17, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


Wishful thinking gives a sense of direction, 


Wishes can do that. 


Wishful thinking leads to believe in things which do not exist, and eventually 
to disarrays and difficulties.






science tells how long it may take to get there.



It can also say if "there" is accessible at all.




To be sure, as I explained sometimes, notably in the second part of Sane04, 
there might be a sort of wishful thinking at the bottom of reality, in the 
sense that if you convince rationally a Löbian entity that If ever she believes 
in Santa Klaus, Santa Klaus exist, then she will believe in Santa Klaus. That 
is actually Löb's theorem, but the comparison with wishful thinking, or with 
the placebo, is a bit metaphorical. Löb's theorem is still very amazing. The 
machine rational beliefs are close for the rule 


[]p -> p
-
 p


Put in another way: []([]p -> p) -> []p is true about the machine. That is 
Löb's formula (with "[]" put for Gödel's provability predicate of the entity). 
It happens that not only it is true, but it is provable too by the Löbian 
entity (machine or divine being). It is the main axiom of the modal logic G 
(and G*).


Bruno




 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 5:46 am
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

 
Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking, 
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic idealism, 
don't you?
 
 

 
 
Yes. I think so.
 

 
 
Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se. Truth is 
not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily wishful thinking. 
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they don't exist.  
 

 
 
Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have still to accept 
their physical existence because they do interfere statistically. If not you 
need a theory like Bohm, with the known difficulties which are insuperable in 
the relativistic domain, or use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a 
dualism, a god playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.
 

 
 
Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already in 
arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.
 

 
 
Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe? Again, that 
leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter in psychology.
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land. 
 
 

 
 
This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe in (at least 
one) universe playing a fundamental role ..
 

 
 
 
 
Ya got wormholes, I'm interested. 
 
 
 

 
 
... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question. The whole 
point is that this question (the number of universe) is amenable to empirical 
refutation. With computationalism, to put it bluntly: there are zero universe, 
only a reality emerging from the first person indeterminacy of the distributed 
subject in infinitely may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer 
science constraints imposed on self-observation.
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
 To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
 Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 
Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.
 
 Brent
 

   
    Forwarded Message 
   
   
Use this MWI  to  access the Aeon article. Sorry
   
 
   
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop r

Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Jan 2017, at 13:17, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


Wishful thinking gives a sense of direction,


Wishes can do that.

Wishful thinking leads to believe in things which do not exist, and  
eventually to disarrays and difficulties.





science tells how long it may take to get there.


It can also say if "there" is accessible at all.


To be sure, as I explained sometimes, notably in the second part of  
Sane04, there might be a sort of wishful thinking at the bottom of  
reality, in the sense that if you convince rationally a Löbian entity  
that If ever she believes in Santa Klaus, Santa Klaus exist, then she  
will believe in Santa Klaus. That is actually Löb's theorem, but the  
comparison with wishful thinking, or with the placebo, is a bit  
metaphorical. Löb's theorem is still very amazing. The machine  
rational beliefs are close for the rule


[]p -> p
-
 p

Put in another way: []([]p -> p) -> []p is true about the machine.  
That is Löb's formula (with "[]" put for Gödel's provability predicate  
of the entity). It happens that not only it is true, but it is  
provable too by the Löbian entity (machine or divine being). It is the  
main axiom of the modal logic G (and G*).


Bruno





-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 5:46 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking,  
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic  
idealism, don't you?


Yes. I think so.

Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se.  
Truth is not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily  
wishful thinking.


Bruno




-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they  
don't exist.


Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have  
still to accept their physical existence because they do interfere  
statistically. If not you need a theory like Bohm, with the known  
difficulties which are insuperable in the relativistic domain, or  
use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a dualism, a god  
playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.


Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already  
in arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.


Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe?  
Again, that leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter  
in psychology.




I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land.

This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe  
in (at least one) universe playing a fundamental role ..



Ya got wormholes, I'm interested.

... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question.  
The whole point is that this question (the number of universe) is  
amenable to empirical refutation. With computationalism, to put it  
bluntly: there are zero universe, only a reality emerging from the  
first person indeterminacy of the distributed subject in infinitely  
may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer science  
constraints imposed on self-observation.


Bruno





-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post

Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.

Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI  to access the Aeon article. Sorry
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Correction to MWI post

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Wishful thinking gives a sense of direction, science tells how long it may take 
to get there.



-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 5:46 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post




On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


 
Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking, 
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic idealism, 
don't you?



Yes. I think so.


Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se. Truth is 
not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily wishful thinking. 


Bruno




 
 
 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they don't exist.  
 

 
 
Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have still to accept 
their physical existence because they do interfere statistically. If not you 
need a theory like Bohm, with the known difficulties which are insuperable in 
the relativistic domain, or use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a 
dualism, a god playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.
 

 
 
Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already in 
arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.
 

 
 
Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe? Again, that 
leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter in psychology.
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land. 
 
 

 
 
This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe in (at least 
one) universe playing a fundamental role ..
 

 
 
 
 
Ya got wormholes, I'm interested. 
 
 
 

 
 
... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question. The whole 
point is that this question (the number of universe) is amenable to empirical 
refutation. With computationalism, to put it bluntly: there are zero universe, 
only a reality emerging from the first person indeterminacy of the distributed 
subject in infinitely may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer 
science constraints imposed on self-observation.
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
 To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
 Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 
Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.
 
 Brent
 

   
    Forwarded Message 
   
   
Use this MWI  to  access the Aeon article. Sorry
   
 
   
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
 
 
 
 
  


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 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
 
 
 
  
 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 


 
 
 
 
 
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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Jan 2017, at 07:35, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 1/24/2017 8:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Jan 2017, at 20:45, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 1/23/2017 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jan 2017, at 21:39, Brent Meeker wrote:


Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.



It can make sense in a non mechanist theory of mind, but ...  
where is that theory? Where is the "Heisenberg cut". (I have not  
yet complete the reading of that note, though).


The MWI is not born with Everett, but with the Einstein/Bohr  
debate, and eventually with von Neuman collapse of the wave  
theory. The collapse of the wave is just a very mysterious  
happening, contradicting the SWE,


Born postulated the probability interpretation of the wave- 
function in order to give it empirical content.  It doesn't  
"contradict" anything - it adds a way to get observables from the  
SWE.


No problem with this. I am OK with interpreting Bohr that way, but  
in his correspondence with Einstein, it is not clear if he still  
not believe in the collapse of the wave, which is essentially what  
Einstein dislikes, as it the collapse, and the collapse only, when  
considered as a physical happening, which introduces a physical  
indeterminacy and non-locality, which made no sense in Einstein's  
mind.






and invented to suppress the many-worlds which are implied by the  
SWE.


It's questionable whether they are implied.  To be "a world" means  
to be a classical world.


You take the word "world" too much seriously.


You are the one who uses modal logic, which depends on Kripke's idea  
of worlds.



That makes my point, because the world of Kripke are only element of a  
set on which a binary relation is defined. Kripke and modal world can  
represent anything (real worlds, imaginary worlds, situations,  
computer states, dreams, computations, or abstract elements use only  
to find logical counter-examples. They are not "world" in any physical  
or metaphysical sense a priori. Just mathematical tool, which can be  
used in metaphysics, depending on our metaphysical or theological  
assumption. In Solovay's proof, the world of the Kripke semantics are  
numbers, and are not conceive as anything looking like a world.






I am not sure there is any "classical world", except for the  
ultimate reality (like a standard model of PA, or SK, ...).  
Classicality is still only a local view developed by a local  
observer.


That's a solipists definition.  The point of classicality is that it  
allows intersubjective agreement between observers.



That is the notion of first person plural, and it does not lead to a  
classical logic. Classical logic is handy for intersubjective  
agreement, but other logic can be handy too, even mandatory in some  
context, like the machine observation context.






There is no world at all, if we assume mechanism. A "world" is a  
subjective construct by a universal number embedded in infinitely  
many computations, and the logic pertaining of what the machine can  
predict *cannot* be classical logic, below the substitution level,  
and can be classical locally above the substitution level, assuming  
the brain works classically.




As Bohr realized having a classical world in which records were  
permanent and sharable was essential.


Essential for its dualistic view where the observers are no more  
described by quantum mechanics.


Essential in order to do science, to repeat experiments, compare  
results, to have beliefs...etc.


The very existence of Everett formulation of QM, or even von Neumann  
contradicts this, it seems to me. QM obeys classical logic. Everett  
made the physical reality quite classical, with an explanation why  
observations looks like not obeying classical logic. Bohr too, but  
only by making QM wrong for the macro and/or observer, and that  
dualism is incompatible with computationalism, if not any monistic  
science.







When Everett try to explain his monistic universal wave theory to  
Bohr, Bohr told him that the conversation was terminated.


Bohr was in his late 70's and probably didn't understand Everett's  
idea.


OK.







Although there are suggestive arguments no one has yet shown how  
classical worlds are implied by QM.


I don't think there are classical physical worlds. Only a classical  
immaterial mind, which is the mind of the universal machine looking  
at its own functionning just above its substitution level.


?? How can a mind have a substitution level.  What do you substitute  
for thoughts?


The substitution level of a mind is the substitution level of the  
program which implements it. Wherever the machine will look below that  
level, the machine will "see" an infinity of different universal  
system/computations. That follows from the first six steps of the UD  
argument/paradox.







The laws of thought are classical (Boole), but with mechanism this  
implies that the laws of physics cannot be classical,


Why not?


Because by 

Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking,  
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic  
idealism, don't you?


Yes. I think so.

Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se.  
Truth is not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily wishful  
thinking.


Bruno





-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they  
don't exist.


Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have  
still to accept their physical existence because they do interfere  
statistically. If not you need a theory like Bohm, with the known  
difficulties which are insuperable in the relativistic domain, or  
use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a dualism, a god  
playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.


Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already  
in arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.


Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe?  
Again, that leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter  
in psychology.




I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land.

This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe  
in (at least one) universe playing a fundamental role ..



Ya got wormholes, I'm interested.

... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question.  
The whole point is that this question (the number of universe) is  
amenable to empirical refutation. With computationalism, to put it  
bluntly: there are zero universe, only a reality emerging from the  
first person indeterminacy of the distributed subject in infinitely  
may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer science  
constraints imposed on self-observation.


Bruno





-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post

Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.

Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI  to access the Aeon article. Sorry
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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/24/2017 8:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Jan 2017, at 20:45, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 1/23/2017 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jan 2017, at 21:39, Brent Meeker wrote:


Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.



It can make sense in a non mechanist theory of mind, but ... where 
is that theory? Where is the "Heisenberg cut". (I have not yet 
complete the reading of that note, though).


The MWI is not born with Everett, but with the Einstein/Bohr debate, 
and eventually with von Neuman collapse of the wave theory. The 
collapse of the wave is just a very mysterious happening, 
contradicting the SWE,


Born postulated the probability interpretation of the wave-function 
in order to give it empirical content.  It doesn't "contradict" 
anything - it adds a way to get observables from the SWE.


No problem with this. I am OK with interpreting Bohr that way, but in 
his correspondence with Einstein, it is not clear if he still not 
believe in the collapse of the wave, which is essentially what 
Einstein dislikes, as it the collapse, and the collapse only, when 
considered as a physical happening, which introduces a physical 
indeterminacy and non-locality, which made no sense in Einstein's mind.







and invented to suppress the many-worlds which are implied by the SWE.


It's questionable whether they are implied.  To be "a world" means to 
be a classical world.


You take the word "world" too much seriously.


You are the one who uses modal logic, which depends on Kripke's idea of 
worlds.


I am not sure there is any "classical world", except for the ultimate 
reality (like a standard model of PA, or SK, ...). Classicality is 
still only a local view developed by a local observer.


That's a solipists definition.  The point of classicality is that it 
allows intersubjective agreement between observers.


There is no world at all, if we assume mechanism. A "world" is a 
subjective construct by a universal number embedded in infinitely many 
computations, and the logic pertaining of what the machine can predict 
*cannot* be classical logic, below the substitution level, and can be 
classical locally above the substitution level, assuming the brain 
works classically.




As Bohr realized having a classical world in which records were 
permanent and sharable was essential.


Essential for its dualistic view where the observers are no more 
described by quantum mechanics.


Essential in order to do science, to repeat experiments, compare 
results, to have beliefs...etc.


When Everett try to explain his monistic universal wave theory to 
Bohr, Bohr told him that the conversation was terminated.


Bohr was in his late 70's and probably didn't understand Everett's idea.




Although there are suggestive arguments no one has yet shown how 
classical worlds are implied by QM.


I don't think there are classical physical worlds. Only a classical 
immaterial mind, which is the mind of the universal machine looking at 
its own functionning just above its substitution level.


?? How can a mind have a substitution level.  What do you substitute for 
thoughts?


The laws of thought are classical (Boole), but with mechanism this 
implies that the laws of physics cannot be classical,


Why not?

except for high  level description, and that is only a useful 
practical simplification.


I think you said it yourself once. It seems you have explained 
sometimes ago that we have only "quasi classical" worlds. I prefer to 
use "consistent histories" à-la Omnes and Griffith, which are closer 
to the machine's computation notion.


Consistent histories are based on projection operators which "collapse" 
the wave function.


Brent

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Re: Correction to MWI post

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking, 
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic idealism, 
don't you?
 
 
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post




On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they don't exist.  


Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have still to accept 
their physical existence because they do interfere statistically. If not you 
need a theory like Bohm, with the known difficulties which are insuperable in 
the relativistic domain, or use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a 
dualism, a god playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.


Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already in 
arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.


Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe? Again, that 
leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter in psychology.






I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land. 



This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe in (at least 
one) universe playing a fundamental role ..




 
Ya got wormholes, I'm interested. 




... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question. The whole 
point is that this question (the number of universe) is amenable to empirical 
refutation. With computationalism, to put it bluntly: there are zero universe, 
only a reality emerging from the first person indeterminacy of the distributed 
subject in infinitely may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer 
science constraints imposed on self-observation.


Bruno






 
 
 
-Original Message-
 From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
 To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
 Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 
Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.
 
 Brent
 

   
    Forwarded Message 
   
   
Use this MWI  to  access the Aeon article. Sorry
   
 
   
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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jan 2017, at 20:45, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 1/23/2017 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jan 2017, at 21:39, Brent Meeker wrote:


Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.



It can make sense in a non mechanist theory of mind, but ... where  
is that theory? Where is the "Heisenberg cut". (I have not yet  
complete the reading of that note, though).


The MWI is not born with Everett, but with the Einstein/Bohr  
debate, and eventually with von Neuman collapse of the wave theory.  
The collapse of the wave is just a very mysterious happening,  
contradicting the SWE,


Born postulated the probability interpretation of the wave-function  
in order to give it empirical content.  It doesn't "contradict"  
anything - it adds a way to get observables from the SWE.


No problem with this. I am OK with interpreting Bohr that way, but in  
his correspondence with Einstein, it is not clear if he still not  
believe in the collapse of the wave, which is essentially what  
Einstein dislikes, as it the collapse, and the collapse only, when  
considered as a physical happening, which introduces a physical  
indeterminacy and non-locality, which made no sense in Einstein's mind.






and invented to suppress the many-worlds which are implied by the  
SWE.


It's questionable whether they are implied.  To be "a world" means  
to be a classical world.


You take the word "world" too much seriously. I am not sure there is  
any "classical world", except for the ultimate reality (like a  
standard model of PA, or SK, ...). Classicality is still only a local  
view developed by a local observer. There is no world at all, if we  
assume mechanism. A "world" is a subjective construct by a universal  
number embedded in infinitely many computations, and the logic  
pertaining of what the machine can predict *cannot* be classical  
logic, below the substitution level, and can be classical locally  
above the substitution level, assuming the brain works classically.




As Bohr realized having a classical world in which records were  
permanent and sharable was essential.


Essential for its dualistic view where the observers are no more  
described by quantum mechanics. When Everett try to explain his  
monistic universal wave theory to Bohr, Bohr told him that the  
conversation was terminated.



Although there are suggestive arguments no one has yet shown how  
classical worlds are implied by QM.


I don't think there are classical physical worlds. Only a classical  
immaterial mind, which is the mind of the universal machine looking at  
its own functionning just above its substitution level. The laws of  
thought are classical (Boole), but with mechanism this implies that  
the laws of physics cannot be classical, except for high  level  
description, and that is only a useful practical simplification.


I think you said it yourself once. It seems you have explained  
sometimes ago that we have only "quasi classical" worlds. I prefer to  
use "consistent histories" à-la Omnes and Griffith, which are closer  
to the machine's computation notion.


Bruno






Brent

The non-many-world theory is just the theory saying that quantum  
mechanics is false, that it does not apply to "me". It is the  
coquetry of the one who want to be one and only one. But it is  
consistent (which is cheap) and possible in case the brain does not  
act like a machine, but that is, in this context, a highly  
speculative assumption making everything more complicated. It is  
never a good idea to make a theory more complex to favor one's  
religious belief, like the belief is a unique physical universe.


Bruno





Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI  to access the Aeon article. Sorry

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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jan 2017, at 20:26, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 1/23/2017 3:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they  
don't exist.


Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have  
still to accept their physical existence because they do interfere  
statistically


But does your theory predict linearity?  and why linearity of  
complex valued vectors?



Probably. To prove this would require more research on the logic of  
the material points of view/hypostases. Up to now we have a ver  
special quantum logic, and I hope others will be able to find the  
equivalent of "Gleason theorem". Then we will get the unique measure,  
and the structure already proved for them (the material hypostases)  
suggests we will obtain the linearity of evolution.


To get the linearity of the tensor product, we need first to extract  
the tensor product.
That this is possible is suggested by some quantum logicians, for some  
quantum logic, but there is a lot of work to do, without doubt.


The unicity of the measure, if the quantum logics are close enough to  
some standard quantum logic, would impose the Hilbert or the von  
Neumann type of quantum logic(s) which will explain the need of the  
complex numbers.


The point is that if a version of classical computationalism is true,  
then, assuming quantum mechanics true, we *have to extract* it from  
the machine's observable theory. That we get already quantum logical  
structure just illustrates how to proceed, but the task is big.  
Obviously such program will take some time before completion.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Brent Meeker]

Sure, but then you still need to explain how an apparently classical 
world obtains.


And of course it's quite possible QM does not provide an exact 
description of Nature since attempts to quantize gravity run into problems.


Brent

On 1/23/2017 12:02 PM, smitra wrote:
Truly classical worlds cannot arise from QM, it's simply not possible 
for the description of Nature in terms of a Hilbert space to somehow 
reduce (in an exact sense) to a classical phase space. So, this whole 
idea of a classical World at some macroscopic scale is not going to 
work, unless you assume that QM does not provide for an exact 
description of Nature.


Saibal


On 23-01-2017 20:45, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 1/23/2017 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jan 2017, at 21:39, Brent Meeker wrote:


Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.


It can make sense in a non mechanist theory of mind, but ... where
is that theory? Where is the "Heisenberg cut". (I have not yet
complete the reading of that note, though).

The MWI is not born with Everett, but with the Einstein/Bohr debate,
and eventually with von Neuman collapse of the wave theory. The
collapse of the wave is just a very mysterious happening,
contradicting the SWE,


 Born postulated the probability interpretation of the wave-function
in order to give it empirical content.  It doesn't "contradict"
anything - it adds a way to get observables from the SWE.


and invented to suppress the many-worlds which are implied by the
SWE.


 It's questionable whether they are implied.  To be "a world" means to
be a classical world.  As Bohr realized having a classical world in
which records were permanent and sharable was essential. Although
there are suggestive arguments no one has yet shown how classical
worlds are implied by QM.

 Brent


The non-many-world theory is just the theory saying that quantum
mechanics is false, that it does not apply to "me". It is the
coquetry of the one who want to be one and only one. But it is
consistent (which is cheap) and possible in case the brain does not
act like a machine, but that is, in this context, a highly
speculative assumption making everything more complicated. It is
never a good idea to make a theory more complex to favor one's
religious belief, like the belief is a unique physical universe.

Bruno


Brent

 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI [1] to access the Aeon article. Sorry

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https://aeon.co/essays/is-the-many-worlds-hypothesis-just-a-fantasy?utm_source=Aeon+Newsletterutm_campaign=3700115874-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_01_19utm_medium=emailutm_term=0_411a82e59d-3700115874-69456137 


[2] https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
[3] https://groups.google.com/d/optout
[4] http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/




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Re: Correction to MWI post

[smitra]

Truly classical worlds cannot arise from QM, it's simply not possible 
for the description of Nature in terms of a Hilbert space to somehow 
reduce (in an exact sense) to a classical phase space. So, this whole 
idea of a classical World at some macroscopic scale is not going to 
work, unless you assume that QM does not provide for an exact 
description of Nature.


Saibal


On 23-01-2017 20:45, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 1/23/2017 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jan 2017, at 21:39, Brent Meeker wrote:


Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.


It can make sense in a non mechanist theory of mind, but ... where
is that theory? Where is the "Heisenberg cut". (I have not yet
complete the reading of that note, though).

The MWI is not born with Everett, but with the Einstein/Bohr debate,
and eventually with von Neuman collapse of the wave theory. The
collapse of the wave is just a very mysterious happening,
contradicting the SWE,


 Born postulated the probability interpretation of the wave-function
in order to give it empirical content.  It doesn't "contradict"
anything - it adds a way to get observables from the SWE.


and invented to suppress the many-worlds which are implied by the
SWE.


 It's questionable whether they are implied.  To be "a world" means to
be a classical world.  As Bohr realized having a classical world in
which records were permanent and sharable was essential.  Although
there are suggestive arguments no one has yet shown how classical
worlds are implied by QM.

 Brent


The non-many-world theory is just the theory saying that quantum
mechanics is false, that it does not apply to "me". It is the
coquetry of the one who want to be one and only one. But it is
consistent (which is cheap) and possible in case the brain does not
act like a machine, but that is, in this context, a highly
speculative assumption making everything more complicated. It is
never a good idea to make a theory more complex to favor one's
religious belief, like the belief is a unique physical universe.

Bruno


Brent

 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI [1] to access the Aeon article. Sorry

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Links:
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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/23/2017 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jan 2017, at 21:39, Brent Meeker wrote:


Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.



It can make sense in a non mechanist theory of mind, but ... where is 
that theory? Where is the "Heisenberg cut". (I have not yet complete 
the reading of that note, though).


The MWI is not born with Everett, but with the Einstein/Bohr debate, 
and eventually with von Neuman collapse of the wave theory. The 
collapse of the wave is just a very mysterious happening, 
contradicting the SWE,


Born postulated the probability interpretation of the wave-function in 
order to give it empirical content.  It doesn't "contradict" anything - 
it adds a way to get observables from the SWE.



and invented to suppress the many-worlds which are implied by the SWE.


It's questionable whether they are implied.  To be "a world" means to be 
a classical world.  As Bohr realized having a classical world in which 
records were permanent and sharable was essential. Although there are 
suggestive arguments no one has yet shown how classical worlds are 
implied by QM.


Brent

The non-many-world theory is just the theory saying that quantum 
mechanics is false, that it does not apply to "me". It is the coquetry 
of the one who want to be one and only one. But it is consistent 
(which is cheap) and possible in case the brain does not act like a 
machine, but that is, in this context, a highly speculative assumption 
making everything more complicated. It is never a good idea to make a 
theory more complex to favor one's religious belief, like the belief 
is a unique physical universe.


Bruno





Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI 
 
to access the Aeon article. Sorry


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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/23/2017 3:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they don't 
exist. 


Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have still 
to accept their physical existence because they do interfere statistically


But does your theory predict linearity?  and why linearity of 
/*complex*/ valued vectors?


Brent

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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Jan 2017, at 21:39, Brent Meeker wrote:


Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.



It can make sense in a non mechanist theory of mind, but ... where is  
that theory? Where is the "Heisenberg cut". (I have not yet complete  
the reading of that note, though).


The MWI is not born with Everett, but with the Einstein/Bohr debate,  
and eventually with von Neuman collapse of the wave theory. The  
collapse of the wave is just a very mysterious happening,  
contradicting the SWE, and invented to suppress the many-worlds which  
are implied by the SWE. The non-many-world theory is just the theory  
saying that quantum mechanics is false, that it does not apply to  
"me". It is the coquetry of the one who want to be one and only one.  
But it is consistent (which is cheap) and possible in case the brain  
does not act like a machine, but that is, in this context, a highly  
speculative assumption making everything more complicated. It is never  
a good idea to make a theory more complex to favor one's religious  
belief, like the belief is a unique physical universe.


Bruno





Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI  to access the Aeon article. Sorry

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they  
don't exist.


Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have still  
to accept their physical existence because they do interfere  
statistically. If not you need a theory like Bohm, with the known  
difficulties which are insuperable in the relativistic domain, or use  
the collapse of the wave, which leads to a dualism, a god playing  
dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.


Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already in  
arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.


Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe? Again,  
that leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter in  
psychology.





I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land.


This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe in  
(at least one) universe playing a fundamental role ..




Ya got wormholes, I'm interested.


... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question.  
The whole point is that this question (the number of universe) is  
amenable to empirical refutation. With computationalism, to put it  
bluntly: there are zero universe, only a reality emerging from the  
first person indeterminacy of the distributed subject in infinitely  
may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer science  
constraints imposed on self-observation.


Bruno






-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post

Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.

Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI  to access the Aeon article. Sorry
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Correction to MWI post

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they don't exist. 
I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land. 
Ya got wormholes, I'm interested. 



-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post


Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.

Brent


  
   Forwarded Message 
  
  
Use this MWI  to  access the Aeon article. Sorry
  

  
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Fwd: Correction to MWI post

[Brent Meeker]

Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.

Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Use this MWI 
 
to access the Aeon article. Sorry


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